

# **'Escalated force', 'negotiated management' or 'strategic incapacitation'?**

Protest policing in the Netherlands

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## Foreword

In September 2021, I was arrested by the Royal Dutch Marechaussee for participating in a nonviolent demonstration against the large-scale pollution of the fossil-fuelled aviation industry at Schiphol Airport. I was detained with three others for violating the Public Manifestations Act, for “participating in a demonstration for which a prior order of prohibition has been issued.”<sup>1</sup> Our hands were bound behind our backs, we were placed in a small cell in an armoured police vehicle and transported to a DJI facility (Custodial Institutions Agency) for further interrogation. On arrival there, we were ordered to hand in our shoelaces, place our hands against the wall, and were thoroughly searched. We were told to wait in the hallway until they had prepared the documents and cells. I remember thinking “they treat us like criminals.”

While waiting, other officers would walk past us: some raised an eyebrow, and others grinned or seemed rather confused. We must have looked misplaced: students in colorful outfits in a gendarmerie detention center. This puzzlement was reiterated in the subsequent hours of incarceration during the two breaks I got. Police agents who had to escort me would ask questions such as:

“What are you doing here?”

“Shouldn’t you be studying? How old are you even?”

(After being informed by another agent about the reason for arrest) “You don’t look like a *threat*.”

While this particular situation is anecdotal, the personal interaction with police officers has prompted this research. Regardless of how it is verbalized, implied at the root of these questions seems to be the disarray of an image of protestors, meaning a stereotyped understanding of (certain) protestors as a threat. It raised questions such as: when did this treatment of protestors become common, for what reasons, and what are the implications for citizens lawfully exercising their right to demonstrate? To what extent do variations exist in how police agencies interfere with or repress demonstrations? The result is the thesis in front of you.

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<sup>1</sup> Wet Openbare Manifestaties, art. 11 lid 1 ahf/sub a. Although there is no law in the Netherlands that states permission or an announcement is needed to have the right to demonstrate (Govers et al., 2018).

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The exercise of the right to demonstrate is essential to the functioning of the rule of law and democratic systems, yet highly controversial (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). It requires a continuous balancing act from public authorities and police officers to maintain public order and facilitate the right of citizens to protest. Protest policing should be viewed as “one specific aspect of state response to political dissent - is the police *handling of protest events*” (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, p. 1). Rather than merely executing state orders, this highlights how police, as representatives of the state, exercise their discretionary power to manage political demonstrations in practice (Thompson et al., 2023).<sup>2</sup>

Though a long-neglected research topic, the events of September 11, 2001, caused a proliferation of studies on policing protests due to changes in political dynamics, police agencies, and counterterrorism in North America and Europe (Della Porta et al., 2006). Several authors suggest an alarming trend in the way police agencies handle demonstrations (Wood, 2014). Based on a historical analysis of public records, jurisdiction, and policy changes in police organisations and public institutions in Western democracies, Wood (2014) shows that demonstrations are increasingly categorized, assessed, and managed using standardized routines based on risk management and pre-emptive action akin to security threats such as terrorism and large-scale events. This trend provides a basis for more repressive protest policing, violence, and militarized strategies by police forces.

This raises critical concerns about the use of force by an institution that is granted a high level of discretion and provided with a monopoly on violence (Della Porta and Reiter, 1998). However, others counter this suggestion on policing style, claiming that there are several cases where police institutions appear to be moving towards a strategy of dialogue-based policing (Gorringe et al., 2012). Monaghan (2023) argues that proportionality should be the leading principle in determining the practices the police use to manage political dissent. Implicit in assessing proportionality is understanding the divergence in the approaches that have emerged over the past two decades and their contemporary effects.

## 1.2 Research problem and goal

### 1.2.1 Research problem

Studies over the past two decades have recognized three policing strategies regarding demonstrations, namely ‘escalated force’ (EF), ‘negotiated management’ (NM), and ‘strategic incapacitation’ (SI). Nowadays, most scholars distinguish between negotiated management and strategic incapacitation, viewing escalated force (EF) as an outdated strategy (see for further discussion Chapter 2). Both contemporary strategies aim to reduce the disruption and expenses associated with overseeing the protest (Wood, 2020). The negotiated management strategy is also commonly referred to as the ‘dialogue-based’, ‘police liaison’, or ‘strategic facilitation’ approach, wherein police officers aim to establish open communication lines between organizers and authorities to facilitate demonstrations (Soule & Davenport, 2009). Della Porta and Reiter (1998) among others (King & Waddington, 2005; Gorringe et al., 2012) speculated on a trend towards the

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<sup>2</sup> Police agents are a classic example of ‘street-level bureaucrats’. These state agents are tasked with enacting government decisions and policies while being granted discretionary power, often on the frontlines directly affecting citizens or protesters. Operating within an environment of substantial discretion and possession the authority to use force, police officers can “decide who to arrest and whose behaviour to overlook.” (Lipsky, 1980, p. 13).

aforementioned facilitative policing styles regarding protests in Europe and North America and the growing importance of intelligence-led protest policing.

Conversely, a growing body of literature recognizes the increasingly repressive character of police enforcement during demonstrations (Wood, 2014). Gorringe et al. (2012) found that uncertainty led to UK police officers using familiar coercive strategies to contain protests rather than facilitate them.<sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, their study observed a distinguishable effort at reorientation in protest policing strategy towards facilitation. Other scholars counter this view by showcasing how facilitative methods can be abused to frame protesters as uncooperative and unreliable, therefore threatening, which grants a justification to use force to dismantle a demonstration (Gilmore et al., 2017; Monaghan & Walby, 2012).

The field of protest policing studies has three major research gaps. First, a systematic theoretical understanding of which factors influence the choice of a certain policing strategy seems lacking. Jackson et al. (2018) advocate for more research on protest policing and understanding the variations in response to different types of demonstrations before speaking of overarching trends. Categorizations can help to outline trends and discern different approaches, yet they primarily serve theoretical purposes rather than descriptive ones. What characteristics make certain protest events elicit a more stringent police response towards people exercising their civil liberties? Considering the hypothesis that protest policing developed towards more repressive, strategic incapacitation methods after 9/11 (Della Porta et al., 2006), to what extent can contemporary factors influencing police strategies found at one protest be generalized to other contexts to be able to speak of consistent results and thus a 'trend' (Earl et al., 2003; Gillham et al., 2012; Della Porta & Zamponi, 2013)?

Second, contradictory findings might result from the underlying research methods. To illustrate this lack of reliability, consider studies on protest policing in the Netherlands. A case study by Terpstra (2006) argues that Dutch police tend to rely on non-coercive strategies in managing climate protests, in line with the argument that there is a general tendency towards facilitative styles that emphasize effective and frequent communication between demonstrators and police. Conversely, Owczarek (2022), shows how police at demonstrations in Rotterdam resorted to repressive and violent measures, matching escalated force. The vast majority of contemporary studies have been based on single-case studies, limited comparisons of multiple case studies, ethnographies, observations, and interviews, particularly from North America, the United Kingdom, and to some degree other European nations. Overall, most studies remain narrow in scope and sample size, analysing a particular event in a particular country (Gillham et al., 2012; Wahlström, 2011; Gorringe et al., 2012; Earl & Soule, 2006; Cunningham, 2022; Waddington, 2011). Earl et al. (2003, p. 582) criticize focussing on a few amplified protest events that drew considerable attention, stating that "research on repression has developed a skewed and overly narrow image of police response by largely ignoring the range of police responses to protests."

Third, considering the commonly used methodologies, a significant theoretical issue in this field remains whether there is sufficient scientific evidence to speak of a dominant approach in protest policing. The limited number of cases analysed and the prevalence of case studies focusing on a particular point in time do not substantiate a general trend. One way to address this is through

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<sup>3</sup> 'Familiar' in this sentence refers to the historical background of UK protest policing. Policing was characterized as primarily coercive and repressive till compliance of protesters, following a period of riots in the 1980's (Gorringe et al., 2012). Upon public critique, reforms of police institutions towards more consent-based models were underway.

extensive longitudinal studies on protest events using news articles to build large datasets (Earl et al., 2004). However, most existing longitudinal research results are based on datasets of protest events from the past century (Reynolds-Stenson, 2017) or over 50 years ago (Earl et al., 2003).

In synthesis and conclusion, considering 1) which characteristics of protest events evoke certain police interventions is not clear; 2) despite numerous small-sample studies using predominantly qualitative methods,<sup>4</sup> there remains a paucity of empirical evidence regarding the international spread of strategic incapacitation methods or negotiated management tactics; and 3) previous research utilizing extensive datasets on protest events in the US and Europe and the police intervention thereof are not up to date with recent presumed trends;<sup>5</sup> it indicates a need for contemporary empirical evidence to understand the current patterns of policing strategies at protests.

### **1.2.2 Research goal**

Gillham et al. (2013, p. 18) called for “further research to determine the extent to which strategic incapacitation tactics have diffused to other democratic nations [other than the US].”<sup>6</sup> Della Porta and Zamponi (2013) and Crosby and Walby (2023) echo similar appeals, emphasizing the need for understanding the underlying factors leading to certain approaches. Though abundant, small-sample case-studies provide inconclusive evidence to answer if there is a trend towards more repressive ‘strategic incapacitation’ or facilitative ‘negotiated management’ police tactics at demonstrations. This study aims to address this gap by initiating systematic longitudinal research in the Netherlands, a country that has so far received little attention in this subject.

The Netherlands is consistently ranked in the top ten strongest democracies worldwide by the annual indexes of both the Economist Intelligence Unit and The Freedom House. Nonetheless, concerns persist regarding constraints faced by protesters and activists, including reports of disproportionate use of force and the detainment of nonviolent demonstrators. In a 2023 evaluation by the CIVICUS Monitor, an online research platform tracking citizen action and fundamental liberties, the country was mentioned as of concern for its treatment of environmental protesters.

This research is descriptive in nature (Van Thiel, 2015), and aims to investigate Dutch police officers’ responses to managing protests, seeing if these generally adhere to more repressive or facilitative strategies. In other words, it seeks to determine if the Dutch police force exhibits a dominant trend in policing style. Additionally, this study examines whether protests managed with repressive policing tactics significantly differ, in certain aspects, from those policed with facilitative tactics – thereby gaining insight into the relationship between protest characteristics and policing strategies. The originality of this research lies in its systematic exploration of the prevalence of negotiated management and strategic incapacitation approaches in the Netherlands, and in describing how the disposition of various aspects of protests correlate with policing strategies.

### **1.3 Research questions**

This leads to the following main research question:

To what extent is there a predominant trend in the policing strategies used by Dutch police agencies in managing demonstrations in the Netherlands and how do protest characteristics correlate with these policing tactics?

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<sup>4</sup> Della Porta and Tarrow (2012) attempted to prove based on interviews and qualitative research data of ten big international protest events that strategic incapacitation methods are widespread in western democracies.

<sup>5</sup> See Hutter’s (2014) literature review on large sample protest event analysis studies for an overview.

To answer this, several theoretical-conceptual sub-questions need to be addressed:

1. What constitutes a protest event?
2. What protest policing strategies does the literature distinguish?
3. Which factors contribute to the use of certain strategies according to previous studies?

Followed by analytical sub-questions:

R1. To what extent can a dominant enforcement strategy be observed at demonstrations in the Netherlands?

R2. What are the protest characteristics associated with policing strategies at demonstrations in the Netherlands?

## **1.4 Relevance**

### **1.4.1 Scientific relevance**

Most studies on protest policing are primarily sociological or stem from contentious politics. Those studies often focused on the experiences of protesters as subjects of policing and the dynamics of protests. In contrast, this Public Administration thesis examined the Dutch police as a public institution with considerable discretion in enforcing government decisions – specifically in the context of protest policing. Positioning this study within prior social movement research, which typically relies on qualitative methods such as ethnographies or interviews, it is deemed relevant in several ways. Firstly, since Public Administration studies are interdisciplinary, this study combined and applied findings from several disciplines (see Chapter 2 Theoretical framework). Furthermore, several authors (Della Porta & Peterson, 2006; Gillham, 2011) have called for additional research to assess the generalizability of case outcomes, as well as the spread of strategic incapacitation and its tactics to other institutional contexts. Van Thiel (2014, p. 4) sees unique research cases as a feature of Public Administration research, however, “that does not necessarily mean that the amount of data to be processed is always small. Quite the contrary, in fact: many subjects of study will turn out to be extremely complex and substantive.” This study reviewed whether trends in protest policing strategies can be observed in the Netherlands using a substantial amount of data to create a unique dataset on protest events involving the Dutch police. Thus, it enriched the protest policing research field by adding a national context. Moreover, as a longitudinal study with a larger sample size, it addressed the aforementioned issues related to the reliability of case studies.

### **1.4.2 Societal relevance**

In recent years, the number of demonstrations in the Netherlands increased. In particular, the farmers’ protests regarding nitrogen measures, protests against the Dutch government’s COVID-19 policy, the Black Lives Matter movement, and climate protests by activist groups such as Extinction Rebellion caught considerable attention.<sup>7</sup> The Dutch National Police Force annual report 2021 stated an escalation in violence used by police agents, which they attribute to the increase in public disorder. Questions about whether the police had double standards in handling demonstrations differently were raised in Dutch national newspapers and the Second Chamber. Moreover, Amnesty International Netherlands (2022) published a critical report on the right to demonstrate being under pressure. Fundamentally these are ineluctable concerns on legal and practical implications concerning constitutional rights as well as the legitimacy of police tactics (Roorda, 2016). In a time when significant portions of society are challenging the role and methods of

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<sup>7</sup> The National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV) threat assessment identified climate protests and eco-activism as a new threat to national security in their annual threat assessment 2019: “Such movements are actively willing to disturb public order, violate the law and face arrest” (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, 2019, p. 29).



law enforcement, basic assumptions about the predispositions of the police do not suffice. Understanding trends in protest policing, examining the characteristics of demonstrations, and identifying what factors create disparities in the use of force by police could lead to more consistent and effective public order policing.

## 2. Theoretical framework

### 2.1 Defining protest events

Notable in many case studies on protest policing is the focus on ‘policing’, without explicitly addressing what constitutes an event, a demonstration, or a protest event. What exactly makes a protest remains scarcely defined. For example, in their methodological research on protest events, Beyerlein et al. (2016, p. 384) kept the definition fairly broad, referring to “various forms of collective action” that are inherently about power and politics. Beyerlein et al. (2016) recognized that this indicates a lack of comprehensive data on features of demonstrations within social movement research. Similarly, Della Porta and Reiter (1998) defined a protest roughly as political dissent. Earl et al. (2003, p. 587) offered a more concrete definition of “public collective action events”. Gillham’s (2011, p. 636) definition of a protest event can be deduced from his concept of the right to demonstrate: “that citizens can take their grievances into the public arena or onto the streets when regular institutional channels are perceived to be unresponsive or unfairly favor elite interests or selected constituencies over others.” According to Gillham (2011, p. 636), the issue with defining protests lies in the political challenge of balancing the facilitation of civil rights and the preservation of public order, supporters of the latter might “consider public protest to be a morally ambiguous activity and treat activists as illegitimate professional agitators, or even as threats to democracy for eschewing the conventional political process in pursuit of their goals.”

To summarize the definitions above, a protest appears to be organized with a specific aim, a political strategy, and implicitly involves collective action (Tilly, 1978). In this research, the definition by Soule and Davenport (2009, p. 14) was used, which synthesizes these elements clearly: “any type of activity that involves more than one person and is carried out with the explicit purpose of articulating a grievance against a target, or expressing support of a target [...] public activities that were explicitly intended to illicit a response and that might draw police action.”

### 2.2 Protest policing strategies

#### 2.2.1 Comparative framework policing strategies

Nowadays, most scholars distinguish between the negotiated management approach and strategic incapacitation, viewing escalated force as a strategy from the past. This stems from a trend analysis of the US law enforcement handling of protest events over forty years by McPhail et al. (1998). McPhail et al. (1998) find five fundamental dimensions for categorizing law enforcement methods. These dimensions should be seen as a spectrum on which the practices of any specific law enforcement agency for a given demonstration can be positioned. The dimensions are as follows: 1. respect for constitutional rights; 2. tolerance of the level of disruption; 3. information sharing between officers and protesters; 4. use of arrests; and 5. use of force. These dimensions were elaborated upon by Gillham (2011) (see table 1). Gillham (2011) introduced three new dimensions for the twenty-first century, based on the growing use of intelligence services and pre-emptive control.<sup>8</sup> The distinctions of policing styles are shortly addressed but not reiterated here. Indicators of these dimensions and their respective styles can be found in Chapter 3.

The first two dimensions, respect for constitutional rights and tolerance of the level of disruption are closely intertwined and fundamental to distinguishing the three policing styles, from which other

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<sup>8</sup> Extensive reviews of these dimensions and policing styles were conducted by Gillham (2011) and Rafail et al. (2012). Furthermore, see Gorringer and Rosie (2008) and Gorringer et al. (2012) for elaboration on the characteristics of negotiated management specifically. Escalated force and negotiated management were compared in a case studies by Rak (2021) and Owczarek (2022), while negotiated management and strategic incapacitation were applied in a case study by Crosby and Walby (2023).

dimensions of policing tactics follow. Under escalated force, assembly rights are *ignored*, allowing police agents to disband disruptive protests easily and intervene in unpredicted situations. Tolerance is *low* (Gillham, 2011), and communication is *minimal*, characterized by “a rigid “us” and “them” distinction” (Rak, 2021, p. 613). Most distinctive of escalated force is the *immediate* and *reactive* response to any disruption or violence. Stemming from strict law enforcement and control, any perceived unlawful action by protesters can be met with physical force, prompt arrests, and retaking control of space. Owczarek (2022, p. 10) mentions “the use of barricades and police lines, strategies like kettling are common to make mass arrests, often accompanied by physical force.”

Negotiated management, emerged as an alternative to escalated force and has a *high* tolerance for the right to assembly, protecting spontaneous protests. Also known as a ‘consensus-based approach’, the goal is still to minimize any incidents or disorder, though the means substantially differ. The right to protest is deemed a *priority*, disruptions and extreme force between police and protesters is avoided by fostering a *high*-level of *proactive* cooperation and communication before and during the protest. The potential success of NM-tactics lies with both parties. Instead of the police being ‘in control’, here “parties settled disagreements over these restrictions through negotiation and compromise” (Gillham, 2011, p. 638). While arrests or the use of force may occur, they are seen as a *last resort* after multiple requests by police.

Similar to escalated force, strategic incapacitation aims to control unpredictable behaviour by protesters, specifically new forms of protest (Gillham, 2011). Strategic incapacitation *selectively* protects the right of assembly, targeting specific transgressive protesters rather than the entire demonstration. Threat-assessments before, during, and after protests are made to selectively neutralize and target those protesters that are deemed a threat. Arrests follow a similar pattern, in which demonstrators are profiled and arrested before committing any act of misconduct. Tolerance is *selective*, with police defining acceptable locations, durations, and actions for protests without consulting organizers, establishing a pre-emptive control strategy. If protesters do not adhere to those conditions, the demonstration is not tolerated. Communication is used *selectively and constrainedly*, to inform protesters of conditions set by the police. Unlike the reactive brutality of escalated force, under strategic incapacitation “police use less-lethal weapons as a means to temporarily incapacitate potentially disruptive protesters and repel others away from areas police are trying to defend such as entrances and exits to secured zones” (Gillham, 2011, p. 643).

These dimensions discussed above are the five proposed by McPhail et al. (1998). Gillham (2011) notes that an incomplete preliminary conclusion might be that police use escalated force or strategic incapacitation tactics with demonstrators using disruptive tactics, and negotiated management towards protesters willing to cooperate. To further clarify the characteristics of strategic incapacitation, he adds three dimensions ‘surveillance’, ‘information sharing’, and ‘control of space’.

While both NM- and EF-tactics involve *low* to *moderate* surveillance during demonstrations and minimal or modest data sharing on the protest and its participants with other police agencies, strategic incapacitation uses these tactics *extensively*. Police monitor protesters before, during, and after protests (e.g. by visiting protesters’ place of residence). Furthermore, intelligence-led surveillance during protests means gathering large amounts of *real-time* data to track the demonstrations. This information is then disseminated not just among involved police organizations, but also *multi-level* beyond agencies and *media consciously*. Lastly, following the principle of selective tolerance, the police define acceptable locations for protests and frame it as a matter of security. They guard ‘zones’ deemed illegitimate for demonstrations and halt demonstrators who attempt to enter these areas.

Characteristic/dimension	Escalated force (pre-1970s)	Negotiated management (1970s–1990s)	Strategic incapacitation (current in United States)
First Amendment rights	Ignored	Stated top priority	Selective
Toleration of disruption	Low	High	Selective
Communication	Low	High	Selective & one-way
Use of arrests	Frequent	Last resort	Selective & proactive
Use of force	High	Last resort	Selective & less lethal
Surveillance	Moderate	Low	Extensive & real time
Information sharing	Moderate	Low	Extensive, cross agencies & media conscious
Controlling space	Localized & reactive	Localized & proactive	Selective, extensive & proactive

*Table 1. Differences between policing strategy styles and their characteristics from Gillham (2011, p. 640).*

It should be emphasized that those dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Gillham (2011, p. 647) mentions “three distinct strategies of protest policing – escalated force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation – that have been employed during different time periods over the last 50 years”, where escalated force was followed by negotiated management and then replaced by strategic incapacitation. Noakes et al. (2005, p. 251) give a more nuanced reading where policing strategies can exist alongside each other and should be seen as “along a spectrum incorporating aspects of negotiation and incapacitation”. Moreover, Earl et al. (2003) confirm this in their analysis of protest events between 1968 and 1973 in New York. While the general consensus is that police repression escalated during this period, their findings show that police responses varied, rarely resorting to force.

Gorringe and Rosie (2008) criticize the chart used by McPhail et al. (1998) by showing negotiated management tactics varying across nations, thus not consistent or standardized, leading to differences in police response. Similarly, various contemporary case studies (Rak, 2021; Owczarek, 2022) conclude that escalated force is still used in democratic states, albeit in more adapted or hybrid forms. The assumption that the adoption of negotiated management strategies in place of escalated force after the 1970s resulted from a growing understanding that harsh, repressive policing frequently backfired and potentially escalated protests would be oversimplified (Gilmore et al., 2017). Nonetheless, the framework offered by McPhail et al. (1998) and adapted by Gillham (2011) gives a comprehensive overview of distinct variations in protest policing styles, providing an analytical framework that aids structural research.

### **2.2.2 Spread of policing styles**

According to Wood (2014), the most currently utilized repertoire to contain political dissent in the US is ‘strategic incapacitation.’ Della Porta and Tarrow (2012) report that in the three years following the terrorist events of 2001, strategic incapacitation methods or variations thereof were extensively applied to transnational demonstrations, irrespective of the hosting country. Recent

studies in Italy and Canada (Della Porta & Zamponi, 2012; Crosby & Walby, 2023) confirm that strategic incapacitation spread to transnational protests around the 2000s. In all cases, characteristics of SI include pre-emptive control, security intelligence, and threat categorizations by police agencies. Specific to strategic incapacitation is the all-encompassing control, as Crosby and Walby (2023, p. 709) find, “police attempt to control all aspects of democratic dissent, including the route and duration of protests.” Gillham (2011) notes that these coercive tactics have become widespread due to transnational collaboration between police organizations and intelligence agencies. Forms of strategic incapacitation tactics have been found in Sweden (Wahlstrom, 2011), the United Kingdom (Gillmore et al., 2019; Pickard, 2019), and Canada (Crosby & Walby, 2023).

In contrast, Gorringer et al. (2012) and Waddington (2011) show how negotiated management was a highly successful tactic in the policing of riots in Sheffield, UK. This approach’s effectiveness relies on the establishment of open communication lines between police and protesters, the level of cooperation, and the high tolerance of public institutions to facilitate the protection of the assembly regardless of any unplanned incidents (Gillmore et al., 2017). The goal is to prevent escalation through facilitative mutual cooperation. Gorringer et al. (2012, p. 124) find the effective policing in their case study to be defined by “[dialogue police officers’] ability to mitigate the police tendency to intervene and to correct police assumptions and pre-conceptions.” Waddington (2011, p. 63) also attributes the success of the dialogue strategy to “a relationship of mutual trust and rapport,” where there was continuous two-way communication during the protest. Gorringer and Rosie (2008, p. 201) set a critical remark that “negotiated management proves a misnomer when asymmetries of power preclude meaningful interaction, or when ‘negotiated’ solutions are underpinned by the threat of escalated force.” Their case study of the Scottish G8 Summit finds that although protests were tolerated, they were so within strict limits. Gillmore et al. (2019) also question the spread of negotiated management tactics, showing how at anti-fracking protest in the UK it did not replace the previous repressive policing discourses. Instead, NM-tactics were used to frame protesters as uncooperative, therefore legitimizing more coercive policing.

## **2.3 Factors explaining variation in protest policing strategies**

There are two overarching approaches in distinguishing features that account for variation in protest policing styles. In this research, it was named the situational approach and the context approach, based on synthesized material.<sup>9</sup> The first line of research considers the trends and developments in policing strategies at demonstrations, often involving case studies to examine variation in police responses. While this significantly enhances the overall comprehension of changes in repression and protest policing over a period, it has largely neglected to address which specific demonstrations or social movements are more likely to face repression under the precedence of a particular policing strategy. It is now well established from a variety of studies that both situational threats of a protest, and the context or background of the protesters themselves account for the different policing of protests. For example, “the sheer increase in diversity of participants that accompanies large events may affect the likelihood of the use of force and/or weapons regardless of the logic of response on which the police are operating” (Earl et al., 2003, p. 601)

### **2.3.1 Situational approach – threat and characteristics of protest events**

Most previous research suggests that the expected enforcement style is best predicted by the ‘perceived threat’ to police agents. A much-debated question is, what constitutes a threat? Numerous studies have postulated a convergence between police previous experience with certain demonstrators, the police agents’ assessment of protesters’ willingness to cooperate, and the choice

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<sup>9</sup> Earl et al. (2003, p. 583) present it as “over time versus at a given time and across time.”

of policing strategies (Baker, 2020; Channing, 2018; Crosby & Walby, 2023; Della Porta & Zamponi, 2013; Eggert et al., 2016; Gorringer & Rosie, 2008; Helfers et al., 2022; Noakes et al., 2005). This signals that police organizations tend to base themselves on stereotypical depictions, or assumptions of the risk of disorder to deal with uncertain environments (Monaghan & Walby, 2012), struggles regarding legitimacy (Reynolds-Stenson, 2017), and limited resources (Wood, 2014). This is unsurprising and quite evident for a hierarchical organization deeply embedded in a highly bureaucratic environment where agents depend on protocols, rules, and regulations (Mastrofski & Willis, 2010). Yet, those threat assessments can become contested when changes in institutional police narratives lead to protesting being increasingly perceived as either a 'security concern' or as a 'threat', rather than the exercise of a fundamental democratic right (Passavant, 2021).

Gorringer and Rosie (2008, p. 200) implicitly signal that the choice of negotiated management tactics depends on police assessment whether it is possible to cooperate with protesters: "We find the potential flattening of democratic debate – entailed in the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' protesters – deeply troubling".<sup>10</sup> Their argument boils down to if police officers make their choice of policing style and tactics according to their risk-assessments based on assumptions of 'bad' protesters, then this expectancy might be confirmed as the police will be less likely to strive for mutual cooperation. The police can over- or underestimate the risk of disorderly conduct. When they decide to use dialogue-based tactics, Gorringer et al. (2012) suggest that it is through continuous communication between protesters and police that risk-assessments are adjusted, thus not leading to intervention. However, Monaghan and Walby (2012) make a compelling case for the other side of the coin with their case study of 'threat amplification' in the policing of a Canadian anarchist protest. They found that when the police made threat-categories, "intelligence agencies conflated anarchism with criminality and targeted this purported menace for strategic incapacitation" (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 653). Gilmore et al. (2019, p. 48) found a similar pattern, where "crude characterisations of protest groups, who often encompass a range of political perspectives and experiences, as radical, militant and 'anti-police', delegitimise their activities and exclude them from the possibilities of a more consensual policing response."<sup>11</sup>

While those studies emphasize police knowledge and the cooperation of protesters as determinant s of the policing strategies used, some authors are more concerned with the 'threat' towards the target or objectives of protest (Jackson et al., 2018), the sociopolitical interests of elites and the size of the protest (Earl et al., 2003), or the risks of physical harm to police officers (Soule & Davenport, 2009). Earl et al. (2003, p. 583) emphasized the importance of the 'threat approach' in explaining police action and presence at large demonstrations: "in which the larger the threat to political elites, the greater and more severe the expected repression." Police presence and intervention were more significant in large protest events involving disruptive forms of action, targeting the state, and radical claims compared to demonstrations that did not have these characteristics (Earl et al., 2003; Soule & Davenport, 2009). Passavant (2021) is bolder in stating that whoever challenges the neoliberal authoritarian status quo can expect harsher, more repressive, and more brutal violence by police organizations during protests. Soule and Davenport (2009) are more concerned with the threat to

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<sup>10</sup> It is for this reason that this research does not make a distinction between 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' protests or protesters. Nor does it differentiate between 'demonstrator', 'protestor', or 'activist'. These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis.

<sup>11</sup> Likewise, Noakes et al. (2005, p. 248) found that for the police "transgressive protest groups are those who: are unfamiliar to the police or have established a reputation for disruptive behaviour; are unable or unwilling to reach agreement with police prior to a demonstration; employ innovative tactics that they do not reveal in advance to police; or are deemed likely to challenge police control of public space and engage in direct action tactics."

police, noting that bigger events with disorderly or confrontational acts of protesters will always be met with heavier forms of police repression. This also reveals an assumption that “the situational threats posed by protesters to those agents who actually perform repression are critical predictors of police presence and action” (Earl & Soule, 2006, p. 145).

### **2.3.2 Context-approach - Racial biases and political affiliations**

The aforementioned theories presuppose that authorities are impartial in their judgment of threats and their following actions. More recently, studies have emerged that raised concerns that the policing style of demonstrations differs based on racial biases (Rafail et al., 2012; Davenport et al., 2011) and political inclination (Channing, 2018; Wood, 2020). In the past decade, several authors have presented compelling evidence that repressive force especially towards citizens of color and black people has increased (Helfers et al., 2022; Koslicki, 2022; Davenport et al., 2011).<sup>12</sup> Rafail et al. (2012) found that police strategies vary depending on the racial background of the initiators of the demonstrations, endorsing concerns that race influences the use of force at protests. In a similar vein, Cunningham (2022) underscores the impact of the degree of complementary values between law enforcement and protesters. A mismatch could lead to asymmetrical treatment of protest groups. Reynolds-Stenson (2017, p. 60) formulates it concisely: “In theory, police should not behave any differently at a white supremacist protest than at a civil rights protest, for example.”

It signals that threat assessments are not exclusively made by situational factors (such as size, movements’ objectives, and protesters’ tactics) at demonstrations (Rafail, 2014). In other words, “when police overwhelmingly arrest left-wing activists rather than their right-wing opponents, questions should emerge” (Wood, 2020, p. 8). Wood (2020) and Davenport et al. (2011) found that the presence of counterdemonstrations led to more frequent use of coercive policing, mostly towards leftist demonstrators. Nonetheless, both sides of the political spectrum have raised questions about the political neutrality of law enforcement, stating that their protest rights have been limited occasionally (Channing, 2018). Disregarding or overlooking these dynamics can lead to unsatisfactory explanations or even perpetuate false theoretical links between perceived threats and police response (Cunningham, 2022). Awareness of these biases and power dynamics in broader society is needed to make sense of possible asymmetries in police action. However, as Channing (2018) notes, the police cannot be perceived as a uniform institution.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Helfers et al. (2022) analysis of the 2020 demonstrations conclude that these heightened political consciousness across society regarding systematic racism embedded in police institutions and practices.

<sup>13</sup> While political bias remains relevant, it’s crucial to see those factors as potential paradigms whilst keeping in mind police organizations operate within various juridical contexts, with different practical limitations, and regional variations.

### 3. Methodology

#### 3.1 Research strategy and method

The research method of this thesis was a desk study, as outlined by van Thiel (2015), using existing data. To situate this thesis within existing research, academic articles were consulted. Chapter 1 discussed the research problem, noting that while there is abundant primary qualitative research based on in-depth interviews, the small sample sizes make it difficult to discern trends. Primary research methods, such as field observations, interviews, and surveys, are useful for gaining a deep understanding of subjective experiences, motivations, or context. However, gathering enough data with these methods can be very time-consuming.

Secondary data in the form of news articles is readily available and can be used to observe policing styles. Considering this, qualitative content analysis with a multiple-case study design was conducted on digital newspaper articles from a wide range of Dutch news outlets reporting on protest events. This research strategy is firmly established in studies on collective action and public order control (Beyerlein et al., 2016; Earl et al., 2003; Earl et al., 2004; Reynolds-Stenson, 2017). Qualitative content analysis is particularly useful for systematically classifying material and identifying critical factors and trends. It is one of the more practical ways to examine trends in protest policing, as it is well-suited for longitudinal research. As Earl et al. (2004, p. 76) note, for many research designs on protest events, “newspapers remain the only source of data on protest events”.<sup>14</sup> To mitigate selection and description biases, multiple sources were selected, and the news database Nexis Uni was used (see 3.2.2 for elaboration).

#### 3.2 Search and selection strategy

##### 3.2.1 Literature review

To embed this study in existing literature, two books were consulted to get a grasp of the research field: *Crisis and Control: The Militarization of Protest Policing* (Wood, 2014) and *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998). Additionally, academic articles were sourced through the databases of Web of Science and Google Scholar. Keywords searched for in the title included: (protest\* OR demonstration\* OR demonstrated OR protested OR protesting OR protest?r\* OR dissent) AND (police OR policing).<sup>15</sup> The question mark replaces one character to account for different spelling, adding the asterisk as a suffix means WoS searched for variations, such as protested/protests. Given the focus of this study on contemporary trends, the publication date of articles was set from January 1st, 2000 onwards. Scholars suggest that protest policing and the adoption of harsher strategies in Western democracies were influenced significantly by the terrorist events of September 2001. Therefore, articles and reviews assessing

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<sup>14</sup> One of the main obstacles in conducting research on protest policing with a focus on police actions is the limited access to police data. Multiple information requests based on the Dutch Wet Open Overheid (Woo) requesting data on the police deployment on demonstrations were rejected by the Chief of Police: “About the deployment of police units at demonstrations I cannot disclose information [...] disclosure of the deployment of the police during a demonstration provides insight into the approach regarding control strategy and the information position of the police.” Police organizations generally respond cautiously if not hesitant in granting permission to police records (Ullrich, 2019).

<sup>15</sup> A search including “OR police-organization\*” led to hundreds of articles with the focus on internal organizational processes (well-being, recruitment, reform) of the police-organization and the challenges the organization faces. As these keywords led to less relevant search results, police-organizations and variations thereof were excluded in the search terms.



protest policing before 2001 were excluded, as well as articles analysing protest policing in a non-Western democratic context.<sup>16</sup>

After a thorough scan of abstracts, methods, and conclusions, the initial 328 articles found were narrowed down to 70 results. Further screening led to a final selection of 42 articles. These articles were selected by including papers from public and police authorities' perspectives and their actions, rather than the experience, motivations, or actions of the subject of protest policing (e.g. journalists, communities, protesters). The selection also included other articles that took a broader view but specifically addressed factors determining outcomes in public order management at demonstrations. The table in appendix 1 provides an overview of the selected articles, their predictions on contemporary policing styles (repressive/facilitative), factors that explain the use of policing tactics, sample sizes, and the forms of data collection.

### 3.2.2 Content analysis

The digital news database Nexis Uni holds a large quantity of Dutch newspaper articles and journals and was primarily used to create a unique database on Dutch protest events and police responses. The search sequence for the titles included *headline("demonstratie" OR "demonstraties" OR "demonstranten" OR "protest" OR "protesten" OR "protestanten" OR "activisten")*. Given this research's focus on police intervention at protest events, the search command for the headline and first main body of text was *AND ("politie" OR "politie-eenheid" OR "ME" OR "politieoptreden")*. The use of 'OR' as a connector allowed for the inclusion of either or both terms, while adding 'AND' means that Nexis Uni retrieved documents containing both sets of terms only—thus, protest events that include references to the police. Only articles in Dutch were analysed to maintain consistency and create a reliable sample, as these articles were abundant and often contained firsthand observations.<sup>17</sup> Several combinations of search commands were tested, with this sequence yielding the most initial relevant articles.

The scope of this study covered the period from February 25, 2022, to April 1, 2024. Nexis Uni showed a significant spike in publications on protest events starting from the early 2000s and continuing to increase to this date. To validly test present policing styles in the Netherlands, events before February 25, 2022, were excluded. The Dutch government implemented several COVID-19 measures impacting public gatherings from March 2020 to February 2022, which could lead to flawed results regarding policing strategies.<sup>18</sup>

From these results, articles were skimmed for relevance through their titles and first paragraphs. Exclusion criteria were opinion articles and columns, articles not directly reporting on specific events, and articles with more than 90% text similarity. News articles directly covering protest events were included. This process grouped 251 articles into protest events for in-depth review, resulting in a database of  $N = 111$  protest events. This research focused on demonstrations where police officers

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<sup>16</sup> For this thesis, the scope was deliberately narrowed to focus on protest policing within Western democratic contexts. This decision was based on the recognition that policing practices are deeply influenced by specific institutional backgrounds and historical contexts. For instance, studies like the extensive research on pro-Kurdish protests in Turkey (Atak & Bayram, 2017) were excluded as the policing strategies in Turkey are informed by specific political, cultural, and historical forces that are not comparable to the Dutch context.

<sup>17</sup> The English articles found were just a handful, and none contained information that was not already mentioned in Dutch articles, if not more extensively.

<sup>18</sup> Many news articles indicated highly repressive policing with low tolerance for public assemblies. Though significant, the reason for it given by authorities was a strict enforcement of covid-19 policies. This could influence the results to such a degree that it would not accurately represent policing strategies under general conditions.

were present. Following the definition of demonstrations mentioned earlier (see 2.1), cases were included if they were organized with a specific aim, political strategy, and implicitly a collective action (Tilly, 1978). For this reason, riots were excluded as they often lacked specific aims or strategy, as well as small individual acts of dissent involving less than five people since it is challenging to categorize them as collective action. Thus, going back and forth, 18 cases (50 articles) were excluded as they lacked information on police presence or were deemed irrelevant upon closer inspection. The final database consists of  $N = 94$  protest events (201 news articles) (appendix 2).



Figure 1 Selection process of newspaper articles on the topic policing demonstrations in the Netherlands

Two caveats should be noted (see Chapter 5 for review). Firstly, when researching protest policing using newspaper articles selection bias should be taken into account (Beyerlein et al., 2016; Earl et al., 2004). Media analyses do not invariably provide a representative overview. Not all demonstrations in which the police intervene receive wide coverage, and some demonstrations are dissolved or banned in advance, preventing them from making the news.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, as protests are highly political events, different sources may describe a single event divergently. Earl et al. (2004) name this description bias, where media covers only certain aspects of a demonstration. To account for different political affiliations and audiences, various major Dutch news outlets (e.g. de Telegraaf, de Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, het Parool, het Algemeen Dagblad) were included. As well as online news platforms nu.nl and metronieuws.nl, as they often provide photos, videos, and firsthand observations or liveblogs.

### 3.3 Analysis strategy

For this research, a dataset was created of 94 protest events from February 2022 to April 2024, using newspaper articles from Dutch national newspapers. Data management and analysis of these news articles were performed using the qualitative data analysis tool ATLAS.ti. This tool was well-suited for organizing and assessing large quantities of written documents.

<sup>19</sup> The effect of selection biases can be mitigated to some extent, although inherent biases will inevitably persist. As Lipsky (1968, p. 1151) states though: "If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media [...] protest organizations will not succeed. Like a tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected." Therefore, because only demonstrations reported by newspapers are included in the sample, there is a bias.

### 3.3.1 Data coding

Coding was done on the level of events rather than per individual newspaper article, consistent with previous longitudinal research based on newspaper data collection. This approach involved grouping multiple articles concerning the same protest event into a single unit to prevent duplicative coding. For instance, if three newspaper articles covered the same protest event, they were grouped into one document and counted as a single event. The data was manually coded to answer the following research questions:

R1. To what extent can a dominant enforcement strategy be observed at demonstrations in the Netherlands?

R2. What are the protest characteristics associated with police intervention strategies at demonstrations in the Netherlands?

To address R1, the police responses after deployment at demonstrations were analysed using eight dimensions by Gillham (2011), adapted from McPhail et al. (1998), to determine which protest policing strategy was dominant in the cases analysed. Coding was done based on the procedures and operationalization used by Rak (2021) and Owczarek (2022) (see appendix 3). From this, protest events and the respective enforcement strategies were categorized to determine if a dominant approach was visible. All cases mentioned the immediate response of the police or ME, the form of protest, and more elaborate news articles further specified the tactics of the police.

To code for R2 and determine if the protests facing certain police interventions shared similar characteristics, data was prepared according to the coding procedure used by Rucht et al. (1999) in their comprehensive German newspaper-based dataset on protest events spanning over three decades (PRODAT project).<sup>20</sup> For this research, nine codes were used to gather data on protest events based on six variables suggested in the literature (see table 2).

	Variable description	Indicators
<i>Situational factors</i>	Size of protest	1. Number of participants
	Confrontational tactics	2. Form of action
	Radicality of goals and challenge posed to political elites	3. Concrete claim
		4. Immediate target of protest
<i>Contextual factors</i>	Perceived level of threat and police knowledge	5. Movement
		6. Organizer
	Racial bias	7. Composition supporters
	Political affiliation	8. Political orientation
		9. Counter-protest

Table 2 Indicators for protest event characteristics

### 3.3.2 Operationalization

According to prior research, it is suggested that perceived risks best predict the expected enforcement style at protests from a situational perspective. To determine what constitutes a threat, the literature points to size and disruptive action forms posing ‘situational threats’ to police agents

<sup>20</sup> The number of variables in PRODAT is extensive since it was specifically designed to be adapted for a wide range of research problems. Hutter (2014) underscores the great flexibility of PRODAT as it allows for data collection on a wide variety of features, but also warns about the need to select and distinguish which variables are useful.

present. According to Earl et al. (2003), situational threats, such as the size of protests measured by participant numbers, and confrontational tactics have more weight in influencing police presence than abstract factors such as the number and radicality of goals. Therefore, the codes ‘form of action’, split into disruptive and non-disruptive protests, and ‘number of participants’ to account for the size of a protest were included in the analysis.

Earl et al. (2003) and Passavant (2021) amongst others, highlight that greater challenges to political elites result in more severe repression. Thus, the codes ‘concrete claim’ (the political claim of the protest) and ‘immediate target of protest’ (where the protest was addressed to e.g. public institutions, official representatives, or corporations) were incorporated. Additionally, prior police encounters with demonstrators and the perceived level of threat are crucial in the choice of police tactics employed according to Eggert et al. (2016). Hence, the code ‘movement’ was added to examine if police agents consistently used certain strategies for particular movements. The prominence of particular groups or organizations and their share in the total number of protest events was also taken into account. For example, if Extinction Rebellion organized the majority of protests concerning climate, they would have relatively high prominence. The code ‘organizer’ is complementary to ‘movement’. By creating these six situational codes, they are separated from codes accounting for racial and political biases.

Moreover, recent studies ascribe significant deviations in police intervention to racial biases (Koslicki, 2022; Rafail, 2010) and political affiliations (Cunningham, 2022; Rafail et al., 2012; Wood, 2020). Furthermore, Wood (2020) found inequalities in the occurrence of counter-protests, where left-leaning activists faced heavier repression than right-wing activists. This suggests that threat assessments are not purely situational but are influenced by broader societal biases, necessitating awareness of these dynamics for accurate analysis of police actions. To account for this, the analysis included three more codes of PRODAT: ‘political orientation’ (of supporters, such as left-radical, left, center, right, right-radical), ‘composition supporters’ (such as farmers, women, youth, students, political parties, ethnic or minority group attendance), and ‘counter-protest.’. This translates to the developed and refined coding scheme used to categorize information (appendix 4).

**3.3.3 Analysis**

The prevalence of a specific policing strategy at protests in the Netherlands (R1) was assessed by filling in the frequency table above using data from newspaper articles. More detailed articles typically addressed at least one of the two main dimensions of a policing style (‘assembly’ or ‘tolerance’) along with several characteristics from the dimensions outlined by Gillham (2011). Shorter articles often mentioned only one main characteristic. The criteria for classifying a policing style required the presence of one of the two main characteristics and, preferably, one additional factor. Hence, the coding was systematic and consistent, capturing the nuances of police strategies for managing demonstrations.

<b>N</b>	<b>Escalated force</b>	<b>Negotiated Management</b>	<b>Strategic Incapacitation</b>
<b>Absolute</b>			
<b>Percentage</b>			

*Table 3 analysis framework for the prevalence of policing styles*

Subsequently, for R2 the aim was to see if demonstrations with specific characteristics were predominantly policed with one of the three policing styles. First, based on the outcomes of R1 the sample was split into three groups: events showing escalated force, negotiated management, or

strategic incapacitation tactics. For each indicator, subgroups of events were made based on different characteristics of the demonstrators or the demonstrations.

The frequency table, shown in table 4, was used to examine whether variations in characteristics of protests coincide with styles of police intervention. For instance, if the variable was the occurrence of confrontational tactics, the code would be the 'form of protest action'. The sample ( $N = 94$ ) was split in events using disruptive tactics and those with non-disruptive tactics. These subgroups of events were then held against three policing styles to determine the frequency in which certain policing styles were used at non-disruptive protests, or whether a particular policing style prevailed at disruptive protests.

Given that some characteristics were not consistently recorded for every protest event and groups varied in size, absolute frequencies might be misleading. Relative frequencies helped in providing a more reliable analysis. This approach provided a systematic examination of the factors associated with protest events and their correlation to police intervention strategies, facilitating a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play.

<b>Characteristic</b>	<b>Escalated force</b>	<b>Negotiated Management</b>	<b>Strategic Incapacitation</b>
<b>Group A</b>	Number of events with characteristic A and EF-policing (%)		
<b>Group B</b>		Number of events with characteristic B and NM-policing (%)	
<b>Etc.</b>			

*Table 4 analysis framework for the variation in protest policing styles*

## 4. Results

### 4.1 Prevalence of protest policing styles

To determine which enforcement strategies can be observed at demonstrations in the Netherlands, protest events ( $N = 94$ ) were coded based on the indicators of eight dimensions (see appendix 5 for the scores of each protest event on the indicators of policing style) and then categorized into three policing styles (table 5). The results indicate that all three policing styles—escalated force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation—were used in contemporary protest policing. However, escalated force was applied significantly less frequently compared to the other two approaches. Furthermore, the data shows no substantial difference in the frequency of use between the negotiated management (NM) approach and the strategic incapacitation (SI) approach. This suggests that there is no single dominant approach to protest policing in the Netherlands.

<b>N</b>	<b>Escalated force</b>	<b>Negotiated Management</b>	<b>Strategic Incapacitation</b>
<b>Absolute</b>	14	39	41
<b>Percentage</b>	14,89%	41,49%	43,62%

Table 5 results prevalence of policing styles

For further analysis of the occurrence of hybrid styles rather than ideal types, table 6 below displays the absolute number of codings across all events. The variables on the left are the overarching code groups (escalated force, negotiated management, and strategic incapacitation), accounting for all quotations of indicators of the dimensions. The findings show that escalated force was categorized as the ideal type in all cases. In contrast, negotiated management had four instances in which it had combined characteristics with strategic incapacitation, while strategic incapacitation had one occurrence where a dimension was similar to escalated force. The latter occurred during the Extinction Rebellion highway blockade on February 3, 2024. The dimension involved was 'arrests'. The ideal type of strategic incapacitation involves pre-emptive and selective arrests, but in this case, the arrests indicated escalated force, with two water cannons used to disperse protesters and four buses ready for immediate mass arrests. The four overlapping cases between strategic incapacitation and negotiated management all belonged to a farmer protest on June 27, 2022. Before and during the demonstration, police showed facilitative approaches, protecting the right to assembly. However, after the protest, police intervention became more stringent. Agents employed strategic incapacitation methods, including extensive information sharing. Police chief Janny Krol initiated a major investigation across several police agencies, using news media to get public assistance in identifying protestors, stating, "If you weren't arrested last night, that doesn't mean you will get away with this." Moreover, police spokespersons stated in the media in advance of new protests, where those could take place and under what conditions, thereby limiting the freedom of assembly and closely mirroring strategic incapacitation tactics.

	Escalated for...	Negotiated...	Strategic in...	Totals
● POL_ACT ESC_FORCE	50 100,00%		1 0,88%	51 20,00%
● POL_ACT NEG_MAN		87 95,60%		87 34,12%
● POL_STRAT_INC		4 4,40%	113 99,12%	117 45,88%
<b>Totals</b>	50 100,00%	91 100,00%	114 100,00%	255 100,00%

Table 6 results hybrid styles

## 4.2 Variation in protest policing styles

### 4.2.1 Situational approach

#### Size of protest event

Table 7 shows the frequency of the policing style used at protests grouped by the number of participants. 'Very small' means 1- 9 participants, 'small group' refers to 10 – 24 participants, 'gathering' encompasses 25 to 99 participants, a 'large protest' consists of 100 up to 999 participants, and a 'mass protest' involves more than 1000 participants. The absolute number represents the count of protest events, with a total of  $N = 94$ . The percentage in the upper right corner of a cell indicates the relative frequency of the row (variable category) while the percentage in the lower left corner stands for the relative frequency of the column (policing style). The bottom right percentage is the frequency for the cell, thus calculating overall dominance within the table. This format is consistent across the following tables. The darker the colour, the higher the frequency.

Small events predominantly experienced more repressive police tactics, with no instances of negotiated management styles. Smaller groups up to large protests faced facilitative approaches more often. In contrast, large protests and mass demonstrations were prone to strategic incapacitation tactics.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
● SUPPORTERS: 1_Size_very_small	2 14,29%	50,00% 2,13%			2 4,88%	50,00% 2,13%	4 4,26%	100,00% 4,26%
● SUPPORTERS: 2_Size_small_group	2 14,29%	9,52% 2,13%	10 25,64%	47,62% 10,64%	9 21,95%	42,86% 9,57%	21 22,34%	100,00% 22,34%
● SUPPORTERS: 3_Size_gathering	3 21,43%	14,29% 3,19%	11 28,21%	52,38% 11,70%	7 17,07%	33,33% 7,45%	21 22,34%	100,00% 22,34%
● SUPPORTERS: 4_Size_large_prot	5 35,71%	15,63% 5,32%	12 30,77%	37,50% 12,77%	15 36,59%	46,88% 15,96%	32 34,04%	100,00% 34,04%
● SUPPORTERS: 5_Size_mass_demo	2 14,29%	12,50% 2,13%	6 15,38%	37,50% 6,38%	8 19,51%	50,00% 8,51%	16 17,02%	100,00% 17,02%
<b>Totals</b>	14 100,00%	14,89% 14,89%	39 100,00%	41,49% 41,49%	41 100,00%	43,62% 43,62%	94 100,00%	100,00% 100,00%

Table 7 results size of protest

#### Form of protest action

When turning to the form of protest actions, separating the sample into disruptive protests and non-disruptive protests, the comparison showed a clear difference between the policing of protests that caused no consequences or obstruction to everyday processes and those protests that caused disruption. Under the category 'disruptive' were protests that used tactics such as road and other types of blockades, intervening meetings, or sit-ins at the entrances of buildings so people could not

enter or leave. ‘Non-disruptive’ were, for example, marches and demonstrations at designated areas or squares.

A comparison of the three groups showed that strategic incapacitation was frequently used at disruptive protests (60,98%), while negotiated management was common at non-disruptive protests (66,37%). Escalated force does not appear to have a clear association with specific protest action forms. Examining variables, strategic incapacitation occurred frequently in all disruptive events (56,82%), and negotiated management accounted for 52% of all non-disruptive events.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
● PROTEST ACTION: form_disruptive	6	13,64%	13	29,55%	25	56,82%	44	100,00%
	42,86%	6,38%	33,33%	13,83%	60,98%	26,60%	46,81%	46,81%
● PROTEST ACTION: form_nondisruptive	8	16,00%	26	52,00%	16	32,00%	50	100,00%
	57,14%	8,51%	66,67%	27,66%	39,02%	17,02%	53,19%	53,19%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14,89%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>41,49%</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>43,62%</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	14,89%	100,00%	41,49%	100,00%	43,62%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 8 results form of action

**Concrete claim**

Table 9 provides the intercorrelations between nine sub-categories using the list of political claims from PRODAT, and the three policing styles. ‘Concrete claim’ was defined as the political goals of a protest event. N = 91 here, as three cases were excluded where the claim was not mentioned. Several observations can be made. Strategic incapacitation was most often used at events focused on environmental issues and goals (46,15%). Protests with human rights claims were policed with negotiated management (34,21%), indicating that the right to assembly was frequently protected in those cases. Nonetheless, within the events of human rights protests, 26,09% experienced escalated force, and 17,39% faced strategic incapacitation, indicating that in 43,48% of these cases, repressive tactics took precedence over facilitative strategies.

Additionally, the same pattern is observed in protests concerning minority issues (e.g. ethnic minorities, asylum seekers, foreigners). Among the cases of negotiated management, a considerable amount (13,16%) pertained to minority claims, after ecology and human rights claims. However, within the group of events with minority claims, the likelihood of experiencing facilitative versus repressive styles is equal (50% negotiated management, 30% escalated force + 20% strategic incapacitation).

Lastly, in Dutch news articles climate protest policing was compared to farmer protests. In this sample, it appeared that this comparison did not hold. Farmer protests dominantly faced strategic incapacitation styles (83,33%).



	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_ecology	4	12,12%	11	33,33%	18	54,55%	33	100,00%
	28,57%	4,40%	28,95%	12,09%	46,15%	19,78%	36,26%	36,26%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_farmers			1	16,67%	5	83,33%	6	100,00%
			2,63%	1,10%	12,82%	5,49%	6,59%	6,59%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_human_rights	6	26,09%	13	56,52%	4	17,39%	23	100,00%
	42,86%	6,59%	34,21%	14,29%	10,26%	4,40%	25,27%	25,27%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_infrastructure			2	50,00%	2	50,00%	4	100,00%
			5,26%	2,20%	5,13%	2,20%	4,40%	4,40%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_minorities	3	30,00%	5	50,00%	2	20,00%	10	100,00%
	21,43%	3,30%	13,16%	5,49%	5,13%	2,20%	10,99%	10,99%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_peace			3	60,00%	2	40,00%	5	100,00%
			7,89%	3,30%	5,13%	2,20%	5,49%	5,49%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_political	1	12,50%	3	37,50%	4	50,00%	8	100,00%
	7,14%	1,10%	7,89%	3,30%	10,26%	4,40%	8,79%	8,79%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_women					1	100,00%	1	100,00%
					2,56%	1,10%	1,10%	1,10%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Claim_workers					1	100,00%	1	100,00%
					2,56%	1,10%	1,10%	1,10%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15,38%</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>41,76%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42,86%</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	15,38%	100,00%	41,76%	100,00%	42,86%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 9 results concrete claim

### Immediate target of protest

It is apparent that a few categories need closer inspection: ‘public institutions’ (e.g., the Dutch government, specific ministries, or other organizations with a public function), ‘society’ (e.g., diffuse targets or broader society), and ‘trade\_companies’ (e.g., trade associations or private companies). The most striking result from the data is that demonstrations targeting public institutions were mostly met with strategic incapacitation tactics (53,33%). As discussed in Chapter 2, it was hypothesized that threats to political entities, or the neoliberal present state of affairs, would be faced with more repressive policing. However, it was also expected that targeting official representatives, private persons, or society would result in a similar response. The data appears heterogeneous for these other factors. More diffuse targets or protests appealing to society often received facilitative NM-approaches (61,11%). Protests directed at trade associations and private companies encountered varied reactions. It is worth noting that, even with a small sample, escalated force was predominantly used when protests targeted public institutions (42,86%) or official state representatives (21,43%).

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_official_reps	3	42,86%	2	28,57%	2	28,57%	7	100,00%
	21,43%	3,19%	5,13%	2,13%	4,88%	2,13%	7,45%	7,45%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_other					1	100,00%	1	100,00%
					2,44%	1,06%	1,06%	1,06%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_other_associations_religion			2	66,67%	1	33,33%	3	100,00%
			5,13%	2,13%	2,44%	1,06%	3,19%	3,19%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_political_parties	1	50,00%			1	50,00%	2	100,00%
	7,14%	1,06%			2,44%	1,06%	2,13%	2,13%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_private_persons			1	100,00%			1	100,00%
			2,56%	1,06%			1,06%	1,06%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_public_inst	6	13,33%	15	33,33%	24	53,33%	45	100,00%
	42,86%	6,38%	38,46%	15,96%	58,54%	25,53%	47,87%	47,87%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_society	2	11,11%	11	61,11%	5	27,78%	18	100,00%
	14,29%	2,13%	28,21%	11,70%	12,20%	5,32%	19,15%	19,15%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Target_trade_companies	2	11,76%	8	47,06%	7	41,18%	17	100,00%
	14,29%	2,13%	20,51%	8,51%	17,07%	7,45%	18,09%	18,09%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14,89%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>41,49%</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>43,62%</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	14,89%	100,00%	41,49%	100,00%	43,62%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 10 results target of protest

**Movement and organizer prominence**

Table 11 offers a detailed breakdown of police responses to various protest movements categorized by problem issues. These movements include civil rights, climate, ethnic groups (e.g., foreigners, asylum seekers, and other ethnic groups), farmers, human rights, others, radical left (e.g., autonomists, anti-fascists, radical left), right-wing, students, women/LGBT, and workers.

The data showed distinct patterns in police response strategies when coincided with the type of protest movement. The civil rights movement was primarily managed with equal instances of negotiated management and escalated force. Strategic incapacitation tactics were significantly present at protest events of the climate movement, farmers, and human rights movements. The latter group faced the most instances of escalated force. In contrast, movements for ethnic groups’ rights within this sample faced a singular approach of facilitative tactics. Right-wing movements were also mostly managed through negotiation.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_civil_rights	2	40,00%	2	40,00%	1	20,00%	5	100,00%
	15,38%	2,17%	5,13%	2,17%	2,50%	1,09%	5,43%	5,43%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_climate	3	8,33%	11	30,56%	22	61,11%	36	100,00%
	23,08%	3,26%	28,21%	11,96%	55,00%	23,91%	39,13%	39,13%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_ethnic_groups			4	100,00%			4	100,00%
			10,26%	4,35%			4,35%	4,35%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_farmers			2	25,00%	6	75,00%	8	100,00%
			5,13%	2,17%	15,00%	6,52%	8,70%	8,70%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_human_rights	4	22,22%	10	55,56%	4	22,22%	18	100,00%
	30,77%	4,35%	25,64%	10,87%	10,00%	4,35%	19,57%	19,57%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_other			1	50,00%	1	50,00%	2	100,00%
			2,56%	1,09%	2,50%	1,09%	2,17%	2,17%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_rad_left	2	40,00%	2	40,00%	1	20,00%	5	100,00%
	15,38%	2,17%	5,13%	2,17%	2,50%	1,09%	5,43%	5,43%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_rightwing	1	12,50%	5	62,50%	2	25,00%	8	100,00%
	7,69%	1,09%	12,82%	5,43%	5,00%	2,17%	8,70%	8,70%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_students	1	50,00%	1	50,00%			2	100,00%
	7,69%	1,09%	2,56%	1,09%			2,17%	2,17%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_women_lgbt			1	50,00%	1	50,00%	2	100,00%
			2,56%	1,09%	2,50%	1,09%	2,17%	2,17%
PROBLEM ISSUE: Mov_workers					2	100,00%	2	100,00%
					5,00%	2,17%	2,17%	2,17%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14,13%</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42,39%</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>43,48%</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	14,13%	100,00%	42,39%	100,00%	43,48%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 11 results movement

The next table takes organizer prominence into account, reflecting scholarly suggestions that policing style depends on previous experiences with protesters. Therefore, it is expected that police intervention would be consistent for each frequent organizer in the sample. Data from table 12 demonstrates that this pattern holds true for more frequent protest events. Pro-Palestine demonstrations were consistently managed in the same manner through negotiated management, reflecting a strategy based on dialogue and cooperation. Farmers Defense Force seemed to generally encounter strategic incapacitation tactics, as well as Pegida and Samen Voor Nederland. However, the latter two were also managed through negotiated management. The results for Extinction Rebellion were more diffuse, yet the police frequently employed strategic incapacitation tactics in those protest events.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
◆ #background: Org_FDF			2	33,33%	4	66,67%	6	100,00%
			7,69%	3,13%	13,79%	6,25%	9,38%	9,38%
◆ #background: Org_KOZP	2	66,67%	1	33,33%			3	100,00%
	22,22%	3,13%	3,85%	1,56%			4,69%	4,69%
◆ #background: Org_Palestina	1	10,00%	7	70,00%	2	20,00%	10	100,00%
	11,11%	1,56%	26,92%	10,94%	6,90%	3,13%	15,63%	15,63%
◆ #background: Org_pegida			2	100,00%			2	100,00%
			7,69%	3,13%			3,13%	3,13%
◆ #background: Org_Samen_Voor_NL	1	20,00%	3	60,00%	1	20,00%	5	100,00%
	11,11%	1,56%	11,54%	4,69%	3,45%	1,56%	7,81%	7,81%
◆ #background: Org_XR	5	13,16%	11	28,95%	22	57,89%	38	100,00%
	55,56%	7,81%	42,31%	17,19%	75,86%	34,38%	59,38%	59,38%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14,06%</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>40,63%</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>45,31%</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	14,06%	100,00%	40,63%	100,00%	45,31%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 12 results organizer prominence

## 4.2.2 Contextual approach

### Political orientation supporters

The first set of variables focused on the situational characteristics of protest events. The next three variables are contextual, examining the relationship between protest policing and the composition of protest groups, rather than the specific characteristics of the protest itself. Table 13 explores protest policing styles frequencies to supporters' political orientation, with  $N = 83$ , as 11 cases did not mention political affiliation or it could not be interpreted from the text. It was suggested that left-leaning protests would face more repressive policing styles. This is supported by the results, which show that escalated force was most commonly used at leftist protest events (54,55%), as was strategic incapacitation (69,44%).

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_ambivalent	2	16,67%	8	66,67%	2	16,67%	12	100,00%
	18,18%	2,41%	22,22%	9,64%	5,56%	2,41%	14,46%	14,46%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_centre							0	100,00%
							0,00%	0,00%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_heterogenous			2	33,33%	4	66,67%	6	100,00%
			5,56%	2,41%	11,11%	4,82%	7,23%	7,23%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_left	6	12,00%	19	38,00%	25	50,00%	50	100,00%
	54,55%	7,23%	52,78%	22,89%	69,44%	30,12%	60,24%	60,24%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_leftrad	2	40,00%	2	40,00%	1	20,00%	5	100,00%
	18,18%	2,41%	5,56%	2,41%	2,78%	1,20%	6,02%	6,02%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_right					2	100,00%	2	100,00%
					5,56%	2,41%	2,41%	2,41%
◆ SUPPORTERS: Support_rightrad	1	12,50%	5	62,50%	2	25,00%	8	100,00%
	9,09%	1,20%	13,89%	6,02%	5,56%	2,41%	9,64%	9,64%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>13,25%</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>43,37%</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>43,37%</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	13,25%	100,00%	43,37%	100,00%	43,37%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 13 results political affiliation

### Composition supporters

This variable was coded more strictly, in contrast with 'movement'. While general statements were sufficient to categorize movements, the focus here is on the specific composition of supporters. To illustrate, most of the protest events in the sample were climate protests organized by Extinction Rebellion. Newspaper articles easily identified the organizer, the movement's claim, and its nature. However, for the composition of supporters, more detailed information was required, such as specific references of supporters, rather than generic statements like "self-proclaimed climate

activists." If the composition of a group was not specified, the case was excluded. Consequently, the sample size for this variable is smaller, with  $N = 49$ .

Noteworthy observations include that escalated force is predominantly used at protests where ethnic groups were present (62,50%). Nonetheless, most of these events relatively faced more negotiated management tactics. Strategic incapacitation was most frequently used at farmer protests. The main concern with this variable is that, with exception of the sub-category of ethnic groups, the sample size was too small to draw definitive conclusions.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
SUPPORTERS: Comp_ethnic_groups	5	21,74%	14	60,87%	4	17,39%	23	100,00%
	62,50%	10,20%	53,85%	28,57%	26,67%	8,16%	46,94%	46,94%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_farmers			2	28,57%	5	71,43%	7	100,00%
			7,69%	4,08%	33,33%	10,20%	14,29%	14,29%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_interest_group	1	14,29%	3	42,86%	3	42,86%	7	100,00%
	12,50%	2,04%	11,54%	6,12%	20,00%	6,12%	14,29%	14,29%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_other	1	20,00%	4	80,00%			5	100,00%
	12,50%	2,04%	15,38%	8,16%			10,20%	10,20%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_party_reps			2	100,00%			2	100,00%
			7,69%	4,08%			4,08%	4,08%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_students	1	50,00%	1	50,00%			2	100,00%
	12,50%	2,04%	3,85%	2,04%			4,08%	4,08%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_women					1	100,00%	1	100,00%
					6,67%	2,04%	2,04%	2,04%
SUPPORTERS: Comp_workers					2	100,00%	2	100,00%
					13,33%	4,08%	4,08%	4,08%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>16,33%</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>53,06%</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>30,61%</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%	16,33%	100,00%	53,06%	100,00%	30,61%	100,00%	100,00%

Table 14 results composition supporters

**Counter-protest**

Table 15 indicates that in the presence of a counter-protest, the initial protest often still faces facilitative approaches. However, as Wood (2020) proposed to check for police biases, a vastly different picture emerges in table 16. Consistent with Wood’s research, if a left-wing counter-protest occurred, the initial protest continued to be facilitated. Conversely, in the case of a right-wing counter-protest, the initial protest encountered various policing styles. Although the sample of  $N = 12$  is too limited to draw definitive conclusions, the fact that even with this limited sample the results aligned with previous findings of political partiality in police handling protest events is noteworthy.

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
PROTEST ACTION: counterprotest	2	16,67%	8	66,67%	2	16,67%	12	100,00%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16,67%</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>66,67%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16,67%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100,00%</b>

Table 15 presence counter-protest

	Escalated for...		Negotiated...		Strategic in...		Totals	
PROTEST ACTION: Counter_left			5	100,00%			5	100,00%
			62,50%				41,67%	
PROTEST ACTION: Counter_right	2	28,57%	3	42,86%	2	28,57%	7	100,00%
	100,00%		37,50%		100,00%		58,33%	
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16,67%</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>66,67%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16,67%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100,00%</b>
	100,00%		100,00%		100,00%		100,00%	

Table 16 counter-protest split

## 5. Conclusion and discussion

### 5.1 Conclusion

This thesis set out to answer *“to what extent is there a predominant trend in policing strategies used by Dutch police agencies in managing demonstrations in the Netherlands, and how do protest characteristics correlate with these different policing approaches?”*

The results of this research show that both negotiated management and strategic incapacitation policing styles are prevalent in the Netherlands. Thus, opposing preliminary conclusions on the spread of protest policing trends internationally do not need to be mutually exclusive. Escalated force is presently used as well, in a lesser degree.

More significantly, when these results are split and coincide with the characteristics of protest, following variables commonly proposed in literature, results indicate that policing style differs based on characteristics like size of protest, confrontational tactics used by protesters, the claim of the demonstration, the target of the protest, and the composition of supporters.

Overall, these results strengthen the idea that protest policing is rather heterogeneous, dependent on context, and possibly varying between and even within national contexts.<sup>21</sup>

### 5.2 Content based discussion

Before this study, most evidence was based on limited case studies of large protest events. It was therefore difficult to make predictions or generalizations about the occurrence of protest policing styles elsewhere. The present descriptive study provides a comprehensive assessment of protest policing styles in the Netherlands, a national context that was understudied. The strengths and weaknesses of this study lie in its descriptive nature. The design of the study does not lend itself to establishing a causal relationship. Although it was able to provide insights regarding the features of protests frequent with certain policing styles, important questions still waiting to be answered are for example (Earl et al., 2003, p. 582) *“why some protests drew extreme responses from police, while other protests seemingly went unnoticed”*, and studying features of protests events more closely to determine statistical significance.

Furthermore, the implicit assumption here was that certain characteristics of protest are commonly associated with certain policing styles. Further research could look into which direction the causal relationship works, is it that police responses are tailored to the perceived threat and characteristics of specific protest movements, aligning with the notion that prior experience and threat assessment are critical in decision-making processes, or is it rather the other way around? Soule and Davenport (2009, p. 29) found that *“it is not so much that the police abandoned their philosophy of protecting protesters in favor of aggressively responding to them. Rather, it is likely that the features of these events were so threatening to police that they responded in a proportional manner – something that they have always done, regardless of the time period in question”*. This likewise signals an evaluation of the usefulness of concepts as policing styles, rather than researching police responses and actions.

A last suggestion would be to look for new factors that could influence police officers' choice of policing style at demonstrations. While conducting the literature review, various studies were found that mentioned 'trust' (Baker, 2019; Gilham et al., 2013; Gilmore, 2017; Gorringer et al., 2012; Gorringer & Rosie, 2008; McCarthy et al., 2007). Moreover, Monaghan and Walby (2012) speak of 'threat amplification', since this research did not have insight into internal documents of police agencies such as threat-assessments, it was not able to determine whether there was a difference in the level of threat the police assumed of a protest and the actual level of threat (such as violent

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<sup>21</sup> This is in line with conclusions of Gorringer and Rosie (2008).

tactics used). If research in protest policing is to be moved forward, it would be useful to develop a better understanding of the influence of more abstract variables like the aforementioned.

### 5.3 Methodological discussion

#### 5.3.1 Addressing validity

In the first place, to ensure validity, description and selection biases need to be addressed. In total 280 indicators of protest policing styles were identified in 201 articles, accounting for 94 protest events. This means that every protest event had on average one or two articles, though there were few cases of bigger protest events with deviations to five articles or more. Thus, cases were uneven in size. Furthermore, as shown in the results, it was visible that for some categories there were few cases available, thus hindering the generalizability of this research.

Through the use of one article instead of multiple sources, the sample is vulnerable to description bias. Description biases refer to the tendency of newspapers to be more objective in reporting “hard news items’ about the event (i.e. the who, what, when, where, and why of the event)” (Reynolds-Stenson, 2017, p. 53). These straightforward news reports are generally considered to be relatively objective in their coverage of events. However, newspapers can be biased in describing ‘softer’ news items, such as the dynamics of a protest or police intervention. The selection strategy already accounted for some of this bias, but an overview of the distribution of newspaper article sources was conducted to identify any remaining biases in the sample. Selection bias is the inclination of newspapers to report on protest events that are in close proximity or have higher news value, meaning incidents that are larger in scale or have a greater degree of casualties. Some authors, such as Earl & Soule (2006), Earl et al. (2003), and Reynolds-Stenson (2017) account for this by restricting their samples to one place. The codes ‘location’ and ‘number of arrests’ were added to see if there were biases towards proximity and/or more dramatic events.

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>N (% articles in sample)</b>
<b>AD/Algemeen Dagblad.nl</b>	72 (35,82%)
<b>De Telegraaf/De Telegraaf.nl</b>	41 (20,40%)
<b>NRC/NRC.nl</b>	24 (11,94%)
<b>Trouw/Trouw.nl</b>	14 (6,96%)
<b>Het Parool/Het Parool.nl</b>	15 (7,46%)
<b>De Volkskrant/De Volkskrant.nl</b>	15 (7,46%)
<b>Metronieuws.nl</b>	10 (4,98%)
<b>Nu.nl</b>	10 (4,98%)

Table 17 results description bias

Table 17 above illustrates the distribution of newspaper sources within the dataset. Notably, Algemeen Dagblad (AD) represents a significantly larger proportion compared to other national newspapers. This is expected, given that AD is a major Dutch newspaper formed from the merger of several regional papers, and it tends to cover more regional news than its counterparts. De Telegraaf, known for its right-leaning perspective, constitutes a fifth of the articles in the sample. The left-progressive newspapers, Volkskrant and Parool, collectively make up a similar share of the sample. Meanwhile, NRC, often characterized as center-progressive, and Trouw, regarded as center-conservative, together contribute to a fairly balanced distribution of viewpoints within the sample.<sup>22</sup> Earl et al. (2004) recommend using at least two different newspaper sources to create a dataset in order to account for description bias. In this research eight news sources were used, therefore even if a case was only covered by one newspaper article the effect of description bias should be

<sup>22</sup> Political affiliation of newspapers was based on the article “Wat Stemmen Krantenlezers?” (2016)



neglectable over the whole sample. Moreover, a discussion within studies on protest policing using newspaper articles remains if multiple sources per event creates a more reliable sample. It could also be argued that adding sources might as well lead to more biases, and it remains unclear if adding articles for different perspectives actually leads to better observations. Another significant issue is how to deal with lacking information, Earl et al. (2004) give some solutions for this which were partially applied in this research, such as categorizing cases on a variable that was mentioned in all cases, and omitting cases with incomplete information.

Location of protest event	N (% events in sample)
1. Amsterdam	20 (21,28%)
2. Den Haag	31 (32,98%)
3. Rotterdam	6 (6,38%)
4. Utrecht	3 (3,19%)
5. Nijmegen	5 (5,32%)
6. Eindhoven	3 (3,19%)
7. Hilversum	3 (3,19%)
8. Other	23 (24,40%)

Table 18 results selection bias

Table 18 presents the geographic distribution of protest events within the sample,  $N = 94$ . The data indicates that Amsterdam and The Hague serve as the primary locations for protest events. This is expected, given that Amsterdam is the capital city of the Netherlands and The Hague hosts the parliament and various government institutions. The 'other' category consists of 21 cities and villages outside the major urban agglomeration of the west-centre Netherlands Randstad region (appendix 6). The data suggest that there is no significant selection bias in the geographical distribution of protest events, which aligns with what was anticipated. Moreover, selection bias could arise from newspapers focusing on larger incidents or those with more casualties. However, the data in table 19 indicate that this is not the case in this sample. Notably, the highest relative frequency (20,21%) was found at events with very few arrests, and protests involving a high number of arrests (more than 99) account for only 17,01% of the sample. The digital newspaper archive Nexis Uni was used, this database collected both printed and digital newspaper coverage allowing the collection of a wide range of incidents. Thus, there appears to be a fair distribution concerning geographical proximity and the dramatic nature of events. Nonetheless, as policing is influenced by institutions and socio-cultural contexts, further research could look into the effects of geographical location, e.g. are there location-specific differences in protest policing styles in cities across the Netherlands using a randomized sample.

Number of arrests	N events (% articles in sample)	Absolute values arrests per case
<b>Total</b>	94 (100%)	
<b>0 arrests</b>	5 (5,31%)	0, 0, 0, 0, 0
<b>1 – 9 arrests</b>	19 (20,21%)	1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
<b>10 – 49 arrests</b>	13 (13,82%)	10, 10, 12, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 22, 25, 30, 30
<b>50 – 99 arrests</b>	5 (5,31%)	50, 62, 70, 90, 92
<b>100 – 499 arrests</b>	9 (9,57%)	104, 120, 146, 150, 175, 300, 400, 400
<b>500 – 999 arrests</b>	3 (3,19%)	650, 700, 768
<b>&gt; 999 arrests</b>	4 (4,25%)	1000, 1579, 2400, 2400

<b>Not mentioned</b>	37 (39,36%)	
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*Table 19 results selection bias*

The time period for this research was from February 25, 2022, to April 1, 2024. Initially the period set from 2021 till 2024. To validly test present policing styles in the Netherlands, events before February 25, 2022 were excluded due to the COVID-19 measures the Dutch government implemented. The reasoning behind this, is that in case those events were included it might not accurately measure protest policing in the Netherlands under ‘normal’ conditions, but rather how the policing style responds to policy changes, especially in crisis management. Further research could investigate to what extent protest policing differed during specific periods, such as during the pandemic.

Another choice was to exclude protest events with less than five participants from the sample. The author assumes that this does not lead to significant different outcomes, as those cases often also lacked a clear aim which was another exclusion ground. Earl et al. (2003) did include those cases, provided they were clearly collaborative actions towards a target. Furthermore, a selection criteria was to only use newspaper articles in which the police was present at a protest in line with the majority of case studies in the field of protest policing. This was also due to the research methods used in this research and the data available. This implies, however, that this study did not capture events in which the police was not present, or which are not reported by media. It would be interesting for future research to conduct a meta-analysis in the effect of differences in methods and definitions used in various studies, and to synthesize those results.

### **5.3.2 Addressing reliability**

Moreover, a core issue regarding the methodology of this research was the operationalization of dimensions regarding protest policing styles. The comparative framework of Gillham (2011) together with the operationalization from Rak (2021) and Owczarek (2022) based on the established theory from McPhail et al. (1998) was adapted to determine which protest policing strategy is dominant in the cases analysed. Rak used a small sample of cases, combining information from several different sources next to newspaper sources for reliability and verification. Since this research had a dataset of 94 events it was decided not to triangulate multiple sources. Most of these dimensions and indicators for policing styles were specified and straightforward enough to derive indicators to categorize sentences in articles. Challenging was the first dimension ‘assembly’, which separated policing styles based on if police officers recognized the right to protest. A coding scheme was made after analysing the first fifteen newspaper articles and adapted to provide more clarity along the way, though it remained subject to interpretation, which might have influenced results.

To illustrate, the case where a police spokesperson stated that officers discussed with activists multiple times that the protest was not allowed, but could continue in a different form or location, with force used if they did not voluntarily leave. This could be coded as negotiated management due to mutual communication initiated by the police during the protest. To resolve such ambiguities, the first two dimensions were consulted to determine the primary goal. In negotiated management, the focus lies on minimizing disruption without necessarily ending the demonstration. In contrast, strategic incapacitation aims to control the form, tactics, location, and duration of the protest. Therefore, even if there was mutual interaction between police officers and protesters, if the protesters had no actual say in whether the protest would be tolerated, it was coded as strategic incapacitation. In practice, distinguishing between strategic incapacitation and negotiated management was therefore sometimes ambiguous.



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## Appendix

### 1. Overview selected articles for literature review

	Article	Prediction trend policing style	Factors identified	Sample size & primary data collection
1.	Baker, D. (2019). Public Order Policing Approaches to Minimize Crowd Confrontation During Disputes and Protests in Australia. <i>Policing</i> , 14(4), 995–1014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paz071">https://doi.org/10.1093/police/paz071</a>	Facilitative	Police knowledge, protester tactics, characteristics protest event, trust	N = 3, case studies, in-depth interviews
2.	Button, M., John, T. L., & Brearley, N. (2002). New challenges in public order policing: the professionalisation of environmental protest and the emergence of the militant environmental activist. <i>International Journal of the Sociology of Law</i> , 30(1), 17–32. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/s0194-6595(02)00017-5">https://doi.org/10.1016/s0194-6595(02)00017-5</a>	-	Emergence of new type of 'professionalised protester'	Primary research, sample not specified
3.	Carey, T. E., & Cisneros, Á. S. (2023). Policing Protest: An Examination of Support for Police Suppression of Protest. <i>PS, Political Science &amp; Politics</i> , 56(2), 234–239. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096522001354">https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096522001354</a>	-	Media frames, issues, race of protesters	US Population survey on support for police intervention at protests (N = 5299)
4.	Channing, I. (2018). Policing Extreme Political Protest: A Historical Evaluation of Police Prejudice. <i>Policing</i> , 14(4), 900–915. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pay010">https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pay010</a>	Repressive	Use of prediction, alignment between police and demonstrators, political affiliation, influence of pragmatism	Historical analysis from interwar years till now
5.	Crosby, A., & Walby, K. (2023). Strategic incapacitation, scaled up: National security influence on protest policing for the 2018 Quebec G7 summit. <i>Environment And Planning. C, Politics And Space</i> , 41(4), 698–713. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544231151676">https://doi.org/10.1177/23996544231151676</a>	Repressive	Perceived threat, police stereotyping protesters as threat	N = 1, case study, internal government documents

6.	Cunningham, D. (2022). Policing White Supremacy: Asymmetry and Inequality in Protest Control. <i>Social Problems</i> . <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spac010">https://doi.org/10.1093/socpro/spac010</a>	Repressive	Threat assessment, size, alignment between police and demonstrators, political affiliation	N = 1, cluster of case studies
7.	Davenport, C., Soule, S. A., & Armstrong, D. (2011). Protesting while Black? <i>American Sociological Review</i> , 76(1), 152–178. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410395370">https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122410395370</a>	-	Race, subjective threat, effect fluctuates over time	N = > 15000, protest events in the US between 1960 - 1990
8.	Della Porta, D., Peterson, A., & Reiter, H. (2006). <i>The policing of transnational protest</i> . Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.	Repressive	-	Several transnational summits and related protest events
9.	Della Porta, D., & Zamponi, L. (2013). Protest and policing on October 15th, global day of action: the Italian case. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 23(1), 65–80. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.727596">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.727596</a>	Repressive	Lack of police knowledge, size of protest, characteristics demonstrations	N = 1, interviews and documentary analysis
10.	Earl, J., & Soule, S. A. (2006). Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest Policing. <i>Mobilization</i> , 11(2), 145–164. <a href="https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.11.2.u1wj8w41n301627u">https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.11.2.u1wj8w41n301627u</a>	Repressive	Threat of the event, size of event and confrontational tactics, diversity of participants	New York State, 1968 - 1973
11.	Earl, J., Soule, S. A., & McCarthy, J. (2003). Protest under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest. <i>American Sociological Review</i> , 68(4), 581–606. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/1519740">https://doi.org/10.2307/1519740</a>	-	Situational threats from groups, weakness, large protests, confrontational tactics, radical goals	N = 1905 events, New York 1968 - 1973
12.	Eggert, N., Wouters, R., Ketelaars, P., & Walgrave, S. (2016). Preparing for action: police deployment decisions for demonstrations. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 28(2), 137–148. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1147565">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2016.1147565</a>	-	Previous experience with protesters, situational threat and level of threat to police agents	N = 4172 permit requests between 2001 and 2010 in Belgium
13.	Gillham, P. F., Edwards, B., & Noakes, J. A. (2013). Strategic incapacitation and the policing of Occupy Wall Street protests in	Repressive	Lack of police knowledge,	N = 1, two-week long field

	New York City, 2011. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 23(1), 81–102. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.727607">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.727607</a>		demonstrator strategies, trust	observations, interviews
14.	Gillham, P. F. (2011). Securitized America: strategic incapacitation and the policing of protest since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. <i>Sociology Compass</i> , 5(7), 636–652. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x</a>	Repressive	minimizing risk by identifying and neutralizing possible threats, risk of on- and in the job troubles for police	Literature review, case-studies of major events in the US between 1970 - 2020
15.	Gilmore, J., Jackson, W., & Monk, H. (2017). 'That is not facilitating peaceful protest. That is dismantling the protest': anti-fracking protesters' experiences of dialogue policing and mass arrest. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 29(1), 36–51. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2017.1319365">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2017.1319365</a>	Repressive	Police stereotyping protesters as threat, trust <sup>23</sup>	N = 1, ethnography, observations, 28 interviews
16.	Gorringer, H., Rosie, M., Waddington, D., & Kominou, M. (2012). Facilitating ineffective protest? The policing of the 2009 Edinburgh NATO protests. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 22(2), 115–132. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.605260">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.605260</a>	Repressive	Limited negotiated management, uncertainty, disruptive tactics used by protesters	N = 3
17.	Gorringer, H., Stott, C., & Rosie, M. (2012). Dialogue Police, Decision Making, and the Management of Public Order During Protest Crowd Events. <i>Journal Of Investigative Psychology And Offender Profiling</i> , 9(2), 111–125. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1359">https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1359</a>	Facilitative	Perceived police legitimacy, perceived threat, trust	N = 1, case study, ethnography, interviews
18.	Gorringer, H., & Rosie, M. (2008). It's a long way to Auchterarder! 'Negotiated management' and mismanagement in the policing of G8 protests <sup>1</sup> . <i>British Journal Of Sociology</i> , 59(2), 187–205. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00189.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2008.00189.x</a>	Facilitative	Police stereotyping protesters as threat, trust	N = 1, case study, participant observations, 6 interviews, review media coverage
19.	Helfers, R. C., Jones-Brown, D., & Boyd, L. M. (2022). Guest editorial: Policing in the aftermath of the 2020 protests: Lessons learned and evolving strategies for reform. <i>Policing</i> , 45(4), 541–555. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-08-2022-200">https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-08-2022-200</a>	Repressive	Minorities, racial disparities	Literature review of protest events in summer 2020

20.	Jackson, W., Gilmore, J., & Monk, H. (2018). Policing unacceptable protest in England and Wales: A case study of the policing of anti-fracking protests. <i>CSP. Critical Social Policy/Critical Social Policy</i> , 39(1), 23–43. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018317753087">https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018317753087</a>	Repressive	Focus and form of political activism, people involved in protest, acceptable protest by police	N = 1, observations, interviews
21.	King, M., & Waddington, D. (2005). Flashpoints revisited: a critical application to the policing of anti-globalization protest. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 15(3), 255–282. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460500168584">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439460500168584</a>	-	Explanation flashpoint model	N = 2, case studies
22.	Koslicki, W. M. (2022). Criticism does not constrain: testing for evidence of de-policing following the murder of George Floyd. <i>Policing</i> , 45(4), 586–599. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-08-2021-0114">https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-08-2021-0114</a>	-	Race	Open dataset of Minneapolis' police use of force, January 2019 to June 2021
23.	Maguire, E. R. (2021). Protest policing and the reality of freedom: Evidence from Hong Kong, Portland, and Santiago in 2019 and 2020. <i>International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice</i> , 45(3), 299–313. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2021.1899002">https://doi.org/10.1080/01924036.2021.1899002</a>	Repressive	Over-response by police	ACLED dataset, comparative case studies in three cities
24.	McCarthy, J. D., Martin, A., & McPhail, C. (2007). Policing Disorderly Campus Protests and Convivial Gatherings: The Interaction of Threat, Social Organization, and First Amendment Guarantees. <i>Social Problems</i> , 54(3), 274–296. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.3.274">https://doi.org/10.1525/sp.2007.54.3.274</a>	Repressive	Nature of protest event, behavior participants, trust, perceived threat by authorities	N = 615, 1985 to 2002 campus protests in the United States
25.	Mullis, D., Belina, B., Petzold, T., Pohl, L., & Schipper, S. (2016). Social protest and its policing in the “heart of the European crisis regime”: The case of Blockupy in Frankfurt, Germany. <i>Political Geography</i> , 55, 50–59. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.07.001">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.07.001</a>	Repressive	Threat assessment, categorizing protesters in ‘criminal’ and ‘normal’	N = 2, case studies of Blockupy protests in Frankfurt
26.	Monaghan, J., & Walby, K. (2012). Making up ‘Terror Identities’: security intelligence, Canada’s Integrated Threat Assessment Centre and social movement suppression. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 22(2), 133–151. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.605131">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2011.605131</a>	Repressive	Threat assessments, categorizing protesters	N = 4, AITA requests

27.	Monaghan, J., & Walby, K. (2012). 'They attacked the city': Security intelligence, the sociology of protest policing and the anarchist threat at the 2010 Toronto G20 summit. <i>Current Sociology</i> , 60(5), 653–671. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392112448470">https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392112448470</a>	Repressive	Threat assessment and amplification, stereotyping protesters as threat, political impartiality	N = 1, information request govt
28.	Nassauer, A. (2015). Effective crowd policing: empirical insights on avoiding protest violence. <i>Policing</i> , 38(1), 3–23. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-06-2014-0065">https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm-06-2014-0065</a>	-	Specific interaction sequences, emotional dynamics, communication	N = 30 in the US and Germany of moderate-left demonstration marches
29.	Owczarek, K. (2022). Escalated force as a model of protest policing: A case study of the Rotterdam 2021 protests. <i>HAPsc Policy Briefs Series</i> , 3(2), 8–13. <a href="https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776">https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776</a>	Repressive, hybrid model	Characterization of protesters as violent, "us vs them" division by police and public institutions	N = 1, qualitative source analysis of Dutch news sites
30.	Passavant, P. A. (2021). <i>Policing protest: The Post-Democratic State and the Figure of Black Insurrection</i> . Duke University Press.	Repressive	Neoliberal authoritarianism	Literature review from 1990s onwards in the US
31.	Pickard, S. (2019). EXCESSIVE FORCE, COERCIVE POLICING AND CRIMINALISATION OF DISSENT. REPRESSING YOUNG PEOPLE'S PROTEST IN TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BRITAIN. <i>Revista Internacional de Sociología</i> , 77(4), 139. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.002">https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2019.77.4.19.002</a>	Repressive	Perceived threat to status quo	Policy- and legalisation analysis
32.	Rafail, P. (2010). Asymmetry in Protest Control? Comparing Protest Policing Patterns in Montreal, Toronto, And Vancouver, 1998-2004. <i>Mobilization</i> , 15(4), 489–509. <a href="https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.15.4.p64822u83v032715">https://doi.org/10.17813/maiq.15.4.p64822u83v032715</a>			
33.	Rafail, P. (2014). Policy spillover and the policing of protest in New York City, 1960–2006. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 25(5), 463–483. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2013.878344">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2013.878344</a>	Repressive	Privatisation of public space, Broken Window crime control spillovers	N = 6147 protest events in New York between 1960 and 2006

34.	Rak, J. (2021). POLICING ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS DURING THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS IN POLAND: BETWEEN ESCALATED FORCE AND NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT. <i>Teorija in Praksa</i> , 598–615. <a href="https://doi.org/10.51936/tip.58.specialissue.598-615">https://doi.org/10.51936/tip.58.specialissue.598-615</a>	Repressive , hybrid models	“us vs them” distinction, threat to police/system	N = 5, protest during first wave covid-19 in Poland
35.	Reynolds-Stenson, H. (2017). Protesting the police: anti-police brutality claims as a predictor of police repression of protest. <i>Social Movement Studies</i> , 17(1), 48–63. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1381592">https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2017.1381592</a>	Repressive	Threat to police as institution, political impartiality	N = 7463, news articles dataset over 35 years from 1960 - 1995
36.	Smith, W. (2015). Policing Democracy: Race, Riots and Protest. <i>Perspectives On Politics</i> , 13(3), 774–777. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592715001334">https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592715001334</a>	Repressive	Minorities, race, categorical boundaries made by police	Review of a book on several protests in NYC and Paris
37.	Soule, S., & Davenport, C. (2009). Velvet Glove, Iron Fist, or Even Hand? Protest Policing in the United States, 1960-1990. <i>Mobilization</i> , 14(1), 1–22. <a href="https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.14.1.y01123143t231q66">https://doi.org/10.17813/mai.14.1.y01123143t231q66</a>	Repressive	Character of the protest and level of threat to police officers	N = 15076, news articles, dataset over 1960 – 1990 in the US
38.	Terpstra, J. (2006). Policing Protest and the Avoidance of Violence: Dilemmas and Problems of Legitimacy. <i>Journal of Criminal Justice and Security</i> , 8(3), 203–212.	Facilitative	Various contradictory police-organization dilemma’s regarding legitimacy, institutional factors, negotiated management	N = 1, case study of environmental protest in the Netherlands
39.	Waddington, D. (2011). Public order policing in South Yorkshire, 1984–2011: the case for a permissive approach to crowd control. <i>Contemporary Social Science</i> , 6(3), 309–324. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2011.619878">https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2011.619878</a>			
40.	Waddington, D. (2013). A ‘kinder blue’: analysing the police management of the Sheffield anti-‘Lib Dem’ protest of March 2011. <i>Policing &amp; Society</i> , 23(1), 46–64. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.703197">https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.703197</a>	Facilitative	Public perception	N = 1, case study, participant observation, 11 in-depth interviews
41.	Wahlström, M. (2011). <i>The making of protest and protest policing: Negotiation</i> ,	-	Mutual lack of trust, use of narratives by	Interview with protesters

	<i>Knowledge, Space, and Narrative</i> [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Gothenburg.		both activists and police	and police officers, Gothenburg and Copenhagen
42.	Wood, L. (2020). Policing counter-protest. <i>Sociology Compass</i> , 14(11), 1–10. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12833">https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12833</a>	Repressive	Political affiliation protesters	N = 64 counter-protest events 2017-2018

## 2. Overview selected cases of protest events

### Name document (date in year-month-day, location, protest event description)

2022_03_01 Lutkemeerpolder blockade
2022_03_05 Den Haag solidarity protest Ukraine
2022_05_07 Amsterdam pro-abortus protest
2022_05_13 Amsterdam XR protest
2022_05_20 Papendrecht Boskalis blockade
2022_05_23 Amersfoort XR demonstration Staatsbosbeheer
2022_05_24 Rotterdam demonstration XR
2022_06_18 Amsterdam demonstration anti-police
2022_06_22 Den Haag demonstration XR Belastingdienst
2022_06_27 Various locations farmer protests
2022_07_01 Den Haag demonstration healthcare
2022_07_01 Harderwijk farmer protests
2022_07_04 Heerenveen demonstration farmers
2022_07_04 Ter Apel Protest Pegida
2022_07_05 Hengelo farmer protests
2022_07_06 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2022_07_07 Bleiswijk farmers protest
2022_07_07 Leeuwarden solidarity protest farmers
2022_07_14 Barendrecht farmers protest
2022_08_24 Amsterdam demonstration Ukraine 24_08_2022
2022_08_26 Amsterdam demonstration asylum system
2022_09_04 Amsterdam demonstration MiGreat
2022_09_04 Amsterdam Samen voor Nederland demonstration
2022_09_20 Hilversum demonstration cancelled
2022_09_23 Den Haag solidarity protest Iran
2022_10_15 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2022_11_01 Den Haag demonstration Kurds
2022_11_07 Amsterdam demonstration against kabinet
2022_11_08 Emmen KOZP demonstration
2022_11_19 Staphorst demonstration KOZP
2022_11_26 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_01_17 Amsterdam UvA occupation
2023_01_28 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_02_20 Den Haag XR VVD office protest
2023_02_21 Hilversum demonstration Kaag
2023_02_23 Amsterdam blockade coal transport
2023_03_11 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_03_12 Den Haag farmer protests
2023_03_25 Eindhoven Airport protest XR
2023_04_24 Amsterdam ING protest XR
2023_05_10 Amsterdam taxi protest
2023_05_10 Soesterberg protest building plans
2023_05_17 Amsterdam occupation Roeterseiland
2023_05_27 Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_06_24 IJmuiden Tata Steel demonstration Greenpeace
2023_07_21 Rotterdam blockade train tracks
2023_07_29 Den Haag farmers protest



2023_08_09	Volkel protest digging tunnel
2023_08_26	Apeldoorn XR demonstration
2023_09_01	Rotterdam blockade bridge Wereldhavendagen
2023_09_09	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_10	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_15	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_16	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_19	Den Haag demonstration Glazen Koets
2023_09_25	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_27	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_09_29	Den Haag A12 XR blockade
2023_10_14	Terneuzen pro-Palestine demonstration
2023_10_15	Amsterdam demonstration pro-Palestine
2023_10_18	Den Haag demonstration pro-Palestine
2023_10_20	Den Haag demonstration pro-Palestine
2023_10_20	Utrecht pro-Palestine demonstration
2023_10_23	Den Haag ICJ pro-Palestine occupation
2023_10_23	Nijmegen demonstration pro-Palestine
2023_11_18	De Lier demonstration KOZP
2023_11_18	Utrecht demonstration Let Women Speak
2023_11_19	Rotterdam pro-Palestine demonstration
2023_11_23	Alphen demonstration KOZP
2023_11_23	Utrecht demonstration Wilders govt
2023_11_25	Nijmegen anti-fascism demonstration
2023_11_30	Rotterdam demonstration wapenbeurs
2023_12_06	Nijmegen station sit-in pro-Palestine
2023_12_08	Rotterdam harbor road blockade XR
2023_12_13	Westland demonstration KOZP
2023_12_21	Gouda station sit-in for Palestine
2023_12_29	Nijmegen ING demonstration XR
2023_12_30	A10 XR blockade
2024_01_05	Urk solidarity demo for a family
2024_01_11	Den Haag ICJ pro-Israel demonstration
2024_01_15	Arnhem Pegida demonstration
2024_02_02	Den Haag station sit-in pro-Palestine
2024_02_03	A12 XR blockade
2024_02_13	Nijmegen road blockade XR
2024_02_17	Amsterdam demonstration for Gaza
2024_02_20	A10 XR blockade
2024_03_02	Den Haag demonstration Israeli embassy
2024_03_05	Den Haag Tweede Kamer pro-Palestine sit-in
2024_03_06	Den Haag blockade roads pro-Palestine
2024_03_09	Maastricht XR demonstration art fair
2024_03_10	Amsterdam protest National Holocaustmuseum
2024_03_21	Alphen protest infrastructure
2024_03_23	Eindhoven XR demonstration
2024_03_30	A10 XR blockade

### Overview of excluded cases in the dataset

Exclusion criteria	Action	(Number of) Documents excluded
<b>High similarity with other articles</b>	<p>D11 and D12 merged into one document (D10) as several decentralized protests were part of the action campaign of Farmers Defense Force (FDF) on 28 June, 2022.</p> <p>D37 and D38 were merged into one document (D27) as it was the same protest event (Extinction Rebellion A12 blockade).</p>	(4) D11, D12, D37, D38
<b>Police presence</b>	Did not contain complete information about police action nor presence and was also excluded from the sample for that reason.	(8) D35, D54, D72, D79, D82, D92, D95, D98
<b>Collective action (&gt; 5 people)</b>	Excluded as it were actions of less than 5 people.	(4) D77, D101, D108, D110
<b>Incomplete information</b>	It contained a video of a protest event without context that was inaccessible, therefore that case was deleted.	(1) D22
<b>Opinion articles</b>	It was a report on police intervention at various events and the opinion of several politicians, thus not a single-case report of a protest event.	(1) D96

### 3. Operationalization of the three policing strategy models

<b>Characteristics</b> <sup>24</sup>	Coding scheme copied from the operationalization by Owczarek, K. (2022). <b>Escalated Force as a Model of Protest Policing: A Case Study of the Rotterdam 2021 Protests. HAPSc Policy Briefs Series, 3(2), 8–13.</b> <a href="https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776">https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776</a> Owczarek (2022) and Rak (2021)	<b>Operationalization of Strategic Incapacitation</b> from Gillham, P. F. (2011). <b>Securitizing America: strategic incapacitation and the policing of protest since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Sociology Compass, 5(7), 636–652.</b> <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x</a>
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	1. Escalated force 2. Negotiated management	3. Strategic incapacitation
<i>The protection of assembly</i>	(1) officers do not recognize freedom of assembly. (2) officers protect freedoms, which is its primary purpose occurring on par with protecting life and property.	(3) officers primary goal is to preserve security and neutralize possible security threats through selectively targeting protesters who use unpredictable and illegal tactics, only protesters who follow police orders and permit procedures are granted protection of their freedoms.
<i>Extent of police tolerance during protest</i>	(1) The police only recognize peaceful forms of protest. Any disruptions that occur that include conditions previously unknown to protest officials are not tolerated by law enforcement. (2) All of the protesters are protected. Unregistered protests that arise spontaneously do not require a permit. While the police seek to limit possible disruptions caused by demonstrations, these are not a reason to end them.	(3) police specifies which areas, length and actions are acceptable for protest in advance. Protesters have no choice but to adhere to pre-emptive rules, rather than negotiating them. If rules are broken, the authorities won't let the demonstration take place at all.
<i>Nature of communication</i>	(1) Communication between law enforcement and demonstrators is minimal. Police avoid consulting and negotiating with protesters before and during gatherings. (2) Communication is a necessary form of organized assemblies that protects the right to assemble and maintains control over it. It keeps the disruptions that occur at a level acceptable to the police. The police strive to support interaction with protesters before and during the assembly.	(3) Communication is constrained and an one-way procedure to inform organizers on what protest activities are tolerable. During protests, police does not interact with protesters other than to provide orders.

<sup>24</sup> Value (1) corresponds to escalated force, (2) to negotiated management and (3) to strategic incapacitation.

	Protesters need the police to protect a given gathering. The police do not have total control over the protest, as part of it is handed over to the protesters, who have their coordinators	
<i>Use of arrests as public order management</i>	(1) arrests are not necessarily supported by legal grounds; they also occur in the absence of violations of legal norms. The response to breaches of the law is immediate. During arrests, physical force is applied, particularly to protesters who appear to be the most active; (2) They are used arrests as a last resort and only against those protesters who have committed violations of legal norms. The necessary documentation is drawn up from the conduct of such actions, and numerous warnings precede the arrests themselves. Protesters are repeatedly informed that they are violating the law and allowed to stop their activities	(3) arrest are made on a selective basis frequently before any offense. These arrests are often conducted without obtaining proof. Detention and fining protesters is used frequently.
<i>The extent and manner of using force to control protests</i>	(1) despite the occurrence of arrests, the use of force as physical punishment against protesters is also emerging. By physical force, we mean using tear gas, batons, electric stun guns, horses, and dogs. The force gradually escalates until the goal is achieved -compliance with police orders; (2) force is used only when required to carry out duties such as protecting people, public order, and property. Clashes with protesters are avoided, and negotiation and cordoning off the demonstration area is essential	(3) police uses force selectively. Less-lethal weapons such as tear gas, pepper spray, tasers, rubber bullets, wooden missiles and bean bag rounds are now the weapons of choice as a means temporarily incapacitate potentially disruptive protesters and repel others away from areas police are trying to defend such as entrances and exits to secured zones.
<i>Surveillance during protest events</i>	(1) police used simple visual observations by officers at the event. (2) surveillance used minimally, and if used mostly to facilitate the protest for example through guiding traffic.	(3) police collect extensive amounts of information on activists and advocacy groups between and during protest events, such as questioning activists in their homes. Extensive use of surveillance during events that entails the collection of both real time and static information by officers in the street and remotely.

<i>Information sharing</i>	(1) information shared with other local and national police agencies. (2) minimal cross agency information sharing.	(3) police rely extensively on information shared across federal, state and local agencies. Moreover, information is shared with news media selectively by public spokespersons to control public perceptions and limit public criticism.
<i>Controlling space</i>	<p>(1) Control of space was primarily reactive as police responded to confrontations as they occurred. Use of barricades and police lines, strategies like kettling are common to make mass arrests, often accompanied by physical force.</p> <p>(2) barriers as a way to guide protesters to the areas they had agreed during the permitting process would be off-limits. Police treated the rights of protesters to gather on par with the rights of protest targets to do the same, often allowing protesters to be within earshot of the targeted gathering</p>	(3) police decide in advance with no input from protest planners where demonstrations will be allowed and divide public and private spaces into three types of securitized zones. The zone where demonstrations are deemed legitimate is out of sight of the intended space by protesters. Presence outside the designated free-speech zone provides police with a rationale for neutralizing them and curtailing their freedom of assembly. Police now rely on elaborate fencing systems to establish extensive hard zones around the targets of protest.

#### 4. Coding scheme

<i>Variables</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Glossary</i>	<i>Examples from cases coded</i>
<b>Characteristics of protest events</b>			
<b>#background protest event (PRODAT 1. Base data)</b>		<i>Code group name</i>	
Newspaper source	201	These codes were coded per article, instead of event. Thus <i>N</i> = 201 articles.	AD, De Telegraaf, NRC, het Parool, Trouw, etc.
Date publication (numeric)	201		In all cases this was filling in the date of the publication and the news source.
Date (day of event)	94	The variable represents the day the protest event happened.	Monday
Duration of protest event	83	If the day of event was the only information this was left blank, if an article mentioned “during the morning/afternoon/evening” it was assumed that the event took between 1 – 6 hours. If the report offered the starting time of the demonstration and the time all protesters left, the duration is the time between those notifications.	<p>“Het oponthoud was van korte duur. Rond het middaguur waren de activisten losgemaakt”</p> <p>“De politie maakte na ruim een uur eind aan het protest.”</p> <p>“Ongeveer anderhalf uur later keerde de boeren, na overleg met de politie, huiswaarts”</p>
Location	94	Geographical location the protest event took place. Coded on city-level.	Amsterdam
Organizer <i>Split in:</i> Organizations that organized two or more protests to check for organizer prominence	84	The actor that organizes the protest event is often mentioned explicitly, in the absence of a clear indication like “organized by” or “protest of”, implicit sentences where organizations’ spokespersons were mentioned were used to identify the organizers.	<p>“Georganiseerd door de Palestijnse Gemeenschap in Nederland”</p> <p>“Milieuactivisten van Extinction Rebellion hebben vrijdagochtend het hoofdkantoor van Boskalis in Papendrecht geblokkeerd”</p>
Number of arrests	82	Absolute number of arrested protesters during a demonstration.	“Twee mensen aangehouden”

		<p>“In total zijn er 175 activisten aangehouden”</p> <p>“De politie hield niemand aan”</p>
<b>SUPPORTERS (PRODAT 2. Supporters)</b>	<i>Code group name</i>	
<p>Number of participants</p> <p><i>Split in:</i></p> <p>Size very small</p> <p>Size small group</p> <p>Size gathering</p> <p>Size large protest</p> <p>Size mass demonstration</p>	<p>94</p> <p>If only the number of arrests was mentioned but the total number of participants was missing, the number of arrests was taken as number of participants. As it indicates the minimum number of participants.</p> <p>Category scale of McCarthy et al. (2007) was used to group size: (1) very small (1-9); (2) small group (10-24); (3) gathering (25-99); (4) large protest (100-999); and (5) mass demonstration (1,000 or more).</p>	<p>“Op de demonstratie kwamen meer dan duizend mensen af”</p> <p>“Zo’n drieduizend mensen blokkeerden de A12, zegt ze, en nog eens zo’n tweeduizend mensen waren aanwezig buiten de blokkade”</p> <p>“De actiegroep hoopt 100.000 demonstranten naar het park te trekken, maar heeft volgens de gemeente aangegeven met 25.000 mensen te komen.”</p>
<p>Political orientation</p> <p><i>Split in:</i></p> <p>Ambivalent</p> <p>Centre</p> <p>Heterogenous</p> <p>Left</p> <p>Left-radical</p> <p>Right</p> <p>Right-radical</p>	<p>83</p> <p>Political orientation of supporters of the demonstration. In some cases newspapers will directly mention the political affiliation, in most cases it was interpreted through the claims of the protest. Annual reports of the NCTV (Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism) were consulted to make a distinction between (far-)right, and left-wing protests. Protests of organizations with several political statements of different actors that did not fit in one category are coded ‘heterogenous’, one-issue protests that did not fit in a left-right division were coded ambivalent.</p>	<p>“Extinction Rebellion toonde zich met de actie solidair met de antiracisembeweging en Kick Out Zwarte Piet.”</p> <p>“Verder riepen demonstranten de leus ‘blauw wit rood, Nederland in nood [...] Onder de sprekers op de Dam waren de Kamerleden Pepijn van Houwelingen van Forum voor Democratie”</p> <p>“Bij de demonstratie zouden twee oranje-wit-blauwe vlaggen zijn gesignaleerd”</p>
<p>Composition supporters</p>	<p>92</p> <p>The specific composition of supporters. For the composition of</p>	<p>“Onder de sprekers op de Dam waren ...”</p>

<p><i>Split in:</i> Ethnic groups Farmers Interest groups Not specified Party representatives Students Women Workers Other</p>		<p>supporters, more detailed information was required, such as specific references of supporters, rather than generic statements</p>	<p>“De demonstrerende studenten in Amsterdam komen van verschillende organisaties: onder meer ...”</p> <p>“Studenten en medewerkers bezetten dinsdagmiddag een deel van het universiteitsgebouw”</p>
<p><b>PROBLEM ISSUE (PRODAT 3. Problem/theme)</b></p>		<p><i>Code group name</i></p>	
<p>Movement</p>	<p>94</p>	<p>Categories from PRODAT: civil rights, climate, ethnic groups (e.g., foreigners, asylum seekers, and other ethnic groups), farmers, human rights, others, radical left (e.g., autonomists, anti-fascists, radical left), right-wing, students, women/LGBT, and workers. (see PRODAT 3.2)</p>	<p>“Koerdische demonstratie op het Malieveld tegen de vermeende inzet van chemische wapens”</p> <p>“Deze organisatie hield tijdens de coronapandemie verschillende protesten tegen de coronamaatregelen”</p> <p>“Boerenprotest”</p> <p>“Taxichauffeurs in Amsterdam”</p>
<p>Concrete claim</p> <p><i>Split in:</i> human rights political institutions and politicians national/EU farmers workers ecology infrastructure women rights minorities peace.</p>	<p>91</p>	<p>Categories used were (see PRODAT CLAIMLIST) Using the PRODAT claimlist it gives an elaborate overview of subcategories within these overarching themes.</p>	<p>There were several Pro-Palestina demonstrations, but claims can differ. If the claim was to show solidarity with Palestinians, or for humanitarian aid, or the right for self-determination it was coded ‘claim_human_rights’, though if the claim is to support peace it was coded as ‘claim_peace’, and if it was focused on discriminating policies in asylum policies it</p>



		was coded 'claim_ethnic minorities'
Immediate target of protest	94	Where the political claim can remain quite abstract (e.g. ecology/climate justice, farmers rights, peace) immediate target refers to where the protest is directed to (e.g. the Dutch government, ING bank, the municipality council).  "Tegen het gebrekkige beleid van de stad"  "Klimaatactivisten Extinction Rebellion protesteren bij het hoofdkantoor van de belastingdienst in Den Haag"
<b>PROTEST ACTION (PRODAT 4. Action)</b>		<i>Code group name</i>
<i>Split code:</i> Disruptive/Nondisruptive <sup>25</sup>	94	Form of protest action  Nondisruptive are events causing no consequences or obstruction to everyday processes, for example marches, demonstrations at designated areas or squares.  Under the category 'disruptive' are protests that use tactics such as road and other types of blockades, intervening meetings, or sit-ins at the entrances of buildings so people could not enter or leave.  "Betoging op het Malieveld met vlaggen en sprekers"  "Klimaatactivisten waren het gebouw binnengelopen en hadden plaatsgenomen in de hal"  "Op het Museumplein zijn zondagmiddag zo'n 300 mensen samengekomen om te demonstreren tegen de noodsituatie in Ter Apel"
Counter-protest <i>Split code:</i> left/right-wing counter-protest	18	Counter-protest can occur more spontaneously, though the adapted definition of protests is used. Thus, collectively organized with the specific aim of expressing support or grievance towards a target, or movement of the initial protest.  "Er waren zo'n 50 tegendemonstranten afgekomen"  "Tegenover de groep demonstranten stond donderdagochtend een groep van zo'n 50 pro-Israel demonstranten"
<b><i>Policing styles dimensions</i></b>		
<b>POL_ACT ESCALATED FORCE</b>	Refinements on dimensions were added. Operationalization adapted from Owczarek, K. (2022). Escalated Force as a Model of Protest Policing: A Case Study of the Rotterdam 2021 Protests. <i>HAPSc Policy Briefs Series</i> , 3(2), 8–13. <a href="https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776">https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776</a>	

<sup>25</sup> It was deliberately chosen to not use illegal/legal as a protest might be highly disruptive, though that does not make it illegal.

assembly: not recognized	10	The right to protest is ignored, allowing agents to disband a demonstration easily, authorities such as the municipality do not give permission for the protest and police is mandated to interfere.	<p>“Burgemeester van Staphorst vaardigde zaterdag een noodbevel uit om de boel niet verder te laten escaleren”</p> <p>“[Burgemeester] weigerde dat op deze manier en liet daarna de politie de zaal ontruimen”</p> <p>“Mensen die misschien zouden willen demonstreren worden weggehaald door de politie.</p>
tolerance: low	15	Only nondisruptive forms of protests are allowed. Tolerance is low for any incidents happening during the demonstration that police agents did not account for. The reaction is immediate.	<p>“De politie voerde de charge naar eigen zeggen uit omdat „enkele tientallen demonstranten” in de richting van de Turkse ambassade liepen. Zij werden door de politie teruggestuurd naar het Malieveld, waar het vervolgens onrustig werd.</p> <p>Volgens de organisatoren van de demonstratie wilde slechts één persoon richting de ambassade gaan”</p>
communication: minimal	3	Communication is minimal between demonstrators and officers during the demonstration.	<p>“De politie deelt KOZP mee dat ze de locatie moet verlaten en rijdt zelf weg omdat zij de situatie als te dreigend ervaart.”</p>
arrests: frequent	8	arrests are not necessarily supported by legal grounds; they also occur in the absence of violations of legal norms. The response to breaches of the law is immediate. During arrests, physical force is applied, particularly to protesters who appear to be the most active;	<p>“Meerdere deelnemers van het protest zijn op de grond gaan zitten, totdat de politie hen verwijderde. Eén van hen werd aan armen en benen meegetild</p>

		richting een politieauto.”
force: escalated till compliance	9	Arrests go hand in hand with the frequent use of brute force. Violence is used and escalated as a mean to force demonstrators till compliance with law enforcement.
		<p>“Enkele mensen zijn gearresteerd of weggeleid en agenten hebben een groep mensen omsingeld”</p> <p>“De agenten deelden daarop enkele klappen uit met hun wapenstokken. Hierna was de orde snel hersteld en de demonstratie verliep verder rustig.”</p>
surveillance: first observations	3	First observations by police agents present at the event.
		“Wel was er veel politie aanwezig. Volgens de woordvoerder van de gemeente controleerden de agenten op strafbare feiten, waaronder ‘bepaalde uitspraken’”
info_sharing: moderate	1	Information shared with other local and national police agencies.
		“omdat uit politie-informatie blijkt dat actievoerders mogelijk vervolgacties willen uitvoeren op of rond het vliegveld.”
cont_space: localized, reactive	6	Retaking space is an immediate response to incidents during the protest. “Use of barricades and police lines, strategies like kettling are common to make mass arrests, often accompanied by physical force.” (Owczarek, p. 10)
		<p>“Rond kwart over 8 omsingelt de Mobiele Eenheid (ME) het gebouw.”</p> <p>“Op het veldje aan de President Kennedylaan zijn de actievoerders door de politie omsingeld zodat de groep niet weg kon lopen. Ook stonden er ME-busjes en was er politie te paard aanwezig.”</p>
<b>POL_ACT NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT</b>	Operationalization copied from Owczarek, K. (2022). Escalated Force as a Model of Protest Policing: A Case Study of the Rotterdam 2021 Protests. <i>HAPSc Policy Briefs Series</i> , 3(2), 8–13. <a href="https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776">https://doi.org/10.12681/hapscpbs.33776</a>	

Assembly: protected	35	officers protect freedoms, which is its primary purpose occurring on par with protecting life and property.	<p>“De politie kwam vrijdag ook even ter plaatse en was op voorhand al op de hoogte van de demonstratie. „Ze hebben er nog meer aangekondigd”, laat een woordvoerder weten. „We probeerden gewoon het gesprek aan te gaan, maar de sfeer was rustig.”</p> <p>Demonstreren mag natuurlijk ook gewoon. „Zolang ze niet iets doen wat een gevaarlijke situatie oplevert, mogen ze dit doen. We willen allemaal geen geweld.”</p>
Tolerance: high	23	All of the protesters are protected. Unregistered protests that arise spontaneously do not require a permit. While the police seek to limit possible disruptions caused by demonstrations, these are not a reason to end them.	<p>“De strategie van de politie is in de eerste plaats in gesprek gaan, liet een woordvoerder eerder op de dag weten, in de hoop dat de boeren zelf wegrijden. In het uiterste geval sleept de politie tractoren weg.”</p> <p>“Hierdoor was de brug lange tijd afgesloten voor autoverkeer. De politie faciliteerde de demonstratie.”</p>
Communication: mutual	9	Communication is a necessary form of organized assemblies that protects the right to assemble and maintains control over it. It keeps the disruptions that occur at a level acceptable to the police. The police strive to support interaction with protesters before and during the assembly. Protesters need the police to protect a given gathering. The police do not have total control	<p>“Het hele protest is volgens de organisatie van tevoren besproken met de politie.”</p> <p>“De demonstratie is niet toegestaan. De politie gaat in overleg met de organisatie en actievoerders om te bekijken hoe een en</p>

		over the protest, as part of it is handed over to the protesters, who have their coordinators	ander tot een goed einde kan worden gebracht.”
Arrests: last resort	7	They are used arrests as a last resort and only against those protesters who have committed violations of legal norms. The necessary documentation is drawn up from the conduct of such actions, and numerous warnings precede the arrests themselves. Protesters are repeatedly informed that they are violating the law and allowed to stop their activities	“Ondanks deze gastvrijheid zijn er toch zes aanhoudingen verricht. „Dat hoort er ook een beetje bij. De mensen die zijn aangehouden, waren de mensen die daadwerkelijk naar binnen zijn gegaan. Die actie is door de politie beëindigd. Maar de demonstratie buiten is nog wel gewoon doorgedaan.”
Force: minimal and avoided	10	force is used only when required to carry out duties such as protecting people, public order, and property. Clashes with protesters are avoided, and negotiation and cordoning off the demonstration area is essential	“De groep mensen die toch naar de Dam kwam, liep vanaf daar een ronde door de stad, begeleid door de politie. [...] Op een gegeven moment kwamen agenten de Dam op, maar ze gebruikten geen geweld.”
Surveillance: minimal	7	surveillance used minimally, and if used mostly to facilitate the protest for example through guiding traffic.	“De brug is afgesloten voor autoverkeer.”  “gemeente Terneuzen werd vooraf op de hoogte gesteld van het protest. Onder toezien oog van de politie verzamelden de betogers zich rond 16 uur in het centrum van de havenstad.”
info_sharing: minimal	0	minimal cross agency information sharing.	-
cont_space: localized, proactive	6	barriers as a way to guide protesters to the areas they had agreed during the permitting process would be off-limits. Police treated the rights of protesters to gather on par with the rights of protest targets to do the same, often allowing protesters to	“Zo konden zij binnen zicht- en gehoorafstand hun tegengeluid laten horen. Daarbij ontstond verkeershinder: een rijstrook was tijdelijk

		be within earshot of the targeted gathering	dicht en verkeer is omgeleid”
<b>POL_ACT STRATEGIC INCAPACITATION</b>		Operationalization from Gillham, P. F. (2011). Securitizing America: strategic incapacitation and the policing of protest since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. <i>Sociology Compass</i> , 5(7), 636–652. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00394.x</a>	
Assembly: selective	33	Officers primary goal is to preserve security and neutralize possible security threats through selectively targeting protesters who use unpredictable and illegal tactics, only protesters who follow police orders and permit procedures are granted protection of their freedoms.	“Voor het protest had men geen toestemming. De politie greep in toen de activisten niet wilden vertrekken.”
Tolerance: selective	30	Police specifies which areas, length and actions are acceptable for protest in advance. Protesters have no choice but to adhere to pre-emptive rules, rather than negotiating them. If rules are broken, the authorities won’t let the demonstration take place at all.	“De groep actievoerders zijn er door de politie op gewezen dat er niet gedemonstreerd mag worden op het kruispunt en dat de menigte zich kan verplaatsen naar de Koekamp, waar wel gedemonstreerd mag worden.”
Communication: constrained and one-way	3	Communication is constrained and an one-way procedure to inform organizers on what protest activities are tolerable. During protests, police does not interact with protesters other than to provide orders.	“Maar van onderlinge afspraken is absoluut geen sprake, verzekeren de woordvoerders van zowel de demonstranten als de KMar. „Het was zeker geen gedogen. We hebben heel duidelijk gemaakt dat het een militair vliegveld is en dat betreden absoluut verboden is.”
Arrests: selective & proactive	20	Arrest are made on a selective basis frequently before any offense. These arrests are often conducted without obtaining proof. Detention and fining protesters is used frequenting.	“Direct bij het begin van de blokkade van Extinction Rebellion op de A10 werden 27 actievoerders aangehouden. Zij hebben volgens de politie de blokkade veroorzaakt.”

Force: selective & less lethal	9	Police uses force selectively. Less-lethal weapons such as tear gas, pepper spray, tasers, rubber bullets, wooden missiles and bean bag rounds are now the weapons of choice as a means temporarily incapacitate potentially disruptive protesters and repel others away from areas police are trying to defend such as entrances and exits to secured zones.	“Volgens de politie was er dinsdagavond sprake van een dreigende situatie, er werden daarom eerst waarschuwingsschoten gelost en daarna werd er gericht geschoten”
Surveillance: extensive & real time	8	Police collect extensive amounts of information on activists and advocacy groups between and during protest events, such as questioning activists in their homes. Extensive use of surveillance during events that entails the collection of both real time and static information by officers in the street and remotely.	“Marechaussee en politie houden al maanden zicht op de chatgroepen waarin Extinction Rebellion een bezetting van vliegveld Eindhoven voorbereidde, toch slaagden de actievoerders er zaterdag in om het gaas open te knippen en urenlang op verboden terrein te blijven. „Bij geen enkele demonstratie moeten strafbare feiten worden toegestaan.”
info_sharing: extensive & media conscious	7	Police rely extensively on information shared across federal, state and local agencies. Moreover, information is shared with news media selectively by public spokespersons to control public perceptions and limit public criticism.	“De Koninklijke Marechaussee (KMar), politie te paard, drones, honden, Mobiele Eenheid, de Staf Grootchalig en Bijzonder Optreden die de strategie bepaalt - vele honderden militairen, politiemensen en andere ambtenaren hadden zaterdag geen vrije dag.”
cont_space: selective, extensive, proactive	18	Police decide in advance with no input from protest planners where demonstrations will be allowed and divide public and private spaces into three types of securitized zones. The zone where demonstrations are deemed legitimate is out of sight of	“protest mag doorgaan, wel andere route” “dat er hekken klaarstaan voor het geval demonstranten zich toch op de

	<p>the intended space by protesters. Presence outside the designated free-speech zone provides police with a rationale for neutralizing them and curtailing their freedom of assembly. Police now rely on elaborate fencing systems to establish extensive hard zones around the targets of protest.</p>	<p>Utrechtsebaan begeven. Uiteindelijk hebben agenten de weg moeten afsluiten. Maar ondanks die afsluiting besloot de politie om op te treden, want het is verboden om op de A12 te staan, zo zegt ze. [...] en werd er gewaarschuwd dat ze worden aangehouden als ze niet zouden vertrekken.”</p>
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## 5. Scores of each protest event and the indicators of policing styles



Police strategies at demonstrations NL PDF.pdf

## 6. Selection bias geographical location

Location 'Other'	<i>N</i> (%)
De Lier (Westland)	2 (2,13%)
Alphen	2 (2,13%)
Papendrecht	1 (1,06%)
Amersfoort	1
Harderwijk	1
Heerenveen	1
Ter Apel	1
Hengelo	1
Bleiswijk	1
Leeuwarden	1
Barendrecht	1
Emmen	1
Staphorst	1
Soest	1
Velsen	1
Apeldoorn	1
Terneuzen	1
Gouda	1
Urk	1
Arnhem	1
Maastricht	1