



The portrayal of the 'politieacties' in Dutch newspapers

A critical discourse analysis

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Chapter 1: Introduction

"The media is the most powerful entity on earth. They have the power to make the innocent guilty and to make the guilty innocent, and that's power. Because they control the minds of the masses. (...) If you aren't careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed and loving the people who are doing the oppressing." – Malcolm X

1.1 Background of the study

Indonesia and the Netherlands formed diplomatic relations in 1949 when Indonesia officially became a sovereign state. However, prior to this stable relationship, a long and complicated history can be found full of colonial and exploitative practices since the Dutch arrived on the archipelago for the spice trade in the seventeenth century (Ricklefs, 2001). Within this history, the 'politieele acties' form arguably the most contested and infamous period. These *police actions* occurred during the Indonesian War of Independence (1945-1949). They were two brutal military operations conducted by the Netherlands to re-establish their rule in their former colony (Oostindie, 2022b). What lay behind the concealing term has long remained hidden. It took over twenty years before a veteran named Joop Hueting would speak out about the war crimes committed during this time (Hueting, 1969). Moreover, an extensive research program concluded only in 2022 that "The Dutch government and military leadership deliberately tolerated the systematic and widespread use of extreme violence by Dutch military personnel in the war against the Republic of Indonesia" (NIOD, 2022). This report led to a significant amount of media attention and the first public apology of the Dutch Prime Minister for what occurred in Indonesia after the Second World War.

It took a long time before the actual events of the 'politieele acties' were revealed to the public. In line with this assessment, this thesis highlights the portrayal of these military operations *during* the Indonesian War of Independence. In doing so, it accepts the notions that the media frames issues and events in a particular way and that "norms and standards within news organizations and news production" fortify framing (De Vreese, 2005, p. 56). This thesis then studies the portrayal of the politieele acties in Dutch newspaper articles by analyzing the texts and combining this analysis with examining the historical and institutional context.

1.2 Research question

The main research question of this thesis is formulated as follows:

"How did Dutch newspaper articles portray the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence?"

This thesis seeks to look at both the language used in Dutch newspaper articles and broader institutional and historical frameworks that might influence the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in these texts. Therefore, different dimensions concerning the newspaper articles need to be reviewed and analyzed. Consequentially, the main body of this thesis consists of three chapters that present a macro-, meso-, and micro-analysis. These chapters acknowledge the following three secondary questions:

1. What is the historical context surrounding the 'politieele acties' and the Dutch-Indonesian relationship?
2. What is the institutional dimension of Dutch newspapers during the Indonesian War of Independence?
3. What language is used by Dutch newspaper articles to portray the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence?

Combining these three questions makes it possible to give a thorough account of how Dutch newspaper articles portrayed the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence.

1.3 Relevance

This thesis is mainly exploratory in nature. That is, although there is no lack in general historical research about the Indonesian-Dutch colonial relationship or the Indonesian War of Independence, the confined topic of the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in newspaper articles has not been the subject of much academic research. The extensive research program mentioned earlier, called *Over de Grens* (2022), was mainly concerned with the extreme violence perpetrated by the Dutch military during the war and the role of the Dutch government. The report did dedicate a chapter to the media attention and portrayal during this time but does not go into detail by considering specific primary sources like newspaper articles. Other research about the role of Dutch media in portraying the Indonesian War of Independence primarily discusses different forms of media than newspapers, such as films and magazines. Examples of this type of research include G.J. Hendriks' 'Not a colonial war': Dutch film propaganda in the fight against Indonesia, 1945–49' (2012) and student theses by Jafrin Rezwana (2017) and Laurian Kuipers (2018).

An analysis of specific newspaper articles is still missing, making this thesis particularly relevant. Another way this thesis sets itself apart from previous research is that it deliberately seeks to combine text analysis with an analysis of the historical context and institutional framework behind the words. This exploratory nature does mean this thesis cannot necessarily rely on many academic sources specifically related to this topic, which makes concluding difficult.

Besides scientific relevance, the "politioenele acties" remain a societal relevant subject even though the events occurred over seventy years ago. This relevance is exemplified by the substantial attention the report *Over de Grens* (2022) received in the (international) media and politics. Also, whether or not the Netherlands should pay reparations to the Indonesian people keeps hanging in the air. Furthermore, in the last couple of years, the role of the media has been a constant subject of debate, with terms like "fake news" and "echo chambers" now ingrained in our vocabulary. An analysis of how Dutch media of that time dealt with a sensitive topic like the 'politioenele acties' could be beneficial in highlighting the role and impact media can have in promoting or repressing a particular narrative.

1.4 Terminology

Before going ahead with the methodology and analysis sections, it is essential to explain the use of certain terms throughout this thesis. Specific words can often already convey implicit meanings and judgments, especially concerning the colonial past of Indonesia and the Netherlands (Oostindie, 2022a). For a long time, the Netherlands used the term 'politioenele acties' (*police actions*) to describe the period of 1945-1949 in Indonesia. This term is particularly sensitive since it masks that these military offensives were part of a war, with the Dutch as the aggressor. In 1969, a Dutch veteran, Joop Hueting, would speak openly about the systematic war crimes he witnessed by Dutch soldiers and committed by himself in Indonesia (Hueting, 1969). This statement on national television led to public uproar and mixed reactions. The television program received close to 900 letters from viewers, and newspapers paid much attention to the story. Most people expressed indignation, but several other veterans also decided to speak out (Mathijssen, 2019). Still, the Dutch government, after research, only qualified the violence executed as 'excesses.' However, in 2022, Oostindie (2022a) states that both historians and prominent political figures have recognized (and apologized for) the war crimes committed by the Netherlands. In a 2005 statement, the minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, said the Netherlands had stood "on the wrong side of history" (Bot, 2005). This change of heart is also exemplified by the King of the Netherlands and the Dutch Prime Minister publicly apologizing in 2020 and 2022, respectively.

In describing and analyzing the events of 1945-1949, this thesis desires to shy away as much as possible from terms like 'politioenele acties' that carry a definite implicit, and sometimes explicit, meaning. Yet, because of the wide use of Dutch primary sources, it is impossible to avoid them since this source material contains many instances of colored vocabulary. However, this generally stays limited to citations from these primary sources. Taking the example of the extensive research 'Over de Grens' (2022), realized through a collaboration between a variety of Dutch and Indonesian researchers, this thesis uses the term 'politioenele acties' only as a denotation for the two specific military operations

(Operation Product and Operation Kraai) carried out in 1947 and 1948-1949. This is also what is referred to both in the title and the research question of this thesis.

For the period 1945-1949, the more objective term 'Indonesian War of Independence' is used. The nature of this period as a 'war' has been recognized by academics and the international political community in different compositions such as 'war of independence,' 'decolonization war,' and 'colonial war' (Oostindie, 2022a). Moreover, this term aligns with the Indonesian alternative *Revolusi Nasional*, which references the years the Indonesian population had to defend their independence. One final term that is important to be transparent about is the choice of the word 'Indonesia.' In line with the current acceptance of the 17th of August 1945 as the official day Indonesia became independent, 'Indonesia' is used to describe the Indonesian archipelago after this date.

Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, this thesis seeks to study how Dutch newspaper articles portrayed the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence in a way that considers the language used and the broader historical and institutional factors in play. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an excellent method to employ in this case. Critical discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary approach to do research as it draws from different disciplines such as linguistics, history, and politics (Unger, 2016). Therefore, it is unsurprising that CDA is also utilized in various fields, like language studies, health studies, and media studies. Briefly, CDA is a scholarly orientation used to analyze the dialectic relationship between text and social construction. In addition to discourse studies' general aim of analyzing language in context, CDA seeks to investigate "hidden power relations and ideologies embedded in discourse" (Johnson & McLean, 2020, p. 379). Norman Fairclough, one of the founders of the approach, describes the aim of critical discourse analysis as follows:

"To systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power" (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 132).

Like other forms of discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis uses Michel Foucault's notion of 'discourse' as a framework upon which to build. For Foucault, discourse does not exist in a vacuum since it occurs within a specific context. Foucault expresses that here discourse, power, and knowledge are linked. According to him, power is "embedded within every social interaction and institution" and is closely related to knowledge (Johnson & McLean, 2020, p. 378). Power relations can produce "apparatuses of knowledge" while knowledge can facilitate power relations (Foucault, 1976). Through discourse, power and knowledge come together (Foucault, 1978). In Foucault's view, discourse is never neutral and does not represent an objective reality. Instead, due to the interaction between discourse and power/knowledge, "regimes of truth" are created. Johnson and McLean (2020) explain this below:

"A particular discourse may, then, become socially legitimated as knowledge, common sense, or self-evident truth. Contrastingly, discourse that challenges, or seems incongruous with, a truth regime might be discredited in specific social context as illegitimate or false. Accordingly, the Foucauldian view considers discourse, truth, and truth regimes, as inevitably subjective and contextually situated

within particular social and spatial relations of power/knowledge" (Johnson & McLean, 2020, p. 378).

They lay out that Foucault's work illustrates that what people believe as true can be altered through this mechanism between discourse and power/knowledge. This means that discourse is instrumental in shaping society, and social constructions and institutions can shape discourse in a dialectic relationship. This mechanism is an underlying assumption of critical discourse analysis. Consequently, the goal of CDA is to explore and uncover these relationships between discourse, knowledge, and power in a specific case, like the portrayal of the 'politieele acties.'

This short description of critical discourse analysis and its underlying assumptions clarifies that CDA is less a methodology and more an orientation one can employ in research (Locke, 2004). CDA is quite flexible and can be adapted according to the study's specific needs. This characteristic can be very convenient for applying CDA in practice, but it is also one of its significant criticisms. Critical discourse analysis lacks methodological rigor (Frantz, 2003). Despite the validity of this criticism, it is primarily resolved when one focuses on a specific CDA scholar who has tried to strengthen the methodological process. These varying approaches include distinctive (albeit sometimes overlapping) methodologies that are clearer to apply than CDA as a general scholarly orientation. Teun van Dijk, Ruth Wodak, and Norman Fairclough are three principal authors who have formulated such a distinct approach.

Van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach highlights cognition as an intermediary between discourse and social practices. He claims that "local and global social structures condition discourse, but they do so through the cognitive mediation of the socially shared knowledge, ideologies and personal mental models of social members as they subjectively define communicative events as context models" (Van Dijk, 2014, p. 12). Wodak's discourse-historical approach focuses mainly on the historical context that is important to understand and analyze discourse. It also considers how discourse changes over time by looking further into this historical context (Wodak, 2015).

Fairclough's three-dimensional framework is employed to conduct a critical discourse analysis for this thesis. Norman Fairclough is a Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University and was one of the founders of CDA. He takes a different approach than the ones from Van Dijk and Wodak.

"He [Fairclough] attributes three dimensions to every discursive event. It is simultaneously text, discursive practice – which also includes the production and interpretation of texts – and social practice. The analysis is conducted according to these three dimensions" (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 149-150).

To be clear, Fairclough employs three levels of analysis to study discourse. In essence, these constitute a micro-, meso- and macro-analysis. The micro-level consists of analyzing the texts and language (discourse) itself through aspects of textual/linguistic analysis. For this thesis, this means analyzing the actual newspaper articles about the 'politieele acties' and looking at the language used and how events are described and formulated. The meso-level refers to the analysis of discursive practices, which means studying the production and consumption of the texts. For this thesis, this level is formulated by analyzing the institutions behind the production of the newspapers and the audiences they are targeting. For this, it is also essential to consider the system of pillarization of Dutch society and politics at that time. And finally, the macro-level consists of analyzing social practice, referring to the broader societal and historical context that constitutes the texts. In this thesis, the macro analysis provides a thorough historical context of the 'politieele acties' and the historical background that underlies these events.

Fairclough's methodology is structured into these three levels. Richardson (2007) explains that because of these three types of analyses, Fairclough's approach is the most accessible way of actually doing critical discourse analysis, as other approaches are more theoretical and less practical. Moreover, Richardson uses this specific three-dimensional framework in his book *Analyzing Newspapers – An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis* (2007). He systematically lays out the different stages of Fairclough's method and how they apply to analyzing newspaper articles. Because of this precedent, Fairclough's CDA is especially relevant for this particular thesis since newspaper articles are its primary focus. In addition to this argument, this method addresses another critique of critical discourse analysis and analyzing news in general. This critique consists of the 'meso-level' or the 'discursive practice' of texts often being neglected. For example, Cotter (2001) notes that current research has not analyzed news text as the "outcome of a discourse process [...] A process- or practice-orientated approach would allow new insights into the integrated examination of news practice, news values and audience role" (p. 428). Incorporating a meso-level analysis in which the production and audience of the newspaper (articles) are confronted tackles this criticism.

2.2. Selection Criteria

2.2.1 Selection Newspapers

This thesis studies the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in Dutch newspapers during the Indonesian War of Independence. Because of the limited scope of this thesis, it was vital to be very strict and selective on the newspapers and articles that could be used for this analysis. Therefore, it was decided to analyze articles from two different newspapers. For the selection of these newspapers, two criteria were employed. First, to provide a representative account, the newspapers needed to be national,

meaning the newspaper in question had to be circulated nationwide from 1945 to 1949. Also, the circulation ought to be quite large to account for representativeness.

The second criterion concerned the character of the newspaper. Realizing Dutch society was pillarized at the time, it was essential to pick newspapers from different 'pillars' in the country. This did not mean the two newspapers needed to have opposite affiliations. Still, they at least required to differ from each other to account for the varying character of Dutch society at the time. That is, the pillarization of society might mean newspapers had different views – or, to use Foucault's terminology, different 'truth regimes' – about the 'politieele acties' and the Indonesian War of Independence. The relevance of the pillarized society of the Netherlands (or *verzuijing*) is addressed in more detail in the following chapters (macro- and meso- analysis).

After some consideration, two newspapers were selected that fit the aforementioned criteria. These are *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*. Between 1945 and 1949, both newspapers were among the most prominent and widely circulated newspapers in the Netherlands. *Het Vrije Volk* was a social-democratic daily newspaper associated with the social-democratic pillar of Dutch society (Lijphart, 1990). *De Waarheid* was a communist daily newspaper associated with the smaller communist pillar in the Netherlands but still had a large audience to which to cater (Lijphart, 1990). Since the meso-analysis of this thesis is mainly concerned with the institutional dimension of the newspaper articles and handles the question of production and consumption, more information about the two newspapers is provided in this section.

2.2.2 Selection Articles

As mentioned in the previous section, because the scope of this research is unfortunately limited, it was necessary to set strict criteria for selecting the newspaper articles. Therefore, the following criteria were worked out, keeping in mind that the pieces had to be representative of the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' and comparable with one another.

Timewise, the decision was taken to focus on journalism that occurred during the military operations themselves. Operation Product took place between 21 July 1947 and 5 August 1947. Operation Kraai took place roughly between 19 December 1948 and 5 January 1949. To account for a possible delay in communication between the actual events in Indonesia and the publishing of newspapers in the Netherlands, five days to each period were added.

Articles published on the same dates were chosen to be more precise about the articles and to be sure that they would be comparable. In theory, both newspapers would have a similar amount of information at the time and would report the same events. This all led to analyzing three articles from

each newspaper per 'politieele actie.' In total, this meant twelve pieces had to be studied. The dates and motivation behind this choice are as follows:

- An article from 21 July 1947 and one from 20 December 1948: the days the military operations started in Indonesia. Looking at these articles made it clear how the newspapers initially reacted to and reported on the events in question.
- An article from 25 July 1947 and one from 23 December 1948: these articles were written several days into the military operations, meaning the events have had some time to settle in Dutch society. Analyzing these articles enabled one to see how the newspapers settled into their views on the military operations and the Dutch leaders who initiated them.
- An article from 5 August 1947 and one from 3 January 1949: the days the military operations started to come to an end. By looking at these articles, it became clear how the newspapers reacted to and reported on the idea of a ceasefire and diplomatic solutions.

In addition to this restriction on time, the articles were chosen with the word combination "politieele actie" in the text or a direct reference to the military operations in Indonesia. 'Politieele actie' was the term the military operations (Operation Product and Operation Kraai) were commonly called at the time. Still, one could not be sure they were exclusively referred to in this manner. Also, potential articles were proofread to check that the military operation(s) was its main subject. With 'main subject,' it meant that the daily updates concerning Indonesia were presented in front-page articles, or the operations were discussed in editorials or op-eds. Lastly, it was checked that the articles were published by the two newspapers (*Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*) selected in the previous section.

2.3 Resources

Delpher database

To find the relevant newspaper articles from *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*, the Delpher database was used. Delpher is the most extensive online newspaper database in the Netherlands with free access. Besides newspapers, the database also provides access to various books, magazines, and radio bulletins. The primary newspaper collection of Delpher consists of 17 million newspaper pages from the Netherlands and their previous colonies between 1618 and 2005. After searching in the database, almost every daily newspaper from *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* was freely available, confirming this choice of database.

Secondary literature

Newspaper articles were not the only sources used. For the historical and institutional backgrounds discussed in this thesis's macro-and meso- analysis, primarily academic literature from books and journals and several other articles were used. The WorldCat Discovery database and Google Scholar were tools to find this literature.

2.4 Method Application

Even when choosing Fairclough's three-dimensional framework, there remains a lot of flexibility in how one conducts a critical discourse analysis and on which elements to focus. Therefore, it is vital to clearly state how Fairclough's critical discourse analysis is applied in the following chapters. Because it is crucial to be aware of the broader social currents and historical context before analyzing specific newspaper articles, this thesis will start with the macro-analysis and move via the meso- to the micro-analysis of the newspaper articles.

The macro-analysis of Fairclough's CDA is defined as 'social practice' or "the social and cultural going-on which the communicative event is part of" (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 57). This can include many different things. However, because of the immense historical background of the 'politieele acties,' the macro-analysis essentially provides a historical context. This historical dimension helps to relate the newspaper articles to broader societal currents during that period, providing an overview of the socio-cultural structures, relationships, and themes that affect the pieces and how they are written. The main subjects discussed in that chapter are Indonesian-Dutch colonial relations, the Indonesian War of Independence and the 'politieele acties' themselves, and the Dutch domestic context of pillarization.

The meso-analysis focuses on the newspaper articles' discursive practices or institutional dimensions. The meso-analysis in critical discourse analysis is the most underdeveloped aspect of the methodology, so it leaves some room for interpretation. Smart (2002) explains that it "involve[s] studying issues of production and consumption. For instance, which institution produces a text, who is the target audience" (Questions of Methods of Analysis section). For this paper, Smart's definition is used. In that chapter, the focus is on the newspapers as institutions behind the production and publishing and the audience consuming the texts. An important context for this was the pillarization of the Netherlands during that time. In doing this, it is shown how this institutional dimension might influence the portrayal of the military operations in Indonesia.

The micro-analysis is pretty straightforward. This consists of analyzing a selection of Dutch articles about the 'politieele acties' from 1947 and 1948, the years the military operations took place. Traditionally, this level of Fairclough's CDA consists of a textual/linguistic analysis. In his work about CDA and analyzing newspapers, Richardson (2007) suggests numerous aspects on which to focus this

analysis. Because of the limited nature of this analysis, it was decided to consider three of these aspects when analyzing the articles:

- **Lexical analysis:** Richardson (2007) explains that "words convey the imprint of society and of value judgments in particular – they convey connoted as well as denoted meanings" (p. 47). For example, the words 'kill' and 'neutralize' might refer to the same thing but have entirely different connotations.
- **Presupposition:** Richardson (2007) explains that "a presupposition is a taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance" (p. 63). For example, the question 'Why do Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Hamas want to crush the West and destroy Israel' presupposes that Islamist terrorist groups want to crush the West and destroy Israel. Also, it assumes that al-Qaeda and Hamas are part of these Islamist terrorist groups.
- **Rhetorical tropes:** Richardson (2007) lays out that "a trope will take words and use them to denote-connote something apart from their ordinary meaning" (p. 65). He suggests turning to tropes such as hyperboles (excessive exaggerations) and metaphors but admits there are many other tropes one can consider. Therefore, this thesis also looks at other tropes like rhetorical questions and similes (comparisons).

The newspaper articles are systematically reviewed in that chapter, with these elements as the focus. However, if one of the elements was not present or relevant to an article, it is not described nor analyzed. When quoting directly from the newspaper articles, an English translation from Dutch is provided. The full Dutch articles can be found in the appendix of this thesis.

In the discussion, the three (macro-, meso-, and micro-analysis) are brought together to give a broad picture of how Dutch newspaper articles portrayed the 'politioenele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence and the relationships between these three different levels of analyses that constitute this portrayal.

Chapter 3: Macro-Analysis – Historical Context

This chapter contains the macro-analysis of the critical discourse analysis, which considers the first secondary question in studying the historical context surrounding the 'politioenele acties' and the Dutch-Indonesian relationship. The chapter starts by describing the Indonesian-Dutch colonial relations. After that, the Indonesian War of Independence is discussed, with the two 'politioenele acties' (Operation Product and Operation Kraai) in more detail. These backgrounds are necessary for understanding the socio-historical context in which newspaper articles about the 'politioenele acties' were written and comprehending the subject matter of the articles in general.

3.1 Indonesian-Dutch colonial ties

The colonial ties between Indonesia and the Netherlands go back to the Age of Discovery that started in the fifteenth century. European powers advanced their economic and geopolitical position during this period by traveling overseas and setting up (trading) colonies. This expansion was enabled by the variety of technological developments at that time (Ricklefs, 2001). This process of overseas exploration and eventual exploitation led to the establishment of global trade and the formation of several European colonial empires, such as the British and Spanish Empires. The initial motivation for this overseas exploration was the need to find a new trade route to the East. This was an area of the world where Europeans knew a lot of coveted products such as spices and silks were located that could generate large profits. However, the Ottoman Empire blocked the long-established overland routes (Ricklefs, 2001). Moreover, the falling apart of the Mongol Empire at the end of the 14th century meant traveling by land could not be done safely (Mitchel, 2020). The Portuguese and the Spanish were the first to build their colonial empires. In the first half of the fifteenth century, the Portuguese already had trading posts on the coast of Africa, like the *feitoria* established by Henry the Navigator on the island of Arguin, near Mauritania. They later were successful in discovering an eastern sea route to India. The Spanish arrived in the Americas in the late fifteenth century for trading and consequently also conquered land areas. This modern form of colonialism meant that Europe quickly became a dominant force in the increasingly globalized world order (Oostindie, 2022b).

The Netherlands, after 1581 known as 'De Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Nederlanden' (the Dutch Republic), followed Portugal and Spain alongside Britain and France. Although its eventual colonial empire would include islands in the Caribbean, forts on the African coast, and even, at one point, the area of present-day New York City (Taylor, 2001), the Indonesian archipelago was its most sizeable and most valuable colony. The first to arrive in Indonesia, however, were the Portuguese. They desired control over the so-called 'Spice Islands' of Maluku. The Portuguese established trading posts and forts on the islands and managed to organize several Catholic missions. Nevertheless, they failed to keep

control over the trade in the area, and "the legacy left behind by the Portuguese was small" given its considerable successes elsewhere (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 29).

After finding out about the riches awaiting them in Asia and the route to get there, the Dutch set sail for the East Indies in 1595. Different expeditions successfully located and brought valuable spices and other products back to the Republic. However, it soon became clear that the different Dutch companies operating in this area triggered an unhealthy form of competition that led prices to go up and, consequently, profits to go down. As a reaction, in 1602, the different companies merged into the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, or 'the Dutch East-India Company') (Ricklefs, 2001; Vickers, 2005). The Dutch had similar aspirations as the Portuguese but were better organized and benefited from better resources. At first, the VOC was mainly focused on establishing trading posts and forts along the archipelago's coastline (Oostindie, 2022b). It is not without reason that the VOC is often called the first great multinational. However, it quickly conquered cities and became involved in *internal* politics, creating a permanent foothold, often through violent manners. For instance, in 1619, the Company conquered the city of Jayakarta and renamed it Batavia after having most of the city destroyed by fire (Ricklefs, 2001). This city would eventually become an important trading center for the region and house the VOC's headquarters. After expelling the Portuguese from their last territories in Indonesia and conquering even more areas, the Dutch had managed to establish a firm hold on the region and "safeguarded its interests" (Vickers, 2005).

By 1800, the Dutch East India Company had control over most parts of Java, Sumatra, Maluku, and several other areas of Indonesia. Nonetheless, during the Napoleonic period, Indonesia was briefly in the hands of the French, followed by the British, since the Netherlands had become a French satellite state (Oostindie, 2022b). Also, the Dutch East-India Company was dissolved around that time because of insurmountable debts, corruption, and mismanagement (Kroeze, 2021). With the founding of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815), the Dutch East Indies were returned to the Netherlands. In this period, the Dutch became even more interested in subjecting the islands militarily and politically. Again, this came with much violence. Still, to maintain a stable colonial state, the Dutch delegated a significant amount of authority to local elites who were coerced or bribed into cooperation (Oostindie, 2022b).

Around 1830, the infamous era of the cultivation system started in Java, an agricultural policy based on the forced labor of the indigenous people (Kroeze, 2021). The plan was designed by Johannes van den Bosch and supported by King Willem I. It is thought that the primary motivation for introducing the cultivation system was financial. The Dutch Treasury was in dire need of extra funds since the Java War and the Belgium Revolution of 1830 resulted in the Netherlands being close to bankruptcy

(Schrikker, 2015). The cultivation system meant that indigenous people had to dedicate around 20% of their lands to export products such as sugar, coffee, and indigo instead of staple products for the local population. The earnings for the export products would be a substitute for the original land tax obligations, and villagers would be allowed to keep any excess payments they received. Ricklefs (2001) notes that, in theory, this system would benefit both parties. However, in practice, "there was hardly a 'system' at all" as the implementation of the cultivation system varied between regions and villages (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 156). More importantly, the cultivation system soon became a breeding ground for exploitation by the Dutch, generally supported by the indigenous elite. The portion of land the Dutch claimed for their products often extended way beyond the 20% that was initially communicated, which would lead the local population into famine. Still, the people were forced to continue their labor, even after abolishing slavery in 1860, while the Dutch earned immense profits in the process (Kroeze, 2021).

These forms of exploitation became a public concern when the book *Max Havelaar* by Multatuli, a pseudonym for Eduard Douwes Dekker, a former Dutch colonial administrator, was published in 1860. In the book, through its protagonist Max Havelaar and the inclusion of different stories in Java, the author protests against the corrupt colonial policies in the archipelago. The book significantly raised awareness of the Dutch and other Europeans about the conditions in their colonial territories (Kroeze, 2021; Oostindie, 2022b). Slowly, the Dutch government became concerned about the increasing public debate around its colonial policies and started making changes. First, the so-called 'Liberal Period' meant that predominantly Java became a territory for private enterprise, which gradually dismantled the cultivation system. Still, this did not improve the conditions of the local population, as disease and famine remained common (Vickers, 2005).

Until the Japanese occupation of 1942, the Ethical Period was the final stage of Dutch colonial rule. In essence, the Ethical Policy of the Netherlands was a manifestation of the ideology of the "white man's burden" or the civilizing missions that were also prevalent in other regions at the time (Kroeze, 2021). Queen Wilhelmina officially declared the policy in 1901. According to its aims, investments needed to be made in the colony to modernize it through developments in education, infrastructure, and social policies to increase the welfare of the indigenous population (Vickers, 2005). However, even though living conditions did increase, the Ethical Policy did not bring about a stop to exploitative practices since the archipelago remained crucial for the Dutch economy (Oostindie, 2022b). In the end, the policy was abandoned because of a lack of finances, which the Great Depression exacerbated. The Dutch were also concerned that education seemed to foster self-awareness and national sentiments in people like Sukarno (Cribb, 1993).

3.2 Indonesian War of Independence

The Indonesian War of Independence took place from 17 August 1945, the day Indonesia proclaimed independence, to 27 December 1949, when Indonesia was finally recognized as its own state. After the Second World War, Indonesia had declared independence, but the Netherlands wanted to re-establish its colonial rule (Oostindie, 2022b). A tumultuous and bloody military and diplomatic conflict unfolded that lasted four years. To understand the war, it is essential to look at how the population of Indonesia found their nationalist sentiments after all these years of colonization.

Gert Oostindie (2022b) gives a good overview of the history of Indonesian nationalism. As mentioned in the previous section, Indonesian national sentiments were on the rise in the Dutch colony during the Ethical Period due to educational opportunities that made the indigenous population more aware and articulate about the possibility of independence. This is not to say that this was the first time resistance had been shown by the indigenous people; that had been present since the early days. What was unique about this period was that the opposition grew to have a nationalist character, forming a movement applicable to the entire archipelago instead of focusing only on local or regional situations (Oostindie, 2022b). Various movements and organizations were conceived with different characters but what they had in common was a universal critique of the colonial system. Generally, this critique was only present in the colony itself, as most parties in Dutch politics (with a few minor exceptions on the left) were still very much in favor of maintaining sovereignty in the territory. For this, they often gave these three arguments: the economic value of the colony for the Netherlands, the geopolitical importance of the East Indies as part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and finally, harking back to the paternalistic ideology reflected in the Dutch Ethical Policy. At first, the Dutch tolerated the rise of nationalism among the population, but from the 1920s onwards, they started actively repressing nationalist sentiment (Oostindie, 2022b). This was done by limiting public freedoms and exiling or imprisoning prominent figures and leaders of the movement to isolate them. One of these was Sukarno, born Koesno Sosrodihardjo, who had studied at the Bandung Institute of Technology and became the most prominent leader of the nationalist movement. In 1927, he founded the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and he "appeared already to have achieved a united front of the main Indonesian political organizations" at the end of the year (Ricklefs, 2001, p. 230). However, this unity was superficial. When he was arrested in 1929 and sent to prison in 1930, the PNI quite rapidly suspended its activities. The Dutch seemed to have maintained control over the population and did not appear to be concerned about the power of nationalist movements. This would prove to be a severe underestimation (Oostindie, 2022b).

Unlike the First World War, the Netherlands did not retain its neutrality during the Second World War. The Netherlands became occupied by Germany in 1940 and could not adequately defend its

colonial territories (Oostindie, 2022b). After the Dutch declared war on Japan because of the Attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese started their invasion of the Dutch East Indies on 10 January 1942, with the Dutch surrendering less than three months later. For the next three and a half years, the Japanese occupied the Indonesian archipelago, and this period was vital for the war of independence that would follow (Ricklefs, 2001). That is, the Japanese supported and spread nationalist sentiment among the population and dismantled a lot of the Dutch colonial systems that were in place in terms of economics, politics, and administration. Still, there was exploitation present in this period since the Japanese drafted men into forced labor and forced women into sexual exploitative practices. Furthermore, the Dutch who had remained in Indonesia, including their support, were put into infamous detention camps with death rates ranging from 13 to 30 percent (Vickers, 2005). The Japanese only capitulated after Japan surrendered in the Second World War in August 1945. The occupation by Japan had shown the Indonesian population that an Asian power could overthrow a Western one. Combining this with the Japanese's opportunities to facilitate nationalists and their organizations, the step towards independence soon followed (Ricklefs, 2001; Oostindie, 2022b).

Ensuing the Japanese capitulation two days earlier, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. Sukarno was elected as its first President. However, the Dutch government failed to recognize this proclamation. Instead, they wanted to re-install the colonial sovereignty over the archipelago they had lost three years earlier to strengthen its geopolitical position and retrieve the colony's economic value that was perceived to be necessary for the Dutch Restoration (Oostindie, 2022b). The news of independence slowly spread through the former colony. During the power vacuum after the Japanese surrender, the Republicans had plenty of opportunities to gain more public support and control over the infrastructure. The British were the first to arrive in the newly found country, and their task was predominantly to restore order (Vickers, 2005). The British saw that the nationalist movement was more potent than their Dutch allies had previously conceived and tried to get the two parties into conversation. However, soon conflicts and fighting broke out in Indonesia between predominately the Republicans and the Dutch colonial soldiers and supporters who had previously been imprisoned. Some of the reasons why this occurred were the Republic still having no unitary control over the population, the coming of the British, and the expected return of the Dutch (Friend, 2003). In the Netherlands, this violent period would be known as the *bersiap*. Eventually, the last British soldiers left in November 1946 when the Dutch military regained a strong presence in the area.

However, before the British left for good, they managed to arrange negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The Linggardjati Agreement was concluded on 15 November 1946 and signed on 25 March 1947. In the Agreement, the Dutch *de facto* recognized the

Republic as having authority over Java, Sumatra, and Madura (Ricklefs, 2001; Vickers, 2005). The Republic also made concessions as they agreed to eventually establish a federal Indonesian state, a semi-autonomous state with still some influence from the Netherlands. Neither side was particularly satisfied with the situation. Soon, both sides would accuse the other of breaking the Agreement, having different interpretations of the Linggardjati Agreement. The British had hardly left Indonesia before the fighting commenced yet again (Oostindie, 2022b).

3.3 Politionele acties

Operation Product and Operation Kraai were the two main military offensives carried out by the Dutch during the Indonesian War of Independence, alternated with periods of negotiations and notions of peace. Because of diplomatic reasoning, these were designated as 'politionele acties' (police actions), articulating a message of bringing law and order in a domestic conflict. Oostindie (2022b) lays out how the Dutch seemed successful before running into diplomatic issues and arriving at a military impasse in both offensives. The Dutch military did not have the experience or resources to win the battles convincingly, while the Republican Army (TNI) would not relent and turned to guerilla tactics. This led to bloody and turbulent conflicts that resulted in thousands of casualties.

The Dutch decided that the only way to settle matters was by force. As a result, on 21 July 1947, the first politionele actie (police action), formally known as Operation Product, was initiated against Indonesia. It would last until 5 August 1947. The Dutch government justified the operation as a reaction to violations of the Linggardjati Agreement. It claimed its 'police' presence was necessary to bring back law and order in the area (Ricklefs, 2001). The Dutch's Operation was a military offense to take down the Republic and gain power over regions of Java and Sumatra for its natural resources. The Dutch perceived this as necessary because the cost of keeping an inactive military force in Java would be too much if this could not be compensated with the products (sugar, rubber, etcetera) available on the islands. Some 100.000 Dutch soldiers were part of the invasion and managed to occupy two-thirds of Java and a third of Sumatra, including over a thousand plantations. On the Dutch side, 76 soldiers died during this 'politionele actie,' whereas on the Indonesian side, this number was in the thousands (Oostindie & Limpach, 2022). Ultimately, the Dutch military did not continue overthrowing the Republican government in Yogyakarta because of international pressure, and they ceased the operation. States such as Australia, the Soviet Union, the United States, and international organizations had looked disapprovingly at the actions of the Netherlands. Also, the United Nations Security Council became directly involved by calling for a ceasefire between the Netherlands and the Republic and establishing a committee supporting further negotiations (UN Security Council, 1947; Ricklefs, 2001).

In the period that followed, the Dutch were busy keeping control over the areas they had conquered and the ensuing Indonesian guerilla warfare. The Renville Agreement, signed in January 1948, meant a slight breather for the continuous fighting as it called for a ceasefire (Vickers, 2005). The United Nations brokered the Agreement. It contained several principles, including recognizing Dutch sovereignty until establishing the Indonesian federal state and the retreat of Republican soldiers from areas occupied by the Dutch (Ricklefs, 2001). However, in June 1948, negotiations on the Agreement's implementation were unsuccessful, and Indonesian soldiers continued their guerilla tactics. General Spoor of the Netherlands noted that the situation would become uncontrollable unless the Dutch started another significant military offensive that would be a thorough 'cleansing' in eliminating the TNI and Republican leaders in Yogyakarta. After some hesitation, the Dutch government agreed to initiate a second 'politieele actie' (Oostindie & Limpach, 2022).

On 19 December 1948, Operation Kraai started, which would begin the war's bloodiest and most destructive phase (Oostindie & Limpach, 2022). Within a day, the Dutch had occupied Yogyakarta and all other major Republican cities on Java and Sumatra. Moreover, they had captured nearly all Republican leaders, including President Sukarno and the vice-president. This time, though, the military operation had not come as a surprise and was not as one-sided as Operation Product since the Indonesian resistance was better organized and equipped to fight back (Oostindie & Limpach, 2022). The Republican military refused to surrender and started with guerilla warfare. The Dutch continued their 'cleansing actions,' which would result in thousands of casualties because of the combined force of artillery, special forces, and the airforce (Vickers, 2005). The attacks were mainly focused on major cities, while Dutch authority remained limited outside these areas. Overall, the war had an unequal death toll, considering both parties involved. The Dutch military reported approximately 5300 deaths on the Dutch side, whereas the Indonesian side lost possibly 100.000 soldiers and civilians. However, these numbers are very much estimated as there are no reliable numbers or figures today (Harinck, Van Horn & Luttkhuis, 2017).

Following the second 'politieele actie,' international opinion quickly turned against the Dutch and their fight to maintain colonial authority over Indonesia. Eventually, they were pushed by the United States and the United Nations to start new negotiations about independence for the Republic. Notably, the United States threatened to stop all of its economic aid to the Netherlands unless they would give Indonesia sovereignty (Friend, 2003). Gradually, weapons were laid down across the archipelago, especially in Java and Sumatra, since these were the areas where the war had primarily escalated (Oostindie & Limpach, 2022).

The Dutch-Indonesian Roundtable Conference (August-November 1949) took place in The Hague between representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. After several months of negotiation, the Netherlands agreed to transfer sovereignty to a new federal state – the so-called 'United States of Indonesia,' which would still have the Dutch monarch as its head (Ricklefs, 2001). Finally, on 27 December 1949, the Netherlands officially transferred sovereignty, and the state was immediately recognized by the international community, including and most importantly, the United States of America. However, soon a unitarist movement started in Indonesia because the population associated the concept of the federation with colonialism and felt the system lacked cohesion. The United States of Indonesia lasted less than a year, and on the fifth anniversary of the initial proclamation of independence – 17 August 1950 – Sukarno replaced it with the Republic of Indonesia (Ricklefs, 2001). By that name, it is still officially known today.

This macro-analysis shows that the relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands goes back centuries to the days of colonialism and that this legacy continued to influence relations and policies up until Indonesia was officially recognized as a sovereign state. The Netherlands always wanted to control the Indonesian archipelago for various reasons, including access to goods and geopolitical arguments. When Sukarno declared Indonesia independent after the Japanese left, the Netherlands wanted to re-establish their rule in their former colony. Negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic did not go smoothly, and the idea of a federal Indonesia never really took root. Eventually, these failed negotiations and the drive of the Dutch resulted in the events of the 'politieele acties.' These military operations form a painful episode in the history of both Indonesia and the Netherlands. Still, one cannot deny that the Dutch military was the aggressor both times, and the Indonesian people suffered disproportionate losses.

Chapter 4: Meso-Analysis – The Newspapers

This chapter contains the meso-analysis of the critical discourse analysis, which accounts for the institutional background of the newspaper articles discussed in the micro-analysis. It considers the second secondary question of this thesis, which seeks to analyze the institutional dimension of Dutch newspapers during the Indonesian War of Independence. First, this chapter considers the system of 'pillarization' that was in place in the Netherlands during this time. Specifically, it talks about its relevance to newspapers. Further on, it describes the background of the newspapers *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* and their alignment concerning the pillarization in the Netherlands. These are also the newspapers from which the news articles in the next chapter are pulled. Alongside the orientation and associations of both newspapers (*Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*), this chapter considers the positions of the social-democratic and communist pillars on the Indonesian War of Independence and the 'politie acties.' These positions namely could have affected the portrayal of these events in newspaper articles.

4.1 Pillarization in the Netherlands

From approximately 1917 to the mid-1960s, the Netherlands lived in a pillarized society. This so-called pillarization (or *verzuiling* in Dutch) had significant consequences on how society organized itself and the daily life of civilians. Paul Lucardie (2008) defines pillarization as "the close ties between political elites and the masses through networks of ideological organization – referred to as pillars or columns" (p. 152). In other words, society is divided into separate blocs or 'pillars' based on their religious or otherwise ideologically-based affiliations. Often, pillarization means a country is segregated, with each pillar having its own political party, social institutions, and other organizations. Political parties within their pillar often try to influence the people through political and unpolitical spheres such as newspapers and broadcasters with apparent affiliations to a pillar. Consequently, people from different pillars of society have limited contact with each other. Steininger (1977) describes this process as follows:

"The parties' striving for pillarization can simply be described as a desire to protect the already recruited and potential members and followers from the influence of the other parties. Their goal was the absorption of even the seemingly unpolitical spheres of social life. The protection of their followers from dissenting political influences and the securing of political loyalty could here be attained even more effectively than in explicitly political clubs" (Steininger, 1977, p. 250).

The clearest examples of this societal division appeared in the Netherlands and Belgium. Countries like the United States also contained different (religious groups) that did not have much contact with one another. However, what distinguished the Netherlands and Belgium from others is that in these states, "these worlds extended into the political sphere (with national political parties) and the socio-economic sphere (with trade unions and a host of professional organizations)" (Hellemans, 2020, p. 126). At the end of the nineteenth century, pillarization in the Netherlands was already manifesting itself. For instance, Protestants objected to the growing influence of liberalism in the country. In addition, groups were starting to organize themselves into political parties (Lijphart, 2008). With the Pacification of 1917, an agreement was made between liberalists, social-democrats, and some Christian parties on equalizing public funding for state and religious schools. However, instead of bringing the groups closer together, this principle of proportionality aggravated the segregation, giving more power to each individual pillar (Lijphart, 1990).

Although the pillars in the Netherlands were not strictly defined, the main ones were the Protestant, Catholic, and social-democratic pillars (Steininger, 1977). Liberals themselves denied the existence of a liberal pillar, but in practice, they constituted the fourth pillar in Dutch society as liberals had their own political party and social institutions (Van Zanden, 1998). Other smaller pillars were, for instance, the Humanist and communist pillars. Each pillar had its own political party, broadcasting union, trading union, schools, hospitals, and newspapers (Lijphart, 2008).

This political system of pillarization was present during the Indonesian War of Independence, and thus when the articles about Operation Product and Operation Kraai were written and published. Newspapers were often aligned with different pillars, bringing different stances on current events, fitting into "the pattern of pillarization" (Lijphart, 2008, p. 51). Because of this, it is essential to realize these different political, religious, or socio-economic backgrounds and biases when analyzing articles published about the 'politioenele acties' as they might affect the portrayal of the events. Although Lijphart (2008) notes that there were some neutral papers in the country, national newspapers were strongly pillarized, with only two of them (*De Telegraaf* and *De Courant Nieuws van de Dag*) bringing a neutral stance. Lijphart continues by describing a close connection between the pillar of the audience and the orientation (pillar) of the newspaper. *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* were two of these newspapers, as they associated with the social-democratic and communist pillars.

4.2 *Het Vrije Volk*

Het Vrije Volk ("The Free People") was a daily social-democratic evening newspaper in circulation from 1 March 1945 to 30 March 1991. It quickly became one of the most prominent and most influential daily newspapers in the Netherlands. The newspaper became publicly known by the official name *Het*

Vrije Volk after 1945. However, it was a continuation of the newspaper *Het Volk* ("The People"), which was already set up in 1900. This paper had the same social-democratic affiliations as *Het Vrije Volk* and was brought out by the same publishing house (Fischer, 2015). When the Germans occupied the Netherlands during the Second World War, *Het Volk* was briefly discontinued but was re-launched as *Het Vrije Volk* after the war ended in 1945. Luebering (2011) described that the newspaper "remained the voice of the Labour Party, retaining a strong political orientation." It was even named the official party organ of the PvdA ("Party of Labour"). At the start of this re-launch, the paper appeared in different editions in the cities freed by the Allies. Soon, however, in January 1946, it became united under one editorial board in Amsterdam. The circulation of *Het Vrije Volk* increased rapidly, becoming one of the largest newspapers in the country. From 1954 to 1956, it was even the biggest paper with a daily circulation of over 300.000 (Fischer, 2015). Nevertheless, the number started to drop when, in 1958, Willem Drees of the social-democratic party PvdA was no longer Prime Minister after ten years. Eventually, *Het Vrije Volk* changed from a national to a regional publication focusing on Rotterdam. On 30 March 1991, the newspaper with the name *Het Vrije Volk* was published for the last time, and in the same year merged with *Rotterdams Nieuwsblad* into the newspaper *Rotterdams Dagblad* (Luebering, 2011).

As mentioned, *Het Vrije Volk* profiled itself as a social-democratic daily newspaper. This orientation is stated very openly in every publication, as the paper's subtitle is "the democratic-socialist newspaper." The social-democratic pillar was one of the main pillars in the Netherlands at that time. The pillar had its political party – the SDAP till 1945 and afterward, the PvdA. Alongside this, they had their own broadcasting union Vara, a trading union called NVV, and two newspapers. *Het Vrije Volk* was more widely read of these newspapers, while *Het Parool* was on the smaller side. After the Second World War, the PvdA became the second-largest political party in the Netherlands, forming a coalition with the Catholics (Rijksoverheid, n.d. a). In 1948, they became the largest and Willem Drees, the party leader of the PvdA, became Prime Minister until 1958 (Rijksoverheid, n.d. b). This means that from the onset of the Indonesian War of Independence, the PvdA and the entire social-democratic pillar by association were aligned with the cabinet initiating and sanctioning the actions of Dutch militaries in their former colony.

When assessing the social-democratic pillar's views on Indonesia and the war, it is most relevant to consider the position of its political party. Mreijen (2010) calls the 'Indonesian question' a particularly painful episode in the history of the PvdA. She explains that it was a period in which the party was part of the government but had numerous internal disagreements about handling the situation regarding the Republic of Indonesia. Before 1945, the SDAP was mainly in favor of granting Indonesia independence but against entirely excluding the colony from Dutch authority (Mreijen, 2010). The

indigenous population still needed to achieve full enlightenment before arriving at this stage. The PvdA took over this colonial argument after the Second World War when they became part of the government that initiated the first 'politieele actie' in 1947. However, the PvdA itself was not unified in this matter, as prominent party members spoke out against the decision, with the party losing over 4000 members (Mreijen, 2010). Still, the leaders of the party stood their ground. In 1948, with the PvdA as the biggest party, the Dutch government ordered the second 'politieele actie.' At this point, the party had fewer people involved in the decision-making of the military operation, but with Willem Drees as Prime Minister, the link between the Dutch actions in Indonesia and the PvdA remained tight (Rijksoverheid, n.d. b). The political party carried on to be partially responsible for the Dutch policy in the former colony. A few years after the Indonesian War of Independence ended, calm returned within the PvdA (Mreijen, 2010).

The alignment of *Het Vrije Volk* with the social-democratic pillar and its connected political party, the PvdA, is more implicitly seen in the organization behind the newspaper and the background of the editor-in-chief Klaas Voskuil. *De Arbeiderspers* was the publishing house behind the newspaper and its predecessor *Het Volk*. *De Arbeiderspers* was founded in 1929 as a social-democratic publishing house with close ties to the SDAP (Fischer, 2015). When looking at the division of shares, fifty percent of the organization was owned by the NVV, the social-democratic trading union, and the other fifty percent by the SDAP (Doppenberg, 2009). When the PvdA was founded, this connection did not waive. For instance, the chief executive of the publishing house, Johan van de Kieft was, between 1945 and 1949, at the same time a member of the Dutch Senate for the PvdA (PDC, n.d., a). Even beyond the period discussed in this thesis, *De Arbeiderspers* remained to have a close relationship with the PvdA, with the chief executives of the publishing house continuing to be representatives of the party in government (Lijphart, 2008).

Klaas Voskuil (1885-1975) was the first editor in chief of *Het Vrije Volk* and fulfilled this role between 1945 and 1961. In 1917, he became an active member of the SDAP and worked closely with Willem Drees. Pollak (1998) states that it was primarily the influence of Drees that eventually made Voskuil editor in chief of *Het Vrije Volk* in 1945. Leading figures within the political party PvdA chose the person who would fill this position. Voskuil was, during his time at the paper, mainly focused on determining the political narrative of the newspaper and maintaining journalistic norms. And the political narrative that was being followed and defended by Voskuil was the one by Drees (Pollak, 1998). Pollak adds that this was also the case during the time of the military operations in Indonesia. Voskuil defended Drees' policies despite being revealed that Voskuil himself had more reservations than he reported in his newspaper. His connection with the SDAP, the PvdA, and Willem Drees clearly showed that Klaas Voskuil was closely tied to the social-democratic pillar within Dutch society.

Thus, *Het Vrije Volk* was a popular daily newspaper in the Netherlands with a distinct alignment to the social-democratic pillar and its political party, the PvdA. This alignment is illustrated through the social-democratic orientation of the newspaper, the publishing house behind the paper, and the background of editor-in-chief Klaas Voskuil. How this relationship with the social democrats affected the portrayal of the Indonesian War of Independence and its military operations in *Het Vrije Volk* remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the social-democratic PvdA was part of both cabinets initiating and monitoring the 'politieonele acties' in Indonesia. Also, Klaas Voskuil was known to defend Prime Minister Drees' policies in this matter.

4.3 *De Waarheid*

De Waarheid ("The Truth") was a daily communist newspaper in the Netherlands that ran from 23 November 1940 to 28 April 1990. And although the communist party never played a prominent part in Dutch politics, *De Waarheid* became the largest newspaper in the Netherlands for a brief period directly after the Second World War. The paper was the voice of the communist party in the Netherlands. Luebering (2011) writes that, alongside *Het Vrije Volk*, "the communist *De Waarheid* ("The Truth") were for a time the only newspapers in the Netherlands with permanent party affiliations." During the Second World War, the paper was illegally pressed and published, becoming a resistance newspaper during the German occupation with a significant following (De Jonge, 1972). After the war, *De Waarheid* was a national publication with some regional editions. In 1945, the paper had a circulation of approximately 300.000 (Delpher, n.d.). By 1955, this circulation had already halved, and the number dropped even more when the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, and *De Waarheid* did not condemn this invasion (Boom & Van Casteren, 1999). The last edition of *De Waarheid* was published on 28 April 1990. At that time, the paper only had a circulation of around 6000, having lost many people along the way. Efforts to reignite the newspaper in other formats were largely unsuccessful (Boom & Van Casteren, 1999).

As mentioned earlier, *De Waarheid* was a Dutch newspaper with a communist signature. The communists did not belong to one of the main pillars in the Netherlands. Still, they did have institutions and (trade) organizations such as the *Eenheidsvkbeweging* (EVB) that together created a smaller communist pillar in Dutch society (Lijphart, 2008). The most telling way to illustrate this is by looking at the communist political party in the Netherlands during that time. The CPN was the Communist Party of the Netherlands that was founded in 1909 under the name Social-Democratic Party (SDP), a demerger of the SDAP. In 1935, the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) became its official name. The party was part of the Communist International (Comintern), an international organization headed by the Soviet Union advocating world communism (Voerman & Wormer, 1997). Like *De Waarheid*, the CPN played a role in resisting the German occupation. This role contributed heavily to

the party's immense support in the years after the war (Van Dijk, 2015). That is, in 1946, the CPN, led by Paul de Groot, had ten seats in the Dutch House of Representatives and several seats in the Dutch Senate. Still, during the Indonesian War of Independence, the political party was not part of the Dutch cabinet. When the Cold War started to manifest significantly in the 1950s, the party began to lose this support. Eventually, the party was discontinued in 1991 (Delpher, n.d.).

Like with *Het Vrije Volk*, it is essential to see how the CPN viewed the situation in Indonesia and the 'politieele acties' specifically. Long before the Indonesian War of Independence, the CPN was supportive of indigenous people resisting the authority and colonial rule of the Dutch within their territory. For instance, it supported the communist rebellion of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Communist Party of Indonesia, in 1926-1927, and other resistance movements, forming a unique position in Dutch politics (Van Morriën & De Vries, 1982). Furthermore, after the CPN received four seats in the Dutch House of Representatives in 1933, one of those seats was filled by an Indonesian nationalist Rustam Effendi (Aerts et al., 2015). He was the first representative of a non-Western background to become part of the Dutch government and distinctly illustrates the CPN's support of Indonesian nationalism and independence. The party continued with this position during the Indonesian War of Independence. It was the only significant party advocating for an end to the conflict and an independent Indonesian state (Boom & Van Casteren, 1999; Verrips, 1995). The CPN stood its ground on this view even when the Dutch government sanctioned the two 'politieele acties'. It was not the case that the CPN opposed every decision of the Dutch government. During and briefly after the Second World War, the communists and other political parties were considered allies because of their common anti-fascist sentiments. Moreover, considering the Indonesian War of Independence, the CPN supported every decision by the Dutch government that they viewed could put an end to the conflict. Still, the party did oppose everything in favor of these Dutch military operations, forming a solid resistance within Dutch politics (Verrips, 1995).

The connection between *De Waarheid* and the Communist Party of the Netherlands is quite clear. The newspaper was the party organ of the CPN. Because of this, it was often compared to the *Pravda* ("Truth"), the official party organ of the communist party in the Soviet Union (De Jonge, 1972). The alignment is also exemplified when considering that leading figures within the newspaper often were leading figures within the CPN. Joop Moriën, a previous editor of the newspaper, notes that until the 1980s, generally, the editor-in-chief and the director of *De Waarheid* were part of the daily management of the CPN (Boom & Van Casteren, 1999). Moreover, Paul de Groot, editor-in-chief of the newspaper from its first publication till 1977, would later become party leader of the CPN in the Dutch parliament (PDC, n.d. c). This case fits into a pattern in the years after the war. Marcus Bakker, the successor of De Groot as CPN party leader, was also an editor of *De Waarheid* in the 1940s and the

1950s. Also, he was a member of parliament while working at *De Waarheid* (PDC, n.d. b). However, this overlap between prominent employees of *De Waarheid* and leaders of the CPN does wind down in the 1980s. Still, during this time, editors remained members of the party.

Thus, *De Waarheid* was a well-read daily newspaper in the Netherlands closely connected to the communist pillar and its political party, the CPN. One can observe this connection through the clear communist orientation of the newspaper, the organization behind the newspaper, and the continuous attachments of leading figures of *De Waarheid* to the CPN. As stated in the analysis of *Het Vrije Volk*, how this relationship with the communists and the CPN influenced the portrayal of the Indonesian War of Independence and its military operations in *De Waarheid* cannot be said yet. Still, it is vital to remember that the Communist Party of the Netherlands was a vigorous opponent of the Dutch actions in Indonesia, including the two military operations that are the main subject of concern in this thesis. Furthermore, leading figures of *De Waarheid* were also often prominent members of this political party.

Chapter 5: Micro-Analysis – Textual Analysis

This chapter contains the micro-analysis of the critical discourse analysis, which consists of a textual analysis of a selection of articles from the Dutch newspapers *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*. In this chapter, the third and final secondary question of this thesis is addressed, which asks about the language used by Dutch newspaper articles to portray the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence. Twelve pieces are considered – six from each paper – with the 'politieele acties' (Operation Product or Operation Kraai) as their primary subjects. The entire Dutch articles can be found in the appendix at the end of this thesis. In this chapter, the pieces are systematically reviewed by first giving a brief description of the content. Also, there is a focus on three specific elements: lexical analysis (the choice and meaning of words), presupposition (assumed knowledge or implicit claims embedded in the text), and rhetorical tropes (e.g., hyperbole, metaphor, rhetorical question). The direct quotations provided in this chapter are English translations from the original Dutch.

5.1 Operation Product

5.1.1 *Het Vrije Volk*

Article 1

This first newspaper article from *Het Vrije Volk* about Operation Product had the headline "Limited military action in Indonesia," published on 21 July 1947. It gives an account of the Dutch armed forces' commencement of a military operation in Indonesia. Near the beginning of the text, it describes the tension present in the Netherlands the days before the operation caused by questions about what would happen in Indonesia. In the article, the author repeatedly refers to and directly quotes from a radio speech made by Prime Minister Beel, in which he announced the start of the military operation.

When analyzing the lexicon of the article, there is quite some emphasis on the fact that the events in Indonesia are merely a limited military action and not a progressive march. This is illustrated in the headline "limited military action in Indonesia" and the words "limited" and "local military actions" appearing throughout the text. The term "politieele actie" is also used. The vocabulary throughout the article also seems to communicate an us vs. them narrative. In a direct quote from Prime Minister Beel, the word "hostilities" refers to the conduct of the Indonesian population. Furthermore, the sentence "The whole of the Netherlands spent the weekend in suspense" contains besides a hyperbole also, the notion of unity among the Dutch people.

"Hundreds of thousands have waited for the miracle that would avert the inevitable." This sentence contains a few compelling elements. Firstly, "hundreds of thousands" is hyperbole as it is unlikely this many people had the exact thought process described in this section of the article. Secondly, "miracle"

and "inevitable" suggest that the Dutch military operation was unavoidable and bound to happen, voicing a rather bold assumption.

"Would the Republic give the order to cease fire at the eleventh hour? Would this finally bring the element into the tense relations that would pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the remaining differences?"

The last quotation of this article essentially comprises two rhetorical questions. The commencement of a military operation means there could not have been a "cease fire" or a "peaceful settlement." Moreover, it assumes "tense relations" and "remaining differences" between the Republic and the Netherlands. Lastly, it is interesting that these questions put the responsibility of a ceasefire or peaceful settlement on the shoulders of the Republic and not the Netherlands.

Article 2

The second newspaper article from *Het Vrije Volk* about the first politionele actie was published on 25 July 1947. The article is an editorial entitled "Indonesian debate." This title is fitting as the text lays out the political debate within the Dutch House of Representatives concerning the military operation in Indonesia. It starts by expressing the united view of the government parties about the validity of the military operations. After this, the author discusses opposition parties like the anti-revolutionaries and the communists and characterizes them as having extreme left and right views that do not agree with the government.

The word "debate" is immediate of interest as it suggests that there is more than one view on the situation in Indonesia. The quotation below is the first sentence of the article:

"In its second major debate on the Indonesian conflict within fourteen days, the House of Representatives has overwhelmingly recognized the inevitability of the tragic turn that events have taken (...)."

"Inevitability" is a term repeatedly used throughout the text and was also seen in the first article from *Het Vrije Volk* discussed above. At the same time, the article does describe the turn of events as "tragic," assuming that the reader agrees with this assessment. A rhetoric trope that recurs is the metonymy of substituting the Dutch or Indonesian soldiers or political leaders with the country's name. The following sentence is a clear example of this:

"Whether the Netherlands and the Republic will easily return to the conference table will depend on all kinds of circumstances, especially on the question of which government will then have acted in the Republic."

"The Netherlands and the Republic" refers to the leaders and representatives of the respective states and does not mean the entire country will be negotiating. What is also thought-provoking here is that the responsibility of resolving the conflict is primarily put on the shoulders of the Republic. Also, the article shows a preference for the policies and plans of the government parties, not those of the opposition. In fact, the article concludes that the opposition parties from both the right and the left have brought about the "distrust" between the Republic and the Netherlands and that "only a firm and wise and lenient policy will have the chance to fill the chasm after the inevitable military action." As the opposition does not provide this, it implies that the answer lies within the government parties through this presupposition.

Article 3

The final article that discusses Operation Product in *Het Vrije Volk* was published on 5 August 1947 with the headline "Day order of general Spoor and admiral Pinke," which is precisely what the article describes. The text describes how general Spoor gives his thanks to the soldiers abroad. Furthermore, the author of this article reports the statement of Pinke that there remains an ongoing task of maintaining peace and order in certain areas about which they are still concerned. Part of this ongoing task is to counter the import and export of (military) goods.

The headline this time is pretty neutral, merely stating that there has been a "day order." As this article is relatively short, there are not many elements to analyze, but there remain a few. Considering the lexicon, the text talks about general Spoor and admiral Pinke giving their "thanks" to the soldiers in Indonesia for the "excellent way in which they performed their task," indicating that the soldiers did something noteworthy. The article also presupposes some aspects.

"He further pointed out the possibility that the Republic, either through unwillingness or impotence, would fail to comply with the "ceasefire" order."

This line assumes that there is a realistic possibility of this occurring. Moreover, it suggests that there are only two options for the scenario of the Republic failing to comply with the ceasefire. Furthermore, the text refers to a "still ongoing task" for the Dutch military, implying that the situation in Indonesia is not fully resolved.

"The maintenance of peace and order naturally continues to include the prevention of infiltration in these areas, the prevention of the import of military goods and the export of products of companies in this area, so that patrol services are maintained."

Lastly, this final quotation assumes that "the maintenance of peace and order," which is in and of itself a euphemism for military actions, "naturally" leads to the measures like limiting imports and export.

5.1.2 *De Waarheid*

Article 4

This first article discussed in the newspaper *De Waarheid* about Operation Product was published on 21 July 1947. The title reads "Fratricidal war in Indonesia unleashed." The text describes that the Dutch military has initiated military operations in the Republic of Indonesia. It gives an account of how Dutch troops have invaded the territory and planes have started to bomb airplane hangars. The author quotes Sudirman, a high-ranking military officer for the Republic, and talks about how the Indonesian military has reacted calmly and orderly. There are also references to Prime Minister Beel's radio speech.

Immediately, the headline of this article jumps out for its choice of words and presuppositions. "Fratricidal war in Indonesia unleashed" assumes that the Netherlands and Indonesia are brothers in some respect, making the fighting more tragic. The term "war" also holds a negative connotation. Other words the author used to refer to Operation Product are "armed raids," "occupy," and "attack." The term "politioenele actie" is only used in quotation marks when discussing the Prime Minister's address. While the article from *Het Vrije Volk* published on the same day mainly considers the Dutch perspective, this text also describes the Indonesian side. Instead of appealing to the authority of the Prime Minister, it turns to the authority of Sudirman, who calls for the need to "defend their homeland." Moreover, it positively represents the Indonesian response to the operation by seeing it as "without dispersion and turmoil but orderly and with composure." The article, in general, is more favorable to the Indonesian side of the conflict than the Dutch side. For instance, it talks about the republican news agency Anantara being "the only official news source" reporting from Indonesia.

When referencing Prime Minister Beel's speech, the article tells the reader, "It hardly needs to be mentioned that Beel threw all the blame on the Republic." This sentence presupposes that this fact does not need to be mentioned and suggests that Beel throwing "all the blame on the Republic" is evident and a regular occurrence. The term "threw" also has a negative connotation, proposing that giving Indonesia all the blame might not be justified.

Article 5

The second article concerning Operation Product was published on 25 July 1947 as an editorial entitled "About the disgrace." The piece describes that a communist motion in parliament to restart

negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands has been denied. The author calls out the Dutch government, especially the PvdA (the social-democratic political party), for "sacrificing" their ideas. Later in the article, it also criticizes how the military operations are portrayed in *Het Vrije Volk*. Moreover, it communicates sympathy to people who might lose their family members overseas.

When performing a lexical analysis, the headline is again very telling. It calls the situation in Indonesia and the consequential political debate in the Dutch House of Representatives "the disgrace," which voices an explicit judgment. Later in the text, it also refers to the military operation as "the war in Indonesia," whereas the Dutch government distances itself from the term "war."

"The communist motion, submitted on Thursday in the House of Representatives, is strikingly simple. She utters what every sane person thinks: the way of violence is the wrong way; negotiations should be reopened."

The quotation above is the article's first sentence and presupposes that the content of the motion is something to which everyone sane should see eye-to-eye. As the article describes how the motion is denied by a "large majority" of the House of Representatives after an "impotent debate," it indirectly calls this majority of the House insane. The text says that "the Chamber voluntarily put itself at the service of the colonial reaction – the only one that expects profit from this fatal adventure." By calling it "voluntarily," the author refutes the statement by the Dutch government of the inevitability of the occurring events in Indonesia. Furthermore, the term "fatal adventure" assumes that the military operation will bring death and is doomed to fail. The adjective "colonial" is also triggering, equalizing the current Dutch politics with that of its colonial predecessors.

Another element that deserves mentioning is that the article is not calling the people from the Dutch military soldiers but "boys, who now fall in Indonesia" and "the boys overseas," providing the reader with a more personal and emotionally-triggering word choice and way of looking at the events in the archipelago.

Article 6

The final article that considers the first politionele actie for *De Waarheid* was published on 5 August 1947, with the headline "Hunger blockade against the Republic?" presenting the reader with a question that will be answered in the article. The article talks about the day order given by admiral Pinke and how this order illustrates how the Dutch conceive the ceasefire that is now in place. The author voices that countering the import and export of goods leads to a hunger blockade against the Republic. Furthermore, the text recounts general Spoor's statement that another operation will

probably be necessary for the future because of some unruly aspects. The article concludes that this means fighting will continue.

The article is pretty short, which means there are not as many interesting aspects to analyze. The author starts with the following sentence: "How the Dutch conceived the ceasefire is best illustrated by Vice Admiral Pinke's order for the day." The word "conceive" is particularly compelling as it suggests that the Dutch give an interpretation to the state of "ceasefire," which should be pretty self-explanatory. The text also presumes that the measures still in place mean "that a hunger blockade has been set up against the Republic," which does not automatically follow steps like blocking the import of military goods. The author also says that "troops" in a future military operation "will be used." This terminology insinuates the dehumanization of Dutch soldiers by the military.

The last sentence, "One can only conclude from this that the fighting continues within the occupied territories," again presupposes a conclusion about the future that one cannot prove.

5.2 Operation Kraai

5.2.1 *Het Vrije Volk*

Article 7

This first article about the second military operation initiated by the Dutch in *Het Vrije Volk* was published on 20 December 1948 as an editorial. It is entitled "The die is cast," referring to the famous Julius Caesar quote. The article discusses the declaration of the Dutch government about the operation not coming as a surprise as there was no hope for an agreement. There is an emphasis on the fact that events had to happen this way. The situation in Indonesia had become untenable. The author calls the current situation a tragic end and that the Netherlands is forced to turn to weapons, but states it will ultimately lead to faster completion of the goal of granting Indonesia freedom and sovereignty.

As was seen in newspaper articles about the first military operation, terms like "untenable" and the idea that everything had to come down to this presupposes that the second politionele actie was unavoidable. The following quotation also presents this view by saying there was no hope:

"(...) there was no hope of agreement, unless the Republic did at the eleventh hour what it could never do: enter the federation as equal to the other states and vigorously oppose the truce violations. If this did not happen, the Netherlands would intervene in the short term."

In terms of rhetoric, it repeats the metonymy of using the term for an entire country (the Netherlands and the Republic) to refer to the military or government officials, giving the impression of

unity of thought in both. The article also presupposes a choice between two options for the Dutch in the following quotation.

"The increasing truce violations by Republican infiltrators in the area behind the demarcation lines created a dangerous and untenable situation, which forced the Netherlands to choose: intervene or leave."

This quotation suggests through the word "forced" that the Netherlands is a passive actor in the conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia, putting the responsibility or blame on the Republic of Indonesia. This negative view is confirmed in other lexical instances, such as the author calling the Republican negotiators "impotent" and saying that "Republican infiltrators" have "created a dangerous and untenable situation." These are all words with a negative undertone.

Article 8

This second article about Operation Kraai was published in *Het Vrije Volk* on 23 December 1948, with the headline "American resolution asks troops to fall back." The text is mainly about an American resolution presented in the UN Security Council, asking for a ceasefire and troops to fall back. The author briefly recounts the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs, Van Royen, explaining the position of the Dutch government and why the operation was necessary. However, most of the article considers with some direct quotes from the US delegate, dr. Jessup, the reasoning and motivation behind the resolution itself.

In general, this article is pretty straightforward in presenting the facts concerning the American resolution in the Security Council. Still, some word choices are relevant to discuss as an illustration of the lexical analysis. Firstly, it is noticeable that nearly every time the resolution or the speech by dr. Jessup is mentioned, words like "asks," "argues," "viewpoint," "thought," and "opinion" are used. These terms suggest that the resolution is not set in stone and is only one way of looking at the events in Indonesia. In contrast, when describing the position explained by Van Royen, it uses the word "defended":

"Dr Van Royen defended the position and action of the Dutch government. Further negotiations with the Republic had proved futile and therefore the Dutch government had decided to purge the Republic of terrorism."

In this quotation, a few other terms also jump out. "Futile" again suggests that negotiations were doomed to fail and that the military operation was unavoidable. "Purge the Republic of terrorism" is an especially triggering fragment. "Terrorism" is a word that has an intrinsically negative connotation and is often used to identify enemies, which is interesting as most of the newspaper articles in *Het*

Vrije Volk still talk about wanting some collaboration or negotiation in the future between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.

Article 9

The final article from *Het Vrije Volk* about the second politionele actie was published on 3 January 1949, entitled "Military action in Java has ended since 1 January." The article describes this point: since the beginning of the year, the military action in Java has ended, and Sumatra will soon follow. Only for some disturbances will military action be necessary anymore. The author uses some elaborate (direct) quotes from Prime Minister Drees' new year's speech that dedicated a significant portion to the events in Indonesia. The article expresses the hope for a federal Indonesia and a good future collaboration between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

While analyzing the lexicon of the article, it is compelling that the headline and the article state multiple times that the military operation has "ended" while also saying the troops have to "limit" their activities, sending a mixed message. For a large portion of the text, Prime Minister Willem Drees is again used as a reliable authority figure. Namely, he is quoted quite extensively, and none of these quotes are disputed or criticized by the author. Interesting aspects in these quotations are the adjective "tragic" and the term "good will" when talking about the military operations and their motivation, respectively.

"We know how the members of our armed forces have not only shown courage, conduct and loyalty, but how in many cases they have also sympathized with the Indonesian people, and, although they eagerly look forward to the return to the Netherlands, they started to love the country and people in Indonesia."

This final statement is a clear example of presupposition as it makes a lot of assumptions about the armed forces members while setting them in a favorable light. That is, words like "courage," "conduct," "loyalty," "sympathized," and "love" all have positive connotations. Simultaneously, the article commends the soldiers for their work in the military and suggests a close and loving relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. While the nature of the military operation pretty much signaled the opposite.

5.2.2 *De Waarheid*

Article 10

The first article discussed here about Operation Kraai, presented in *De Waarheid*, was published on 20 December 1948. The article's headline is "Proclamation of the CPN (De Waarheid)." This headline immediately indicates an unapologetic alignment between the CPN (Communist Party of the

Netherlands) and the newspaper. The text itself announces that military violence has been unleashed in Indonesia. The author is critical of how the Dutch government has justified this decision. The text addresses the readers directly by saying that the military operation was started without communicating it to the people and that know "your sons" have to die, making it personal for the audience. It ends with proclaiming that Drees' government needs to be replaced. The lexical analysis of this article presents quite some triggering and thought-provoking vocabulary.

First of all, the new military operation is characterized by the author with graphic terms such as "military violence," a "bloody Christmas eve," and a "killing spree." Moreover, it returns to identifying the people of Indonesia as a "brother nation." These terms indicate that the CPN and *De Waarheid* are more aligned with the Indonesian side of the conflict than the Dutch.

"In the manner that Hitler used to do, it was announced from the official side late Saturday evening that the Dutch troops had already been in action for six hours."

The quotation above uses the rhetorical trope of *simile* to voice an extreme comparison between Hitler and Dutch officials. Even today, comparing a politician or situation with anything related to Hitler or Nazi Germany is seen as radical. But it is important to remember that the Second World War for these people only ended three years earlier, meaning the comparison is very severe and contemporary. The prevalence of rhetoric within this particular text is also illustrated in the quotation below.

"Which rights? The right of South Sulawesi, the right of the death train [...], the right of the burned down village of Paklandji, the right of the concentration camps?"

These are rhetorical questions. Especially the second sentence, with negative terms like "death train" and "concentration camps," insinuates that the idea of the Netherlands giving rights to Indonesia is quite absurd.

"The betrayal of a few bribed thugs of the sort of Hatta opened the gates of the Republic to the colonial troops after they had assassinated some of its best defenders, the Communists, from the Republic."

This final quotation only confirms the position of the author as a communist siding with the Republic of Indonesia as it calls the Dutch "colonial troops," referring back to this exploitative colonial period, and assumes communists are the "best defenders" of the Republic.

Article 11

The second article concerning the second politionele actie for *De Waarheid* was published on 23 December 1948, entitled "American resolution in the Security Council: Stop firing – troops back to initial settings." The text mainly concerns the American resolution calling for a ceasefire. The author states that the resolution surprised government officials in the Hague and caused quite a stir. Like most articles discussed from *De Waarheid*, this piece is quite critical. However, besides being critical of the Dutch government this time, it was also not satisfied with the American resolution. The author is not happy that it is not strict or binding. In the remaining part of the article, it recounts some of dr. Jessup's speech, the American UN delegate. Also, it provides the reader with the whole American resolution at the end.

The text of this newspaper article is overall a straightforward account of the resolution and the view of dr. Jessup, illustrated by presenting the full resolution itself in the article. Still, a couple of sentences stick out.

"The weakness of the American resolution, however, resides in the fact that it merely "calls upon" the parties, and does not give them the binding prescription to follow the two directives."

The word "weakness" in this sentence suggests that the resolution formulated by the US is not strong enough. Moreover, it presupposes that the lack of a binding prescription to follow its directives weakens this resolution. This statement indicates that the article's author is questioning whether the resolution will be enough to provide a ceasefire in the end.

"If the number of truce violations was as vast as claimed, why did the Dutch government not report this to the Security Council before taking military action?"

The quotation above follows the statement of dr. Jessup that the Netherlands violated the truce from January 1948 and had "no excuse for the resumption of military operations in Indonesia." This quotation assumes that these truce violations were "vast" and suggests criticism of the Dutch government, as they did not report the violations and immediately turned to weapons.

Article 12

The final article discussed in this chapter about Operation Kraai was published on 3 January 1949 by *De Waarheid* and has the headline "No ceasefire order in Java." The subtitle of the article refers to the continuing fighting in Indonesia. The author says there is no ceasefire enacted in Java, even though the Dutch government has communicated that the military operation has officially ended since the beginning of the year. The text mentions the guerilla fighting in Java and the Republican resistance still battling with Dutch troops on the ground. The article also expresses that this situation shows the

ambiguity of the American resolution. Near the end, an Asian conference where the Dutch operation will be discussed is also mentioned.

The article starts by saying that, despite the ceasefire order, such order has "actually" not been issued in Indonesia, questioning the trustworthiness of the Dutch government. The author even states that "on the contrary, General Spoor orders his commanders and even urges them to take action," saying that reality completely contradicts the announcement of a ceasefire. Regarding lexical analysis, the words "guerilla" and "the Republican resistance" suggest that Indonesia refuses to accept the current situation and is willing to fight.

"In short, Minister Sassen's statement further boils down to this that, thanks to the ambiguous American resolution, which does not ascertain that the Netherlands is the attacker, the Dutch troops will be able to continue firing as long as the Republicans continue to resist!"

The quotation above is a presupposition as it says Minister Sassen's statement "boils down" to something not stated explicitly in his words. Furthermore, the fragment "which does not ascertain that the Netherlands is the attacker" insinuates that it is, in fact, justified to call the Netherlands – a metonymy for the Dutch military – the attacker in this situation. This article from *De Waarheid* once again chooses the side of the Republic of Indonesia. Adding the adjective "colonial" multiple times and saying that former Prime Minister Beel "delivered a eulogy to the Dutch colonial administration," associates the Dutch government and its motivations with the country's colonial past.

Chapter 6: Discussion

6.1 Critical Discourse Analysis

This thesis aimed to analyze how Dutch newspaper articles portrayed the 'politieele acties' during the Indonesian War of Independence by using Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional framework methodology of critical discourse analysis. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 have provided the three types of analyses necessary for a thorough examination. Chapter 3 contained a macro-analysis, in which the historical context surrounding the 'politieele acties' and the Indonesian-Dutch relationship was discussed. Chapter 4 involved a meso-analysis of the institutional dimension of Dutch newspapers during the Indonesian War of Independence and mainly focused on pillarization and the newspapers *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid*. Finally, chapter 5 comprised the micro-analysis, in which the language of twelve newspaper articles from the beforementioned newspapers was analyzed by mainly focusing on lexical analysis, presupposition, and rhetorical tropes.

The macro-analysis illustrated the complicated relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands because of their colonial past. The Netherlands initially came to the archipelago for the spice trade through the VOC but started gaining more influence and authority within the territory. This hold on Indonesia was beneficial for economic reasons, keeping a solid geopolitical position and fostering a paternalistic ideology. However, there was no harmony within these relations, as the Netherlands frequently exploited the indigenous people. The cultivation system is an excellent example of this exploitation. The Dutch were ousted from the archipelago when Japan occupied the territory during the Second World War. Still, when Sukarno declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands wanted their colony back and re-establish their authority. Attempts to find compromises through the Agreement of Linggardjati did not work out. Consequently, the Dutch initiated the 'politieele acties,' which resulted in two bloody and infamous periods that partially made up the Indonesian War of Independence. There was fighting on both ends, but the immense losses on the Indonesian side of the conflict show that the Netherlands was the aggressor in these events, committing extreme violence against the Indonesian population. Eventually, after the massive amount of negative international responses, the Netherlands had no choice but to end both 'politieele acties' and, in the end, recognize the independence of Indonesia.

The meso-analysis indicated that the system of pillarization, which was in place in the Netherlands at the time, had a significant impact on the lives of citizens. Society was divided into different pillars (e.g., catholic, social-democratic, protestant), each having its own political party, organizations, and schools. Newspapers also were part of this system, meaning each pillar had its own newspaper providing news for those same people, giving a colored view. The newspapers *Het Vrije Volk* and *De*

Waarheid had a social-democratic and communist alignment, respectively. For *Het Vrije Volk*, this was seen in the explicit social-democratic orientation and the close connections to the social-democratic political party PvdA through the publishing house and the editor-in-chief. For *De Waarheid*, it was pretty similar as the newspaper was the voice of the communist party CPN and the leading figures of the paper were often also prominent figures within the CPN.

The micro-analysis of the newspaper articles themselves gave a mixed view. While the newspaper articles from *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* about both 'politieele acties' generally contained the same topics, the language used was very different. In terms of lexical analysis, the newspaper articles from *Het Vrije Volk* used words with positive connotations such as "courage," "loyalty," and "wise" for the Dutch military and government officials. For the Republic of Indonesia, terms with a more negative connotation were used, such as "dangerous," "impotent," and "terrorism." The military operations themselves were referred to as a "politieele actie" and called "limited," voicing a clear understatement. At the end of the operations, the events were also considered "tragic." In contrast, the articles from *De Waarheid* presented an entirely different image of the military operations in Indonesia. Most importantly, the pieces showed a clear preference for the Indonesian side of the conflict through favorable terms like "brother nation" and "defend," whereas the paper used terms with negative connotations for the actions of the Dutch government and military. Examples of this are the words "disgrace" and "colonial." Moreover, *De Waarheid* disagrees with the nature of the operations, referring to them with terms like "fratricidal war" and "killing spree."

In almost all of the newspaper articles, presuppositions are utilized. For example, *Het Vrije Volk* emphasized the "inevitability" of both conflicts throughout its pieces. Moreover, it constantly put the responsibility and blame of the military operations on the shoulders of the Republic of Indonesia, assuming its self-evidence. *De Waarheid* presupposed in its articles that every "sane" person would agree with their view that the violence should be stopped. Also, it is often assumed that the Dutch only have their interests in mind and will continue to be aggressive. Regarding rhetorical tropes, *Het Vrije Volk* regularly employed metonymy and hyperbole to provide images of unity among the Dutch and the Indonesian population. *De Waarheid*, on the other hand, applied rhetorical questions and the occasional simile to criticize the policies of the Netherlands.

Despite these many differences, for both newspapers, the situation in Indonesia was considered something everyone should be aware of and seen as noteworthy. Both papers also often supposed their readers would agree with their conclusions without providing any solid arguments and gave the limelight to the political parties behind their newspapers (PvdA and CPN).

The relations and overlap between these three analyses are pretty evident. Putting the macro-, meso-, and micro-analysis together leads to the aim of this thesis to thoroughly analyze the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in Dutch newspaper articles.

The macro-analysis comes into play when considering the importance the political parties and the newspaper articles give to the situation in Indonesia. The authors assume the readers have a lot of background knowledge concerning Indonesia and why the Netherlands operates in the territory. Also, nearly all the articles about Indonesia were quite long and published on the newspaper's front page. The historical context is also essential for interpreting the text. For example, when *De Waarheid* talks about the "colonial administration" of the Netherlands, it refers to the history of colonialism between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

The micro-analysis of the twelve newspaper articles illustrated that the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' is not one-dimensional. On the contrary, it is quite varied. *Het Vrije Volk* generally portrayed Operation Product and Operation Kraai as inevitable operations because of the actions of the Republic. The articles describe the Republic of Indonesia as dangerous, whereas the Dutch's activities are commendable and courageous. Overall, these articles do not talk extensively about the fighting and instead understate them. *De Waarheid* generally portrayed both military operations as bloody conflicts caused by the colonial administration of the Netherlands. The articles view the actions of the Dutch as disgraceful and choose to align themselves with the Indonesian people who want to defend their country.

When one considers the meso-analysis of the thesis, this difference in portrayal can at least partially be explained by relating it to the context of pillarization. *Het Vrije Volk* was aligned with the social-democratic pillar and its political party PvdA and *De Waarheid* with the communist pillar and its political party CPN. This association is seen in the newspaper articles analyzed when the newspapers explicitly support their political parties while speaking negatively about others. Moreover, the alignment is implicitly seen through the articles' views on the 'politieele acties' as these almost perfectly line up with the opinions of their political party on this matter. The PvdA was part of the Dutch government during the Indonesian War of Independence and generally supported the military operations, which is also communicated within the pages of *Het Vrije Volk*. The CPN, on the other hand, was part of the opposition and was unique in refusing to show support and being very critical. These connections suggest that pillarization had a significant impact on portraying the 'politieele acties' in Dutch newspapers.

All in all, the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in Dutch newspaper articles was varied and multidimensional. The language used in the articles by *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* is explicitly and

implicitly colored, choosing sides in the Indonesian War of Independence and the 'politieele acties' specifically – events that have an incredibly rich historical background. This different portrayal is, at least for a significant amount, caused by adopting the views of the pillars to which the newspaper belonged. This case clarifies that the media has the power to twist a story and can be influenced by institutions, like political parties, that constitute them.

6.2 Limitations and further research

As is the case for every research, this thesis has its limitations. First and foremost, as mentioned in the methodology, the scope of this thesis is bound. Because of the time constraint of a couple of months, it was impossible to conduct research to the extent that was probably desirable for this topic. Analyzing the portrayal of the "politieele acties" in newspaper articles only concerns two specific events. However, the amount of source material is still quite substantial, and there are a lot of newspapers and articles to consider. This thesis discussed twelve articles from two newspapers for its micro-analysis – the social-democratic *Het Vrije Volk* and the communist *De Waarheid*. While a small sample size does not diminish the value of the research, for further study, it would be beneficial to increase the sample size and look at more articles. Moreover, this thesis has shown that the institutional context of pillarization is especially relevant to studying how events are portrayed in different newspapers. Therefore, further research needs to look at a wider variety of newspapers from other pillars of Dutch society (e.g., *Trouw* and *Algemeen Dagblad*). This will provide a broader image of the portrayal of the politieele acties within the Netherlands.

This thesis only focused on the Dutch portrayal of Operation Product and Operation Kraai. To give a more international perspective, further research could examine how Indonesian media wrote and talked about these military operations and perhaps compare it with the Dutch media. Other international accounts, such as the American, British or Russian, could also be subject to research. Another limitation of this thesis lies within the exploratory nature of the research. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a lack of previous studies on this particular topic, making it difficult to rely on any standardized analysis or relate the subject to a theoretical framework. This does not discount the relevance of this research but does make it hard to move beyond interpretation to conclusive results.

Beyond further research based on the limitations of this particular thesis, there are also some other opportunities. This thesis was not necessarily interested in the public perception of the 'politieele acties,' but this could be a good subject for further study. The pillarization context could once again be utilized to research this question. Furthermore, there are similarities between pillars and the more modern phenomenon of echo chambers, mainly in how information is accessed and processed. This

comparison would make an interesting research subject and could move beyond the topic of the military operations during the Indonesian War of Independence to a wide variety of issues.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The 'politieele acties' form an integral part of the history of both the Netherlands and Indonesia, but its true events for a long time have remained buried for the general public. This thesis sought to analyze the portrayal of the 'politieele acties' in Dutch newspaper articles from *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* during the Indonesian War of Independence. By utilizing Norman Fairclough's three-dimensional framework of doing critical discourse analysis, this thesis provided a macro-, meso-, and micro-analysis in studying the dialectic relationship between text and social constructions.

The macro-analysis communicated the historical context behind the infamous 'politieele acties,' in which the Dutch sought to re-establish their colonial rule over the Indonesian archipelago by initiating two aggressive and notorious military operations. When reading and analyzing the articles written in two Dutch newspapers – *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* – these historical events are nevertheless described in two different ways. This thesis has illustrated in its micro-analysis, which questioned the language used within Dutch newspaper articles in portraying the 'politieele acties,' that a distinct narrative was voiced within each newspaper. *Het Vrije Volk* supported the Netherlands in the conflict and focused its reporting on the inevitability of military action, commending the Dutch troops, and admonishing the Republic of Indonesia. *De Waarheid*, however, supported the Republic of Indonesia. This became apparent through the newspaper voicing the strength of the Indonesian forces and frequently critiquing the Dutch government and military actions in Indonesia.

The following two quotations from the same date, taken from the micro-analysis of this thesis, illustrate this contrast.

"The increasing truce violations by Republican infiltrators in the area behind the demarcation lines created a dangerous and untenable situation, which forced the Netherlands to choose: intervene or leave." – *Het Vrije Volk*, 20/12/1948

"In the manner that Hitler used to do, it was announced from the official side late Saturday evening that the Dutch troops had already been in action for six hours."
– *De Waarheid*, 20/12/1948

In the quotation from *Het Vrije Volk*, it was stated that the Netherlands was 'forced' into a choice, which put the responsibility of the military operation on Indonesia and presupposes that the Dutch only had two options. The quotation from *De Waarheid* used the rhetorical trope of *simile* to compare the Dutch way of doing things to Adolf Hitler, communicating a definite negative perception of the actions of the Netherlands in Indonesia. These examples exemplify that Dutch newspapers did not shy

away from using colored vocabulary, presuppositions, and rhetorical tropes to articulate their narrative of the 'politioenele acties' in Indonesia.

The meso-analysis of this thesis, which sought to analyze the institutional framework behind the newspapers, at least partially clarified what constituted this language use. Since the Netherlands was a pillarized society during the Indonesian War of Independence, people were segregated into groups based on their religion and socio-political views. Accordingly, newspapers were also part of this system, with *Het Vrije Volk* aligned with the social-democratic pillar and *De Waarheid* with the communist pillar. This analysis showed that this alignment influenced each newspaper's portrayal of the 'politioenele acties.' That is, the depiction of the events in Indonesia matched the views of the social-democratic political party PvdA and the communist political party CPN, respectively.

This thesis has illustrated that the portrayal of the 'politioenele acties' in Dutch newspaper articles during the Indonesian War of Independence varied significantly when comparing two different newspapers of that time. However, what *Het Vrije Volk* and *De Waarheid* had in common is that both newspapers communicated a particular narrative concerning the 'politioenele acties' from which they did not waiver throughout their reports. All accounts depicted a colored vocabulary concerning the military operations and the characterization of the Dutch and Indonesian sides of the war. Moreover, both newspapers explicitly and implicitly were the voice of their associated pillars and political parties while writing about these critical and infamous historical events that are still discussed over seventy years after they occurred in Indonesia.

By analyzing the depiction of the 'politioenele acties,' this thesis has demonstrated how newspapers can alter stories and pick and choose which narrative to adopt. "If you aren't careful, the newspapers will have you hating the people who are being oppressed and loving the people who are doing the oppressing," Malcolm X stated correctly. The media is a powerful entity in and of itself. However, this thesis has also illustrated that the media does not operate independently. Newspaper articles about a subject like the 'politioenele acties' are perhaps instrumental in shaping society, providing readers with a specific narrative or 'truth regime.' Still, historical constructs and other institutions such as political parties can also shape this discourse, as the analyses in this thesis have shown. If one seeks to remain outside of this influential power, when reading the black and white words printed in newspapers or published on the Internet, it is pertinent to ponder what made them appear there in the first place.

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Appendix

Beperkt militair optreden in Indonesië

De Nederlandse strijdkrachten zijn Zondag, 24 uur plaatselijke tijd, van alle bezette zones of Java uit met plaatselijke militaire acties begonnen

Regering blijft vasthouden aan beginselen van Linggadjati

In een Zondagavond gehouden radiorede heeft de minister-president Dr. L. J. M. Beel verklaard, dat met het oog op de toestand in Indonesië, de regering de Landvoogd heeft gemachtigd over te gaan tot een politionele actie.

Het persbureau Reuter meldt uit Batavia, dat inleidende operaties door de Nederlandse strijdkrachten Zondagavond 23 uur Javatijd zijn ingezet.

Heel Nederland heeft het week-einde in spanning doorgebracht. Wat zou er in Indonesië gebeuren? Hoe zou de ontwikkeling der gebeurtenissen zijn? Zou de Republiek te elfder ure het bevel geven tot het staken van het vuren? Zou daarmee dan eindelijk het element in de gespannen verhoudingen zijn gebracht, dat de weg zou effenen voor een vreedzame beslechting van de nog over-blijvende geschillen?

Na de berichten, die kranten en radio Zaterdag en Zondag hebben gebracht, begreep men wel, dat de spanning langzamerhand ondragelijk was geworden. Er moest iets gebeuren! Honderdduizenden hebben gewacht op het wonder, dat het onvermijdelijke zou afwenden. Maar naarmate de uren verstreken en van de zijde der Republiek niet het verlossende bericht kwam "Wij hebben de Republikeinse troepen opdracht gegeven het vuren te staken" ... naarmate het nieuws, dat door de radio weerklonk duidelijker en duidelijk deed worden, dat de hoop ijdel was, begreep men, dat de aangekondigde radiorede van de minister-president dr. Beel een van de belangrijkste zou worden, die na de bevrijding werden uitgesproken.

Een stralende zomerdag, wandelende mensen in de straten, mensen met vakantie in de bossen en de velden. Maar aller gedachten verwijlen bij de mannen in Batavia, in Djokjakarta en in Den Haag, die gesteld werden voor een zo verantwoordelijke beslissing.

De uren kropen voort. De Nederlandse nieuwsberichten, die door de radio werden uitgezonden, waren sober. Het was voor de waarnemer duidelijk, dat de Nederlandse radio niet wenste vooruit te lopen op de ministeriële radio-rede. Blijkbaar wilde men elke indruk vermijden alsof men door berichtgeving e.d. de rede van dr. Beel "psychologisch wilde voorbereiden" in de gehate Goebeliaanse stijl. Om zeven uur Nederlandse tijd zonden de Britse radiozenders het bericht uit, dat in Batavia de voorbereidende actie was begonnen. Nederland wachtte totdat minister Beel geëindigd was.

Twee gedeelten in die rede van dr. Beel werden met grote nadruk uitgesproken. Het eerste gedeelte handelde over het beperkt politoneel optreden. De Minister-President zeide

"De Regering heeft de landvoogd gemachtigd om, gezien het nog steeds voorduren het verscherpen zelfs van de vijandelijkheden, de vernielingen en al wat dies meer zij, met de hem ter beschikking staande strijdmacht tot politoneel optreden over te gaan, om datgene te verwezenlijken waartoe de Republiek zelf onmachtig blijkt."

Het tweede gedeelte, dat zo mogelijk, met nog groter nadruk werd uitgesproken bakende de positie scherp af tegenover de koloniale stoke-branden van "Rijkseenheid". De minister-president zeide:

"De Regering blijft aan de beginselen van Linggadjati vasthouden. Wie mocht menen dat nu aanleiding is zich van deze beginselen te ontdoen, zal de regering tegenover zich vinden."

Geen mars naar Djokja

De Nederlandse strijdkrachten zijn Zondag om 24 uur plaatselijke tijd van alle bezette zones op Java uit, begonnen met plaatselijke militaire acties. Ofschoon thans nog nadere berichten omtrent deze operaties ontbreken, mag men wel aannemen, dat zij zich zullen beperken tot de gebieden in West- en Oost-Java, die men op de beide kaartjes ziet aangeven. Men kan hieruit afleiden, dat het niet de bedoeling is naar Djokjakarta op te rukken. Het geldt hier een beperkt militair optreden.

Indonesisch debat

De Tweede Kamer heeft in haar tweede grote debat over het Indonesische conflict binnen veertien dagen in overgrote meerderheid de onvermijdelijkheid erkend van de tragische wending, die de gebeurtenissen genomen hebben sinds de tiende Juli de dag waarop minister Beel mededeelde, dat over eenstemming bijna bereikt was. Thans spreken de wapenen en dit feit beheerste natuurlijk het parlementaire debat. De Kamer heeft het regeringsbeleid als onvermijdelijk aanvaard, maar in dat aanvaarden was uiteraard geen eenstemmigheid te horen. De fracties van de K.V.P. en van de P.v.d.A. stonden het dichtst bij de regering, de laatste met uitzondering van de heer Nederhorst, die de tijd voor de toepassing van het geweld nog niet gekomen achtte. Het verschil tussen prof. Romme en prof. Logemann was, dat de leider van de K.V.P., die het regeringsbeleid zonder voorbehoud aanvaardde, tegenover de Republiek gematigd onverschillig stond. Hij wilde haar niet vernietigen, maar ook niet redden.

Prof. Logeman daarentegen drong er sterk op aan, dat onverminderd gestreefd zou worden naar herstel van de betrekkingen met de Republiek. Hij trachtte van de regering de verzekering te krijgen, dat zij van de goede diensten van buitenlandse mogendheden, zoals die door Engeland reeds zijn geboden, maar door de regering vrij koeltjes ter zijde zijn gelegd, gebruik zou maken. Minister Jonkman heeft dit toegezegd met dit voorbehoud, dat het geschieden zal als het nodig is, hetgeen wij, met prof. Logemann, aldus opvatten, dat de noodzaak vervalt als beide partijen elkaar zonder andermans tussenkomst vinden.

Dit is, zoals men begrijpen zal, het voornaamste punt in het toekomstig beleid, een punt dat, naar het schijnt, spoedig actuele betekenis zal krijgen. Als de tekenen niet bedriegen zullen de militaire operaties spoedig de gestelde doelen bereikt hebben en dan moet het wapen weer zwijgen voor de staatkunde. Of Nederland en de Republiek dan gemakkelijk weer aan de conferentietafel zullen komen, zal van allerlei omstandigheden afhangen, vooral van de vraag, welke regering in de Republiek dan zal zijn opgetreden. Hoe belangrijk dit herstel der betrekkingen ook in het buitenland wordt geacht, hebben de persstemmen uit Amerika en Engeland overvloedig aangetoond, dikwijls in voor ons weinig vriendelijke woorden waarin minister Bevin in het Engels Lagerhuis gewaagde van een systeem voor het aanbieden van bemiddeling, dat thans aan zijn departement wordt uitgewerkt.

De oppositie, in het bijzonder de Anti-Revolutionnaires en de Christelijk-Historischen, om van de heer Zandt te zwijgen, onderscheidde zich van de beide regeringspartijen door haar houding tegenover de Republiek. Ze ziet de militaire actie het liefst als een oorlog, die een eind moet maken aan de Republiek en spreekt in vage termen over nieuwe staatkundige vormen, zonder te kunnen aanduiden in hoeverre deze vormen verschillen van het koloniale verleden. In de redevoeringen van de heren Schouten en Tilanus klonk teleurstelling over de oppositionele afzondering, waarin zij ook nu nog gedwongen zijn te blijven. Hoe graag hadden zij de regering zien mislukken om dan in een nationaal kabinet hun invloed te kunnen aanwenden tot het koloniaal herstel. Het moet deze teleurstelling zijn geweest – Mr. Van der Goes van Naters wees er een scherp wederwoord op – die de heer Schouten verleidde tot het verwijt aan de P.v.d.A. dat zij de regering niet voldoende ondersteund had en daardoor verantwoordelijk was voor de gang van zaken. Dat moest nu juist de heer Schouten zeggen, die in het koor der reactionairen al twee jaar lang zijn partij meezingt en daardoor mee heeft geholpen het wantrouwen te vergroten, dat in feite de oorzaak is van het tragisch mislukken van het overleg.

De communisten voerden hun eigen oppositie. Zij verkeren kennelijk in verlegenheid. Zij hebben gespeculeerd op de mislukking van het regeringsbeleid en stonden met ongeduld gereed uit de beroering die zij verwacht hebben, winst te behalen. De beroering is uitgebleven en daardoor miste hun optreden de achtergrond, de revolutionaire bedreiging. Hun aandeel in het debat was slap en onzeker. Tevergeefs zochten zij er vuur in te brengen door hun aanvallen te richten op de P.v.d.A. Mr v.d. Goes en mr. Joekes hebben hun afdoende te woord gestaan. Minister Jonkman verweet hun in een scherpe tegenaanval, dat zij de tegenwerkende krachten in de Republiek hebben aangemoedigd, en daardoor de mislukking van het overleg hebben bevorderd.

Dit is de conclusie uit het debat. De samenwerking is gestrand op het wantrouwen in de Republiek en het is de oppositie rechts en links in Nederland geweest, die dit wantrouwen heeft gezaaid met volle handen.

Nu zitten we met de stukken en alleen een vast en wijs en mild beleid zal de kans hebben om na de onvermijdelijke militaire actie de kloof te dempen, die gaapt tussen de Republiek en Nederland.

Dagorder van gen. Spoor en adm. Pinke

Lt.-gen. Spoor heeft een dagorder door de radio omgeroepen, waarin bij de militairen dank brengt voor de voortreffelijke wijze waarop zij hun taak hebben uitgevoerd. Hij gedacht daarbij hen die gevallen waren, gewond of vermist. Verder wees hij op de mogelijkheid, dat de Republiek, hetzij door onwil of onmacht de order "staakt het vuren" niet zou nakomen, en zei: "Dit mag echter onder geen voorwaarde voor u aanleiding zijn om tot eigenmachtig optreden over te gaan. Uw plicht en uw opdracht luiden nog steeds, rust, orde, recht en veiligheid te brengen. Het is echter nodig u er op te wijzen, dat de uiterste waakzaamheid geboden blijft. Dat heeft het verleden ons geleerd."

De dagorder van vice-admiraal Pinke hield eveneens een dankwoord aan de militairen in en de nog blijvende taak omschreef hij met de woorden: Het blijft de plicht van de krijgsmacht rust en orde te handhaven in de onder onze zorg staande gebieden. Tot het handhaven van rust en orde blijft vanzelfsprekend behoren het tegengaan van infiltratie in deze gebieden, het tegengaan van de invoer van militaire goederen en van de uitvoer van producten der ondernemingen in dit gebied, zodat patrouillediensten gehandhaafd blijven.

Article 3 - Het Vrije Volk 05/08/1947

Broederoorlog in Indonesië ontketend

Gewapende razzia's te Djokjakarta

Indonesische troepen vangen offensief kalm en zonder verwarring op

Dr. Gani (in strijd met de diplomatieke onschendbaarheid) gearresteerd

Zondagmiddag omstreeks 5 uur namiddag (Ned. tijd) zijn langs alle demarcatielijnen op Java inleidende operaties door de Nederlandsche strijdkrachten tegen de Republiek ingezet.

Op dat ogenblik begonnen Nederlandse troepenafdelingen de Republikeinse gebouwen te Djakarta te bezetten.

Alle openbare nutsbedrijven, die door de Republikeinen werden beheerd, werden onder militaire bewaking gesteld.

Ook het radiostation en de spoorwegstations werden bezet.

Vrachtauto's beladen met Nederlandse soldaten, raasden door de straten en gingen tot massa-arrestaties over.

Niemand, die van republikeinse gezindheid werd verdacht, was veilig. Alle telefoon-verbindingen waren verbroken.

Ook het postkantoor werd bezet en het verzenden van berichten tegengehouden.

Het personeel van de republikeinse bedrijven was geïnstrueerd, geen tegenstand te bieden. Tevoren hadden de

republikeinse autoriteiten reeds aan iedere employé twee maanden salaris en zoveel mogelijk levensmiddelen

uitgereikt. Al het republikeinse personeel in de door de Nederlandse troepen bezette gebieden is opgeroepen de non-coöperatie-campagne te beginnen.

Oproep van Soedirman

"De tijd is gekomen voor de Indonesiërs om hun vaderland te verdedigen tegen de Nederlandse aanvallen", aldus generaal Soedirman in een oproep tot de Indonesiërs. Hij protesteerde er tegen, dat de Nederlanders hun aanvallen hadden ingezet, zonder enige oorlogsverklaring.

Het Nederlandse offensief is door de republikeinse strijdkrachten zonder verslagenheid of verwarring, maar ordelijk en met kalmte ontvangen, verklaarde Soedirman tenslotte.

Nederlandse vliegtuigen in actie

Het republikeinse nieuwsbureau Antara meldde, dat twee Nederlandse vliegtuigen het vliegveld van Moas Pati hebben aangevallen. Dit vliegveld ligt in de buurt Madioem. De hangars werden gebombardeerd. Ook het vliegveld bij

Soerakarta werd gebombardeerd. Nederlandse vliegtuigen vlogen laag boven Djokjakarta maar gingen niet tot actie

over. Een ander vliegtuig viel Malang met machinevuur aan en twee andere beschoten een munitieopslagplaats bij Mangelan. Een vliegveld in de buurt van Bandoeng werd een half uur lang gebombardeerd.

Over de operatie aan de r(..)nten is nog weinig nieuws, omdat een hevige regenval de militaire acties bemoeilijkt.

Militaire waarnemers waren van mening, dat de eerste grote acties niet voor morgen konden worden verwacht. Zware regens, begeleid door onweersbuien hebben het land in een modderpoel herschapen. Het zicht is tot niets

gereduceerd. De Hollandse soldaten zijn in zware capes gehuld. Bij de aanval door drie Nederlandse vliegtuigen op het vliegveld van Malang beantwoorden de republikeinen het vuur met hun luchtafweergeschut.

Generaal Spoor heeft een oproep tot de bevolking van Cheribon gericht om kalm te blijven en vooral geen tactiek van

de verbrande aarde toe te passen. Het republikeinse persagentschap Antara, dat alle gevechtshandelingen tot op de

minuut mededeelde en dat de enige officiële nieuwsbron was waaruit de berichten uit de Republiek tot ons kwamen

werd door de Nederlandse troepen gesloten en bezet. De spertijd in Djakarta gaat thans elke avond in om half zeven.

De republikeinse radio in Djakarta, die eerst gesloten was, is thans heropend met Nederlandse uitzendingen.

Hoe Beel het volk "inlichtte"

Oorlogsverklaring met Wilhelmus tot besluit

Minister-president Beel heeft gisterenavond in een radiorede medegedeeld, dat de regering de landvoogd (!) heeft gemachtigd over te gaan tot een "politiële actie" tegen de Republiek Indonesia. Hij vertelde dat deze stap de regering

zelf grote moeite heeft gekost. Volgens Beel had de regering echter zorgvuldig nagelaten enige druk op de Republiek

uit te oefenen. Zij had de Republiek "in volkomen vrijheid" tot een overeenkomst bewogen. De regering blijft, volgens

Beel althans, aan Linggadjati vasthouden en hij verwees daarbij naar de Malino-gebieden, waarbij ook andere zich nog

kunnen aansluiten. Dat Beel alle schuld op de Republiek wiep, behoeft wel nauwelijks te worden vermeld. De

uitzending van de rede, die over beide zenders plaats had, werd met het Wilhelmus besloten.

Rondom de Schande

De communistische motie, Donderdag in de Tweede Kamer ingediend, is van een treffende eenvoud. Zij spreekt uit, wat ieder weldenkend mens meent: de weg van het geweld is de verkeerde weg; de onderhandelingen moeten worden heropend.

Toch is deze motie door de Kamer met grote meerderheid verworpen. Na een onmachtig debat, dat bij de rede van Jan Schouten zelfs in een doodgewone burenruzie ontaardde. Zo stelde de Kamer zich vrijwillig in dienst van de koloniale reactie – de enige, die winst verwacht van dit heilloos avontuur.

De P.v.d.A. stemde in haar geheel tegen de communistische motie. Ook diegenen onder haar Kamerleden, die het met de inhoud van de motie eens zijn. Alle registers van het anti-communistische orgel werden opengetrokken, om hen af te schrikken, naar hun overtuiging te handelen. Zo bleef Palar de enige, die de eer redde. De rest ging roemloos onder het juk door.

De coalitie met de K.V.P. werd door de P.v.d.A. aangegaan, teneinde een vreedzame oplossing in Indonesië te waarborgen. "Het is een voortdurend touwtrekken, om de katholieken over de streep te krijgen", verklaarde Van der Goes van Naters eens. Donderdag eindigde het touwtrekken ermee, dat een geweld oplossing in Indonesië werd aanvaard ter wille van de coalitie. Eindelijk was een der partijen "over de streep". Maar het waren niet de katholieken...

Romme is dan ook in zijn nopjes. Hij vindt, dat de P.v.d.A. zich maar wàt keurig gedragen heeft. Was de communistische motie achterwege gebleven, zo schrijft hij in de Volkskrant, dan had men alleen de conclusie kunne n trekken dat een grotere of minder grote meerderheid van de Kamer met de regeringspolitiek instemde. Maar nu: negen-tiende deel! Het is, om zo te zeggen, "kollosal"!...

Aan zulke bondgenoten als de P.v.d.A., daarbij heb je wat aan. Zij offeren liever hun partijprogramma op, dan hun coalitie-broeders in de steek te laten...

De vraag is alleen: juicht Romme niet de vroeg? De Kamerfractie van de P.v.d.A. werd met zwaar anti-communistengeschut over de roomse streep gejaagd.

Maar het geweten knaagt. De strijd tussen partij-discipline en socialistische overtuiging duurt voort.

De beroering komt niet tot bedaren, evenmin als het geweld in Indonesië tot bedaren komt.

Velen hebben reeds gesproken en nog meerderen zullen volgen.

Want men mag niet zwijgen wanneer men ervan overtuigd is, dat de regering het land in een avonduur stort, waarvan de noodlottige gevolgen niet zijn te overzien...

De berichten over de oorlog in Indonesië waren Donderdagavond in een hoekje van de voorpagina van Het Vrije Volk weggemoffeld. In plaats daarvan schrijft het blad, hoe goed en "vertrouwenwekkend" het zou zijn, als er inderdaad eens mocht blijken, dat het doel van de militaire acties beperkt is. Het zou ook zo geruststellend zijn, als nu inderdaad "de goede diensten" van het buitenland werden aanvaard om de breuk met de republiek te helen.

Het Vrije Volk poogt weliswaar de strijd van de communisten voor herstel van de vrede met Indonesië te kleineren, maar helemaal gerust dat de arbeiders alles maar zullen blijven slikken, is het blad toch niet... En hun vonnis over de regeringspolitiek is tegelijkertijd een vernietigend oordeel over de P.v.d.A. ...

Als men dit zielig geschrijf van Het Vrije Volk leest, moet men denken aan de jongens, die thans in Indonesië vallen. Het zijn er niet weinige, ook al heeft Spoor beloofd, dat hij zuinig met hen zal omgaan en al stelt Trouw, met verdraaide ogen, hun levens in de hand van God...

Wij begrijpen heel goed, welk een pijn en angst de berichten over de Nederlandse verliezen moeten veroorzaken in de gezinnen van hen, die een jongen overzee hebben. Wij hebben alles gedaan wat wij konden, om hun vertrek te verhinderen en, eenmaal ginds, hun terugkeer te bewerkstelligen.

Bij elke gelegenheid was het de P.v.d.A., die gerust stelde: "Wij stellen ons garant voor een vreedzame oplossing, de troepen zullen niet voor oorlogshandelingen worden gebruikt." Dat was zo bij de geforceerde wijziging van art. 192 van de Grondwet, bij de wet uitzending dienstplichtigen, telkens en telkens weer. Art. 192 zou nimmer gewijzigd zijn, indien de P.v.d.A. zich daartegen had verzet; haar stemmen voltooiden de vereiste 2/3 meerderheid.

Nederlandse soldaten sneuvelen – voor een on-Nederlandse zaak. De P.v.d.A. zond ze er heen, de P.v.d.A. keurde goed, dat zij werden "ingezet".

Neen – de P.v.d.A. heeft geen recht, òns te kapittelen, zij heeft geen recht te jammeren – in plaats van het volk met nieuwe illusies te voeden, heeft zij slechts beschaamd te zwijgen, tot haar leden deze grote schande zullen hebben uitgewist.

Hongerblokkade tegen de Republiek?

Hoe de Nederlanders de wapenstilstand opvatten, blijkt het beste uit de dagorder van vice-admiraal Pinke. Hij zei, dat het de plicht blijft van de krijgsmacht, rust en orde te handhaven in de onder "onze zorg staande gebieden." Hiertoe behoort in de eerste plaats het tegengaan van "infiltraties" in deze gebieden, het tegengaan van de invoer van militaire goederen en van de uitvoer van producten der ondernemingen uit dit gebied. De patrouillediensten blijven gehandhaafd. Deze maatregelen houden dus in, dat er een hongerblokkade tegen de Republiek is ingesteld, aangezien de rijkste gebieden thans onder controle van de troepen van Spoor staan. Ook Spoor zelf heeft in een dagorder zijn troepen tot de uiterste waakzaamheid opgeroepen.

Spoor voegde aan zijn verklaringen nog toe, dat in de toekomst een strenge actie waarschijnlijk nodig zal zijn om bepaalde "bandeloze" elementen te bezweren. De troepen mogen echter niet zelfstandig ingrijpen. Maar alle zullen worden gebruikt tegen "die elementen, die ons trachten te weerhouden van de handhaving van wet en orde".

Men kan hieraan slechts de conclusie verbinden, dat de gevechten binnen de bezette gebieden voortgaan.

Article 6 - De Waarheid 05/08/1947

De teerling geworpen

Voor niemand is de regeringsverklaring van Zaterdagavond als een verrassing gekomen. Nadat de besprekingen tussen Nederland en de Republiek waren afgebroken en de Nederlandse regering had aangekondigd, dat zij het besluit betreffende instelling van het Bewind in de Overgangstijd (het B.I.O.-besluit) zou afkondigen was er geen hoop op overeenstemming meer, tenzij de Republiek te elfder ure deed wat zij nooit heeft kunnen doen: in de federatie treden als gelijkgerechtigd met de andere deelstaten en de bestandschendingen krachtig tegengaan. Geschiedde dit niet dan zou Nederland op korte termijn zelf ingrijpen.

Het is niet geschied. De persoonlijke poging van Hatta, die geen weerklank heeft gevonden in zijn eigen omgeving, moest falen en dus is het daarmee onweerhoudbaar naar het laatste bedrijf gegleden.

Nog eenmaal heeft de regering der Republiek getracht de loop van de ontwikkeling te stuiten door een beroep op arbitrage op de Verenigde Staten. Maar dit beroep beperkte zich tot een communiqué. Van een ernstig voorstel is niets gebleken en van enige weerklank bij de regering van de Verenigde Staten op deze suggestie werd niets gehoord.

Tot deze ontwikkeling van het conflict moest het ten slotte komen. Wij hebben daarop reeds, herhaaldelijk gewezen.

De toenemende bestandschendingen door Republikeinse infiltranten in het gebied achter de demarcatielijnen schiepen een gevaarlijke en onhoudbare toestand, die aan Nederland de keuze opdrong: ingrijpen of heengaan.

Heengaan zou betekenen, het veld algeheel vrijlaten aan het leger en de vrijescharen van de Republiek, de zeer vele Nederlanders en de Indonesiërs die met Nederland hebben samengewerkt achterlaten, onbeschermd tegen de geregelde en ongeregelde troepen, die meer en meer de macht in de politiek wakker wordende Republiek aan zich hebben getrokken. Het zou betekenen de staatkundige opbouw en de economische herleving opgeven.

Het zou betekenen dat dit grote deel van Zuid-Oost-Azië opdringende invloed van Rusland waartegen de Republiek – de enige Indonesische staat met een leger – niet zou kunnen optreden. De Nederlandse regering heeft besloten niet heen te gaan en dit besluit dwong haar tot de andere these: ingrijpen met haar militaire apparaat. Een andere mogelijkheid bleef niet meer open.

Dit is het tragische einde van vele vruchteloze pogingen om het nationalisme van de Republiek te voegen in het geheel van een soeverein Indonesië; pogingen die van beide kanten met geduld en volharding zijn gedaan en die begeleid zijn door fouten van beide kanten, maar die ten slotte zijn afgestuit op de onmacht van de Republikeinse onderhandelaars om op de resultaten van hun besprekingen met de Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers de goedkeuring van Djokja te verwerven.

De teerling is geworpen.

Het woord is nu aan de wapenen.

Nederland heeft men dit besluit een risico op zich genomen. Het is er ten slotte toe gedwongen. Dit risico is verantwoord, wanneer het besluit om in te grijpen, leidt tot het enige doel, dat de politiek van Nederland waarde kan geven: de snellere voltooiing van de staatkundige hervorming, die Indonesië de vrijheid en de soevereiniteit schenkt, waarop het eilandenrijk aanspraak heeft.

Amerikaanse resolutie vraagt de troepen terug te trekken

C.v.G.D krijgt opdracht tot het bepalen der verantwoordelijkheid.

De Amerikaanse afgevaardigde Jessup heeft in de Veiligheidsraad een resolutie ingediend, mede ondertekend door Syrië en Columbia. Volgens deze resolutie moet het vuren worden gestaakt en dienen beide partijen zich terug te trekken in de posities, die zij innamen bij het tekenen van de wapenstilstand in Januari 1948. Dr Jessup betoogde, dat het hernieuwde uitbreken van vijandelijkheden in Indonesië een ernstige bedreiging is van de internationale vrede. Vóór dr Jessup hadden de Nederlandse gedelegeerde Van Royen en de Republikeinse gedelegeerde L. N. Palar gesproken. Dr Van Royen verdedigde het standpunt en actie van de Nederlandse regering. Verdere onderhandelingen met de Republiek waren nutteloos gebleken en derhalve had de Nederlandse regering besloten de Republiek te zuiveren van terrorisme. Het doel bleef echter de vestiging van de soevereine Verenigde Staten van Indonesië en niets zou de Nederlandse regering van deze gedragslijn doen afwijken.

"Nu wij tot deze moeilijke beslissing zijn gekomen", aldus dr Van Royen "is Nederland vast besloten haar uit te voeren, welke de kosten of de consequenties ook mogen zijn."

Palar vroeg de raad een bevel uit te vaardigen om onmiddellijk het vuren te staken. De Nederlandse troepen zouden zich moeten terugtrekken op de stellingen van vóór de aanval en de gevangenen zouden moeten worden vrijgelaten. Na de rede van Jessup werd de bijeenkomst verdaagd tot Donderdagmorgen halfelf.

Jessup: Bevel overtreden

De Amerikaanse gedelegeerde dr Jessup, die na de heer Palar het woord nam, stelde aan het einde van zijn rede vast, dat het onder de tegenwoordige omstandigheden voor de C.v.G.D. ongetwijfeld enige tijd zal vragen, alvorens zij de Veiligheidsraad volledig over de recente ontwikkelingen kan inlichten, welke inlichtingen hij van grote waarde voor de Raad achtte om de oorzaken van de huidige toestand in Indonesië te kunnen nagaan.

Ondertussen is er in Indonesië een gewapend conflict. Hij noemde het een vaststaand feit, dat een bevel van de Raad van 1 Augustus 1947 overtreden is. Dit is een aangelegenheid, welke de Raad onmiddellijk ter hand moet nemen zonder nadere rapporten van de C.v.G.D. af te wachten, aldus dr Jessup. Zoals hij reeds eerder opmerkte, is hier geen sprake van een toestand, waarin enige onzekerheid behoefde te bestaan, of hier in feite sprake is van het uitbreken van vijandelijkheden. Het kwam hem voor, dat de Raad verplicht is, aan de hand van het Handvest, in dit stadium van zijn beraadslagingen onmiddellijk het bevel te geven dat de vijandelijkheden in Indonesië gestaakt worden en te verlangen, dat de strijdkrachten van beide partijen onmiddellijk worden teruggetrokken.

Hij herhaalde het gezichtspunt van zijn regering, dat de order "Staakt het vuren" van 1 Augustus 1947 nog altijd bindend is voor beide partijen en dat die order werd geschonden door de recente actie, die door de Nederlandse autoriteiten in Indonesië werd ondernomen:

"Het is ons weloverwogen mening, dat een hernieuwd uitbreken der vijandelijkheden kan bewijzen, een ernstige bedreiging te zijn van de internationale vrede. Daarom hebben de Verenigde Staten de gelegenheid verwelkomd om tezamen met de delegaties van Columbia en Syrië een ontwerp-resolutie aan de raad voor te leggen."

Hij sprak de hoop uit, dat dit voorstel zich zelf zal aanbevelen bij de leden van de Raad en dat de ontwerp-resolutie vlug kan worden aangekomen.

Jessup zeide, dat het standpunt der Verenigde Staten in de grond hetzelfde is als medio 1947, toen de Veiligheidsraad een "cease fire"- resolutie aannam. Hij herinnerde er aan, dat de Verenigde Staten van mening waren, dat het uitbreken van vijandelijkheden op zich zelf de Raad de bevoegdheid gaf om in te grijpen onafhankelijk van de vraag, of de Republiek als een onafhankelijke staat kon worden aangemerkt.

De toestand van het ogenblik is minstens even ernstig als in Juli 1947 en de heer Jessup meende, dat de Raad overeenkomstig deze ernst moet handelen. De heer Jessup ging uitvoerig het verloop van de reeks mislukte onderhandelingen na. Hij zeide, dat zijn regering van mening is, dat er onvoldoende pogingen zijn gedaan om de onderhandelingen tot een succesvol einde te brengen onder auspiciën van de C.v.G.D.

Dit wordt in het bijzonder duidelijk in het licht van het feit, dat het bestand in den beginne op bevredigende wijze kon worden toegepast, zei hij. De heer Jessup zeide verder nog, dat de Verenigde Staten geen rechtvaardiging konden vinden voor het heropenen der vijandelijkheden. Dit in het bijzonder, wijl zeven maanden zijn voorbijgegaan, waarin de diensten van de commissie niet werden gebruikt. Indien de inbreken op het bestand van de zijde der Republiek inderdaad zo veelvuldig en voortdurend zijn voorgekomen, dan had de Nederlandse regering, naar de mening van de heer Jessup, deze inbreuken direct aan de Veiligheidsraad kunnen rapporteren voor en aler het bestand werd opgezegd. Dit is in het bijzonder opmerkelijk in het licht van de verzekeringen, door de Nederlandse vertegenwoordiger aan de Raad gegeven bij de laatste behandeling van het geschil en in het licht van meer recente verzekeringen, gegeven aan de regeringen, die in de Raad zijn vertegenwoordigd. De heer Jessup preciseerde daarna de omstandigheden, onder welke Nederland het bestand heeft opgezegd en hij citeerde in dit verband de opmerkingen van de C.v.G.D.

Militaire optreden op Java is sinds 1 Januari geëindigd

Staking der vijandelikheden op Sumatra spoedig verwacht

Op 31 December zijn de militaire acties op Java geëindigd.

Van officiële zijde wordt medegedeeld, dat de legercommandant in Indonesië het bevel heeft gegeven aan de troepencommandanten op Java zich van 1 Januari af te beperken tot optreden tegen nog rondzwervende groepen, bendes of enkelingen, die ongeregelheden trachten te veroorzaken.

Een dergelijk bevel kan, naar Aneta verneemt, een dezer dagen eveneens voor de troepencommandanten op Sumatra worden verwacht. Officieel wordt voorts medegedeeld, dat sinds het begin van de actie aan Nederlandse zijde 66 militairen zijn gedood en 172 gewond.

Het Franse persbureau A.F.P. bericht, dat van Nederlandse zijde nog geen maatregelen zijn genomen tot vrijlating van president Soekarno en de andere Republikeinse leiders.

Boodschap van dr W. Drees

Het blijft een diepe tragiek, dat de goede wil bij velen aan beide zijden gedurende de afgelopen jaren dit niet heeft kunnen voorkomen, en dat voor allen, die hierbij betrokken zijn, weer nieuw leed wordt toegevoegd aan wat in de jaren van verwarring en strijd reeds werd veroorzaakt.

Aldus de minister-president dr W. Drees in een boodschap, die op Oudejaarsavond over de zenders van de Wereldomroep werd uitgesproken.

Een belangrijk deel van zijn rede wijdde de minister-president aan de gebeurtenissen in Indonesië. "Dit probleem, waarmede wij zo lang en zo moeizaam hebben geworsteld, heeft sinds de capitulatie van Japan als een loden last op ons allen gedrukt. Thans is het gekomen tot een botsing, die internationaal door velen wordt gezien als een agressie onzerzijds. Het Nederlandse volk en stellig ook de Nederlanders, die elders vertoeven en die de gebeurtenissen hebben gevolgd, weten echter met hoeveel ernst gepoogd is in jarenlang overleg een uitweg te vinden zonder strijd en hoe hier niet strijd is begonnen, maar slechts de consequenties zijn aanvaard van een toestand, waarin onafgebroken in een of andere vorm strijd werd gevoerd.

De Nederlandse regering zal harerzijds het mogelijke doen, om dezer dagen de actie te beëindigen. Wij hopen, dat thans in belangrijke mate de voorwaarden geschapen zijn, die het mogelijk maken verantwoordelijkheid te dragen voor de overgang naar de nieuwe rechtsorde in geheel Indonesië.

1 Januari 1949 was, wat men noemde, de streefdatum, waarop getracht zou worden de Verenigde Staten van Indonesië tot stand te doen komen. Te veel hinderpalen werden op de weg daarheen aangetroffen. Moge toch dit moment in de toekomst blijken uitgangspunt te zijn geworden voor de opbouw van een vrij federatief Indonesië, in goede samenwerking met Nederland.

Niet te vergeefs

Dan zullen de offers, die gebracht zijn en worden door hen, naar wie onze gedachten op dit uur in het bijzonder uitgaan, niet vergeefs zijn geweest. Wij weten, hoe de leden van onze strijdkrachten niet enkel moed, beleid en trouw hebben getoond, maar hoe zij ook in vele gevallen met het Indonesische volk hebben meegeleefd, en, al zien zij verlangend uit naar de terugkeer naar Nederland, van land en volk in Indonesië zijn gaan houden. Wij hopen, dat in de toekomst Nederlanders als waardevolle medewerkers in Indonesië belangrijke arbeid zullen kunnen blijven verrichten.

Proclamatie van de C.P.N. (De Waarheid)

Opnieuw is het militaire geweld in Indonesië ontzettend. Op de wijze, zoals Hitler dat placht te doen, is van officiële zijde Zaterdagavond laat bekend gemaakt, dat de Nederlandse troepen reeds sinds zes uren in actie waren getreden. Het volk werd overrompeld, aan de vooravond van de Zondag, aan de vooravond van het Kerstfeest, waarbij over Vrede op Aarde wordt gesproken. Dit is de bloedige Kerstnacht van het koloniale kapitaal!

In begin Juli nog, enkele dagen voor de verkiezingen, ontkende de regering van de P.v.d.A. en de K.V.P., dat tot deze militaire actie besloten was. Het was "een bedenkelijke verkiezingsmanoeuvre van de communisten."

De actie, die Zaterdag 18 December begonnen is, werd echter reeds maanden geleden voorbereid.

Het volk werd dus op een "bedenkelijke" wijze bedrogen.

Men beroept zich nu opnieuw, als op 20 Juli 1947, op een "onhoudbare toestand." Men zegt: wij moesten in Indonesië vechten of heengaan. Maar het is duidelijk dat vechten de onderdrukking en slachting van het Indonesische volk betekent en dat de enige wijze om dit volk de vrijheid te geven, waarop het recht heeft, bereikt kan worden doordat de Nederlandse troepen heengaan en naar huis terugkeren, waar men ben tegen hun wil vandaan heeft gehaald.

Men zegt, dat thans gevochten wordt om het Indonesische volk zijn "rechten" te geven:

Welke rechten?

Het recht van Zuid-Celebes, het recht van de dodentrein [...], het recht van het platgebrande dorp Paklandji, het recht van de concentratiekampen?

Het enige recht, dat de regering op het oog heeft, is het recht van het koloniale kapitaal om het Indonesische volk uit te [...] en te onderdrukken.

Het is het recht waarvoor onze jongens sterven, waarvoor het Indonesische volk [...] wordt geslacht.

Van officiële zijde pronkt men thans niet schijnbare gemakkelijke successen, ook zoals op 20 Juli 1947. Het gevolg was een onhoudbare toestand. En het gevolg van de huidige actie zal nog erger zijn!

Het verraad van enkele omgekochte sujetten van het soort van Hatta, heeft de poorten van de Republiek voor de koloniale troepen geopend, nadat zij door sluipmoord de Republiek een aantal van haar beste verdedigers, de communisten, hadden beroofd.

Maar de strijd zal thans pas beginnen, en duizenden Nederlandse jongens zullen er aan ten offer vallen.

Nederlanders!

Tot deze militaire actie is besloten zonder uw voorkennis. Uw volksvertegenwoordiging kon, zoals dat onder het totalitaire bewind Drees-Beel-Stikker de gewoonte is, zich daarover niet van tevoren uit te spreken.

Uw zonen moeten sterven, gij kunt het betalen en verder is het "Maul halten!" Leden en aanhangers van de P.v.d.A.!

De Partijraad van uw partij is bijeengeweesd en heeft mede tot deze militaire actie besloten.

In het geheim, zonder dat een uwer ook maar iets had in te brengen!

Gij moet thans een keuze doen. Thans rust de zwaarste verantwoordelijkheid op u.

Zonder de medewerking van uw partij zou deze nieuwe verkrachting van recht en democratie niet mogelijk zijn.

Gij moet thans kleur bekennen!

Een socialist en democraat kan nooit de geweldpleging tegen het Indonesische broedervolk duiden. Geen volk kan vrij zijn, dat andere volkeren onderdrukt.

Als ge rood wilt zijn, dan zult ge het thans moeten tonen door u in alle openlijkheid tegen de politiek van Drees-Beel te verzetten.

Er wordt een daad gevraagd! In Indonesië smijt men met de miljarden en met mensenlevens voor de winzucht van enkelen.

U, arbeiders, scheept men nog steeds af met karig loon, met een kale Kerstmis. Stelt onmiddellijk uw eisen!

In een verklaring van het Partijbestuur der CPN wordt gij opgeroepen: Verzet u tegen de toenemende verslechtingen van uw levensvoorwaarden en dwingt uw loon en andere eisen af door de massa-stakingen!

Geen ma en geen cent meer voor de regeringspolitiek.

Alleen door massa-actie kan aan de moordpartij in Indonesië een eind worden gemaakt en de regering van de koloniale oorlog, Drees, worden vervangen door een regering van vrede, recht en opbouw!

Het bestuur van het NVV, dat eens beleefd had "heel het raderwerk stil te zetten als er in Indonesië geschoten werd", wekt u thans op tot "rust en kalmte."

In dezelfde bewoordingen waarmede zij ook tijdens de bezetting tegen arbeidersacties optraden, komen thans de Vermeulens de reactie te hulp! Kent echter uw plicht! Uw plicht is niet te werken voor de koloniale oorlog, maar te strijden voor uw gezin, voor uw loon, voor de terugkeer van uw zonen voor de vrede!

Weg met de koloniale oorlog in Indonesië!

Voor onmiddellijke loonsverhoging! Leve de strijd.

Weg met Drees!

STAAKT HET VUREN! TROEPEN NAAR HUIS!

Amerikaanse resolutie in de veiligheidsraad:

Stop schieten – troepen teug naar uitgangstellingen

Marshall-hulp aan het Ned-Indische regering stopgezet

Gistermiddag heeft de Amerikaanse vertegenwoordiger in de Veiligheidsraad een resolutie ingediend, waarin Nederland en de Republiek opgeroepen worden, het vuur onmiddellijk te staken en de troepen onmiddellijk terug te trekken op de posities, die zij voor het begin van de nieuwe militaire actie hebben ingenomen.

Aldus werden de geruchten bevestigd, die wij gisteren in een deel van onze edities reeds konden vermelden en waarin werd gezegd, dat dr. Jessup nieuwe instructies uit Washington had ontvangen.

De resolutie heeft in Parijs grote verrassing gewekt en in Haagse regeringskringen heerst beroering. De indruk werd nog versterkt door het besluit van Washington, om de Marshall-hulp voor Indonesië stop te zetten.

Een belangrijk verschil met Juli 1947, de eerste militaire actie, is, dat Amerika toen wel "staakt het vuren" had geëist, maar niet het terugtrekken van de troepen naar de uitgangstellingen.

Indien deze resolutie wordt aangenomen, zal generaal Spoor gehouden zijn, Djokja te ontruimen evenals alle andere grote steden die hij volgens zijn zeggen heeft bezet (zoals Solo, Boekittinggi (Sumatra enz.) en naar de demarcatielijn die op 17 Jan. 1948 werd vastgesteld, terug moeten trekken. De zwakheid van de Amerikaanse resolutie schuilt echter in het feit, dat daarin slechts een "beroep" op de partijen wordt gedaan (call upon), en hun niet het bindende voorschrift wordt gegeven om de twee richtlijnen op te volgen.

Dr. Jessup, de Amerikaanse gedelegeerde, die gisteren na Palar, de vertegenwoordiger van de Republiek, aan het woord kwam, zei ongeveer het volgende: "De situatie waarmede de Veiligheidsraad te maken heeft laat geen twijfel bestaan over het feit dat wij te maken hebben met een overtreding van een bestandsovereenkomst. Het is waar dat de Nederlandse regering geheel formeel en officieel aangekondigd heeft dat zij de bestandsovereenkomst van 17 Jan. 1948 heeft herroepen.

Maar de Amerikaanse regering kan na zorgvuldige studie van het materiaal dat door de Commissie van Drie ter beschikking is gesteld, géén verontschuldiging vinden voor de hervatting van de militaire operaties in Indonesië."

Indien het aantal bestandschendingen zó groot was als wordt beweerd, waarom heeft de Nederlandse regering dat dan niet aan de Veiligheidsraad gerapporteerd, alvorens tot militaire actie over te gaan?

Dit is een zaak, waar de Veiligheidsraad onmiddellijk en zonder verdere rapporten van de Commissie van Drie af te wachten, handelen moet.

Dr. Jessup kondigde hierna de Amerikaanse voorstellen aan en voegde er aan toe: "Het is onze weloverwogen mening dat het nieuwe uitbreken van de vijandelijkheden in Indonesië een ernstige bedreiging van de internationale vrede kan blijken te zijn."

De resolutie luidt als volgt:

"De Veiligheidsraad met bezorgdheid de hervatting der vijandelijkheden heden in Indonesië gadeslaand, nota genomen hebbend van de rapporten van de commissie van drie, beschouwt zulk een hervatting der vijandelijkheden te zijn in strijd met de resolutie, welke door de Veiligheidsraad tijdens zijn 171^{ste} vergadering op 1947 werd aangenomen, doet een beroep op partijen

1. de vijandelijkheden onmiddellijk te staken en

2. onmiddellijk hun strijdkrachten terug te trekken op de respectieve kanten van de gedemilitariseerde zone, vastgesteld onder bestandsovereenkomst van 17 Januari 1948,

Geeft de commissie van drie opdracht de Veiligheidsraad telegrafisch een volledig en dringend rapport te zenden over de gebeurtenissen welk sedert 12 Dec. 1948 in Indonesië hebben plaats gevonden, ter vaststelling van de verantwoordelijkheid voor het uitbreken van de vijandelijkheden.

Geen bevel "Staakt het vuren" op Java

Nachtelijke gevechten in Djokja – Brandende dorpen – Spoor voorspelt troepen zware taak

Ofschoon de Nederlandse afgevaardigde in de Veiligheidsraad, dr. Van Royen, aangekondigd heeft, dat op 31 December middernacht aan de Nederlandse troepen op Java bevel zou worden gegeven om het vuren te staken, is er feitelijk tot nu toe een dergelijk bevel niet uitgevaardigd. Het enige wat de Nederlandse regering gedaan heeft is de publicatie op 2 Januari van een bekendmaking van generaal Spoor aan zijn commandanten.

Daarin werd alleen medegedeeld, dat "op 31 December 1948 de militaire acties en daarmee de vijandelikheden op Java beëindigd zijn".

Over een bevel "staakt het vuren" wordt niets gerept, integendeel, generaal Spoor geeft zijn commandanten juist het bevel en spoort hen zelfs aan tot het houden van acties "tegen nog rondzwerfende groepen en benden of enkelingen", onder het voorwendsel van "gevaar voor de openbare veiligheid". De Commissie van Drie heeft geen mededeling ontvangen van de uitvaardiging van een bevel tot staakt het vuren door generaal Spoor.

In een Nieuwjaarsboodschap tot zijn troepen waarschuwde generaal Spoor o.m., dat de taken van de troepen in de komende maanden nog zwaar zullen zijn.

De ouders, vrouwen, verloofden en andere familieleden van de Nederlandse soldaten in Indonesië schenkt hij het "prettige" vooruitzicht, dat de troepenschepen, welke thans van Indonesië naar Nederland varen, uitsluitend zieke, gewonde en afgekeurde militairen vervoeren. Omtrent het tijdstip van de repatriëring van de troepen is nog niets bekend.

Guerrilla-strijd op Java

Kleine zenders van het republikeinse verzet melden, dat overal in de bezette gebieden een guerilla-strijd woedt. Het Franse persbureau A.F.P. verneemt van een reiziger uit Djokja, dat de toestand zeer verward is.

In de nacht vinden er gevechten plaats tussen guerrilla's en de Nederlandse troepen, waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt van mortieren. Niemand waagt zich bij donker op straat. Vooral in de nacht van 29 op 30 December zou hevig zijn geschoten in Djokja. A.F.P. meldt vervolgens, dat ook op West- en Oost-Java de toestand zeer verward is.

"De partizanen worden met de dag stoutmoediger, de plantages en afgezonderde politieposten worden voortdurend aangevallen. In de nacht van 29 op 30 December werden in de voorsteden van Bandoeng gevechten geleverd. De horizon was verlicht door de brandende dorpen, die door de Nederlanders in brand werden gestoken als weerwraak tegen de actie der partizanen, aldus A.F.P.

Dubbelzinnigheid Amerikaanse resolutie blootgelegd

Hoe juist de Sowjet-Unie gehandeld heeft door te weigeren haar steun te geven aan de Amerikaanse resolutie in de Veiligheidsraad tot staken van het vuren in Indonesië wordt thans door minister Sassen wel duidelijk aan het licht gesteld. Tegenover Reuter heeft minister Sassen n.l. met nadruk verklaard, dat de Amerikaanse resolutie betreffende het staken van het vuren ook van toepassing is op de Republikeinen.

In het kort komt de verklaring van minister Sassen verder hierop neer, dat de Nederlandse troepen, dank zij de dubbelzinnige Amerikaanse resolutie, die niet uitmaakt, dat Nederland de aanvaller is, zullen kunnen blijven schieten zolang de Republikeinen verzet blijven plegen! In een nieuwjaarsrede over de radio te Batavia heeft de "hoge vertegenwoordiger van de kroon", dr. Beel, een lofredede gehouden op het Nederlandse koloniale bestuur, in het bijzonder op de vorming van de marionettenstaten en op de toeneming van de winstgevende exporten der koloniale ondernemingen.

India roept Aziatische conferentie bijeen

Pandit Nehroe, de minister-president van India, heeft bekend gemaakt, dat zijn regering andere Aziatische regeringen heeft uitgenodigd een conferentie bij te wonen, waarop de Nederlandse aanval op de Indonesische Republiek in beschouwing genomen zal worden.

Door Nehroe werden voor deelneming aan de conferentie uitgenodigd: Turkije, Egypte, Syrië, de Libanon, de Hedjaz (Arabië), Perzië, Irak, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Siam, Birma en China. Nehroe hoopte, dat Australië en Nieuw-Zeeland waarnemers zullen sturen. Opmerkelijk is, dat de democratische volksrepubliek Viet-Nam, die een zware strijd voert tegen het Franse imperialisme, niet is uitgenodigd door Nehroe. Nehroe verklaarde voorts, dat het minimum dat gedaan moet worden voor de Indonesische Republiek is:

1. Terugtrekking van alle Nederlandse strijdkrachten tot de oorspronkelijke demarcatie-lijnen
2. Een onderzoek naar de aanval
3. Stopzetting van elke hulpverlening aan Nederland
4. Schepping van voorwaarden, waaronder de Republiek kan functioneren.

Birmese brigade voor Republiek

Uit Rangoon wordt gemeld, dat in Birma een Birmese brigade wordt gevormd, die aan de zijde der Republikeinse strijdkrachten zal vechten. Reuter meldt, dat Irak als protest tegen de Nederlandse aanval de vergunning voor Nederlandse vliegtuigen, op de vliegvelden van Irak te landen na Januari zal intrekken.