
The soft power behind the throne: Charting and comparing parliamentary monarchies from a public administration perspective



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Preface

This thesis is the concluding chapter of both my bachelor's program and my time in general at Tilburg University. It was an incredibly educational part of my life, in an academic and a social sense. Now, the time has come for the next step at Leiden University, where I will pursue an MSc degree in Public Administration, via the International and European Governance track. This thesis will hopefully provide me with the degree of Bachelor of Science to be able to start aforementioned track.

Monarchy is a topic that has long been of personal interest to me as a seeming anachronism in our modern society, which nevertheless exerts a certain intangible charm. Whatever one's opinion on the institution, one thing is certain: it has provided a lot of colourful characters throughout history, a natural consequence of the luck of the draw providing countries with their head of state.

The process of writing this thesis was not easy and certainly not short. During the past few years, I had to deal with faltering health and impactful events in the personal sphere. It fills me with relief that I have been able to complete my thesis at long last. For their support, I would like to extend my gratitude towards a few people. First, I wish to express my heartfelt thanks to my thesis supervisor Rob Pranger for his valuable advice, kind understanding and limitless patience. I am also very thankful towards my parents and brother, Geert, Willeke and Michiel, for their unwavering support and words of motivation. Not to forget any members of the family, it must be mentioned that walks with my dog Beatle were essential for clearing my head in between reading and writing. Special thanks go out to my friends Boris Kox, Jaap Gipmans and Sander Van de Ven for providing me with valuable feedback through their peer reviews. I would also like to thank Boris for providing me with all the coffee and biscuits one could wish for.

I hope those reading this thesis will find it enlightening and inspiring.

Jules Arts, 12 July 2021

Chapter 1: Introduction

§1.1: Introductory context

"The whole world is in revolt. Soon there will be only five Kings left: the King of England, the King of Spades, the King of Clubs, the King of Hearts and the King of Diamonds". These words were spoken by King Farouk of Egypt in 1948, four years before the coup that cost him his throne (Knowles, 2008). The monarch's prediction has turned out to be false. As of June 2021, 44 of the 195 states of the world are monarchies (CIA, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2021). This leaves a considerable number of countries led by a crowned head of state.

Not only are these monarchies still in existence, they remain visible societal institutions. According to Duxbury (2020), this has recently been exemplified during the ongoing Covid-19 crisis. Televised messages from the Kings and Queens of Europe were broadcast, in which citizens were urged to follow government advice and behave responsibly. The Emperor of Japan followed suit in early 2021 by voicing his concerns and sympathies with regard to the crisis (Sim, 2021). In Europe at least, these actions elicited mixed responses, ranging from praise for the monarchs assuming a 'uniting role' to criticism for an 'antiquated institution' imposing itself on the people (Duxbury, 2020).

Regardless of the contrarian views on monarchy, it is clear that royalty continue to play important societal roles. One way to characterise and delineate this role, is by looking at the soft power of monarchy. The British monarchy is characterised as a safeguard against political extremes by standing above politics: "whatever the skulduggery that goes on at one end of the Mall, at the other we can be sure of the enduring soft power of the monarchy" (The Spectator, 2021). This soft power held by the United Kingdom's royalty is confirmed by Hill and Beadle (2014), who point to the splendour of the British court and the personal popularity of Queen Elizabeth II strengthening this power. Monarchy's use of soft power is not a recent phenomenon. The Dutch monarchy, after losing its absolute power in the first half of the nineteenth century, embraced its soft power in order to survive. Queen Emma purposefully undertook royal tours from the 1890s onwards to build the institution's soft power (Kleijn, 2018). It becomes clear that there is a lurking connection between monarchy on the one hand and soft power on the other, historically developed and continuing into the present day, which warrants further exploration.

§1.2: Problem statement and research goal

§1.2.1: Problem statement

The issue underlying and worsening monarchy's ambiguous role in today's world, and the turbid debate that role leads to, is that "no new political theory on this topic has been developed since Bagehot wrote about the monarchy in *The English Constitution* (1867)" (Hazell & Morris, 2020, p. 4). Therefore, as interesting as it would be, the aim is not to delve into the normative debate between monarchists and republicans by presenting and assessing arguments. Not only is there a lack of research in the area of political science, there is a severe lack of academic inquiry into the subject of monarchy in general. Whereas libraries can be filled with historical works on monarchies, several scholars point out the understudied nature of the subject of twenty-first century royalty. In the area of culture it receives: "an astonishingly modest amount of academic attention" according to Jordan and Polland (2020, p. 10), who pioneered the topics of royalty in literature, theatre, cinema and popular culture. The relationship between monarchies and the European Union is characterised by Jessurun d'Oliveira (2012, p. 64) as "a neglected topic". Turner (2011) even points out a certain disdain and insensitivity to the mood of the country among academics when it comes to royal events such as weddings. What these examples make clear is that monarchy is an area of academic research waiting to be filled, at least partially due to the irrelevance perceived by (academic) analysts as opposed to the relevance perceived by the broader public (Turner, 2011). This perception stands in contrast to the changed environment monarchies operate in, the influence of the European Union being an example.

The political research that has been conducted on monarchy is heavily skewed in favour of ruling and constitutional monarchies (Stepan, Linz & Minoves, 2014). Thus, what is needed is a broader and deeper basis of knowledge on constitutional monarchies and, particularly, on parliamentary monarchies, which is confirmed by Gerring et al. (2020, p. 33): "There is much that we do not understand about this under-studied regime type. … We need to know more about variation across different types of monarchies, including those with different rules of succession and those that evolved into constitutional monarchies".

A first step in this direction has been taken by Hazell and Morris (2020, p.269), who have endeavoured to construct a comprehensive political theory on monarchy for the twenty-first century. In the words of Ginsburg (2020, p. 1535): "To say that monarchy has received too little attention in the field of comparative constitutional law is to engage in understatement". Hazell and Morris (2020) focus on several areas to chart the variation between the parliamentary monarchies, where the monarch serves in a mostly ceremonial capacity, of Europe: the seven kingdoms and the one grand duchy that remain. Three of these areas are so-called monarchical functions, regarding the most fundamental characteristics of the monarchies. They are the constitutional, political and ceremonial functions. The three functions and accompanying subfunctions are displayed in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1

The three monarchical functions and subfunctions

Constitutional functions	**Political functions**	**Ceremonial functions**
Appointing and dismissing ministers	Weekly meeting with prime minister	Coronation
Summoning and dissolving parliament	Chairing the Council of State	Religious test
Royal assent to legislation	Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions	Opens legislature (usually including a speech)
Immunity of monarch, accountability of ministers	Appointment of senior officials, including judges	Christmas/New Year message or similar
Oath to observe the constitution	Receiving ambassadors	State religion

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from *The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchies Compared* (pp. 20-21, 64-65, 100-101), by R. Hazell and B. Morris (Eds.), 2020, Oxford, United Kingdom: Hart. Copyright 2020 by Hart.

Hazell and Morris (2020) thus only look into and compare the parliamentary monarchies of Europe, which raises the question what the situation is like in the non-European parliamentary monarchies of the world, of which there are dozens (CIA, 2021), and how they compare, in terms of variation on the three monarchical functions, to their European counterparts. Figure 1.1 displays the described position of monarchy in existing research, from the specific knowledge gap underlying this thesis to the gaps it is based on.




Figure 1.1. The state of affairs for (knowledge lacunes on) monarchy in academic literature, from specific to broad.

As stated, modern monarchy is associated with soft power. For instance, Hill and Beadle (2014) include the monarchy as an asset of soft power for the United Kingdom, a state resource with an international reach. Their definition of soft power lines up with Hayden's (2012), in that it is about obtaining outcomes without using coercion, but rather through "attraction and co-option". However, it is never specified what these two terms entail for the soft power of the monarchy. Overall, the concept of soft power suffers from a lack of a precise definition, leading to difficulties with applicability and operationalisation, according to Ohnesorge (2020, p. 16), who even calls it confusing. Specifically, he points to two research gaps for soft power, present "despite the vast amount of literature dealing with the phenomenon". He states, firstly, that the nature of the concept remains unclear and, secondly, that empirical studies of policy examples and limitations are needed. In the words of Gallarotti (2015, p. 245), referring to soft power and its components: "Yet with all this scholarly attention, the concepts have evolved little theoretically, and their historical applications have been limited and far from rigorously executed".

This general vagueness of soft power creates a need to clarify the concept, something this thesis will make a modest contribution to, by exploring the link between soft power and monarchy (possessing it), a connection easily made (Hill & Beadle, 2014), yet unclear in its precise workings. Soft power theory is usually entrenched in works on international affairs (Ohnesorge, 2020). It will, through this thesis, be lifted out of that framework. This has the aim of testing whether soft power terms and concepts, usually limited to international relations literature, can be used in research on domestic issues. Through this, (part of) answers to Ohnesorge's (2020) research gaps for soft power, posed above, can be formulated.

Examining and comparing the constitutional, political and ceremonial functions of the parliamentary monarchies, can provide an indication of the amount of soft power these parliamentary monarchies still possess. This examination will be done through existing descriptions of the European cases and new descriptions for the non-European ones. As noted by Hazell and Morris (2020, p. 271), despite heavy constraints, parliamentary monarchs "can develop influence through Bagehot's trio of rights, the right to be consulted, to encourage and to warn". Hazell and Morris (2020, p. 271) note, in this regard, that the monarch has the potential to encourage and support the prime minister. Still, overall "we can never know the full extent of a monarch's influence" (Hazell & Morris, 2020, p. 271).

The vagueness of both soft power and the extent of a monarch's influence provides a challenging starting point. Yet, it is precisely this blurriness providing a 'double' knowledge gap. The lack of knowledge on the variation on the functions of parliamentary monarchies, combined with the lack of knowledge on the nature of and empirical workings of soft power, lead to a composite knowledge lacune concerning the extent to which and the way in which monarchical functions provide parliamentary monarchies with soft power . The structure of the three 'subgaps', leading to the composite final knowledge lacune underlying this thesis, is displayed in Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2. The knowledge lacune underlying this thesis, with the 'subgaps' upon which it is based.

Despite the aforementioned conceptual issues, several categories of soft power have been formulated, providing the justification for the assumption that the three monarchical functions give indications of a monarch's soft power. In his taxonomy of soft power, Ohnesorge (2020) distinguishes between active and passive soft power as an overarching differentiation. Within the active category, the author provides a causal scheme between actors A and B to clarify the process of active soft power. The theoretical framework contains further explication and defence of how Hazell and Morris' (2020) three functions fit into Ohnesorge's (2020) framework.

This thesis thus constitutes a comparison of the world's parliamentary monarchies, based on both existing (for Europe) and new (for the rest of the world) descriptions of the respective constitutional, political and ceremonial functions. This comparison enables conclusions to be drawn on the variation across the non-European monarchies and between those monarchies on the one hand and the European ones on the other. In turn, the noted variation leads to conclusions on the extent of soft power held and wielded by the parliamentary monarchies and reflections on the value of soft power for research on monarchies and vice versa.
The relevant supporting disciplines of public administration, the field for which this work has been written, are linked to the relevant factors to be used for the analysis. Thus, the thesis can serve as a basis for the topic of monarchy, and particularly the current state of affairs in the parliamentary monarchies, for scholars of public administration. This also paves the way for further research on explaining the reasons why monarchies vary as they do.

§1.2.2. Research goal

The goal of the research conducted for this thesis is mostly explorative. Explorative research concerns topics for which there is little to no knowledge available (Van Thiel, 2015). This is in line with the problem statement, in that there is little knowledge on, firstly, the variation between the functions of parliamentary monarchies and, secondly, the nature and workings of soft power. Charting the extent to which these monarchies possess soft power, which constitutes the final knowledge lacune, thus requires explorative research, which will lead to detailed empirical descriptions of the functions of the parliamentary monarchies (Van Thiel, 2015). Explorative research is, as pointed out by Van Thiel (2015), additionally used to investigate how a certain theoretical concept is interpreted and used in practice. This element is present in the thesis as well, because of the concept of soft power. The nature and workings of this concept are, as mentioned, unclear. The empirical research on monarchies aids not only in broadening knowledge on the topic in general, but also in lifting soft power out of its theoretical surroundings and in understanding how it is interpreted and used in practice.

In the sense that the thesis works from the assumption that the three monarchical functions are useful indicators for the extent to which parliamentary monarchies possess soft power, a testing element is present as well. It will be tested whether these functions are truly useful for this purpose and to what extent. Testing research is about expectations being formulated preceding the actual research, based on theory.

These expectations can concern characteristics or causes of a given topic. Using a basis of comparison is not, as pointed out by Van Thiel (2015), part of the research goal but will rather serve as a method to describe and provide insight into the world's parliamentary monarchies.

§1.3: Research question

The main question that this work aims to provide an answer to is as follows:
To what extent do parliamentary monarchies possess soft power, when assessed by the variation on their constitutional, political and ceremonial functions?

In order to be able to answer the main question, it is necessary to formulate a few sub-questions:

- *What is meant with parliamentary monarchy?*
- *What is meant with constitutional, political and ceremonial functions?*
- *What is meant with soft power?*
- *What are the constitutional, political and ceremonial functions of the parliamentary monarchies?*
- *How do the parliamentary monarchies vary on the three functions?*

§1.4: Scientific and societal relevance

§1.4.1: Scientific relevance

This thesis is scientifically relevant because it partially closes the specific knowledge gap concerning the relationship between parliamentary monarchies and soft power. It aids in exploring the hitherto heavily underexamined link between monarchy and soft power and tests its merits. Through that, the thesis clarifies the understanding of the concept of soft power both theoretically and in practice. It also aids in placing soft power in a broader scope than international relations alone. As mentioned, it is written for the academic field of public administration. It provides scholars of that field with a solid starting point for further research on monarchy, soft power and on explaining the reasons for monarchical variation. The thesis also provides a basis for further research on the link between Therefore, it must be entrenched within that realm of research. Public administration is characterised by its multi-disciplinarity. It relies on a number of principal disciplines of dominant social sciences, such as economics, law, political science and sociology (Uwizeyimana & Basheka, 2017).

Most works on autocratic monarchies are political science publications, with Gerring et al. (2020) constituting an example. As an entry in a comparative public law series, the work of Hazell and Morris (2020) can be placed in the field of constitutional law, obviously in particular for constitutional functions. For the political functions, it lines up more with the field of political science. As far as ceremonial functions are concerned, there is also a sociological relevance at play.

As pointed out by Macionis, Peper and van der Leun (2014), religious rituals and symbols play a role in uniting society and in modern secular countries, a quasi-religious patriotism has largely usurped that role. Monarchical ceremonies, often of a religious nature or at least origin, fulfil this role as well. As a broad concept about decision-making, power is of relevance to public administration in general (McKinney & Howard, 1998). It is a concept of particular significance to the supporting field of political science, as a basic political concept (Hague & Harrop, 2013). With that, the form of power called soft power is also of relevance to the field and thus, to public administration.

§1.4.2: Societal relevance

It is clear that public opinion about (the continued existence of) monarchy differs from country to country. The debate about which form of state a country should have concerns an important fundamental question, touching upon the importance of national institutions as "the pillars of order in politics, as the structures that lend the polity its integrity, facilitate its routine operation and produce continuity in the face of potentially destabilising forces". (Hague & Harrop, 2013, p. 79). Yet, as Hazell and Morris (2020) point out, this debate is more often than not characterised by contradictory expectations and assumptions. On the one hand, royals represent an often very old institution of great symbolic importance surrounded by glamour. On the other, they are expected to be approachable, ordinary and down to earth and in line with modern ideas. As put by Jordan and Polland (2020, p.15): "those remaining monarchies … have to renegotiate their places between the institutions' histories and traditions on the one hand and (post-)modern political, social, and medial environments on the other". Modern monarchies have to get by in primarily democratic and meritocratic spheres of influence, while a number of them are also affected by the European Union limiting their sovereignty (Jessurun d'Oliveira, 2012). Some of the monarchies must deal with separatism, the primary example being the Catalan case in Spain (Minder, 2019). It depends on one's political leanings how one judges a monarchy's preservation versus its abolition. Additionally, a better understanding of the concept of soft power is of societal relevance as well. As put by Ohnesorge (2020, p. 2): "socially relevant research offers new approaches for the understanding of certain political or social issues for policy-makers and the public alike". The contrasting views on monarchy, combined with the vague foundations (including the soft power aspect) of the important debate on the matter bestow societal relevance upon this thesis, which will aid in lifting the fog hanging over the topic.

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

§2.1: Defining parliamentary monarchy

Middleton (2005) states that monarchy as a form of state has existed throughout human history and in all parts of the world, although there has always been a lot of variation in the size and significance of monarchies, the histories of its dynasties and the powers and behaviours of its monarchs. Hague and Harrop (2013) characterise the difference between monarchies and republics by looking at how the head of state is selected: either through inheritance in the former or through election in the latter. Nuancing this, Crabb (1978) points to the importance of what a state proclaims itself to be. Even if de facto hereditary succession takes place in a country, as was the case in Haiti, self-categorising as a republic proves conclusive for both internal and external classifications (Crabb, 1978). The reverse is true for certain monarchies, such as Andorra, where no inheritance takes place. This nation is consistently included in lists of monarchies, because Andorra proclaims itself to be a principality (CIA, 2021). Taking this principle of self-proclamation into account, 44 of the world's sovereign states are generally regarded as monarchies.

Often, monarchies are divided into two types: absolute or ruling monarchies versus constitutional monarchies. In the first, the monarch has unrestrained power, in the second he shares power, including with the elected legislature. Stepan, Linz and Minoves (2014, p. 37) propose the addition of a third form: parliamentary monarchy, as one of "three ideal types of monarchies in modern territorial states". The three types of monarchy as denoted by Stepan et al. (2014) are: absolute or ruling monarchy, constitutional monarchy and parliamentary monarchy. In an absolute monarchy, the head of state wields most, if not all, of the governing power and is not or barely bounded by legal (including constitutional) or parliamentary constraints. In a parliamentary monarchy, the legislature possesses the primacy and the monarch reigns but does not rule, essentially serving in a ceremonial position. No power is shared with him by the parliament. The judiciary is completely independent from the monarchy. The constitutional monarchy serves as a middle ground between these two, with power-sharing between monarch and parliament in terms of legislation and appointing governments (Stepan et al., 2014). Table 2.1 provides an overview of the three types of monarchy. A complete and detailed list of the world's monarchies can be found in Appendix A.

Table 2.1

The three types of monarchy

Type	**Main characteristics**	**Examples**
Absolute	The power of the monarch is mostly unconstrained by either the constitution, laws or parliament. The monarch forms and dissolves governments. He also appoints and controls the judiciary, at least in part.	Oman, Saudi Arabia
Constitutional	The monarch shares power with the legislature and must observe several (uncodified) rules and is partially bounded by the rule of law. Forming and dissolution of governments requires the consent of both the monarch and the parliament. The judiciary is usually fairly independent.	Jordan, Morocco
Parliamentary	The monarch reigns but does not rule and is completely law-bound. No power is shared with him by the parliament. The judiciary is completely independent from the monarchy.	Sweden, United Kingdom

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from "Democratic Parliamentary Monarchies," by A. Stepan, J.J. Linz and J.F. Minoves, *Journal of Democracy, 25*, p. 37. Copyright 2014 by Johns Hopkins.

§2.2: Defining the monarchical functions

Hazell and Morris (2020) have used several approaches to describe and compare the European parliamentary monarchies. They include such diverse topics as the monarchies' financial situation, the regulation of the royal families' size and the lines of succession and public opinion on the monarchies. Although all these activities have their relevance, given the purposes and scope of this thesis they are not included. As previously defended, the constitutional, political and ceremonial functions (the various tasks and duties of the monarchs) are most directly linked to the field of public administration, with such subjects as royal finances and lines of succession not possessing the same weight. Public opinion and media relations are of interest to the normative discussion on monarchical survival, but not to research in which fundamental characteristics of the monarchies are described. Similarly, national holidays and comparable undertakings, which do have a certain ceremonial significance, are not inherent (codified) attributes carrying the same weight (Krunke, 2020) .

Thus, the three functions concerning monarchical roles which are constitutionally prescribed, affect everyday politics and through which ceremonial symbolism is expressed (Hazell & Morris, 2020), are best suited to explorative research, in line with the problem statement and research goal. As mentioned, functions are to be understood as a monarch's tasks and duties, but can also entail more 'passive' characteristics, that is, constituting elements relevant to monarchical variation on soft power. It must be noted that the three functions have some overlap between them, in that certain political functions, such as appointing officials, or certain ceremonial functions, such as opening the legislature, can indeed be prescribed by constitutional articles. The constitutional functions are all highly formal in nature, allowing little to no room for manoeuvring by the monarch (Hazell, 2020). The political functions provide monarchs with venues to exert informal influence, however limited (Hazell, 2020). The ceremonial functions are above everyday politics and are generally uncodified, although they do present the monarch as "head of state and the ultimate source of political authority" (Morris, 2020, p.93), giving them symbolic significance. The three functions, and the way in which the cases can vary on them, are described in more detail in the following subsections.

§2.2.1: Constitutional functions

The first factor for variation among the monarchies to be used, is the one relating to constitutional functions. This factor concerns a monarch's formal prerogative powers and duties, as codified in the relevant articles of national constitutions and other laws of comparable importance. These functions are the reserve powers still held by the monarch, although the prerogatives are nowadays heavily regulated and limited by laws or, more often, conventions. There is very little room for discretion, barring highly exceptional situations. This does mean that "the monarch remains the ultimate constitutional backstop". (Hazell, 2020, p. 22). Five constitutional tasks are the main ones according to Hazell (2020) and are therefore the most relevant. These subfunctions, including the forms they can take, are displayed in Table 2.2 below.

Table 2.2

The constitutional subfunctions and the possible variation on them

Constitutional subfunctions	**Possible variation**
Appointing and dismissing ministers	Yes to both / Yes to either / No to both
Summoning and dissolving parliament	Yes to both / Yes to either / No to both
Royal assent to legislation	Yes / No, but promulgation occurs / No, no role for the monarch
Immunity of monarch, accountability of ministers	Yes / No
Oath to observe the constitution	Yes / No

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from *The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchies Compared* (pp. 20-21), by R. Hazell and B. Morris (Eds.), 2020, Oxford, United Kingdom: Hart. Copyright 2020 by Hart.

The first two are formal duties, by which governments and legislatures are formed and dissolved. Royal assent means that the monarch formally approves a piece of legislation to become law by signing it, as the final step of the law-making process (Pironnet, 2020). The monarch's immunity denotes his freedom from legal prosecution, enabled by ministerial accountability with the ministers responsible for the monarch's words and actions (Hazell, 2020). The fifth constitutes an important symbolic moment, which, unlike coronations or similar ceremonies, can also be conducted in writing (Krunke, 2020).
Some less relevant (Hazell, 2020) duties include issuing currency, providing for the collection of taxes, granting pardons and granting honours.

§2.2.2: Political functions

Political functions are about a monarch's 'softer' roles, "done in an endless round of meetings, public engagements, reading official papers and signing documents of all kinds" (Hazell, 2020, p. 63). Those political functions considered the most significant by Hazell (2020) are summarised in Table 2.3 below.

Table 2.3
The political subfunctions and the possible variation on them

Political subfunctions	**Possible variation**
Weekly meeting with prime minister	Yes / No
Chairing the Council of State	Yes / No
Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions	Yes to both / Yes to either / No to both
Appointment of senior officials, including judges	Yes / No
Receiving ambassadors	Yes / No

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from *The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchies Compared* (pp. 64-65), by R. Hazell and B. Morris (Eds.), 2020, Oxford, United Kingdom: Hart. Copyright 2020 by Hart.

To be considered, certainly for the first two, is how much autonomy the monarch possesses as a political actor when exercising these functions and thus, how much informal influence he or she still has on other political actors such as ministers. No records are kept of the contents of the weekly meetings (Hazell, 2020), preventing research into what is said at them to gauge soft power. Instead, whether it occurs at all is the question to be answered. The countersignature and appointment of senior officials are more formal in nature, given the inevitable overlap in constitutional and political functions, but do occur in less 'visible' circumstances than the formal constitutional functions.

§2.2.3: Ceremonial functions

Finally, the third factor, ceremonial functions, is about the high-visibility functions of monarchs, including those with a religious character. As stated, they are above everyday politics and are generally uncodified, although they do present the monarch as "head of state and the ultimate source of political authority" (Morris, 2020, p.93), giving them symbolic significance. Part of why these functions have survived and are still (symbolically) significant is because "monarchy has historically had a very close, mutually supportive relationship with religion" (Morris, 2020, p.117). This religious dimension is still clearly present in the subfunctions concerning a state religion and a religious test. It also shines through in the coronations and annual messages in certain monarchies. Cranmer (2020) considers the subfunctions contained in Table 2.4 the most significant.

Table 2.4

The ceremonial subfunctions and the possible variation on them

Ceremonial subfunctions	**Possible variation**
Coronation	Yes / No, but secular ceremony / No, no ceremony
Opens legislature	Yes / No, but monarch is present / No, no role for monarch
Religious test	Yes / No
Christmas/ New Year's Message	Yes / No
State religion	Yes / No

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from *The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchies Compared* (pp. 100-101), by R. Hazell and B. Morris (Eds.), 2020, Oxford, United Kingdom: Hart. Copyright 2020 by Hart.

Coronations refer to actual crowning and/or anointing rites, as the one that still takes place in the United Kingdom. There are also more secular enthronement ceremonies, which have become more common nowadays (Cranmer, 2020). Opening the legislature is a ceremony of less but still considerable ceremonial significance, often surrounded by pomp and splendour (Morris, 2020). A state religion is the official religion of a country, endorsed by the state. For Europe at least, monarchs play a role in these state religions. A religious test refers to whether there is a requirement for the monarch to adhere to a certain religion or a specific state church. This is often in line with the presence of a state religion but not necessarily: there is a religious test for the Swedish monarch but no state religion in the country. The Christmas/New Year message can serve as an avenue for the monarch to express personal sentiments (Hazell and Morris, 2020), and is thus partially political. It is mostly significant here as an annual tradition with high visibility.

§2.3: Defining soft power

Bertrand Russell (1938, p. 10), already noted that power has many faces when he stated: “power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion”. Hague and Harrop (2013) define power in general as “the capacity to bring about intended effects”. According to Hague and Harrop (2013), most research on power focuses on relationships, that is, power over others. The original propagator of the term soft power, Joseph Nye, stated that there are different ways to affect behaviour: “you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want” (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 28). The classic distinction between hard power and soft power depends on this notion of coercion and inducement versus attraction. Soft power thus denotes influence without any direct stimulus. According to Hayden (2012, p. 9), soft power recognises that “traditional metrics of power in international affairs should be inclusive of ideational factors: what people believe can shape or constrain the agency of a political actor and their ability to effect change”. What this refers to is the ‘attractiveness’ of the culture and institutions of a given actor, which makes it so that other actors have the same goals and view international politics in a mostly similar normative fashion. For nation states, its values and culture are the sources of soft power. According to Hayden (2012), soft power is thus both a way to measure resources and to reflect on behavioural outcomes. The importance of soft power is confirmed by Ferguson (2008, p. 18): “wielding true global power takes more than just greenbacks and green berets”, and by Ohnesorge (2020, p. 53): “the soft power of the Vatican did not wane because the size of the Papal States diminished”.

A contribution to the clarification of the concept of soft power has been made by Ohnesorge (2020), in an attempt to make it more precise and more easily applicable, with his taxonomy of soft power. This framework provides the connection between soft power and the monarchical functions, that is, how those functions provide indications of the soft power of the monarchies. Figure 2.1 contains the model as presented by Ohnesorge (2020, p. 89).




Figure 2.1. A taxonomy of soft power. Reprinted from *Soft Power: The Forces of Attraction in International Relations* (p. 89), by H.W. Ohnesorge, 2020, Cham, Switzerland: Springer. Copyright 2020 by Springer.

Before explaining how Ohnesorge's (2020) model connects to monarchy, its elements require further explication. In his model, soft power is about the effect of actor A on actor B, with the results aimed for being a reception of attraction and an outcome of compliance. The overall distinction between active and passive soft power denotes the difference between the pursuit of "active efforts to create attraction and soft power" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 88) on the one hand, and the reliance upon resources themselves exuding attraction, eliminating the need for the use of instruments, on the other. This passive dimension, deemed the 'city-upon-a-hill effect', thus skips the use of instruments, having a direct link between resources and reception. Active soft power does make use of the instruments: public diplomacy and personal diplomacy, with their various subcategories. The use of the metaphor of a city on a hill is derived from a biblical passage: "ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on a hill cannot be hid" (Nye, 2011, p. 98). The resources and instruments of soft power are further explained in subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.

The effects of actor A's use of soft power on actor B are categorised by Ohnesorge (2020) as reception, leading to outcomes. Ohnesorge (2020) defines reception as actor B's perception. It is divided into three varieties: attraction, apathy and repulsion. Attraction refers to a favourable reception through drawing attention, creating a positive magnetic effect. It is deemed the most essential characteristic of soft power (Ohnesorge, 2020). Apathy is the middle ground between attraction and repulsion. It constitutes indifference, either because of a combined positive and negative perception or because of a lack of perception in general. Repulsion is the opposite of attraction and results from actor A being perceived as "malign, manipulative, incompetent or ugly" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 176). Outcomes are the result of reception. Ohnesorge (2020) again notes three varieties: compliance, inaction and opposition.

Compliance denotes actor B modifying his behaviour to bring it in line with actor A's desires. Inaction is neutral in nature. Actor B does not change his behaviour. Opposition results in a negative effect. Whereas inaction changes nothing, opposition may lead actor B to act against actor A, even though he would not have done so before (Ohnesorge, 2020).

§2.3.1: Resources of soft power

Resources are the intangible assets from which soft power arises. Resources include being culturally and ideologically attractive as well as the rules and institutions governing (international) regimes. They consist of four forms: culture, values, policies and personalities (Ohnesorge, 2020).

Culture is one of the key fundamental bases of soft power. Ohnesorge (2020) states that there is no single clear definition and that the concept has been explained in numerous ways. One way to characterise and summarise it concisely is that culture constitutes "the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 96). It has its roots in civil society, but has been adopted by political actors as an "affordable and effective source of national power" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 99).

The preferences of others are strongly affected by the values a government espouses in its domestic behaviour. Domestic values concern a specific political system and the values it champions, which can be a significant resource of soft power. A democratic system can, for example, exert a form of attraction. However, so can an authoritarian system, as "attraction lies in the eyes of the beholder (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 105).

The policies espoused by a government domestically and abroad constitute the third resource. Within the domestic dimension, reputation and trust are very important to governmental achievements and their legitimacy. This resource is highly interdependent with values (Ohnesorge, 2020).

Personalities concerns leading and 'visible' individuals possessing the ability to influence history through their attractive power. Through this, they aid in "instilling a sense of pride within their own countries, provoking nationalistic cohesion or wide support for their government (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 213). In this regard, Ohnesorge (2020) points to Max Weber's three notions of charisma. The first variety concerns hereditary charisma, which can be transferred by belonging to a certain dynasty. The "affiliation to royal families constitutes a prominent example" of this variety of charisma (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 119). Secondly, office charisma is derived from holding a certain public office. The Papacy (a monarchy) is cited as an example. It is "the belief in the specific state of grace of a social institution (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 120). In this case, the charisma is not provided by the individual as such but rather by the office itself, particularly if it holds prestige and has existed for a long time. Pure charisma is the conviction that an individual is extraordinary due to his personality and charisma in the usual sense of the word. It can sometimes take on a religious dimension, as if the individual is sent from God (Ohnesorge, 2020).

§2.3.2: Instruments of soft power

Instruments are the ways in which the resources are wielded. There are two primary forms: public diplomacy and personal diplomacy, each possessing a number of manifestations, five for public diplomacy and four for personal diplomacy (Ohnesorge, 2020).

Public diplomacy is defined as "the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other people and governments, in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy decisions" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 137). Listening refers to consultation, including studying others' views on various actors and issues, demonstrating that those views are taken seriously and into account. Advocacy concerns "activities centring around the explanation and promotion of particular policies or purposes" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 154). Cultural diplomacy is a long-term instrument, including activities such as hosting sports events, having the aim of making cultural resources known. Exchange diplomacy works "by sending citizens abroad and hosting foreign citizens in return, mutual understanding between the partners can be nurtured and lasting relationships can be established" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 156). Finally, international broadcasting concerns state-supported news, information and entertainment aimed at a population outside the supporting state's borders. The goal of this broadcasting is to raise that country's (cultural) presence abroad (Ohnesorge, 2020).

Personal diplomacy is the second form the instruments of soft power can take. Ohnesorge (2020, p. 162) heavily entrenches it in international relations with the following description of personal diplomacy as "an actor's attempt to manage the international environment by visiting foreign decision-makers … and engaging actively with them through means of joint appearances, speechmaking, or symbolic acts". Foreign travels in general denote the head of state or dignitaries of slightly less importance travelling abroad to make state visits or in a less official capacity. The second form of personal diplomacy is speech-making. It is about the capacity to put into words a compelling vision, exerting influence in the process. Symbolic acts, in this context, denote activities which draw much attention and which exemplify a particular policy. An example is wreath-laying. Elite networks establish and cultivate themselves by allowing direct operating between elites. They are "groups of individuals whose hold on power, positions, and potential resources provide them with opportunities for influence that enable them to play a decisive role in shaping policy, economics and culture" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 169).

§2.4: Connecting the monarchical functions to soft power

Although the thesis is explorative in nature, researching the link between soft power and monarchy, it must be defended why the three monarchical functions 'say something' about the extent of soft power wielded by the various parliamentary monarchs. To that end, this section describes how the functions can be placed within Ohnesorge's (2020) framework, specifically, within which resources and instruments. This endeavour requires the adaptation of characteristics normally applied to international contexts to domestic contexts.

For the general connection between soft power and monarchy, the resource of personalities provides an excellent path leading out of the vagueness of said connection. Hereditary charisma and office charisma prove particularly significant. Belonging to a certain dynasty with which people affiliate and holding an old and prestigious office exudes an inherent attraction, thus leading to a city-upon-a-hill effect, that is, passive soft power (Ohnesorge, 2020). This passive soft power is expressed through and strengthened by a few constitutional functions, some of which denote active soft power as well. Immunity from prosecution raises a monarch's exalted status. Royal assent, the notion that a monarch possesses the final authority in making an act into law (Hazell, 2020), has the same effect. Both functions thus heighten monarchical hereditary and office charisma. The ceremonial functions, with their high visibility, also create inherent attraction, by building on traditions where the monarch is consciously presented as the ultimate authority of the nation (Cranmer, 2020).

Culture's broad definition as the collection of values and practices creating meaning for society allows it to be applied to a wide array of subjects, including monarchy. Religion, as a social institution concerned with specific customs (Macionis et al., 2014), forms the foundation underneath the ceremonial functions of a state religion, a religious test, a coronation and, to a limited extent, Christmas messages (Cranmer, 2020). Values, defined as those espoused by a specific political system, have direct relevance for all constitutional functions. Those functions define the basic field of operations of a political system, as constitutional law concerns the highest organs of state and their organisational structure (Burkens et al., 2012). No (relevant) link between monarchy and the resource of policies has been found.

Besides the noted use of both active and passive soft power through resources, monarchical functions also link up with a number of instruments, both in the spheres of public diplomacy and personal diplomacy. Listening lines up with the political functions of meeting the prime minister, chairing the Council of State and receiving ambassadors.
All these functions, particularly the first, provide monarchs with the opportunity to study others' views (Ohnesorge, 2020). Advocacy, as the "activities centring around the explanation and promotion of particular policies or purposes" (Ohnesorge, 2020, p. 154), contains the ceremonial functions of opening the legislature and the Christmas/New Year's messages. In the first, the monarch presents (explains and promotes) his government's new agenda (Morris, 2020).

The monarch's 'purposes' are promoted through the annual message, in which he can express personal sentiments (Hazell and Morris, 2020). To a degree, (domestic) broadcasts in the form of those messages can raise the monarchy's cultural presence. The public diplomacy instruments of cultural and exchange diplomacy do not appear applicable, although receiving ambassadors can contribute somewhat to exchange diplomacy, through the exchange of viewpoints.

Personal diplomacy must be adapted to a domestic context. Therefore, Ohnesorge's (2020, p. 162) definition must be made to fit national contexts: an actor's attempt to manage the domestic environment by visiting or receiving decision-makers and engaging actively with them through joint appearances, speechmaking or symbolic acts. With that, foreign travels become irrelevant for this thesis' purposes. Speech making, formulating compelling visions, is once more applicable to the annual messages and to a degree, opening the legislature. Symbolic acts such as coronations, opening the legislature and the annual messages draw much attention. The constitutional functions of royal assent and the oath exemplify a particular policy, that is, certain laws and the constitution itself. Elite networks are vital to monarchs, as individuals in a position providing them with opportunities for influence on policy. Several functions allow monarchs to operate in these networks. The constitutional functions of appointing and dismissing ministers and summoning and dissolving parliament are examples. All political functions line up with this instrument: meeting the prime minister, chairing the Council of State, receiving ambassadors, appointing senior officials and countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions all allow the monarch to communicate with (other) elites and through that, exert influence.

In conclusion, the three monarchical functions, and all their subfunctions, can be connected to and placed within the framework of several resources and instruments. This leads to a combination of both active and passive soft power. With this, it has been defended that those functions are solid indicators for the extent of soft power wielded by parliamentary monarchs.

Chapter 3: Methodology

§3.1: Research design and method

In order to gain insight into the characteristics of the parliamentary monarchies, they will be described by looking at their constitutional, political and ceremonial functions. A desk study using existing material is the most appropriate way to achieve this. This is the case because plenty of material has proven to be available to describe the three functions in the selected cases. With this material, insight into the amount of soft power can be gained, by charting and assessing the variation among cases. This in turn allows an answer to the research question to be formulated. As such, although acquiring information via interviews, observation or surveys would improve reliability and validity through triangulation (Van Thiel, 2015), it is not needed for this research. Existing material in this context refers to research information that has been produced for a different purpose than the purpose of this thesis but that can be reused for it (Van Thiel, 2015). The information required for this endeavour comes from a variety of sources, ranging from academic books and journal articles to news articles and encyclopaedic works.

Content analysis is the method to be used for analysing the literature, whereby the content of sources is used to assess the message of the producer of the material (Van Thiel, 2015). With this method, the aforementioned range of sources is used to collect the relevant facts, in order to be able to bestow codes (labels), which in turn enables a score to be given to every case (country) for each of the three factors. These codes are summaries for the possibilities in variation for the different functions. Secondary analysis is inappropriate, because that method makes use of research previously collected by other researchers (Van Thiel, 2015). The explorative character of the thesis makes this an impossible endeavour. For the same reason, meta-analysis is even more inappropriate, because there data from a large number of previous academic investigations are brought together.

The choice for a case study design was made because the topic of monarchy is not merely a theoretical abstraction, but (for the time being) also an everyday reality, in line with the field of public administration (Van Thiel, 2015), which is characterised by application-oriented research. As a multiple-case study, the thesis can be categorised as having a most similar systems design. In this design, cases are homogenous, belonging to a single category (Van Thiel, 2015). In this instance, parliamentary monarchies are said group of homogenous cases (similar systems). This leads to a logic of replicability, meaning the results are expected to be similar in non-selected cases. This in turn raises the reliability and validity of the research, conjuring building blocks for further research (Van Thiel, 2015).

§3.2: Search and selection strategy

§3.2.1: Case selection

Ideally, the three functions of all parliamentary monarchies would be analysed and described to ascertain the amount of soft power held by each of them, leading to an overview of and conclusion on all relevant nations. Firstly, such an endeavour is impossible due to the time available and wordcount allowed for this thesis. Secondly, not all parliamentary monarchies possess the same level of relevance. The cases were selected using a three-step elimination scheme, which is displayed in Figure 3.1. These steps are explained and defended below.




Figure 3.1. The three-step elimination scheme for selecting the relevant cases.

The first step of elimination concerns the hereditary nature of a given head of state. As noted, Hague and Harrop (2013) mark heredity the most significant characteristic of monarchy. It has been defended that self-proclamation is important for distinguishing republics with factual hereditary succession from monarchies (Crabb, 1978), with the non-hereditary states of Andorra and Vatican City (CIA, 2021) deemed monarchies. It is the combination of both that leads to a list of countries which are, beyond a single shadow of a doubt, monarchies, due to their combination of inheritance and proclaiming as a monarchy. Removing this doubt ensures that all parliamentary monarchies to be selected are as similar (homogenous) as possible. As mentioned, this has a positive effect on the reliability and validity of the research (Van Thiel, 2015). This first step eliminates Andorra and Vatican City. In these countries, the heads of state are either appointed or elected (CIA, 2021).

The second criterium for elimination concerns the type of monarchy. Of the 42 hereditary monarchies still in existence, fifteen are excluded given their absolute or constitutional character. Fourteen of them are confirmed as absolute or constitutional by Gerring et al. (2020): Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Eswatini, Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tonga and the United Arab Emirates. Thailand is not included in their list, but "while Thailand is officially a constitutional monarchy, King Maha Vajiralongkorn wields immense power"(Wongcha-um & Thepgumpanat, 2020). It is thus safe to conclude that Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, seemingly moving in the direction of an absolute one instead of a parliamentary one. It is thus excluded as well.

For the moment, this leaves us with 27 parliamentary monarchies. As mentioned, the nature of the thesis does not allow for examination of all of these countries. A defendable approach to bringing this number down to a workable level, is by looking at which countries are Commonwealth Realms. All the North American and Oceanian parliamentary monarchies, in addition to the United Kingdom in Europe, are Commonwealth Realms, totalling sixteen nations. They are independent kingdoms and members of the Commonwealth of Nations, which share Queen Elizabeth II as monarch. She is represented in each Realm, except the United Kingdom where she resides, by a Governor-General. As pointed out by Murphy (2019), there exists an ambiguity in these countries when it comes to determining the head of state: the Queen or the Governor-General? He defends that it is the Queen, mainly due to diplomatic convention. This ambiguity in and of itself leads to including Commonwealth Realms as cases endangering the mentioned purpose of selecting cases which are as similar as possible. Still, excluding all of them would both reduce the number of cases too much and would also lead to no North American or Oceanian cases being included. The explorative nature of the thesis, which must provide a starting point for future research, speaks against these two points. A middle ground is found by including, in addition to the United Kingdom, one from each continent. Australia and Canada are the largest countries of their continents, both in area and population. They are selected for inclusion because their size, certainly in population, makes it more likely for (reliable and informative) sources on them to be found. This final step of elimination excludes Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, all located in North America. The one Oceanian exclusion is Tuvalu (CIA, 2021).

This leads to the definitive selection of fourteen cases, six non-European cases for detailed description, and eight European cases included for comparative purposes, as displayed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1
The cases selected for analysis

Non-European cases	**European cases**
Australia	Belgium
Cambodia	Denmark
Canada	Luxembourg
Japan	Netherlands
Lesotho	Norway
Malaysia	Spain
	Sweden
	United Kingdom

§3.2.2: General search and selection strategy

Several search engines were employed in constructing the first two chapters. These are, in order of descending importance: WorldCat Discovery, Google Scholar and Google. General (news) sources were searched for using Google. The underlying foundations of the thesis, the 2020 book by Hazell and Morris and the 2020 book by Ohnesorge, were found by searching on Google Scholar using the term 'monarchy democracy' for the first, and 'soft power definition' for the second. Through this, the work by Stepan et al. (2014) was also found, being significant for defining parliamentary monarchy. Such sources as Hayden (2012), Jordan and Polland (2020) and Jessurun d'Oliveira (2012) were found through WorldCat Discovery. Some sources, such as Hague and Harrop (2013) and Van Thiel (2015), are part of the author's personal library. The used sources were mostly selected based on their abstracts as this provides a good middle ground between selection based on title and selection based on reading the full article, let alone the full book. The sources used for the definitions in the theoretical framework were definitively included based on a reading of the full texts.

When it comes to the analysis, the relevant constitutional provisions have (unsurprisingly) provided the needed information on the constitutional functions. They have also proven relevant for such political functions as the countersignature and the appointment of officials. Gaps, such as the monarchs' relations with parliament, have been filled with the related source of parliamentary documents. Legal texts are thus a primary source for this thesis. News articles and other popular sources were needed to acquire information on less codified functions. Examples include the political functions of a weekly meeting with the prime minister and receiving ambassadors. Ceremonial functions detailed by using these sources include the coronation and the messages. Google has provided a good gateway into both the legal texts and the popular sources. Legal texts were found by searching for 'constitution *country'.* News sources were generally found by searching for '*subfunction country'.* This sometimes necessitated tweaking formulations, such as substituting 'enthronement' for 'coronation', or 'legislature' for parliament. Academic sources were mostly used for solving problems of definition and inclusion. An example is the question of whether Australia and Canada have coronations. Selection of sources has usually taken place based on a global reading of the full text in these cases. These sources were searched for using Google Scholar and WorldCat Discovery. Google Scholar generally provides more relevant results, WorldCat Discovery provides sources that are accessible more often. Selection of academic sources given by these two search engines took place mostly by reading abstracts and conclusions, which together gave a concise overview of the source's contents while showing whether those contents are relevant. This relevance is dependent on whether references to the two functions and their subfunctions are (clearly) present.

§3.3: Analysis strategy

§3.3.1: Analytical framework

The design, method and search and selection strategy for the research at hand have been explained and defended. The question remains how the material will be analysed, so as to formulate an answer to the main question of the amount of soft power possessed by parliamentary monarchies.

The analysis of the collected sources will be conducted using a scoring system. This scoring system is based on the qualitative research analysis technique of descriptive codes, meant to describe characteristics of the data source (Van Thiel, 2015). The system serves two purposes: to guide and organise the descriptions of the cases and their functions and secondly to enable the formulation of a conclusion on the amount of soft power of the parliamentary monarchies, based on the three functions. Quantitative scores can effectively show how much soft power the variation on the functions bestows upon the different cases. It has been defended in section 2.4 that those functions are indicators for measuring the amount of soft power. All subfunctions bestow a degree of soft power, active or passive, through a resource, an instrument or both.

Every case will receive a score for each of the three functions. These three scores combined provide a final score for every case. The scores for the functions are based in turn on the scores per subfunction. These subfunctions, or indicators, require labels which make them more easily measurable. These labels determine the scores per subfunction. The variation on the monarchical subfunctions, as explained and displayed in section 2.2, serve this purpose well. The labels yes or no provide scores of 0 or 1, that is, whether soft power is present at all or not at all. The labels which provide room for more variation, such as royal assent, can attain a score of 0.5, denoting a degree of soft power, but less than the maximum amount available for that specific subfunction. In this way, every subfunction contributes to measuring the amount of soft power held by individual cases. The scoring process is visualised in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2. The process of the scoring system.

Every country or case can attain a maximum final score of fifteen points, with a maximum of five points per function and a maximum of one point per subfunction. Table 3.2 clarifies the procedure, with an imaginary country attaining the maximum score.

Table 3.2

The hypothetical situation of a case attaining the maximum score

Case	**Score constitutional functions**	**Score political functions**	**Score ceremonial functions**	**Final score**
Country	5 (1 for each of the 5 subfunctions)	5	5	15 out of 15

A monarchy with a score of fifteen thus possesses all the possible constitutional, political and ceremonial functions for the purposes of this research**.** The analytical framework as it has been described and is employed in the analysis is displayed in Table 3.3 on the following page.

Table 3.3

The analytical framework

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 1.2: Yes to either 1.3: No to both 2.1: Yes to both 2.2: Yes to either 2.3: No to both 3.1: Yes 3.2: No but promulgation occurs 3.3: No, no role for monarch 4.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 1.2: 0.5 1.3: 0 2.1: 1 2.2: 0.5 2.3: 0 3.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 5.2: 0
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 1.2: No 2.1: Yes 2.2: No 3.1: Yes to both 3.2: Yes to either 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 1.2: 0 2.1: 1 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 5.2: 0
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 1.3: No, there is no ceremony 2.1: Yes 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 3.2: No, but monarch is present 3.3: No, no role for monarch 4.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 1.2: 0.5 1.3: 0 2.1: 1 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 5.2: 0

Note. Original general table note. Adapted from *The Role of Monarchy in Modern Democracy: European Monarchies Compared* (pp. 20-21, 64-65, 100-101), by R. Hazell and B. Morris (Eds.), 2020, Oxford, United Kingdom: Hart. Copyright 2020 by Hart.

§3.3.2: Operationalisation

The meaning of the labels and their connection to their respective subfunctions is based on the precedent set by Hazell and Morris (2020), for how the European monarchies operate. It is has been defended that the non-European cases, as parliamentary monarchies, can be set within the same framework. What is needed is adaptation to national contexts. For instance, when it comes to coronations, not only Christian ceremonies are considered to fit that term. Ceremonies with similar religious significance are labelled as coronations as well. For example, the Japanese Emperor is enthroned using several rituals of the Shinto religion (Starrs, 2009). To effectively operationalise and adapt the monarchical functions to the national contexts, alternative formulations and passages in the sources to be analysed need to be considered and employed. Staying with the Japanese example, analysing the sources must be done taking into account such terms as: 'Shinto', 'rituals', 'rites', et cetera. This approach applies in particular to the ceremonial functions, which are more dependent on national cultural contexts than constitutional and political functions (Cranmer, 2020). Increasing the number of formulations judged to be relevant is thus necessary when analysing the non-European cases, particularly when it comes to their ceremonial aspects.

Chapter 4: Results

§4.1: Europe

Before turning to the analysis of the functions of the non-European parliamentary monarchies, what we already know about the European parliamentary monarchies requires attention. That information is briefly summarised in this section. More detailed descriptions on the eight European cases can be found in Appendix B. The scores per function and overall, with which the amount of soft power has been measured, are displayed in Table 4.1 below. The subsequent sections contain similar tables, one per country.

Table 4.1
The variation of the European cases overall and per function, ranked by total score from highest to lowest (ranked alphabetically if the total scores are identical)

Case	**Constitutional functions**	**Political functions**	**Ceremonial functions**	**Total score**
Denmark	4.5	5	3.5	13
Norway	4.5	3.5	5	13
United Kingdom	4	4	5	13
Luxembourg	4.5	5	2.5	12
Netherlands	4.5	4.5	2.5	11.5
Spain	5	4	2.5	11.5
Belgium	4.5	5	1.5	11
Sweden	2	2	3.5	7.5

When it comes to constitutional functions, there are a lot of similarities between the eight European cases, with one notable exception. The Swedish monarchy became completely ceremonial in nature in 1974, when all its formal power was removed (Hazell, 2020). In the other European monarchies, the constitutional functions are essentially the same, barring a few subtle differences. In terms of political functions, Sweden again proves the exception for most subfunctions. Ceremonial functions differ more among the eight cases, with Belgium scoring remarkably low and Sweden remarkably high. It stands out how no one country occupies the top position for more than one function. Spain scores highest on constitutional functions with five points. Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg share the top score on political functions. Norway and the United Kingdom both have five points on ceremonial functions.

When the scores are totalled, it becomes clear which countries possess the most soft power overall: Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom, the latter two thanks to their high scores on ceremonial functions. Denmark scores less well on ceremonial functions, but scores well on the first two functions. Despite high scores on constitutional functions and political functions, Belgium scores low overall due to its very limited ceremonial functions. Sweden is, unsurprisingly, by far the lowest scorer overall, because of its largely eradicated constitutional and political functions.

§4.1.1: Belgium

Table 4.2 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Belgium. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Pironnet (2020).

Table 4.2
Detailed scores of Belgium

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.2: Yes to either (dissolving) 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.2: 0.5 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.2: No 3.3: No, no role for monarch 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 1.5**
Total score on all three functions			**11**

§4.1.2: Denmark

Table 4.3 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Denmark. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Krunke (2020).

Table 4.3
Detailed scores of Denmark

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.2: Yes to either (dissolving) 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.2: 0.5 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.3: No, there is no ceremony 2.1: Yes 3.2: No, but monarch is present 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.3: 0 2.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3.5**
Total score on all three functions			**13**

§4.1.3: Luxembourg

Table 4.4 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Luxembourg. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Heuschling (2020).

Table 4.4
Detailed scores of Luxembourg

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.3: Yes to both 3.2: No but promulgation occurs 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.3: 1 3.2: 0.5 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 2.5**
Total score on all three functions			**12**

§4.1.4: Netherlands

Table 4.5 displays the scores on the subfunctions for the Netherlands. These scores are based on Andeweg (2020), Bovend'Eert (2020) and Cranmer (2020).

Table 4.5
Detailed scores of the Netherlands

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.2: Yes to either (dissolving) 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.2: 0.5 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.2: Yes to either 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 2.5**
Total score on all three functions			**11.5**

§4.1.5: Norway

Table 4.6 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Norway. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Smith (2020).

Table 4.6
Detailed scores of Norway

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.2: Yes to either (dissolving) 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.2: 0.5 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.1: Yes 3.2: Yes to either 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3.5**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 1 **Total: 5**
Total score on all three functions			**13**

§4.1.6: Spain

Table 4.7 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Spain. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Powell (2020).

Table 4.7
Detailed scores of Spain

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.1: Yes to both 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 2.5**
Total score on all three functions			**11.5**

§4.1.7: Sweden

Table 4.8 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Spain. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Wenander (2020).

Table 4.8
Detailed scores of Sweden

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.3: No 2.3: No to both 3.3: No, no role for monarch 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.3: 0 2.3: 0 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 2**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.1: Yes 3.3: No to both 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.1: 1 3.3: 0 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 2**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 3.5**
Total score on all three functions			**7.5**

§4.1.8: United Kingdom

Table 4.9 displays the scores on the subfunctions for the United Kingdom. These scores are based on Cranmer (2020) and Hazell (2020).

Table 4.9

Detailed scores of the United Kingdom

Functions	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.3: No to both 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.3: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Total score on all three functions			**13**

§4.2: Non-Europe

In this section, the variation on the six non-European cases is displayed and assessed. Detailed introductory national backgrounds for each of the non-European cases can be found in Appendix C. The scores used to measure the amount of soft power held by these monarchies is based on newly created descriptions of their functions. This extensive and detailed information can be found in Appendices D up to and including I. The scores per function and overall, with which the amount of soft power has been measured, are displayed in Table 4.10 below. The subsequent sections contain similar tables, one per country.

Table 4.10
The variation of the non-European cases overall and per function, ranked by total score from highest to lowest (ranked alphabetically if the total scores are identical)

Case	**Constitutional functions**	**Political functions**	**Ceremonial functions**	**Total score**
Malaysia	3.5	3	5	11.5
Cambodia	4	3	4	11
Lesotho	5	3	2.5	10.5
Australia	4	3	3	10
Canada	4	3	3	10
Japan	3	2	4	9

The six cases are quite varied when it comes to constitutional functions, with Lesotho's constitution clearly bestowing the most functions on its monarch and Japan's constitution evidently being the most restrictive in terms of constitutional functions. Malaysia scores slightly better and Australia, Cambodia and Canada occupy the middle ground between the two low and high scorers. It stands out how similar the cases are when it comes to political functions with Japan the clear exception. None of the cases score particularly high on this function, with Lesotho's position remarkable given the constitutional functions held by that country's monarch. Cambodia and Japan score well on ceremonial functions, with only Malaysia scoring better, occupying the top position. Lesotho's score is fairly low, while Australia and Canada both have mediocre scores.

Overall, it first stands out how Australia and Canada, the two Commonwealth Realms, have the exact same scores on all three functions with 4, 3 and 3 respectively. With that said, the two countries do not share the exact same subfunctions per function. Still, the scores appear to suggest that there are strong constitutional similarities between Commonwealth Realms. Overall, Japan occupies the lowest position, given its Emperor's heavily restricted constitutional and political functions. Lesotho attains second place, despite its low score on ceremonial functions and relatively low score on political functions, because of its high score on constitutional functions. Malaysia is the clear victor overall, thanks to its high score on ceremonial functions and not scoring low on the other two functions.

It is closely followed by Cambodia, which scores slightly lower on constitutional functions and a point lower on ceremonial functions. It is noteworthy that the highest and lowest scorer, Malaysia and Japan, differ only 2.5 points. With the European cases, the three highest scorers, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom have 5.5 points more than the lowest scorer, Sweden.

§4.2.1: Australia

Table 4.11 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Australia. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix D.

Table 4.11
Detailed scores of Australia

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.1: Yes to both 3.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.1: Yes 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.1: 1 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 3**
Total score on all three functions			**10**

§4.2.2: Cambodia

Table 4.12 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Cambodia. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix E.

Table 4.12
Detailed scores of Cambodia

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.2: Yes to either 2.2: Yes to either 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0.5 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.2: No 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Total score on all three functions			**11**

§4.2.3: Canada

Table 4.13 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Canada. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix F.

Table 4.13
Detailed scores of Canada

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.1: Yes to both 3.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 4**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.2: No 3.1: Yes to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 3**
Total score on all three functions			**10**

§4.2.4: Japan

Table 4.14 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Japan. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix G.

Table 4.14
Detailed scores of Japan

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.2: Yes to either 2.1: Yes to both 3.2: No, but promulgation occurs 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0.5 2.1: 1 3.2: 0.5 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.2: No 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.2: 0 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 2**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 4**
Total score on all three functions			**9**

§4.2.5: Lesotho

Table 4.15 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Lesotho. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix H.

Table 4.15
Detailed scores of Lesotho

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.1: Yes to both 2.1: Yes to both 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.2: No 2.1: Yes 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0 2.1: 1 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.2: No, but there is a secular ceremony 2.2: No 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.2: No	1.2: 0.5 2.2: 0 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.2: 0 **Total: 2.5**
Total score on all three functions			**10.5**

§4.2.6: Malaysia

Table 4.16 displays the scores on the subfunctions for Malaysia. These scores are based on the descriptions that can be found in Appendix I.

Table 4.16
Detailed scores of Malaysia

Function	**Subfunctions**	**Labels**	**Scores**
Constitutional	1. Appointing and dismissing ministers. 2. Summoning and dissolving parliament. 3. Royal assent to legislation 4. Immunity of monarch (accountability of ministers). 5. Oath to observe the constitution	1.2: Yes to either 2.1: Yes to both 3.1: Yes 4.2: No 5.1: Yes	1.2: 0.5 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.2: 0 5.1: 1 **Total: 3.5**
Political	1. Weekly meeting with prime minister 2. Chairing the Council of State 3. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions 4. Appointment of senior officials, including judges 5. Receiving ambassadors	1.1: Yes 2.2: No 3.3: No to both 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.2: 0 3.3: 0 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 3**
Ceremonial	1. Coronation 2. Religious test 3. Opens legislature 4. Christmas/New Year message 5. State religion	1.1: Yes 2.1: Yes 3.1: Yes 4.1: Yes 5.1: Yes	1.1: 1 2.1: 1 3.1: 1 4.1: 1 5.1: 1 **Total: 5**
Total score on all three functions			**11.5**

§4.3: Synthesis of Europe and non-Europe

In this section, the European and non-European cases will be integrated into one comparison. Through this, the variation between them can be made insightful, providing the foundation for the conclusion of section 5.1. Table 4.17 contains the scores per function and overall, with which the amount of soft power has been measured.

Table 4.17

The variation of the European and the non-European cases overall and per function, ranked by total score from highest to lowest (ranked alphabetically if the total scores are identical)

Case	**Constitutional functions**	**Political functions**	**Ceremonial functions**	**Total score**
Denmark	4.5	5	3.5	13
Norway	4.5	3.5	5	13
United Kingdom	4	4	5	13
Luxembourg	4.5	5	2.5	12
Malaysia	3.5	3	5	11.5
Netherlands	4.5	4.5	2.5	11.5
Spain	5	4	2.5	11.5
Belgium	4.5	5	1.5	11
Cambodia	4	3	4	11
Lesotho	5	3	2.5	10.5
Australia	4	3	3	10
Canada	4	3	3	10
Japan	3	2	4	9
Sweden	2	2	3.5	7.5

§4.3.1: Constitutional functions

Figure 4.1 displays the ranking of the constitutional functions, with the European countries in blue and the non-European ones in red. The countries are displayed with the first two letters of their name. Sweden is called SW for instance. The United Kingdom is abbreviated as UK, as is common. Cambodia and Canada are abbreviated as Cam and Can.




Figure 4.1. The constitutional functions of the European and non-European cases, ranked from lowest to highest.

For the constitutional functions, a number of things stand out in general. The non-European monarchies, with the clear exception of Lesotho on the high end, occupy the lower ranks. Six out of the seven countries ranked first are European. The United Kingdom joins the other two Commonwealth Realms and Cambodia with four points. It is notable that Japan and Sweden, both the most symbolic monarchies of all thirteen cases, differ one whole point.

When the differences in subfunctions are assessed, some notable differences can be found. Firstly, there is only one constitutional subfunction that all fourteen monarchies share, even if the form and venue differ: each monarch has to swear an oath to observe the constitution.

There is one subfunction that all European monarchs share but that only two non-European monarchs possesses: legal immunity. All the sovereigns of Europe enjoy this protection both de jure and de facto, codified in the national constitutions. Outside Europe, this only applies to the Kings of Cambodia and Lesotho. The Emperor of Japan enjoys de facto immunity but this is not found in (constitutional) writing. The King of Malaysia is the only resident monarch who explicitly does not hold immunity as per the constitution. The Governors-General of Australia and Canada are not immune, even if they represent Queen Elizabeth II.

There is also one subfunction that almost all non-European monarchs and viceroys possess, where only a few European ones do. The non-European heads of state both summon and dissolve parliament. The Cambodian monarch can only dissolve. Only the Luxembourgish and Spanish monarchs do both in Europe. The Belgian, Danish, Dutch and Norwegian sovereigns only do one of the two. The British and Swedish monarch do neither. Here we see a notable difference between the United Kingdom and the other two Commonwealth Realms. In addition, the first explanatory difference between Japan and Sweden becomes clear.

There is only one monarch who does not appoint or dismiss ministers: the King of Sweden. The Emperor of Japan, the King of Cambodia and the King of Malaysia (all the Asian cases), appoint but do not dismiss. All other monarchs and the two Governors-General both appoint and dismiss.

Finally, the Swedish monarch is also the only one who is not required to give assent but also does not promulgate new laws. The Japanese and Luxembourgish monarchs promulgate but do not have to assent to legislation. All other twelve monarchs and viceroys give royal assent.

It is notable that only the Luxembourgish and Japanese monarchs merely promulgate. This can be explained by the Grand Duke's refusal to assent in 2008, which led to constitutional amendments. (Heuschling, 2020). The question why Japan and Sweden, both monarchies where the constitutional reality largely reflects the political reality do differ can be answered as follows: the Japanese monarch retains the formal prerogative to summon and dissolve parliament and he also continues to appoint the prime minister. The Commonwealth Realms have the same score of four, but the British monarch does not summon or dissolve parliament whereas the viceroys do. In addition, the British monarch enjoys immunity while the Governors-General do not.

In conclusion, Lesotho and Spain wield the most soft power through their constitutional functions, while Sweden and Japan wield the least. In general, the European parliamentary monarchies possess more soft power through these functions than the non-European ones, with seven out of the first eight countries being European.

§4.3.2: Political functions

Figure 4.2 displays the ranking of the political functions.




Figure 4.2. The political functions of the European and non-European cases, ranked from lowest to highest.

One thing immediately stands out for the political functions: apart from the symbolic Swedish monarchy, the non-European monarchies possess the least political functions. It is notable that Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom differ an entire point from Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg. The United Kingdom scores higher than the other two Commonwealth Realms.

The subfunctions can shed a light on the reasons for the differences. Once again, there is only one subfunction that all monarchs possess: receiving ambassadors. The manner in which this is conducted is notably uniform in all monarchies, without noteworthy differences between Europe and non-Europe. The Swedish monarch is the only one of all fourteen who does not appoint officials, including judges.

Chairing the Council of State is a clear European practice, with even the King of Sweden doing so. The King of Lesotho and the Governor-General of Australia are the only non-European ones who do. The weekly meeting with the prime minister is an established practice in most European cases, except for Norway, Spain and Sweden. Notably, Malaysia is the only non-European case where this meeting takes place. No clear pattern is visible when it comes to countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions, although that too is a practice more clearly present in Europe. The Cambodian monarch and the Canadian viceroy and the monarchs of Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Spain countersign both. The Dutch and

Norwegian monarchs only countersign decrees. The British, Swedish and most non-European monarchs do not countersign. Neither does the Governor-General of Australia.

The dominance of Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg can be explained by the fact that they all have weekly meetings with the prime minister and countersign both decrees and ministerial decisions. The chairing of the Council of State and the weekly meeting with the prime minister explain why the United Kingdom scores higher than Australia and Canada. The three subfunctions mentioned in this section also explain the overall European dominance on political functions.

In conclusion, Belgium, Denmark and Luxembourg wield the most soft power through their political functions, while, once again, Japan and Sweden wield the least. In general, the European parliamentary monarchies possess more soft power through these functions than the non-European ones, with the first seven countries being European.

§4.3.3: Ceremonial functions

Figure 4.3 displays the ranking of the ceremonial functions.




Figure 4.3. The ceremonial functions of the European and non-European cases, ranked from lowest to highest.

The results on ceremonial functions are quite varied. Belgium is shown to not only be the lowest European scorer on ceremonial functions, but overall as well. Although the seven countries with the highest scores are mostly European, there is not as clear a European dominance in the upper echelons as with the constitutional and political functions. A question that presents itself is why Malaysia, Norway and the United Kingdom dominate with a one point difference to Cambodia and Japan, the next ranked countries.

The subfunctions can once more provide more insight. Unlike the preceding two functions, there is no one subfunction shared by all monarchs: Although the day and form differ, all monarchs but the King of Cambodia give a Christmas or New Year's message, although the day and form differ.

Most monarchs open the legislature, including all non-European ones. Most European monarchs do so, with two notable exceptions: the Danish monarch is merely present and the Belgian monarch has no role whatsoever.

Three European monarchies have a state religion: Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom. Two non-European monarchy do: Cambodia and Malaysia. This mostly lines up with whether a religious test is present for the monarch, which is the case for the aforementioned four countries. Japan and Sweden do require their monarchs to adhere to specific religions, but have no state religion. Religious ceremonies, here qualified as coronations, take place in Cambodia, Japan, Malaysia, Norway and the United Kingdom. Indirectly, the coronation of the British monarch also pertains to Australia and Canada. Notably, the Danish monarchy, bound to a state religion and a religious test, does not practice a coronation, or indeed any form of enthronement. Most European monarchies practice secular ceremonies: Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. Lesotho is the only non-European monarchy to do so.

The high scores for Malaysia, Norway and the United Kingdom can thus be explained by the presence of three subfunctions: a coronation, a religious test and a state religion. This, combined with the first two subfunctions applying in Denmark and the second one applying in Sweden, can explain the relative dominance of Europe. Cambodia's position is due to the lack of an annual message and Japan's position is due to a lack of a state religion. Belgium's position can be explained by its lack of an opening of parliament, combined with no religious subfunctions and a secular enthronement ceremony.

In conclusion, there is more variation on this function than on the other two when it comes to the ranking of Europe versus non-Europe, giving both sets roughly equal soft power through this function. Malaysia, Norway and the United Kingdom wield the most soft power through their ceremonial functions, while, for a change, Belgium wields the least.

§4.3.4: Overall assessment

Figure 4.4 displays the ranking of all the functions combined.




Figure 4.4. The constitutional, political and ceremonial functions of the European and non-European cases combined, ranked from lowest to highest.

When the countries are assessed on the three functions combined, there are a few noteworthy rankings. Sweden and Japan, as the two most curtailed monarchies, logically rank last, with Japan scoring slightly better due to wider constitutional and ceremonial functions. The two non-European Commonwealth Realms share the same scores on all three functions and thus also have the same final score. Notably, the one European Commonwealth Realm, the United Kingdom, scores much better overall. This is due to a higher score on political functions and a far higher one on ceremonial functions. Malaysia is the highest ranked non-European country due to its high score on ceremonial functions.

In conclusion, it mostly stands out that of the first seven, six are European countries. Five out of the six non-European countries rank in the bottom seven. The overall European dominance can be explained by a number of reasons. They more widely possess legal immunity and are relatively dominant in appointing and dismissing ministers. The chairing of a Council of State, a weekly meeting with the prime minister and the royal countersignature are present to a far greater extent in Europe. Religious subfunctions are slightly more prominent in Europe as well. Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom possess the most soft power overall, while Sweden possesses the least. What stands out as well is that there is no single monarchy possessing no soft power whatsoever, either in general or on one of the functions.

Chapter 5: Conclusion and discussion

§5.1: Conclusion

In this section, an answer to the main question will be provided. This question reads as follows: “to what extent do parliamentary monarchies possess soft power, when assessed by the variation on their constitutional, political and ceremonial functions?”

This thesis has explored the link between monarchy and soft power. It has, through that, tested the usefulness of soft power theory for the topic of monarchy. It has aided in closing the constituting knowledge lacunes on variation in functions of parliamentary monarchies, the nature of soft power and a lack of empirical studies on soft power.

The three monarchical functions, provided by Hazell and Morris (2020), have been formulated and thereafter connected to soft power theory. This was done by placing them within the framework of Ohnesorge (2020), via the resources and instruments of both active and passive soft power. The functions were then applied to fourteen European and non-European cases, the six non-European ones through new research.

What has been found, is that all parliamentary monarchies possess at least some soft power, although none come close to a maximum score. Europe dominates in general, and in particular on the constitutional and political functions. A surprising find, given the comparatively heavy democratic and meritocratic spheres they must operate in, compared to the non-European ones (Jessurun d’Oliveira, 2012). Although the non-European monarchies do possess considerable soft power through their ceremonial functions, they do not overtake Europe in that regard.

In the overall ranking, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom ‘win’, with Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands and Malaysia also ranking in the top seven. The bottom seven consists of the ‘loser’ Sweden, and also includes Japan, Australia, Canada, Lesotho, Belgium and Cambodia. Thus, the European parliamentary monarchies possess more soft power than the non-European ones.

In conclusion, parliamentary monarchies possess soft power through their monarchical functions, to the extent that all possess some, at least 7.5 out of 15 points in the analysis. However, the highest score attained is 13. So, within the framework of this thesis, the parliamentary monarchies are at least 7.5 points removed from no soft power at all, yet only two points removed from all soft power they could possibly have. The soft power ‘behind the throne’ is alive and well.

§5.2: Discussion

§5.2.1: Theoretical discussion

It has been shown that the three monarchical functions of Hazell and Morris (2020) can be placed within a theoretical framework, namely, that of Ohnesorge (2020). Still, some notes must be placed. Firstly, constitutional, political and ceremonial functions are only three of the ways Hazell and Morris (2020) mention to research monarchy. They have provided such additional ones as international functions, royal finances and public opinion. These characteristics can lift monarchy into more practical and normative spheres of research. Because of the fact that the theory on soft power was added to the thesis later, the three functions had to be made suitable to that theory. Although a usable framework for that purpose, the one by Ohnesorge (2020), was thankfully found, it created a risk of not being able to connect the two adequately. In future, it is vital to include a solid theoretical basis prior to completing the analysis part of the research. Ohnesorge's (2020) framework had to be adapted to national contexts. International functions, which include state visits, do not require this adaption. Describing more functions would also increase the theoretical basis with regard to public administration. For instance, international functions and royal finances would bestow economic relevancy, another supporting discipline of public administration (Uwizeyimana & Basheka, 2017). Furthermore, the nature (the monarch as actor A) and scope of the thesis allowed for only the resources and instruments of soft power to be examined and connected to monarchy. In future research, actor B's side should be researched, that is, the side of reception and outcomes. Combining this with the mentioned international functions and public opinion would have a threefold effect: the theory of soft power would not have to be lifted out of its usual international surroundings, it would aid in knowledge about the side of actor B and it would aid in further exploring the connection between monarchy and soft power.

In general, Hazell and Morris (2020, p. 282) conclude that European monarchies have not only survived but continue to be popular. This is because they remain acceptable to their governments due to their powerlessness on the one hand and on the other monarchy remains "popular with the citizenry for its symbolic national functions, impartial bearing and the glamour it brings into their lives". Performing research into public opinion could test whether these three reasons are truly as relevant to citizens as Hazell and Morris (2020) suggest.

Looking at the results, it can be seen that all fourteen examined monarchs possess the constitutional function of having to swear an oath and the political function of receiving ambassadors. Further research could take this notion in two opposing directions. Firstly, it could be decided not to include these functions, working from the assumption that the results of the cases can be generalised to all parliamentary monarchies. Alternatively, they could be included for the purpose of testing whether they do indeed appear in all parliamentary monarchies, strengthening their position as monarchical functions, and, indirectly, as sources of soft power.

Despite attempts to make the case selection diverse and significant, research on describing parliamentary monarchies would benefit, scope permitting, from including all significant non-European parliamentary monarchies, raising the total number of cases to ten. Even more generalisability would be created if all such monarchies, regardless of population, were included, particularly for analysing the differences between Commonwealth Realms, as most of the cases not included belong to that group of countries.

§5.2.2: Methodological discussion

Given the lack of knowledge on the niche area of non-European parliamentary monarchies, it has been defended that an explorative research goal is the most appropriate way to approach this topic. Content analysis is the method used to achieve this. Because very little is known on non-European parliamentary monarchies, alternative methods are inappropriate. Meta-analysis creates an overview of earlier research findings while secondary analysis results in new calculations made with existing numerical data (Van Thiel, 2015). The risk of content analysis is that the meaning of passages is interpreted differently by the researcher than they are meant by the original author. With that said, the sources, certainly the most significant ones, are legal texts, analyses of those legal texts and news articles, none of which contain (overly) normative passages when it comes to the basic characteristics of monarchies.

Reliability and validity are important concepts when it comes to the quality of scientific research. Reliability is about how precise and consistent the measuring of the variables is, while (external) validity is about generalisability, the extent to which the results are valid for other institutions (Van Thiel, 2015). For case studies, the theoretical generalisability is important for allowing further research to be conducted on the topic. This generalisability is hampered by the limited number of cases described in this thesis, although it is mitigated by a case selection based on excluding doubtful and overly similar cases, creating a list of cases which are as representative as possible. Common methods proposed by Van Thiel (2015) for increasing the reliability and validity of research based on existing material are triangulation and nested design. Triangulation means choosing more than one method of research, such as interviews, observations and questionnaires. Not only are these methods very time consuming, they are also not useful for researching (theoretical) characteristics of monarchies, especially inherent codified characteristics. Nested design refers to the practice of identifying subunits within cases, so as not to make the cases too broad. By their nature, monarchies require research that uses entire countries as cases, making nested design as such not possible (although it can be argued that parliamentary monarchies are a subunit of countries) (Van Thiel, 2015).

Although the scoring system used in this thesis has been defended by its connection to the amount of soft power through monarchical functions, its reliability could be increased if the applied scores were not self-created, but were instead derived from literature. This would, certainly if taken from a peer reviewed source, make it more precise and consistent (Van Thiel, 2015). Validity would similarly be increased, by showcasing that the scores have a direct basis in the literature. This would make the results more valid for other purposes.

With regard to the need for further research into other monarchical functions, as described in the preceding subsection, alternative methods could actually aid in this research. They are not as fundamental and theoretical in nature as the three functions used in this thesis and, because of that, are better suited to the methods of interviewing and surveying. Interviews with residents of monarchies could provide direct, personal opinions on the institutions. Surveys could prove even more effective, as through them, opinions from a large number of people can be collected.

A few remarks must be made concerning the case selection. Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, the three Commonwealth Realms included in the research, have not proven to be overly similar, apart from the constitutional functions. Although they differ on subfunctions, they have the same score on those functions. With that said, the three cases do evidently differ on the political and ceremonial functions. It could thus be considered to only evaluate the constitutional functions of all Commonwealth Realms to confirm the similarities, or, on the opposite end, evaluate them only on their political and ceremonial functions. This last option would result in a more heterogenous inquiry, that is, using contrasting cases (Van Thiel, 2015).

The availability of English-language sources proved good in general, although for the case of Lesotho, certain subfunctions were given labels, on the perhaps overly interpretative analysis of non-academic sources, creating a risk of subjectivity. However, Lesotho was a crucial case to include, as the only extant African parliamentary monarchy.

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
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Appendices

Appendix A : The monarchies of the world

Table A.1

The monarchies of the world, ranked alphabetically



Country (continent)	**Type**	**Monarch(s)**	**Population**	**Territory (in square kilometres)**
Andorra (Europe)	Parliamentary	Co-Prince Emmanuel Macron and Co-Prince Joan-Enric Vives I Sicilia	85.645	468
Antigua and Barbuda (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	99.175	443
Australia (Oceania)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	25.809.973	7.741.220
The Bahamas (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	352.655	13.880
Bahrain (Asia)	Constitutional	King Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa	1.526.929	760
Barbados (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	301.865	430
Belgium (Europe)	Parliamentary	King Philippe	11.778.842	30.528
Belize (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	405.633	22.966
Bhutan (Asia)	Constitutional	King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck	857.423	38.394

Brunei (Asia)	Absolute	Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah	471.103	5765
Cambodia (Asia)	Parliamentary	King Norodom Sihamoni	17.304.363	181.035
Canada (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	37.943.231	9.984.670
Denmark (Europe)	Parliamentary	Queen Margrethe II	5.894.687	43.094
Eswatini (Africa)	Absolute	King Mswati III	1.113.276	17.364
Grenada (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	113.570	344
Jamaica (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	2.816.602	10.991
Japan (Asia)	Parliamentary	Emperor Naruhito	124.687.293	377.915
Jordan (Asia)	Constitutional	King Abdullah II	10.909.567	89.342
Kuwait (Asia)	Constitutional	Emir Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah	3.032.065	17.818
Lesotho (Africa)	Parliamentary	King Letsie III	2.177.740	30.355
Liechtenstein (Europe)	Constitutional	Prince Hans-Adam II	39.425	160
Luxembourg (Europe)	Parliamentary	Grand Duke Henri	639.589	2586
Malaysia (Asia)	Parliamentary	King Abdullah Sultan Ahmad Shah	33.519.406	329.847
Monaco (Europe)	Constitutional	Prince Albert II	31.223	2
Morocco (Africa)	Constitutional	King Mohammed VI	36.561.813	716.550
Netherlands (Europe)	Parliamentary	King Willem-Alexander	17.337.403	41.543
New Zealand (Oceania)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	4.991.442	268.838
Norway (Europe)	Parliamentary	King Harald V	5.509.591	323.802
Oman (Asia)	Absolute	Sultan Haytham bin Tariq bin Taimur Al-Said	3.694.755	309.500
Papua New Guinea (Oceania)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	7.399.757	462.840
Qatar (Asia)	Absolute	Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani	2.479.995	11.586
Saint Kitts and Nevis (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	54.149	261
Saint Lucia (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	166.637	616
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (North America)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	101.145	389
Saudi Arabia (Asia)	Absolute	King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud	34.783.757	2.149.690
Solomon Islands (Oceania)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	690.598	28.896
Spain (Europe)	Parliamentary	King Felipe VI	47.260.584	505.370

Sweden (Europe)	Parliamentary	King Carl XVI Gustaf	10.261.767	450.295
Thailand (Asia)	Constitutional	King Vajiralongkorn	69.480.520	513.120
Tonga (Oceania)	Constitutional	King Tupou VI	105.780	747
Tuvalu (Oceania)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	11.448	26
United Arab Emirates (Asia)	Absolute	Emir-President Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nuhayyan	9.856.612	83.600
United Kingdom (Europe)	Parliamentary	Queen Elizabeth II	66.052.076	243.610
Vatican City (Europe)	Absolute	Pope Francis	1000	0.44

Notes:

- All information in Table A.1 is derived from the CIA World Factbook (2021)
- Barbados is set to become a republic in November 2021 (BBC, 2020).
- Denmark's territory size is given without the Faroe Islands and Greenland. With those territories included, the territory size is 2.210.573 square kilometres.
- Eswatini was known as Swaziland until 2018.
- With the exception of the United Kingdom, Queen Elizabeth II is represented by a Governor-General in all the countries of which she is the reigning monarch.

Appendix B: Detailed description of the European variation on the monarchical subfunctions

When it comes to constitutional functions, there are a lot of similarities between the eight European cases, with one notable exception. The Swedish monarchy became completely ceremonial in nature in 1974, when all its formal power was removed (Hazell, 2020). In the other European monarchies, the constitutional functions are essentially the same, barring a few subtle differences. In terms of political functions, Sweden again proves the exception for most subfunctions. Ceremonial functions differ more among the eight cases, with Belgium scoring remarkably low and Sweden remarkably high. In Sweden, the monarch is not involved with the appointment and dismissal of ministers, with the summoning and dissolvement of parliament and is also not required to provide royal assent to legislation. He does enjoy criminal immunity and is required to swear an oath before parliament upon accession. Examples of that would be Luxembourg, where royal assent is no longer required but the Grand Duke does proclaim new legislation, and the United Kingdom, where Parliament itself has the power to dissolve itself (Hazell, 2020).

In terms of political functions, most monarchs have weekly meetings with their prime ministers, with Sweden again being the exception. Most of them preside over councils of state, though in a mostly symbolic fashion. Countersigning decrees and ministerial decisions takes place in all countries apart from Sweden and the United Kingdom. The same is true for appointing senior officials, with the same two countries excepted. Receiving ambassadors is something all eight monarchs do. Psychological influence is likely present through the talks with the head of government, as the monarch can act as an impartial coach for the prime minister in whom he or she can confide (Hazell, 2020).

Finally, ceremonial functions differ more among the eight parliamentary monarchies of Europe. The British monarchy is the only one still practising a religious coronation service, although a toned down blessing ceremony does take place in Norway. Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden prescribe a secular oath-taking ceremony in parliament. A similar ceremony, be it with more regal trimmings, takes place in the Netherlands. Denmark does not practice a ceremony of any kind to mark a new monarch's accession. Notably, and seemingly contradictory, the Danish monarch is required to be Lutheran and Denmark has a state church. The British and Norwegian monarchs are required to be Anglican and Lutheran respectively, in line with the state religions. The British, Danish and Norwegian formally head their national churches. Harmonious with the secular enthronement services in those countries, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain do not have state religions and their monarchs are not required to practise a certain religion. The Swedish monarch is required to be Lutheran but there is no state religion. The British, Dutch, Luxembourgish, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish monarchs open the legislature, usually once per year. The Danish monarch does not but is present at the opening ceremony. There is no role for the Belgian monarch at an opening of parliament. Finally, all eight monarchs give an annual message to the public.

The monarchs of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom make a broadcast on Christmas. The monarchs of Denmark and Norway do so at New Year's (Hazell, 2020).

Appendix C: National backgrounds of the non-European cases

Australia is a huge continental country in Oceania, at 7.741.220 square kilometres. It has a population of nearly 26 million and boasts a highly advanced economy. First claimed by the British in 1770 under James Cook, the entire country became a part of the British Empire in 1829. The original six colonies federated into the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, a major step towards independence (CIA, 2021). Full legal independence became a reality through the Australia Act 1986, when the last remnants of British influence were removed. To this day, the country retains the British monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, as its head of state. The Queen of Australia, on the throne since 1952, is represented by a Governor-General, who is to "carry out all the functions which the Queen would perform were she resident" (Australian Monarchist League, 2021). The incumbent Governor-General is David Hurley, in office since 2019 (CIA, 2021).

Cambodia is located in southeast Asia, bordering Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. It has a territory of 181.035 square kilometres and a population of 17.3 million. The Cambodian state originates in the Angkor Empire, which had weakened by the late nineteenth century. France colonised the country as a part of French Indochina in 1887. After the Japanese occupation during World War II, the country became independent from France in 1953. The gruesome communist regime of Pol Pot commenced in 1975 (CIA, 2021). The monarchy was abolished at that time, but it was restored in 1993 (Nunan, 1993). The poor country remains in the grip of political turmoil. The incumbent King Norodom Sihamoni succeeded to the throne in 2004.

Canada, an economically advanced country, is the largest monarchy in existence in terms of area, at 9.984.670 square kilometres. Located in North America, its only borders are with the United States. Its population is almost 38 million. Its origins are that of a British colony, becoming self-governing in 1867. Final legal ties with the United Kingdom were cut in 1982. Like Australia, it is a Commonwealth Realm with Queen Elizabeth II as its head of state. She is currently represented by Richard Wagner, in office since 2021 (CIA, 2021).

An island country of 377.915 square kilometres in East Asia, Japan is the only non-European case described in this thesis to have never been under British rule. After centuries of isolation, the country began to modernise and industrialise in the late nineteenth century. It played a major part in the Second World War as one of the Axis powers. Following the war, the new constitution retained the monarchy but it was reduced to a symbolic institution. Japan has since developed into a peaceful and prosperous nation, with a highly advanced economy. Most of its inhabitants adhere to Shintoism or Buddhism (sometimes combined). With 124,6 million people, it is the largest monarchy in existence in terms of population. It is also the only country in the world which still has an Emperor as monarch. The incumbent Emperor, Naruhito, succeeded his father in 2019 (CIA, 2021).

Lesotho is an enclaved kingdom in the south of Africa, completely surrounded by the country of South Africa, on which it is heavily dependent. It is largely inhabited by the homogenous Basotho people and the country counts 2.1 million inhabitants overall, many of whom live in poverty. Christianity is the major religion. At 30.355 square kilometres, it is relatively small in terms of territory size. It became a British protectorate in 1868 and later a crown colony in 1884. In 1966, the country became an independent sovereign state. The current King, Letsie III, succeeded to the throne in 1996, playing a largely ceremonial role. National affairs remain tumultuous, with (attempted) military coups and contested election results characteristic of the country's politics (CIA, 2021).

Malaysia is located on the Malay Peninsula and the island of Borneo in southeast Asia, bordering Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand. Its size is 33.519.406 square kilometres. The federal country counts 33.5 million inhabitants, most of whom are Muslims. What is now Malaysia was first occupied by the British in the late eighteenth century and remained under British control until independence in 1957 (CIA, 2021). The Malaysian monarchy is elective, in the sense that the nine hereditary sultans reigning over the constituent states elect the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or King, who serves as Malaysia's federal head of state (Ahmed, Kausar & Ali Behan, 2016). The current King is Sultan Abdullah of Pahang (CIA, 2021).

Appendix D: Detailed description of the Australian variation on the monarchical subfunctions

The Queen of Australia, on the throne since 1952, is represented by a Governor-General, who is to "carry out all the functions which the Queen would perform were she resident" (Australian Monarchist League, 2021). Therefore, the monarchical functions for the Commonwealth Realms, including Australia, are assessed by looking at the Governor-General's tasks executed in the monarch's name, unless the Queen herself performs the function specifically for the Commonwealth Realm in question.

The constitution specifies the Governor-General's most important duties in chapter 1, 'the parliament', and chapter 2, 'the executive government'. The Governor-General appoints and dismisses ministers of state, including the prime minister, ex section 64 of the constitution. Officially, he appoints "officers to administer departments of State of the Commonwealth". Section 57 of the constitution stipulates that the Governor-General may dissolve both the House of Representatives and the Senate simultaneously, if the Senate twice rejects a motion twice accepted by the House. Following that, he may convene a joint session of parliament if the Senate continues to reject, even after a period of dissolvement.
The Governor-General assents to bills in the Queen's name on the basis of section 58, after a proposed law has passed both the House and the Senate. There is no passage in the constitution providing the Governor-General with legal immunity. Although it is sometimes argued that the Queen's immunity automatically flows to him, even Australian constitutional law experts remain vague regarding this question (Crikey, 2005), as the Queen constitutionally does not enjoy immunity in her capacity as Queen of Australia. In any case, there is no formal, codified immunity for the viceroy, or indeed, for the Australian monarch. Although the oath to observe the constitution is not prescribed by that document, it is mandated by the parliament (Parliament of Australia, 2013), that the Governor-General swears an oath of allegiance to the Queen and an oath of office, swearing to govern according to law.

According to the Governor-General's program, he meets with the Federal Executive Council on a weekly basis (The Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2021). Although the prime minister is, on the basis of the constitution, a member of this council, he does not always attend. There is no indication in the program that there is a weekly one-on-one meeting between the Governor-General and the prime minister. Jackson (2013) states that there is a meeting between the two approximately monthly. The constitution nor any other source makes mention of the use of royal decrees or ministerial decisions, let alone that these would require the Governor-General's countersignature. Therefore, for the time being it must be assumed that 'no to both' is the answer for this subfunction. Section 67 of the constitution specifies that the Governor-General appoints senior officials, or 'other officers of the Executive Government". Ex section 72, justices of the High Court and other courts are also appointed by the Governor-General. The Governor-General receives the letters of credence of ambassadors and high commissioners to Australia.

For instance, the viceroy received the credentials of Qatar's ambassador in August 2018 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, 2018).

Constitutionally, the Queen's only task is to appoint the Governor-General. Ceremonially, when it comes to her coronation, her Anglican coronation oath included the names of the separate dominions, including Australia. Thus, the coronation in a sense served as an Australian occasion and not exclusively a British one (Winterton, 1993). There is no state religion in Australia and there is no constitutional requirement for the Governor-General to adhere to any religion specifically. Even if the monarch herself is required to be Anglican (Cranmer, 2020), a religious test is not present in the Australian monarchy specifically.
The Australian opening of parliament ceremony is heavily reminiscent of the British one. The British monarch may not enter the House of Commons and therefore gives her speech in the House of Lords. The Australian Governor-General may not enter the House of Representatives and thus opens parliament in the Senate chamber (Parliamentary Education Office, 2021). In addition to the Queen's annual message, the Governor-General records his own Christmas message annually (Stonehouse, 2018).

Appendix E: Detailed description of the Cambodian variation on the monarchical subfunctions

The Cambodian King does, per the constitution, appoint ministers. He does not however, dismiss them. The appointment clause can be found in article 19. In that article, it is also stated that the King appoints the prime minister specifically. The King does not dismiss because article 98 states that the National Assembly (parliament) dismisses members of the government. There is no constitutional provision for the King to summon parliament. He can, if government is deposed twice within the same year, dissolve it ex article 78. Royal assent is a part of the legal workings in Cambodia. Article 28 states that "The King shall sign … laws adopted by the National Assembly and laws completely reviewed by the State". The Cambodian monarch possesses immunity on the basis of article 7, which states that the King is inviolable. Finally, the King is required to swear an oath on the constitution ex article 14: "upon enthronement, the King shall take the oath of allegiance".

There is no weekly meeting between the King and the prime minister because article 20 of the constitution states that an audience will be granted to the prime minister twice per month, where he presents reports to the King regarding the state of the country. The constitution does not provide for a Council of State or a comparable body. Ergo the King does not chair such a Council. The King countersigns decrees and ministerial decisions. This is specified in article 28: "The King shall sign … the royal decrees presented by the Council of Ministers". The King appoints judges per article 21, which states he signs decrees, through which he does so. Ambassadors are received by the King and this practice is mandated by the constitution. Article 25 contains the provision that the monarch receives the letters of credence of foreign ambassadors.

Upon his accession to the throne, the Cambodian monarch participates in an ancient Buddhist coronation ceremony, including such elements as visiting a sacred temple, offering food to monks and sitting in a pavilion facing the rising sun (BBC, 2004). Although there is no de jure religious test per the constitution or other laws, there is a clear de facto requirement for the King of Cambodia to be a Buddhist. This stems from the aforementioned Buddhist coronation, arguably the most important ceremony in a monarch's reign (Cranmer, 2020). In addition, Buddhism is the state religion ex article 43 of the constitution, strengthening the de facto religious test. There is obviously no Christmas message and nor does there appear to be a New Year's message or a message of similar significance. The King opens parliament: "in his opening speech to parliament, Cambodia's King Norodom Sihamoni said" (BBC, 2013).

Appendix F: Detailed description of the Canadian variation on the monarchical subfunctions

As pointed out by Heard (2012), constitutional conventions, in addition to the written constitution, are highly significant when it comes to the functioning of Canadian constitutional law. For instance, the position of prime minister mostly came to be on the basis of conventions and is not codified as such in the constitution. Thus, although the Governor-General appoints and dismisses ministers (The Governor-General of Canada, 2021), there is no written constitutional passage on it. The Governor-General also summons, prorogues and dissolves parliament (The Governor-General of Canada, 2021). This is sanctioned in part on section 38 of the constitution, in which it is stated that the Governor-General "shall from Time to Time, in the Queen's Name, by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon and call together the House of Commons". Section 55 of the constitution stipulates that a bill passed by both houses of parliament will only become law once it has been assented to by the Governor-General, thereby making it an act of parliament. The Queen officially enjoys legal immunity in Canada, but this immunity does not extend to her representatives. A precedent for this was set in 2014 when Quebec's former Lieutenant Governor Thibault attempted to use royal immunity in her defence, a claim dismissed by the presiding judge, after the Supreme Court had referred her back to the Quebec court (CBC, 2014). There is no mention in the constitution of the Governor-General having to swear an oath (although such a requirement is mentioned for the provincial Lieutenant-Governors). Nevertheless, the viceroy does swear an oath of allegiance at his installation in the Senate chamber. It is administered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Governor-General thereafter gives his first address to the nation (Government of Canada, 2021).

In Canada, meetings between the Governor-General and the prime minister have historically varied in terms of frequency. In the 1960s, weekly meetings were a regular practice, but later, prime minister Trudeau senior met with the Governor-General only sporadically (Jackson, 2013). It appears safe to say that weekly meetings are not a regular practice in Canada. There is a Privy Council (Council of State) in Canada on the basis of section 12 of the constitution. The Governor-General appoints its members but does not himself chair the meetings. Those meetings are very few and far between, with the most recent meeting taking place in 1981 (Government of Canada, 2020). The Governor-General countersigns so called Orders-in-Council, drafted by Cabinet and not requiring parliamentary scrutiny. These Orders-in-Council often concern federal appointments and wider federal regulations as well (Forsey, 2020). They are countersigned on the advice of either the prime minister or other individual ministers (Government of Canada, 2020). In addition to the ministers, the Governor-General also appoints the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (CBC, 2017). The constitutional basis for this appointment and the appointments of other senior judges can be found in section 96. The Governor-General receives the credentials of ambassadors to Canada. For instance, Governor-General Julie Payette received the letters of credence in November 2019 of the ambassadors from Afghanistan, China, Jordan, Kuwait, Rwanda and Venezuela (The Governor-General of Canada, 2019).

In addition to the installation ceremony of the Governor-General, as described in Appendix D, the Queen's coronation was a Canadian affair as well. The oath included Canada as a separate dominion. Thus, the same reasoning applies to Canada as to Australia, with the coronation of 1953 serving in a sense as a Canadian occasion and not exclusively a British one (Winterton, 1993). As with Australia, there is no state religion in Canada and there is no constitutional requirement for the Governor-General to adhere to any religion specifically. Even if the monarch herself is required to be Anglican (Cranmer, 2020), a religious test is not present in the Canadian monarchy specifically. The Canadian opening of parliament ceremony is heavily reminiscent of the British one as well. The British monarch may not enter the House of Commons and therefore gives her speech in the House of Lords. The Canadian Governor-General may not enter the House of Representatives and thus opens parliament in the Senate chamber (Senate of Canada, 2021). In addition to the Queen's annual message, the Governor-General records his own message annually, although the Canadian message is broadcast at New Year's (CBC, 2020).

Appendix G: Detailed description of the Japanese variation on the monarchical subfunctions

Chapter 1 of the constitution sets out the responsibilities of the Emperor. Article 6 stipulates that he appoints the prime minister, based on the person designated for that position by the Diet (national parliament). Article 7 contains most of the Emperor's duties and emphasises the need for the advice and approval of the Cabinet for all these tasks. He formally attests to the appointment of other ministers, according to article 7, but does not himself appoint them, which the prime minister does ex article 68. Given that he does appoint the prime minister, the most significant minister, the question whether he appoints ministers, even if he only appoints one, must be answered affirmatively. The Emperor, ex the same article, attests to the ministers' dismissal, but does not himself dismiss them. Article 7 further stipulates that the Emperor convenes the Diet and also dissolves the House of Representatives. Based on the same article, the Emperor does not assent to new legislation, but, like the Grand Duke of Luxembourg, merely promulgates amendments to the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties. Bills become law upon passage by both houses of parliament ex article 59. There is no constitutional passage bestowing the Emperor with legal immunity. However, even if he does not enjoy immunity in a formal sense, it is still generally accepted, according to De Gracia (2019), that he cannot be tried in court, either for criminal or for civil matters, given his designation as the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people" under the constitution. This difference between the de jure and the de facto situation makes classifying the monarch's immunity difficult. Given that there is no confirmation in law, including the constitution, that the Emperor is immune, the de jure situation will take precedence. During his enthronement ceremony, which will be described in more detail later, the Emperor swears the following oath: I swear that I will act according to the constitution and fulfil my responsibility as the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people" (BBC, 2019).

There is no constitutional requirement for the prime minister to keep the Emperor personally informed on matters of state and government. With that said, the prime minister does meet with the Emperor on a regular basis to "explain issues in person under their jurisdiction" (The Imperial Household Agency, 2021). There is no indication in any available source that the Emperor meets with the prime minister weekly, made unlikely by the Emperor's heavily restricted role. The constitution nor any other source makes mention of a Council of State or a comparable body. Ergo the Emperor does not chair such a Council. Article 74 stipulates that all laws and cabinet orders are signed by the responsible minister and countersigned by the prime minister. Therefore, the Emperor does not countersign decrees or ministerial decisions. Article 6 states that the appointment of the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court is to be done by the Emperor. Lower judges are appointed by the cabinet ex article 79. Thus, the political function of appointing judges is present, based on the same line of reasoning as the one employed in defending the appointment of ministers. The Emperor receives foreign ambassadors on the basis of article 7 of the constitution. A recent example of such an audience is the ambassador of Oman presenting his credentials to the Emperor in December 2018 (Oman Daily Observer, 2018).

According to Breen and Teeuwen (2010), the Emperor's coronation is divided into three stages, all set into the framework of the native Shinto religion. First, he is presented with a sword and jewel and in the second phase the public proclamation, including the aforementioned constitutional oath, take place. Finally, the Emperor participates in a rite in which he makes offerings to the Shinto sun goddess. Questions have been raised, including by Breen and Teeuwen (2010), regarding the compatibility of the coronation rituals with the separation of church and state (codified in article 20 of the constitution), leading to Japan explicitly not having a state religion. The friction with the historical status of the Emperor as a living god, renounced after the Second World War, is also contemplated. Regardless, the Emperor is enthroned by manner of religious Shinto rituals and a coronation thus takes place. Logically, given the many centuries of the Emperor being regarded as a Shinto 'kami' and the aforementioned Shinto rituals which confirm his status as reigning monarch, the Emperor is required to adhere to the Shinto religion in order to serve as Emperor. A religious test thus takes place. The Emperor traditionally opens parliament in assembled session after elections. The speech contains generalities and does not address political issues (Yamaguchi, 2019). In Japan, the annual tradition is for the Emperor to give a New Year's address at the palace. In 2021, the Emperor released a video message containing New Year's wishes for the first time (The Japan Times, 2020). Whatever the exact form, there is a yearly tradition of the Emperor giving a speech on the occasion of the new year.

Appendix H: Detailed description of the Lesothan variation on the monarchical subfunctions

The constitutional functions of the Lesothan monarch are described in chapters five (the King), six (parliament) and eight (the executive) of the national constitution of the kingdom. The King appoints ministers, including the prime minister, on the basis of section 87, articles 2 and 4. The prime minister, he who appears to have a majority in the National Assembly, is appointed conform the advice of the Council of State. Other ministers are appointed in accordance with the prime minister's advice. If a resolution of no confidence is passed by the National Assembly, or the prime minister no longer has enough support following an election, the King can dismiss him ex article 5a. Other ministers can be dismissed by him, in harmony with the prime minister's advice, on the basis of article 7d. The constitution also provides the King with the subfunction of summoning and dissolving parliament. Parliament is summoned ex section 82, article 1 "at such time as the King shall appoint", although certain conditions apply. One of these is that parliament must be summoned within fourteen days following an election. Section 83, article 1 stipulates that the King may dissolve parliament on the basis of the prime minister's advice. As 'Nyane (2020) points out, the King may have some room for discretion regarding dissolvement, that is, he may go against the prime minister in certain cases. This remains a hotly debated issue in Lesotho however. Royal Assent is required for bills to become acts of law. Section 78 article 1 prescribes that the King's assent follows passage of the bill through the National Assembly and the Senate. After giving assent, the King ensures the law's publication in the Gazette. Immunity for the King from both civil and criminal prosecution is guaranteed by section 50. Section 91, article 1 confirms that the King must act conform the advice of the Cabinet or a responsible individual minister. Finally, the King is required to swear an oath to observe the constitution ex section 51. He swears to "obey and observe the provisions of the Constitution and all other laws of Lesotho, preserve the character of the monarchy as a symbol of the unity of the Basotho Nation".

Section 92 of the constitution instructs the prime minister to keep the King completely up to date on the government's general affairs. The King may request any kind of information pertaining to the government and the prime minister must comply. Given that there is no indication to be found in any available (academic, legal or popular) source that there is a scheduled weekly meeting between the head of state and head of government, it must for now be assumed that no such meeting takes place and contact between the King and prime minister is generally more infrequent. The King chairs the Council of State according to section 95, article 9 of the constitution, although he does not always attend. The King formally summons the meetings ex article 7. The Council consists, among others, of the monarch, prime minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly and two judges of the High Court. The constitution nor any other source makes mention of the use of royal decrees or ministerial decisions, let alone that these would require the King's countersignature. Therefore, for the time being it must be assumed that 'no to both' is the answer for this subfunction. The King appoints several officials, including judges.

The President of the Pardons Committee on the Prerogative of Mercy and two other members of that committee are appointed by the King ex article 1 of section 102 of the constitution. The President of the Court of Appeal is royally appointed in accordance with section 124, article 1. The Chief Justice of the High Court, the most prominent judge of the country, is also appointed by the King, on the basis of section 120, article 1. Lastly, the King receives foreign ambassadors in formal audiences where they present their letters of credence. An example would be the Russian ambassador doing so in December 2019, who simultaneously serves as the representative of his country to South Africa. The ceremony at the royal palace was complete with a guard of honour and the playing of the national anthems. (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of South Africa, 2019).

As described by Harris (1997), the monarch of Lesotho is crowned in an elaborate ceremony in the nation's capital Maseru. Though steeped in tradition, feathered headdresses included, it is not a religious ceremony and did not involve any Catholic elements, despite King Letsie's Roman Catholic beliefs (Sacred Military Constantinian Order of Saint George, 2013). Therefore, it is qualified as a secular ceremony. Freedom of religion is extensively protected by (the constitution governing) the government of Lesotho. As mentioned, the King adheres to the Roman Catholic religion. However, there is no legal requirement for the monarch to be of that, or indeed of any, specific religion. In line with these arrangements, there is no state religion in Lesotho. There is no annual tradition of a state opening of parliament, as in some European cases. However, section 13 of the Standing Orders of the National Assembly (2021) specifies that the King may signify his personal wish to open parliament by giving a speech from the throne. An example of when this occurred was in October 2014, as a part of the peace process following an abortive coup attempt (Estramant, 2014). The King sends a New Year's message to his subjects every year, emphasising such issues as public health and government corruption (Metro, 2019).

Appendix I: Detailed description of the Malaysian variation on the monarchical subfunctions

Chapter 1 of the constitution on 'the supreme head' contains the most important regulations applying to the Yang-di Pertuan Agong, the King. The monarch appoints the prime minister on the basis of section 40, article 2 of the constitution. He appoints the other ministers of the cabinet ex section 43, article 1. The prime minister cannot be removed by the King, with that power resting with the parliament. Individual ministers can be dismissed by the King, but given that he does not dismiss the most important one, the prime minister, the appointing and dismissing of ministers is given the label 'yes to either'. According to section 55, articles 1 and 2, the King both summons and dissolves parliament. No more than six months may elope between the parliamentary sessions. Section 66, article 5 specifies that for a bill to become law it must pass both houses of parliament and must thereafter receive royal assent. After that, the Public Seal is attached to it and publication makes the law enter into force. Unlike most monarchs, the King of Malaysia is not immune to prosecution and he may be tried for both civil and criminal matters before the Special Court, as stated in part XV, section 182 of the constitution. When charged, the King ceases to serve as head of state and thus loses his position, ex section 33A. Section 37, article 1 prescribes that the King must swear an oath of office before the Conference of Rulers and with the Chief Justice of the Federal Court in attendance. He swears to rule in accordance with Malaysia's laws and constitution.

The prime minister meets with the King on a weekly basis, before the Cabinet meeting. The meeting is meant to "discuss and exchange ideas" (New Straits Times, 2020). The constitution does not provide for a Council of State or a comparable body. Ergo the King does not chair such a Council. The constitution nor any other source makes mention of the use of royal decrees or ministerial decisions, let alone that these would require the King's countersignature. Therefore, for the time being it must be assumed that 'no to both' is the answer for this subfunction. The King appoints the judges of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Courts, ex section 122B, article 1. He also appoints the Auditor General on the basis of section 105, article 1. Ambassadors are accredited before the King. An example would be the German ambassador presenting his credentials in December 2020 at the Istana Negara royal palace (German Embassy Kuala Lumpur, 2020).

It is stated in section 3, article 1 that Islam is the religion of the country, although Malaysia expressly allows for freedom of religion. Chinyong Liow (2009, p. 104) points out that "the intention of making Islam the official religion of the Federation, was primarily for ceremonial purposes, for instance to enable prayers to be offered in the Islamic way on official occasions such as the installation of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong". Given the religious character of the ceremony, it is qualified as a coronation. The religious importance of the King is further confirmed by the constitution. Section 3, article 3 stipulates that the rulers of each individual state serve as the symbolic 'head of the religion of Islam'. The King, as the federal head of state, serves in that position for the constituent states of Malacca, Penang, Sabah and Sarawak.

Parliament is officially in session when the King has delivered his royal speech from the throne (The Official Portal of the Parliament of Malaysia, 2018). Section 3, article 3 of the constitution sanctions the King to address parliament, either one of the houses separately or both jointly. The King sends a message to the people annually at New Year's. For his message at the end of 2019 for instance, he spoke of the need of tackling racial prejudice and he also called on younger generations to play their part in maintaining unity (New Straits Times, 2019).