The Stereotyping Effect of Media? The Case of Honor-Related

Violence in Perceptions of Honor Cultures

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Abstract

Stereotypes are built on over generalized beliefs about entire groups. Perceptions of one group member are often applied to all group members. Frequently, stereotyping (especially of minority groups) is exacerbated by stereotypic portrayals of group members in the media. In the current research, we explore how attitudes about an individual become stereotypes about the whole group in a novel context-perceptions of honor cultures. Specifically, we test whether views towards perpetrators of honor violence are also transferred to views of their in-group (i.e., honor culture). In Study 1 (N=439), using an adapted real news article, we explored how labelling a crime as honor violence (or not) influences attitudes towards the perpetrator's ethnic group. In Study 2 (N=166) we explored if perpetrator ethnicity interacts with a crime being labelled as based in honor or not, by conducting a 2x2 study comparing European vs Middle Eastern perpetrators and domestic vs honor violence. In Study 3 (N=92) we conducted exploratory analyses which explicitly examined the extent to which views of the perpetrator influence views of the ethnic group. Overall, our results run counter to previous stereotyping literature. Attitudes about perpetrators of honor violence do not extend to their in-group members (i.e., others in their honor culture).

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Gathering information from environmental cues is an essential component that aids humans in learning and decision making. It is what allows us to know which restaurants to avoid, what computer to purchase, and which doctor we should trust. Each day we use information from reviews that we read online, events that we witness, and advice given by trusted friends to evaluate nearly everything in our surroundings. While gathering this information can be incredibly useful—there are downsides. This process can also cause stereotypical attitudes to form about groups of people. For example, after meeting one American who happens to be very outgoing—one may think all Americans are very outgoing. People tend to allow their views of one out-group member to shape their views about all group members (Hamburger, 1994). While the example given here is rather benign (i.e., whether a whole group is outgoing or not), this process can have much more serious consequences (e.g., equating all African Americans with criminality). However, when are perceptions of one group member most likely to reflect onto the entire group?

Long established research highlights how common it is to have perceptions of one minority member sway attitudes towards all others in their minority group. For example, when viewers see African Americans accused of crimes on the news, the African American community at large is viewed more negatively (Dixon, 2008; Czopp & Monteith, 2006), being associated with criminality (Welch, 2007) and violence (Unnever & Cullen, 2012). Further, in the wake of 9/11 there was a spike in anti-Muslim sentiment (Panagopoulous, 2006), suggesting Westerners equated the acts of the terrorists with the greater Muslim community. However, why do attitudes toward one or two minority group members permeate into stereotypes about the entire minority

group? This is likely because minority groups tend to be viewed as very similar (or interchangeable to one another; Lickel et al., 2000), meaning perceptions of one member of a minority group are frequently reflected onto the entire group (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). This research suggests entire minority groups are especially prone to be defined by actions of an individual group member.

Stereotyping and Media

This tendency, of attitudes towards one minority group member influencing attitudes towards the entire minority group, often occurs in the domain of media consumption. What people see on television shows, news broadcasts, and in the local newspapers all influence how they perceive groups. For example, experimental research has shown African American female characters with stereotypic characteristics on television influence judgments of all African American women (Brown Givens & Monahan, 2005). This notion is supported by other research suggesting stereotypic portrayals of minority group members increases viewers' stereotypical thinking about the entirety of the minority group, especially when viewers have little or no contact with individuals from these groups in their everyday lives (Fujioka, 1999).

According to Abrajano & Singh (2009), news organizations further exacerbate this tendency. They often use a "crime script" to portray minorities (e.g., immigrants) in a group-centric way—making it easy for viewers' attitudes towards one individual, to transfer to the entire minority group. Further, analyses have revealed minorities are often portrayed negatively on television (Tyree, 2011), which in turn could negatively influence how viewers perceive the entire minority group. Taken together, this previous research suggests media is a perfect platform for a transference of attitudes from an individual to their minority group as a whole. As viewers are faced with an individual (often portrayed in a negative light), their negative attitudes are

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likely to expand to all minority group members, as individuals within these groups are seen as interchangeable.

Downstream Consequences of Stereotyping

Based on the plethora of previous research highlighting peoples' tendency to expand their views of one minority member to their views of the whole minority group, we assume this psychological process is pervasive across a variety of contexts. However, we also posit there are many downstream consequences to this stereotyping process, and that these downstream consequences can be observed both in attitudes towards an individual from a minority group, and observed in attitudes towards their entire minority group.

Moral Similarity

Past research has highlighted the centrality of morality in in-group favoritism (Leach, Carraro, Garcia, & Kang, 2015), and out-group degradation (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). In fact, perceptions of morality have been so closely linked to in-group and out-group perceptions by past research, that it has become a central component of key stereotyping frameworks (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011). Research has held that when people stereotype, they view outgroup members as morally dissimilar (Brambilla & Leach, 2014; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012), and are especially likely to dislike outgroup members when those individuals have differing moral convictions (Weisel & Böhm, 2015). Based on this knowledge, and our understanding of the transference of attitudes between individual minority members and minority groups, we posit that when people view individual minority group as morally dissimilar to themselves, they will also view the entire minority group as morally dissimilar.

Consequences of Perceptions of Reduced Moral Similarity

Viewing outgroup members as morally dissimilar to oneself can lead to many negative consequences for intergroup relations. People tend to view themselves and their ingroup as highly moral, and outgroups members as less so (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). When we view individuals (or groups) as less moral than ourselves we are much less willing to engage with them (Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro, & Ellemers, 2013). This is due to perceptions of a lack of moral similarity driving a variety of consequences that are discussed below.

Dehumanization. When people view others as less moral (or in fact immoral), a component of that individual's or group's humanness is removed (Esses, Vennvliet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008). Dehumanization has been closely associated with perceptions of moral inferiority (Greenhalgh & Watt, 2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2013). We assume that when people dehumanize individual minority members, they will also dehumanize the entire minority group. Further, we predict viewing the minority group as morally dissimilar from oneself (or ones' group), will predict greater dehumanization towards that minority group.

Tolerance. When we view others as morally dissimilar to ourselves, we also are less willing to be tolerant towards them (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). For example, one study focusing on whether certain religious individuals were tolerant of homosexuals, found that perceptions of immorality by homosexuals was a key reason for intolerance towards this group (Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005). We assume that when people are intolerant of individual minority members, they will also be intolerant of the entire minority group. Further, based on tolerance research, we predict viewing the minority group as morally dissimilar from oneself (or ones' group), will predict greater intolerance (i.e., less tolerance) towards that minority group.

Threat. Perceptions of outgroup threat are often associated with perceptions of moral dissimilarity between the outgroup and ingroup (Brambilla et al., 2013). When we believe others lack moral compasses, they can seem much more threatening, as they do not abide by the same moral constraints as ourselves. Evidence for the link between perceptions of moral dissimilarity and threat are apparent through experimental research. For example, when group memberships are based on moral convictions—meaning those within ones' in-group are morally similar and those in ones' out-group are morally dissimilar—individuals view outgroup members as especially threatening. Similar effects are not found when group memberships are based on non-moral convictions (Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). We assume that when people view individual minority members as threatening, they will also view the entire minority group as threatening. We also predict viewing the minority group as morally dissimilar from oneself (or ones' group), will predict greater perceptions of threat by that minority group.

Stereotyping and Honor Cultures

Stereotyping of entire minority groups based on observations of a select few individuals has been well established by previous psychological literature. Additionally, communications research has highlighted how the media can exacerbate this tendency, such as by overreporting on minority violence (Klein & Naccarato, 2003), or including stereotypic portrayals of minorities (Tyree, 2011). However, surprisingly little research has been conducted exploring the stereotyping of one minority group in particular—members of honor cultures. Honor cultures tend to be based in reciprocity—the willingness to pay back both the good and bad. This notion can lead to harsh punishments in the name of honor and strong responses to insults (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Many honor cultures are established within North Africa and the Middle East (Devers & Bacon, 2010). While some have studied the stereotyping that occurs within honor

cultures, such as single Turkish women being stereotyped as fragile by Turkish participants (Sakalli-Uğurlu, Türkoğlu, Kuzlak, & Gupta, 2018). Little is known about how outgroup members (e.g., Westerners) view honor cultures.

Based on our knowledge of the stereotyping literature, it is likely the case that individuals from honor cultures will be stereotyped similarly to other minority groups. Since most honor cultures are based in non-White majority regions of the world (e.g., parts of the African continent, and the Middle East), it seems probable Westerners will assume people from honor cultures are in fact minorities. We also know Westerners have negative stereotypes about Africans (Falanga, De Caroli, & Sagone, 2014) and Middle Easterners (Horry & Wright, 2009). With these regions consisting of many honor-based cultures—it would not be surprising for Westerners to stereotype honor cultures similarly to other minority groups or cultures.

Therefore, in the current research we predict the stereotyping mechanisms we know that occur when Westerners' consider other minority groups (e.g., Latin Americans) also hold for honor based cultures. We predict that attitudes about one individual from an honor culture also sway Westerners' opinions about the cultural or ethnic group as a whole. In order to test this proposition, we look to a cultural practice of some honor based communities—honor related violence.

Honor Related Violence

Honor related violence is defined as, "any form of mental or physical violence that is committed on the basis of a collective mentality and in response to (the threat of) damage to the honor of a man or woman, and thereby to that of his or her family, of which the outside world is aware or threatens to become aware" (Janssen, 2009). While cases of honor violence occur primarily in non-Western societies, such as the Middle East (Kulczycki & Windle, 2011), similar

crimes are on the rise in Western countries as immigrant communities continue to grow (Singal, 2017). Additionally, the rate of reported honor violence (especially honor killings) has significantly grown in the last few decades (Chesler & Bloom, 2012), however this could be due to more individuals reporting to authorities rather than a greater increase in instances of honor violence. Taken together, this suggests honor related violence is of increasing relevancy, and yet our understanding of how these crimes influence how people perceive honor-based cultures as a whole, is woefully understudied (Sedem & Ferrer-Wreder, 2014).

Current Research

The current research applies stereotype literature, which states that views towards one minority member are often disseminated to all minority group members, to understand how people view honor based cultures. While little is known about how Westerners' view honor based cultures—we predict stereotypes about individuals and groups, would work similarly as to other minority populations (e.g., African Americans, immigrants, etc.). We test this by focusing on perpetrators of honor violence. We assume that attitudes about these perpetrators will be reflected into attitudes towards the entire ethnic group (i.e., honor culture).

We also know the media can be a driving factor for increasing negative stereotypes about minorities (Arendt & Northup, 2015). Therefore, in the current research we explore whether a crime labelled as honor violence or not in a news report influences how people view the ethnic group of the perpetrator of this violence. We assume that when crimes are labelled as honor-related, people will view the perpetrator negatively. This negative view will in turn lead them to view the perpetrator's ethnic group more negatively as well. However, when crimes are not labelled as honor related, we predict this attitude transference between perpetrator's and the entire ethnic group will not be present—thus meaning the perpetrator's ethnic group will be

viewed more favorably. We predict this asymmetry in attitude transference because we predict less stereotyping occurs when crimes are not based in honor. Honor crimes act as cues to the group likely being a minority based community. On the other hand, with no information about a perpetrator's race or ethnicity, non-honor based crimes will make it difficult for individuals to determine whether the perpetrator is from a minority group or not—thus making it less likely they will engage in stereotyping behaviors.

We also believe the tendency for people to stereotype the entire minority group based on actions by a perpetrator of honor violence has downstream consequences. We assume people view perpetrators (regardless of whether their crime was honor related or not) as less morally similar, endorse dehumanization and intolerance of them, and view these perpetrators as more threatening. This is supported by previous research highlighting peoples' perceptions of criminals as sub-human (Hetey & Eberhardt, 2014), and criminals being a highly stigmatized group in society (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997). However, we also expect these views to translate to the entire ethnic community when the perpetrator commits honor violence, as we have seen in previous stereotyping literature. Based on previous research, we propose the following:

Hypothesis 1: Increased dehumanization and threat, and reduced tolerance of a perpetrator's ethnic group will occur when the crime is labelled as honor based (as compared to non-honor based).

Hypothesis 2: Perceptions of reduced moral similarity between participant's and perpetrator's ethnic groups when the crime is labelled as honor based (as compared to non-honor based).

Theoretical Framework for Understanding Downstream Consequences of Stereotyping

Furthermore, we also predict a theoretical model (See Figure 1) for understanding the stereotyping of the ethnic group of perpetrators of honor violence. Specifically, we predict the following:


Hypothesis 3: Honor based crimes (as compared to non-honor based) will predict increased dehumanization of the perpetrator's ethnic group through a mediational pathway of moral similarity.

Hypothesis 4: Honor based crimes (as compared to non-honor based) will predict reduced tolerance of the perpetrator's ethnic group through a mediational pathway of moral similarity.

Hypothesis 5: Honor based crimes (as compared to non-honor based) will predict increased perceived threat of the perpetrator's ethnic group through a mediational pathway of moral similarity.

Figure 1

Theoretical framework for understanding downstream consequences of stereotyping in honor related violence.



Study 1

Study 1 tested the predictions mentioned above. In this research we assumed views of perpetrators of honor violence would be transferred to their entire ethnic group, but this would not occur when perpetrators committed non-honor violence. Since this was an assumption, we did not explicitly test attitudes towards perpetrators—as a wealth of stereotyping research supported such an assumption.

Methods

Power Analysis

Currently, G*Power 3.1.9.3 is unable to conduct power analyses for mediations. However, Fritz & MacKinnon (2007), conducted simulations in order to empirically compute power for the different forms of mediation analysis. These analyses provided a template for the required sample size to achieve sufficient power in mediation analyses.

Our study design consisted of one independent variable at two levels (condition; *honor* (1) vs *non-honor* (0)), one mediator (i.e., moral dissimilarity), and one dependent variable in each analysis (e.g., dehumanization). For our mediation analyses, we used Version 3.3 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017) which uses percentile bootstrap confidence intervals when calculating the effect of condition (the dependent variables) on the independent variables. The Fritz and Mackinnon (2007) simulations were conducted on continuous independent variables, while ours is dichotomous. However, past research shows dichotomous IVs in mediations produce nearly identical models when all effect sizes are predicted to be equal (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheet, 2002). As a conservative estimate, we predicted the effect of the independent variable on the mediator and the effect of the mediator on the dependent

variables to be small ($\alpha = 0.14$, $\beta = 0.14$). Results from Fritz and Mackinnon's simulations suggest, in order to achieve 80% power and find a small effect we would need 558 participants.

Manipulation

Our manipulation of honor related violence versus non-honor related violence consisted of participants reading articles adapted from a real news article about a real crime. The original article, and the adapted versions can be found in the Supplementary Materials (S1-S4). In both conditions' participants read about a man who was charged with the killing of his wife. The articles were identical except in the honor condition, participants read that the husband committed an honor killing (e.g., "The beheading of 37-year-old Asiya Hassan has all the markings of an honor killing"), and in the non-honor condition participants read that the husband simply killed his wife (e.g., "The beheading of 37-year-old Asiya Hassan has all the markings of a killing").

Participants and Procedure

Five hundred and sixty participants, were recruited from Mechanical Turk. All participants were residents of the United States and at least 18 years or older. After reading the informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to either read the honor killing article, or the non-honor killing article. As a comprehension check, participants then used a free response box to write what the perpetrator was accused of in the article. Acceptable responses were those stating he was accused of killing, murdering, or beheading. Responses that did not meet this criterion lead to that participant being removed from all analyses. One-hundred and nineteen participants failed the attention check, meaning only 439 participants were included in subsequent analyses (179 men, 253 women¹, *Mage*= 35.00, *Sdage*=12.04, 38% reported having a

¹ Three participants reported their gender as "Other".

liberal ideology). Two-hundred and fourteen participants were in the honor condition and 225 participants were in the non-honor condition.

Based on our initial power analyses, this sample size did not provide enough power for the mediation analysis. However, we decided to conduct sensitivity analyses to determine if this sample size provides enough power to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. These hypotheses posit there are significant differences between the honor and non-honor conditions on moral similarity, dehumanization, tolerance, and threat—meaning t-tests are appropriate for these analyses. A sensitivity analysis using G* Power version 3.1.9.3, suggested a two-tail t-test comparing the non-honor and honor conditions, with our sample size, and 80% power is able to detect a Cohen's d = .268. This suggests our sample size should be able to detect a relatively small effect size, and that we have sufficient power to conduct analyses for Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Mediating Variable. After completing the comprehension check question, participants responded to a variety of measures focused on the ethnic group the perpetrator is part of. The first measure, moral dissimilarity is the proposed mediator.

Moral Similarity. To measure moral similarity between ones' own ethnic group and the ethnic group of the perpetrator, an adapted version of the Inclusion of Other in Self Scale was used (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Participants responded to the following question, "Please choose which circle represents the moral similarity between your ethnic group and the perpetrators ethnic group" by choosing between 7 options of circles labelled "My Group" and "Their Group" with varying degrees of overlap. The circles with the least overlap represented the least perceived moral similarity between the participant's ethnic group and the ethnic group of the perpetrator the circles with the most overlap represented the greatest perceived moral

similarity, *circles do not overlap* (1), *circles overlap almost completely* (7). See Figure S5. for a visualization of this measure.

Dependent Variables. Participants then responded to the dependent variables, which assessed the downstream consequences of the term "honor killing" on perceptions of people from the perpetrator's ethnic group. Participants responded to the items in the order presented below.

Dehumanization. Dehumanization was measured with 8 items adapted from Bastian, Denson, and Haslam (2013). Example item: "I feel like people from this ethnic group lack selfrestraint, like an animal", using a 7-point scale from (1) *Not At All* to (7) *Extremely*. Four items were reverse coded and then all items were averaged together. Higher scores on this measure indicate greater dehumanization of the ethnic group. Reliability analysis indicated the dehumanization items had an adequate reliability, α =.78.

Tolerance. Tolerance of the ethnic group was assessed using a measure from Sullivan et al., (1979). Participants responded to 6 items in response to the following prompt, "Please indicate how willing you would be to have people from this ethnic group... 1) live next door, 2) come for dinner, 3) date your son or daughter, 4) be a candidate for president of the United States, 5) to hold rallies, 6) teach in public schools". Participants responded using a 7-point scale from *Very Unwilling* (1) to *Very Willing* (7). Higher scores on this measure represent greater tolerance. Reliability analysis indicated the tolerance items had excellent reliability, α =.96 (George & Mallery, 2003).

Threat. Participants next respond to 6 items assessing perceived ethnic threat using a 5point scale from *Tend to Disagree* (1) to *Tend to Agree* (5). Example item: "In schools where there are too many children from this ethnic group, the quality of education suffers." This

measure was adapted from Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Cenders (2002). Higher scores on this item represent greater perceived threat. Reliability analyses indicated the threat items had excellent reliability, α =.92 (George & Mallery, 2003).

Control Variable. Participants also were asked about their support for multiculturalism. This was entered as a covariate in a series of our models to assess whether general support for diversity (or lack thereof) does not blur the observed effects of our manipulation on individual's tolerance, dehumanization, perceived threat, and morality of the perpetrator's ethnic group.

Multiculturalism. We used a 12-item shortened version of the Multicultural Attitude Scale from Breugelmans, Van de Vijver, &, Fons (2004). Example item: "I think that it is good for the United States to have different groups with a distinct cultural background living in this country". Participants responded to these items using a 7-point Likert scale from *Totally Agree* (1) to *Totally Disagree* (7). Reliability analyses indicated the multiculturalism items had good reliability, α =.85 (George & Mallery, 2003).

Demographic Variables. Afterwards, participants reported demographic information. Participants reported their gender (Male=1, Female=2, Other=3), their age, and their political ideology from *strongly liberal* (1) to *strongly conservative* (7).

Results

Main Analyses

We first conducted correlation analyses to explore the ways in which the study variables and demographic variables related to one another. Overall, most study variables were significantly correlated with one another, and with participant political ideology, see Table 1.

Table 1.

Correlations between	dependent variables	and demographic	variables in Study 1.
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	M(SD)	M(SD)	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6	7.
	Honor	Non-							
		Honor							
1.Moral Similarity	2.19(1.77)	2.23(1.84)	1.00						
2.Dehumanize	3.77(1.14)	3.66(1.08)	25**	1.00					
3.Tolerance	4.22(1.86)	4.31(1.76)	.31**	57**	1.00				
4.Threat	2.60(1.13)	2.54(1.09)	.003	.56**	35**	1.00			
5. Multiculturalism	4.89(0.99)	4.77(1.05)	.12*	46**	.58**	41**	1.00		
6.Political Ideology (High Scores= Conservative)	25(1.63)	06(1.58)	.03	.26**	23**	.37**	34**	1.00	
7.Age	35.71 (12.83)	34.33 (11.22)	11	.02	12*	06	07	.01	1.00

Next, we conducted t-tests to determine if there are significant differences in perceptions of the perpetrator's ethnic group when the term "honor killing" is used in a news article versus not. These analyses address Hypothesis 1 & 2. We predicted there would be significant differences across conditions in ratings of the perpetrator's ethnic group. Results did not support our hypotheses. Participants in the honor condition viewed the perpetrator's ethnic group similarly across all dependent variables (Hypothesis 1), and the mediating variable (Hypothesis 2). See Table 2 for the results of these analyses.

Table 2.

	Honor	Non-Honor	
	Means(sd)	Means(sd)	Inferential
Moral Similarity	2.19(1.77)	2.23(1.84)	<i>t</i> (437) =.26, <i>p</i> =.80
Dehumanization	3.77(1.14)	3.66(1.08)	<i>t</i> (435) =-1.03, <i>p</i> =.31
Tolerance	4.22(1.86)	4.31(1.76)	<i>t</i> (436) =.54, <i>p</i> =.59
Threat	2.60(1.13)	2.54(1.09)	<i>t</i> (436) =64, <i>p</i> =.53

T-Test analyses on mediating and dependent variables in Study 1.

Skewness Analyses

After finding a lack of support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we conducted skewness analyses. Histograms suggested positive skewness across conditions for the moral similarity, suggesting there were floor effects with this measure—many people rated the ethnic group as very morally dissimilar across both conditions. Non-parametric tests were run to further understand this skewness distribution (See S6), analysis of the log transformed moral similarity measure were similar (See S7). Histograms pointed to normal distributions for the dehumanization, tolerance, and threat measures.

Mediational Analyses

Next, we tested Hypotheses 3- 5 by running mediational analyses using PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2017). For each mediation analysis, Model 4 with a 5,000 bootstrap sample was used. This model uses Ordinary Least Squares and logistic regression path analysis. We predicted the honor condition would lead to increased dehumanization, reduced threat, and increased perceived threat of the perpetrator's ethnic group, as compared to the non-honor condition through a mediational pathway of moral similarity. In each model, condition was entered as the independent variable (X), and moral similarity was entered as the mediator. The dependent variable (Y) was changed in each of the 3 mediational analyses. The dependent variable was dehumanization, then tolerance, and finally threat. See Table 3 for the results of the mediational analysis.

These models were re-run controlling for multiculturalism (See S8), because whether or not participants support cultural diversity may influence their attitudes towards minority groups. We also re-ran the models controlling for participant political ideology (See S9) as ideology was closely associated with nearly all dependent variables (See Table 1). Neither covariate influenced the direction of results.

Table 3.

			Effect of		
		Effect of	Mediator on		
	Indirect effect	Condition on	Dependent	Total	Direct Effect
	of Mediator	Mediator (SE),	Variable (SE),	Effect (SE),	(SE), [95%
Test Statistic	(SE), [95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	CI]
	B=.005(.10),	B=03(.17),	B=15(.03),	B=.11(.11),	B=.10(.10),
Dehumanize	[10, .31]	[37, .31]	[21,10]	[10, .32]	[10, .31]
	B=01(.05),	B=04(.17),	B=.31(.05),	B=09 (.17),	B=08 (.16),
Tolerance	[12, .09]	[38, .30]	[.22, .40]	[43, .25]	[41, .24]
	B=0001(.01),	B=04(.17),	B=.002(.03),	B=.07(.11),	B=.07(.11),
Threat	[01, .01]	[38, .30]	[06, .06]	[14, .28]	[14, .28]

PROCESS Macro mediational analyses in Study 1.

Note: The mediator is moral similarity, condition is the independent variable (X), and dehumanization, tolerance, and threat were all entered as dependent variables in separate models (Y). Significant effects are written in boldface.

Study 1 Discussion

Study 1 revealed no significant differences across conditions on ratings of moral similarity, dehumanization, tolerance, or threat. This means none of our hypothesis were supported, participants did not view the ethnic group of perpetrators of honor violence more negatively that the ethnic group of perpetrators of non-honor violence. This study provides no initial credence to the idea that attitudes towards perpetrators become attitudes towards the perpetrator's ethnic group in cases of honor related violence. While we attempted to develop a study with real world application (i.e., a slightly revised news article), the manipulation may have been too weak to produce any effects. A shorter article that had starker contrasts between the honor and non-honor conditions may have produced significant effects. This issue we attempt to address in Study 2 with a stronger manipulation of honor versus non-honor violence.

While Study 1 countered our predictions, we did find that moral similarity predicted reduced dehumanization. This finding reinforced claims by previous researchers that points to a relationship between dehumanization and morality— with dehumanized groups deemed as morally unworthy (Bandura, 1999; Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007), or morally unacceptable (Bar-Tal, 1990).

Study 1 also finds that moral similarity increases tolerance. Many have explored how our moral convictions make us intolerant of individuals who disagree with our opinions (e.g., Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005; Wright, et al., 2008), yet little to no research has highlighted how our perceptions of outgroup members moral similarity to ourselves molds our tolerance of them. Although this may be an assumption made by researchers, our study provides initial evidence that this could indeed be the case.

Taken together, the results from Study 1 did not support our predictions. However, they did suggest that regardless of the framing of the crime, Westerners view the entirety of the ethnic group similarly. This suggests that perceptions of honor based cultures may not follow the same pathway as previous stereotyping literature would suggest. It seems, regardless of whether a crime is labelled as honor based or not, people view the perpetrator's ethnic group similarly. However, to more explicitly test whether honor-based violence acts as an indicator of honor cultures being a minority group, we must explore how crime and ethnicity interact. This is a primary goal of Study 2.

Study 2

Study 2 had two main goals. First, it explored whether there is an interaction between the crime a perpetrator commits (honor or non-honor based), and the perpetrator's ethnicity on evaluations of the perpetrator's ethnic group as a whole. Secondly, Study 2 attempted to strengthen the manipulation of honor versus non-honor violence by using a much shorter vignette inspired by a story of domestic violence in the United States².

We manipulated ethnicity in order to disentangle the stereotypes associated with honor cultures, and stereotypes about Middle Eastern communities—a population often facing both implicit and explicit biases by other groups (French, Franz, Phelan, & Blaine, 2013). Manipulating both the ethnicity of the perpetrator, and the type of crime committed (i.e., honor violence or domestic violence), provides an avenue to explain the true role that both ethnicity and type of violence have on perceptions of the perpetrator's ethnic group.

² The article can be found here: <u>https://www.huffpost.com/entry/recovering-from-an-abusive-relationship_n_5e3aed70c5b6b5fb438b56e5</u>

In Study 2, we explored the idiosyncratic and combined effects of using the term honor violence (versus domestic violence), and the ethnic background of the perpetrator, in shaping attitudes towards the perpetrator's ethnic group. This study was pre-registered (aspredicted #37786). Our hypotheses were the following:

Hypothesis 1: A significant interaction effect between type of crime (honor vs non-honor violence) and perpetrator ethnicity (Middle Eastern vs European) on ratings of perceived morality, dehumanization, tolerance, and threat of the perpetrator's ethnic group. *Hypothesis 2:* A main effect of perpetrator ethnicity, such that the ethnic group of Middle Eastern perpetrators will be viewed as less moral, be more dehumanized, be less tolerated, and be viewed as more threatening that the ethnic group of European perpetrators.

Hypothesis 3: A main effect of crime committed, such that the ethnic group of perpetrators of honor violence will be viewed as less moral, be more dehumanized, be less tolerated, and be viewed as more threatening that the ethnic group of perpetrators of domestic violence.

Study 2 Methods

Power Analysis

We conducted power analysis using G*Power 3.1.9.3. The main analysis in Study 2 was a MANOVA to determine if there were significant differences between ratings of morality, dehumanization, tolerance, and threat by condition. Further, we anticipated our manipulation would capture a medium effect (f^2 = 0.25). With 80% power, 4 conditions, and 3 degrees of freedom, the power analysis indicated we would need 179 participants. We gathered participants online via social media (e.g., Facebook and Instagram), therefore we continued recruitment until we had at least 190 participants as we anticipated a few would not pass attention checks or meet our demographic criteria (i.e., be an American citizen).

Manipulation

To test the interplay between perpetrator ethnicity and crime we developed a 2 (honor violence versus domestic violence) by 2(European versus Middle Eastern) between-subjects design. Participants in the honor condition read the following vignette, "Despite many red flags, Samantha married a man named [Muhammad/Oliver] who is an immigrant from [the Middle East/Europe]. Soon after the marriage he began abusing her—committing multiple acts of [honor/domestic] violence, [because he felt his honor was at stake/]. He physically hurt Samantha, and convinced her that she deserved it". In the non-honor condition, honor violence was replaced with domestic violence and the part stating "because he felt his honor was at stake", was omitted.

Participants and Procedure

One hundred and ninety-four participants, were recruited from social media platforms. However, only 166 participants were included in subsequent analyses (37 men, 129 women³, *Mage*= 41.09, *SDage*=16.31, 66.7% reported having a liberal ideology), due to the others failing our attention check. After reading the informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. After reading the vignette participants completed two manipulation/ attention check questions. First, participants reported where the perpetrator was from (1= The Middle East, 2= Europe, 3= Asia, 4= Africa), and then they reported what crime the perpetrator committed (1=Domestic violence, 2= Honor violence, 3=Animal abuse, 4= Money Laundering).

³ Three participants reported their gender as "Other".

Measures

After completing the manipulation/ attention check questions, participants responded to a variety of measures focused on the ethnic group the perpetrator is part of. The dehumanization, tolerance, threat, and demographic measures were all identical to those in Study 1, except this time the order of presentation for the dehumanization, tolerance, and threat items were randomized, and so too were the individual items for each of the 3 variables. The dehumanization (α =.82), and the threat (α =.82) measures both had good reliability. The tolerance measure (α =.93) had excellent reliability (George & Mallery, 2003). We did not assess dispositional support for multiculturalism in this study because in Study 1 it had a non-significant effect on the variables of interest.

Morality. We observed skewness in the moral similarity measure in Study 1, therefore we decided to use a new measure focused on overall perceived morality of the perpetrator's ethnic group in Study 2 in hopes of not having a skewed measure once again. Overall morality was assessed using the morality measure from Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini (2011). Participants rated the extent to which individuals from the perpetrator's ethnic group are; sincere, honest, righteous, trustworthy, and respectful using a 7-point scale from (1) *absolutely no* to (7) *absolutely yes.* The morality items were presented in a randomized order. Reliability analysis indicated the morality items had excellent reliability, α =.92 (George & Mallery, 2003).

Results

Manipulation Checks

Initially we planned to only include participants that correctly answered both attention/ manipulation checks. However, we realized 51% of those in the honor conditions incorrectly answered the manipulation check focused on what crime the perpetrator committed, whereas no

one in the domestic violence conditions provided an incorrect answer. We believe this occurred because in all versions of the vignette we stated the husband abused his wife and then either labelled the abuse as domestic or honor violence. This may have led to confusion in the honor condition, as participants read the word abuse and immediately conflated that with domestic violence. Due to this oversight, we decided to include all participants in analyses who were American citizens and correctly answered the ethnic manipulation check. However, participants in the non-honor condition had to correctly answer the attention check in the domestic violence conditions (which was all participants), and participants in the honor conditions had to either report the crime as domestic violence or honor violence. Based on this criteria, 28 individuals failed the attention check, meaning 166 participants were included in analyses.

When looking at our manipulation/attention checks, we also noticed an interesting systematic pattern of incorrect answers on the ethnic check questions (i.e., recalling the ethnicity of the perpetrator). Overall, participants had a significantly easier time remembering the ethnicity of the Middle Easterner than the European (See S10 for more information).

Correlational and Descriptive Analyses

There were significant correlations between all dependent variables. As with Study 1, participant political ideology also was closely related with many of our study variables. Correlations between dependent variables and demographic variables can be found in Table 4. Means and standard deviations of dependent variables across conditions can be found in Table 5.

Table 4.

	М	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1.Morality	4.47	1.06	1.00						
2.Dehumanize	2.83	.93	48**	1.00					
3.Tolerance	5.60	1.32	.41**	54**	1.00				
4.Threat	1.86	.83	30**	.54**	54**	1.00			
5.Political Ideology (High Scores= Conservative)	-1.19	1.45	07	.26**	40**	.41**	1.00	1.00	
6.Age	41.09	16.31	04	.01	22**	.06	.25**	1.00	

Correlations between dependent variables and demographic variables in Study 2.

Note: ****** represents correlation significant at p<.01 level

Table 5.

Means and standard deviations of dependent variables in Study 2.

	Honor Europe	Honor Middle East	Non-Honor Europe	Non-Honor Middle East
	Mean(sd)	Mean(sd)	Mean(sd)	Mean(sd)
Number of				
Participants	30	45	40	51
Morality	4.15(1.08)	4.64(1.01)	4.38(.88)	4.58(1.18)
Dehumanization	3.09(1.06)	2.62(.81)	3.01(.91)	2.72(.91)
Tolerance	5.51(1.59)	5.83(.99)	5.38(1.24)	5.64(1.46)
Threat	2.07(.87)	1.67(.73)	1.96(.79)	1.83(.90)

Main Analyses

For the main analyses (Hypotheses 1-3), we created two dummy coded variables to more easily assess the individual effects of perpetrator ethnicity (0 = European, 1 = Middle Eastern perpetrator), and whether the crime was based in honor or not (0 = non-honor, 1 = honor). We ran multivariate tests with ethnicity and honor dummies (and their interaction) as predictors and morality, dehumanization, tolerance and threat were all entered together as dependent variables. Analyses revealed that responses to the dependent variables were not statistically significantly related to the ethnicity of the perpetrator, F(4, 159)=2.09, p=.09; Wilks' $\lambda=.95$, nor by whether the crime was domestic violence or honor violence, F(4, 159)=.34, p=.85; Wilks' $\lambda=.99$ Further, the interaction effect between both ethnicity and whether the crime was based in honor or not was not significant, F(4, 159)=.49, p=.74; Wilks' $\lambda=.99$.

Since only the multivariate effect of ethnicity was even trending towards significance, we only explored the univariate effect of ethnicity. Results indicated a main effect of ethnicity on perceptions of morality, with the Middle Eastern conditions (M=4.61, SD=1.10) eliciting higher levels of perceived of morality than the European conditions (M=4.28, SD=.97), F(1,162)=4.72, p=.04. There was also a main effect of ethnicity of the perpetrator on dehumanization towards the perpetrator's ethnic group. The European perpetrators (M=3.04, SD=.97) elicited greater dehumanization for their ethnic group than Middle Eastern perpetrators (M=2.67, SD=.87), F(1,162)=6.83, p=.01. In regards to tolerance ratings, there was no main effect of ethnicity. European perpetrators (M=5.43, SD=1.39) and Middle Eastern perpetrators (M=5.73, SD=1.26), were rated similarly, F(1, 162)=1.96, p=.16. There was a main of effect of ethnicity on perceived threat of the perpetrator's ethnic group. European perpetrators' ethnic groups (M=2.01, SD=.82),


were rated as more threatening than Middle Eastern perpetrators' ethnic groups (M=1.76, SD=.82), F(1, 162)=4.09, p=.05.

Mediational Analyses

We also conducted exploratory mediation analyses which re-ran the mediation models from Study 1. However, this time the mediator was perceived morality rather than moral dissimilarity. This change in the mediating variable led to an adaptation of our theoretical model (See Figure 2). For each mediation analysis, Model 4 with a 5,000 bootstrap sample was used. As noted in our pre-registration, we chose to only include a subset of participants—particularly those in the Middle Eastern conditions. We chose to do this to ensure we were not testing the role of ethnicity (i.e., Europe versus Middle Eastern), but rather the role of honor versus domestic violence.

Figure 2

Adapted theoretical framework for understanding downstream consequences of stereotyping in honor related violence.



As with Study 1, perceived morality did not act as a mediational pathway between condition and our 3 dependent variables (i.e., dehumanization, tolerance, and threat). However, perceived morality of the perpetrator's ethnic group did predict reduced dehumanization, increased tolerance, and reduced threat (See Table 6). Since participant political ideology was correlated with many of the dependent variables, we also decided to re-run these models with political ideology as a covariate—however results were similar to the main mediation model (See S11).

Table 6.

			Effect of		
		Effect of	Mediator on		
	Indirect effect	Condition on	Dependent	Total	Direct Effect
	of Mediator	Mediator (SE),	Variable (SE),	Effect (SE),	(SE), [95%
Test Statistic	(SE), [95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	CI]
	B=.06(.23),	B=.06(.23),	B=28(.08),	B=10(.18),	B=09(.17),
Dehumanize	[39, .51]	[39, .51]	[43,13]	[45, .25]	[42, .25]
	B=.03(.11),	B=.06(.23),	B=.49(.11),	B=.18 (.26),	B=.16(.23),
Tolerance	[18, .27]	[39, .51]	[.28, .70]	[33, .69]	[3 1, .62]
	B=014(.06),	B=.06(.23),	B=26(.07),	B=16(.17),	B=15(.16),
Threat	[13, .10]	[39, .51]	[40,11]	[50, .17]	[46, .17]

PROCESS Macro mediational analyses in Study 2.

Note: The mediator is perceived morality, condition is the independent variable (X), dehumanization, tolerance, and threat were all entered separately as the dependent variable (Y). Significant effects are written in boldface.

Study 2 Discussion

These analyses run counter to all our hypotheses. We predicted there would be an interaction effect between perpetrator ethnicity and crime committed (Hypothesis 1), this was not the case. While there was some support for a main effect of perpetrator ethnicity (Hypothesis 2)

on ratings of morality, dehumanization, and threat, this was not the case for ratings of tolerance. We also found no support for a main effect of crime committed (i.e., honor violence vs. domestic violence; Hypothesis 3).

These results provide further credence to our findings in Study 1. Again, views of perpetrators' ethnic groups were not influenced by whether the crime committed was honor related or not. Further, Study 2 suggested that even when controlling for the effect of perpetrator ethnicity, this pattern still holds true.

Out exploratory mediation analyses also produced similar results to what we observed in Study 1. Our proposed theoretical framework, where honor violence (as compared to non-honor violence) leads to dehumanization of the perpetrator's ethnic group, reduced tolerance of them, and greater perceived threat through a mediational pathway of a perceived lack of morality, was not supported. However, this analysis was severely underpowered as there were only 45 participants in the Middle Eastern honor condition, and 40 participants in the Middle Eastern non-honor condition. Analyses like these typically need hundreds of participants, even when anticipated effect sizes are medium or large to achieve 80% power (Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007), making the lack of significant results not overly surprising.

Study 2 attempted to explain the surprising findings observed in Study 1 (i.e., that perpetrators' ethnic groups are viewed similarly, regardless of whether a crime was based in honor or not). Study 2 tested whether the role of perpetrator ethnicity explains how ethnic groups are viewed. Surprisingly, there was only partial evidence that perpetrator ethnicity influences participant perceptions of the ethnic group—and even this evidence went in the opposite direction of predictions (i.e., Middle Eastern ethnic groups were viewed more favorably).

Study 1 and 2 produced unanticipated findings, which suggest the way people stereotype honor based cultures may not map onto what the stereotyping literature says about other minority groups. In Studies 1 & 2 we assumed that attitudes about perpetrators of honor violence would be transferred to attitudes about the greater ethnic community. This assumption seemed intuitive and based on immense research showing such tendencies (Crawford et al., 2002; Fujioka, 1999; Hamilton, Chen, Ko, Winczewski, Banerji, & Thurston, 2015; Monahan, Shtrulis, & Brown Givens, 2005). However, such counter-to-expected findings in both studies suggest a third exploratory study explicitly examining whether this attitude transference between perpetrators and their minority ethnic group does indeed occur within the context of honor cultures and honor related violence, is merited.

Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 did not support our hypotheses, whether a perpetrator committed honor violence or not (e.g., domestic violence)—did not impact how participants viewed the ethnic group of the perpetrator. This could suggest two things, first, that Westerners views of a perpetrator do not carry over to viewpoints of the entire group, and two, when participants think about the entire ethnic group—they may be focusing on non-perpetrators within the group (e.g., victims), rather than categorizing the entire group as similar to the perpetrator. Due to these possibilities, we conducted Study 3 in hopes of explicitly testing our assumption that thoughts about perpetrators of honor violence carry over to thoughts about the whole honor culture. Since this study was exploratory in nature, we did not posit any hypotheses and therefore did not preregister the study.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Ninety-two participants, were recruited from social media platforms, (31 men, 61 women, *Mage*= 33.65, *SDage*=15.65, 74.70% reported having a liberal ideology) A majority of participants (57.60%) were from the United States, 28.30% were from the Netherlands, 5.4% were from Great Britain. Of the remaining participants; 1 was from Australia, 1 was from Canada, 1 was from Finland, 2 were from Germany, 1 was from Lithuania, and 1 was from New Zealand. After reading the informed consent, participants read a definition of honor violence adapted from a translation of the Dutch government's definition (Ferwerda & Van Leider, 2005), and the AHA foundation⁴—an organization with a goal to protect women from honor related violence. The definition we adapted was, "Honor violence is any form of mental or physical violence committed in response to a (threatened) violation of the honor of a man or a woman, and with that of his or her family, of which the outside world is (about to be) informed. Honor violence can include sexual assault, rape, or kidnapping; but it also includes forced marriage, and in more extreme cases honor violence can lead to murder. In sharp contrast to other forms of domestic violence, honor violence is often condoned by families and communities, making it particularly difficult to identify and stop. It often involves several perpetrators within the family or community."

Measures

After reading this definition of honor violence, participants responded to a variety of exploratory measures that focused on their thoughts of victims, perpetrators, and the ethnic group

⁴ The definition by the AHA foundation can be found here: <u>https://www.theahafoundation.org/honor-violence/</u>

as whole. We first assessed what person or persons people tend to focus on when thinking about honor related violence. Participants were asked, "As you were reading the definition of honor violence, who was the person—or people—you were thinking about primarily?". Participants could choose one of the following multiple choice options; the victims, the perpetrators, the ethnic or cultural community, or none of the above.

Free Response Items. In order to better assess how participants view a perpetrator of honor violence, victims of honor violence, and the ethnic group as a whole, we also asked participants several free response questions. Participants were asked to write 3 adjectives in text boxes that describe each of the following (9 adjectives total); perpetrators of honor violence, victims of honor violence, and the ethnic group of perpetrators of honor violence. Participants responded to these items in a randomized order. After data collection, responses were categorized to assess whether adjectives used to describe the ethnic group as a whole were adjectives that were more similar to responses about the perpetrator, or about the victim.

Morality and Tolerance. In Studies 1 and 2 we found that the perceived morality and tolerance of the ethnic group of perpetrators does not seem to be related to whether the perpetrator commits honor violence or not. One explanation for this could be a lack of carry over effects—participants may view the perpetrator as less moral, and be less tolerant of them, but this does not shape how participants view the ethnic group as a whole. To test this, participants responded to the morality and tolerance items used in Study 2, except this time they rated both the ethnic group of the perpetrator (Morality: α =.92; Tolerance: α =.84), and the perpetrator themselves (Morality: α =.83; Tolerance: α =.96) on these items. This meant they responded to the order of targets, as well as items within target blocks were randomized.

Responsibility. Participants also responded to an item that assessed how responsible they believed the ethnic group of the perpetrator was for the perpetrator's crime: "To what extent do you think the ethnic group of a perpetrator of honor violence is responsible for the perpetrator's actions?", using a 7-point scale from *not at all responsible* (1) to *completely responsible* (7). We measured this as a possible explanation for the null effects between conditions in the previous studies. If participants do not view the ethnic group as responsible for honor related violence, it could explain why attitudes towards perpetrators do not transfer to attitudes towards the larger community.

Assessment of explicit carry over effects. We asked participants explicitly whether or not their thoughts about the perpetrator shape their views of the group. Participants were asked, "To what extent do you think a perpetrator of honor violence shapes your view of the perpetrator's ethnic group as a whole?", and responded using a Likert scale from, *not at all* (1) to *very much so* (7). Both this item and the responsibility item were presented in a randomized order to participants.

Knowledge. Another possibility for the unanticipated results in Studies 1 & 2 could be due to a lack of knowledge of what honor related violence is. Honor crimes are rare in the United States, with only about two dozen cases occurring each year (Helba, Bernstain, Leonard, & Bauer, 2014). This may mean people are unfamiliar with these crimes, and thus may perceive perpetrators (and the ethnic group) in ways we could not anticipate. To assess knowledge about honor related violence, we asked participants, "Before taking this study, how much did you know about honor violence?". Participants responded using a 7-point Likert scale from *I knew nothing at all about it* (1) to *I knew a great deal about it* (7).

Demographic Information. Participants responded to the demographic items used in the previous studies, however since participants were not all from the United States, we also asked them to report the country they currently reside in.

Results

Correlational and Descriptive Analyses

After looking at participant responses, we created 14 categories that best represented responses towards perpetrators, victims, and the ethnic group. Descriptions of the categories created can be found in Table 7. Correlational analyses revealed that perceptions of perpetrators morality were not related to perceptions of morality of the ethnic group. Tolerance towards the perpetrator was also not related to tolerance towards the perpetrator's ethnic group. This suggests our assumption, that attitudes towards perpetrators of honor violence transfer to attitudes towards the entirety of the honor culture (i.e., ethnic group), was not supported. However, when individuals believed the ethnic group was responsible for the honor violence, participants viewed them as significantly less moral and tolerated them less. See Table 8.

Table 7.

Descriptions of categorizations of free-response items towards perpetrators, victims, and the

ethnic group.

Categorization	Examples
Negative Adjectives	Evil, Aggressive, Unkind
Lack of Intelligence, Irrational, or biased	Stupid, narrowminded, not smart
Demographic Variables	Age, Religion, Geographic region, Ideology, Traditionalist
Pity Language	Pitiful, unlucky, shame
Lack of Agency	Lack of power or skills, vulnerable, insecure
Agency, self-aggrandizement	Powerful, proud, arrogant
Gender	Male, female, sexism, patriarchy
Blame, Wrongness Harm or Fear	Guilt, responsibility Manipulation, trapped, captivity, abused
Community	Collective, society, cultural
Positive Adjectives	Pretty, smart
Sadness or Loneliness	Desperate, alone
Innocence or Victim	Innocent, victimized
Other	Items that did not fit into one of these categories

Table 8.

Correlations between dependent variables and demographic variables in Study 3.

	М	SD	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.
1.Morality of Perpetrator	2.38	1.28	1.00								
2.Morality of Ethnic Group	3.44	1.48	.17	1.00							
3. Tolerance of Perpetrator	1.57	.81	.17	01	1.00						
4. Tolerance of Ethnic Group	4.44	1.64	.06	.46	.09	1.00					
5.Ethnic Group Responsibility	3.85	1.72	.19	26*	.06	30**	1.00				
6. Perpetrator Shaping Views of Ethnic Group	3.90	1.77	.31**	.05	.17	17	.51**	1.00			
7. Knowledge of Honor Violence	3.78	1.84	03	.04	15	.04	11	.02	1.00		
8. Age	33.65	15.65	.10	.05	03	10	.08	.15	.19	1.00	
9. Political Ideology (High Scores= More Conservative)	-1.34	1.36	.17	18	.03	21*	.19	.07	.01	.37**	1.00

Note: ** represents correlation significant at p<.01 level; * represents correlation at p<.05 level

The next step in our analyses was to assess participants' free responses. We explored whether there are differences in the ways people describe perpetrators of honor violence, victims, and the ethnic group as a whole. In general, participants responses were dependent on which target(s) they were considering. When participants described perpetrators of honor violence, they primarily used negative adjectives (41%) to describe the individual (e.g., "aggressive", "violent", or "cruel"), they also wrote that perpetrators were "unintelligent", "narrow-minded", or "ignorant" (11% of responses). Participants frequently mentioned demographic information (e.g., "Muslim" or "Middle Eastern"), and gendered language (e.g., "Male", "Macho", or "Sexist"), 10% and 9% of responses, respectively. Notably, only about 5% of responses highlighted guilt, blame, or responsibility of the perpetrator, and 1% highlighted the community or culture.

When participants described victims of honor related violence, they frequently highlighted the lack of agency or power of these victims (e.g., using terms such as "weak" or "powerless"), this occurred in 21% of responses. Participants also mentioned the physical and emotional pain victims experience (e.g., "harm", "scared", "loneliness", "despair), 16% of the time. Participants used the words "Innocent" and "Victim" in 9% of their descriptions of victims. Notably, 7% of responses mentioned a lack of intelligence, or some degree of ignorance, while only 3% highlighted the community or culture.

When participants described the ethnic group of perpetrators of honor violence, they often highlighted demographic information (39%), mentioning specific religions, geographic regions, or ideologies that they associate with honor violence. Often these responses focused on Middle Eastern communities (e.g., "Arabs", "Muslims"), but not always (e.g., "The American South", "conservatives", "traditionalists"). While participants highlighted negative adjectives far more for perpetrators, than for the ethnic group as a whole, χ^2 = 39.23, *p*<.001, participants still

mentioned negative descriptors to describe the ethnic group 17% of the time. Participants also used words suggesting a lack of intelligence or irrationality 7% of the time—these types of responses were less common when describing the ethnic group than the perpetrator. Interestingly, only 1% of responses discussed blame or responsibility, and only 4% mentioned agency or power—suggesting perpetrators are viewed as much more agentic than the ethnic group as a whole, an interesting finding as agency is closely associated with culpability (van der Woerdt & Haselager, 2019). See Figure 3 for a visual breakdown of responses.

Additional Analyses

Results indicated participants views of perpetrators of honor violence did not relate to their views of the ethnic group. People tended to view the perpetrator as less moral (M=2.38, SD=1.28), than the ethnic group (M=3.44, SD=1.48), t(90)=-5.66, p<.001. Participants were also less tolerant of the perpetrator (M=1.57, SD=.81), than the ethnic group (M=4.44, SD=1.64), t(91)=-15.66, p<.001. Further, there was no relationship between morality ratings of perpetrators and their ethnic group (r=.17, p=.11), nor tolerance ratings between both targets (r=.09, p=.38).


When participants viewed the ethnic group as less responsible for the perpetrator's actions; they were deemed as more moral (r=-.26, p=.02) and were more tolerated (r=-.30, p=.003). Not surprisingly, when participants believed the ethnic group was very much responsible for the perpetrator's actions they also reported that the perpetrator's actions greatly impacted how they viewed the ethnic group (r=.51, p<.001).

When participants reported the perpetrator's actions greatly impacted how they viewed the ethnic group, participants also viewed the perpetrator as more moral (r=.31, p<.001). Thus, when participants view a perpetrator as moral, they are also more likely to have this perception influence their attitudes towards the entire the ethnic group.

Figure 3


Representation of Categories of Responses

Perpetrators




Victims





Ethnic Group



Study 3 Discussion

The results from Study 3 provide intriguing insights into the unexpected results observed in Studies 1 and 2. We theorized that our assumption, that attitudes towards perpetrators of honor violence do not translate to attitudes towards the entire ethnic group (i.e., honor culture). Study 3 supported these postulations. Participants ratings of the morality of, and tolerance towards, perpetrators was not related to the perceived morality of the ethnic group, and tolerance towards the ethnic group. Participants reported their views of the perpetrator only impacted their views of the ethnic group when the perpetrator was rated as more moral-suggesting immoral actors are not deemed as reflective of their entire ethnic group. Further, coding of participants free responses indicated little overlap in adjectives used to describe perpetrators, victims, and the ethnic group as a whole, suggesting when people think about honor cultures, they do not focus on primarily perpetrators or victims of honor violence. Very few descriptors highlighted the ethnic or cultural community when participants thought about perpetrators and victims, likely explaining why there were no attitude carry over effects in Studies 1 and 2 between perpetrators and the ethnic group. Study 3 provides evidence that counter to previous stereotyping literature, perceptions of perpetrators of honor violence do not sway how people view honor cultures as a whole.

General Discussion

We set out to study how attitudes about an individual transfer to attitudes about an entire minority group in a novel context—honor based cultures. Previous stereotyping literature suggests one environment where this pattern is most likely to occur, is when people think about minority group members while engaging with news media (e.g., by reading about a minority member in a news article). Based on this well-established research, we assumed this process

would be similar in the context of honor based cultures and that perpetrator's ethnic groups would be stereotyped more so (i.e., viewed more negatively), when the perpetrator committed honor based violence as compared to other forms of violence. However, in Studies 1 & 2, we find that individuals view of a perpetrator's ethnic group is not dependent on whether the perpetrator's crime is related to honor or not. Based on these surprising findings, we decided to explicitly test the assumption that attitudes towards individual minority group members can be expanded to attitudes that encompass the entire group. Study 3 indicated—counter to well established stereotyping literature—that attitude transference does not occur in the context of evaluating perpetrators of honor based violence and honor cultures as a whole.

Finding that attitudes towards perpetrators of honor violence does not expand to attitudes towards the whole group is surprising, as honor violence is an act with strong ties to cultural customs. While crimes such as domestic violence are punished and garnered as immoral acts in Western societies, honor violence is often condoned by honor based cultures. Therefore, it should be easy for people's attitudes towards perpetrators of honor violence to also expand to the entire honor culture. This discrepancy—of Westerners not tying the actions of perpetrators of honor violence to perceptions of their greater cultural community is an intriguing research question that should be examined further. This finding runs counter to how other minority groups are perceived. Minority groups are often stereotyped due to crimes perpetrated by individual minority group members even when those acts are not associated with cultural traditions or customs—as documented by work exploring perceptions of African Americans and stereotypes about criminality (Welch, 2007) and violence (Unnever & Cullen, 2012).

Not only do our findings run counter to previous stereotyping literature, but these results also provide insight into how people perceive news media about honor based violence. To the

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best of our knowledge, there has been no research exploring how people perceive incidences of honor related violence discussed on any media platform (e.g., social media, news reports, or television programming). We know there is a tendency for Western media platforms to mislabel crimes committed by Muslim individuals as honor-related when in fact they are crimes of domestic violence (Temple-Raston, 2011). It therefore seems plausible that mislabeling this crime as such could have negative consequences in perceptions of Muslim communities. The current research explicitly tested this possibility—finding that regardless of how the crime was labelled—participants view the perpetrator's ethnic group similarly. This provides promising insight; even though crimes are often assumed to be honor-related by Western media when the crime is committed by Muslims, our research suggests there may not be negative consequences for how the greater ethnic or cultural community will be viewed due to this mislabeling.

While our research provides valuable insights into how future researchers should examine perceptions of honor violence, our studies also faced limitations. These studies relied on participants self-responses, meaning response biases could shape our results. In hopes of not appearing intolerant or racist, participants may have reported more positive viewpoints towards the ethnic groups of perpetrators of honor violence than they would experience in reality. Future research should not solely rely on online self-report surveys, but integrate laboratory and field studies, and perhaps even archival analyses and more implicit tests such as the Implicit Associate Task (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) to gain a fuller scope of how people view perpetrators of honor violence communities as a whole.

Another limitation of these studies was the lack of demographic representativeness of our samples. While in Study 1, the study was conducted on Mturk which is more representative of the American public, especially in regards to representation of liberals and conservatives

(Clifford, Jewell, & Waggoner, 2015), Studies 2 and 3 were conducted using recruited participants from social media platforms. A majority of these participants were connected to the author via social media, likely biasing the results. This is supported by the fact that only 10.8% of participants in Study 2 and 12.1% in Study 3 reported having a conservative political ideology. Ideally, future research will use more representative samples to conduct similar research in order the improve the generalizability of these results.

The current research provides a promising groundwork for honor violence research and re-examining basic tenants of stereotyping research. There has yet to be any experimental research conducted exploring Western perceptions of honor cultures and honor-related violence in particular. This lack of research points to a larger gap in the field in understanding how Western society will confront honor-based violence as individuals from honor cultures continue to immigrate to Western countries, and instances of honor based violence continue to occur in these immigrant communities within Western society (Williams, 2011). Our studies propose views of perpetrators of honor violence do not influence views of the entire ethnic group (i.e., honor culture). This suggests that as Western society continues to diversify, the intergroup relations between non-honor and honor based cultures will be more positive than predicted by previous stereotyping literature on majority-minority intergroup interactions.

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Supplementary Materials

S1. Original Article

Retrieved from: <u>https://www.foxnews.com/story/beheading-in-new-york-appears-to-be-honor-killing-experts-say</u>

The beheading of 37-year-old Aasiya Hassan has all the markings of an honor killing, psychologists and Islamic experts tell FOXNews.com, as the upstate New York woman's husband awaits a preliminary hearing on murder charges.

Muzzammil Hassan, 44, remains jailed after being charged with the second-degree murder of his wife, whose body was found Thursday at the office of Bridges TV, their television station in Orchard Park, near Buffalo.

Orchard Park Police Chief Andrew Benz said Hassan has not confessed to the crime, despite media reports to the contrary.

"He came in and said his wife was dead," said Benz, who declined to elaborate on the particulars of his conversation with the suspect.

But Erie County District Attorney Frank Sedita III left no doubt that he believes Muzzammil Hassan killed his wife. Hassan will appear for a preliminary hearing Wednesday in Orchard Park. If convicted of second-degree murder, he faces up to life in prison.

"He's a pretty vicious and remorseless bastard," Sedita told FOXNews.com Tuesday. "Whether he was motivated by some kind of interpretation of his religious or cultural views, we don't know. We'll look into everything in the case."

Asked if the murder is being probed as an honor killing, Benz replied, "We've been told that there's no place for that kind of action in their faith, but I wouldn't say that there's anything that's being completely ruled out at this point."

But psychologists and some American Muslims said the slaying has all the markings of an honor killing.

"The fierce and gruesome nature of this murder signals it's an honor killing," said Dr. Phyllis Chesler, an author and professor of psychology at the Richmond College of the City University of New York. "What she did was worthy of capital punishment in his eyes."

Following multiple episodes of domestic violence, Aasiya Hassan filed for divorce on Feb. 6 and obtained an order of protection that barred her husband from their home, according to attorney Elizabeth DiPirro, whose law firm, Hogan Willig, represented Aasiya Hassan in the divorce proceeding.

Chesler, who wrote "Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?" for Middle East Quarterly, said some Muslim men consider divorce a dishonor on their family."This is not permitted in their culture," said Chesler, whose study analyzed more than 50 reports of honor killings in North America and Europe. "This is, from a cultural point of view, an honor killing."

Chesler said honor killings typically are Muslim-on-Muslim crimes and largely involve teenage daughters, young women and, to a lesser extent, wives.

But Chesler said the "extremely gruesome nature" of the crime closely matches the characteristics of an honor killing.

"Leaving the body parts displayed the way he did, like a terrorist would do, that's very peculiar, it's very public," Chesler said. "He wanted to show that even though his business venture may have been failing, that he was in control of his wife."

Chesler called on U.S. and Canadian immigration authorities to inform potential Muslim immigrants and new Muslim citizens that it's illegal to abuse women in the two countries.

"As long as Islamist advocacy groups continue to obfuscate the problem, and government and police officials accept their inaccurate versions of reality, women will continue to be killed for honor in the West, such murder may even accelerate," Chesler wrote. "Unchecked by Western law, their blood will be on society's hands."

M. Zuhdi Jasser, founder and chairman of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, agreed with Chesler.

"It certainly has all the markings of [an honor killing]," Jasser told FOXNews.com. "She expressed through the legal system that she was being abused, and at the moment she asked for divorce, she's not only murdered — she's decapitated."

Muzzammil and Aasiya Hassan founded Bridges TV in November 2004 to counter anti-Islam stereotypes, touting the network as the "first-ever full-time home for American Muslims," according to a 2004 press release.

Jasser said he was concerned that Aasiya Hassan suffered such a barbaric death after she and her husband were seen as a couple focused on bettering the "Islamic image" in the United States.

"The most dangerous aspect of this case is to simply say it's domestic violence," Jasser told FOXNews.com.

In a 1,300-word statement, Islamic Society of North America Vice President Imam Mohammed Hagmagid Ali said the organization was "shocked and saddened" by the killing.

"This is a wake up call to all of us, that violence against women is real and can not be ignored," the statement read. "It must be addressed collectively by every member of our community."

Ali called on imams and community leaders to take a "strong stand" against domestic violence, and he denounced the link of shame and divorce among Muslims.

"Women who seek divorce from their spouses because of physical abuse should get full support from the community and should not be viewed as someone who has brought shame to herself or her family," the statement continued. "The shame is on the person who committed the act of violence or abuse. Our community needs to take a strong stand against abusive spouses."

Meanwhile, Rabbi Brad Hirschfield, a producer and host for Bridges TV who worked alongside the Hassans, said "now is not the time" to debate the cultural and religious context of the murder that appears to be an honor killing inspired by Aasiya Hassan's desire to divorce her husband.

"There will be time for that later," Hirschfield said in a statement obtained by FOXNews.com. "I will only say to those who leap to the conclusion that this kind of thing is intrinsic to Islam, ask yourselves if you think that drunkenness is intrinsic to Irish Catholics, or cheating in business is to Jews?"

S2. Original article with strike through of what was deleted.

The beheading of 37-year-old Aasiya Hassan has all the markings of an honor killing, psychologists and Islamic experts tell FOXNews.com, as the upstate New York woman's husband awaits a preliminary hearing on murder charges.

Muzzammil Hassan, 44, remains jailed after being charged with the second-degree murder of his wife, whose body was found Thursday at the office of Bridges TV, their television station in Orchard Park, near Buffalo.

Orchard Park Police Chief Andrew Benz said Hassan has not confessed to the crime, despite media reports to the contrary.

"He came in and said his wife was dead," said Benz, who declined to elaborate on the particulars of his conversation with the suspect.

But Erie County District Attorney Frank Sedita III left no doubt that he believes Muzzammil Hassan killed his wife. Hassan will appear for a preliminary hearing Wednesday in Orchard Park. If convicted of second-degree murder, he faces up to life in prison.

"He's a pretty vicious and remorseless bastard," Sedita told FOXNews.com Tuesday. "Whether he was motivated by some kind of interpretation of his religious or cultural views, we don't know. We'll look into everything in the case."

Asked if the murder is being probed as an honor killing, Benz replied, "We've been told that there's no place for that kind of action in their faith, but I wouldn't say that there's anything that's being completely ruled out at this point."

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Following multiple episodes of domestic violence, Aasiya Hassan filed for divorce on Feb. 6 and obtained an order of protection that barred her husband from their home, according to attorney Elizabeth DiPirro, whose law firm, Hogan Willig, represented Aasiya Hassan in the divorce proceeding.

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"Leaving the body parts displayed the way he did, like a terrorist would do, that's very peculiar, it's very public," Chesler said. "He wanted to show that even though his business venture may have been failing, that he was in control of his wife."

Chesler called on U.S. and Canadian immigration authorities to inform potential Muslim immigrants and new Muslim citizens that it's illegal to abuse women in the two countries.

"As long as Islamist advocacy groups continue to obfuscate the problem, and government and police officials accept their inaccurate versions of reality, women will continue to be killed for honor in the West, such murder may even accelerate," Chesler wrote. "Unchecked by Western law, their blood will be on society's hands."

M. Zuhdi Jasser, founder and chairman of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, agreed with Chesler said,

"It certainly has all the markings of [an honor killing]," Jasser told FOXNews.com. "She expressed through the legal system that she was being abused, and at the moment she asked for divorce, she's not only murdered — she's decapitated."

Muzzammil and Aasiya Hassan founded Bridges TV in November 2004 to counter anti-Islam stereotypes, touting the network as the "first-ever full-time home for Americans Muslims," according to a 2004 press release.

Jasser said he was concerned that Aasiya Hassan suffered such a barbaric death after she and her husband were seen as a couple focused on bettering the "Islamic image" in the United States.

"The most dangerous aspect of this case is to simply say it's domestic violence," Jasser told FOXNews.com.

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Ali called on imams and community leaders to take a "strong stand" against domestic violence, and he denounced the link of shame and divorce among Muslims.

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Meanwhile, Rabbi Brad Hirschfield, a producer and host for Bridges TV who worked alongside the Hassans, said "now is not the time" to debate the cultural and religious context of the murder that appears to be an honor killing inspired by Aasiya Hassan's desire to divorce her husband.

"There will be time for that later," Hirschfield said in a statement obtained by FOXNews.com. "I will only say to those who leap to the conclusion that this kind of thing is intrinsic to Islam, ask yourselves if you think that drunkenness is intrinsic to Irish Catholics, or cheating in business is to Jews?"

S3. Honor Article

Note: Additions to this article from the original is in red text.

The beheading of 37-year-old Aasiya Hassan has all the markings of an honor killing, psychologists tell FOXNews.com, as the upstate New York woman's husband awaits a preliminary hearing on murder charges.

Muzzammil Hassan, 44, remains jailed after being charged with the second-degree murder of his wife, whose body was found Thursday at the office of Bridges TV, their television station in Orchard Park, near Buffalo.

Orchard Park Police Chief Andrew Benz said Hassan has not confessed to the crime, despite media reports to the contrary.

"He came in and said his wife was dead," said Benz, who declined to elaborate on the particulars of his conversation with the suspect.

But Erie County District Attorney Frank Sedita III left no doubt that he believes Muzzammil Hassan killed his wife. Hassan will appear for a preliminary hearing Wednesday in Orchard Park. If convicted of second-degree murder, he faces up to life in prison.

"He's a pretty vicious and remorseless bastard," Sedita told FOXNews.com Tuesday. "Whether he was motivated by some kind of interpretation of his cultural views, we don't know. We'll look into everything in the case."

Asked if the murder is being probed as an honor killing, Benz replied, "I wouldn't say that there's anything that's being completely ruled out at this point."

But psychologists said the slaying has all the markings of an honor killing.

"The fierce and gruesome nature of this murder signals it's an honor killing," said Dr. Phyllis Chesler, an author and professor of psychology at the Richmond College of the City University of New York. "What she did was worthy of capital punishment in his eyes."

Following multiple episodes of domestic violence, Aasiya Hassan filed for divorce on Feb. 6 and obtained an order of protection that barred her husband from their home, according to attorney Elizabeth DiPirro, whose law firm, Hogan Willig, represented Aasiya Hassan in the divorce proceeding.

M. Zuhdi Jasser, founder and chairman of the American Forum for Democracy, said

"It certainly has all the markings of [an honor killing]," Jasser told FOXNews.com. "She expressed through the legal system that she was being abused, and at the moment she asked for divorce, she's not only murdered — she's decapitated."

Muzzammil and Aasiya Hassan founded Bridges TV in November 2004 to counter stereotypes, touting the network as the "first-ever full-time home for Americans," according to a 2004 press release.

Jasser said he was concerned that Aasiya Hassan suffered such a barbaric death after she and her husband were seen as a couple focused on bettering the United States.

"The most dangerous aspect of this case is to simply say it's domestic violence," Jasser told FOXNews.com.

In a 1,300-word statement, Society of North America Vice President- Mohammed Hagmagid Ali said the organization was "shocked and saddened" by the killing.

S4. Non-Honor Article

Note: Additions to this article from the original is in red text. Text removed from this article is is represented by strikethroughs.

The beheading of 37-year-old Aasiya Hassan has all the markings of a killing, psychologists tell FOXNews.com, as the upstate New York woman's husband awaits a preliminary hearing on murder charges.

Muzzammil Hassan, 44, remains jailed after being charged with the second-degree murder of his wife, whose body was found Thursday at the office of Bridges TV, their television station in Orchard Park, near Buffalo.

Orchard Park Police Chief Andrew Benz said Hassan has not confessed to the crime, despite media reports to the contrary.

"He came in and said his wife was dead," said Benz, who declined to elaborate on the particulars of his conversation with the suspect.

But Erie County District Attorney Frank Sedita III left no doubt that he believes Muzzammil Hassan killed his wife. Hassan will appear for a preliminary hearing Wednesday in Orchard Park. If convicted of second-degree murder, he faces up to life in prison.

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Asked if the murder is being probed as an honor killing, Benz replied said, "I wouldn't say that there's anything that's being completely ruled out at this point."

But psychologists said the slaying has all the markings of an honor killing.

"The murder is fierce and gruesome in nature", said Dr. Phyllis Chesler, an author and professor of psychology at the Richmond College of the City University of New York. "What she did was worthy of capital punishment in his eyes."

Following multiple episodes of domestic violence, Aasiya Hassan filed for divorce on Feb. 6 and obtained an order of protection that barred her husband from their home, according to attorney Elizabeth DiPirro, whose law firm, Hogan Willig, represented Aasiya Hassan in the divorce proceeding.

M. Zuhdi Jasser, founder and chairman of the American Forum for Democracy, said

"It certainly has all the markings of [an honor killing]," Jasser told FOXNews.com. "She expressed through the legal system that she was being abused, and at the moment she asked for divorce, she's not only murdered — she's decapitated."


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In a 1,300-word statement, Society of North America Vice President- Mohammed Hagmagid Ali said the organization was "shocked and saddened" by the killing.

S5. Moral similarity measure (adapted from Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). Greater overlap of circles represents greater perceived moral similarity.



S6. Non-Parametric tests of moral similarity distribution in Study 1

Since the moral similarity measure was skewed, we conducted Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test, which is a non-parametric test that determines whether samples stem from the same distribution. The null hypothesis of this test is that the samples do indeed stem from the same distribution (McDonald, J. H, 2007). This analysis revealed non-significant differences in distributions between samples in the honor and non-honor conditions for the moral similarity measure, X^2 =.02. *p*=.90.

S7. Analysis with log transformed moral similarity measure in Study 1

To attempt to reduce the effects of the non-normality in the moral similarity measure, we re-ran the t-test comparing ratings of moral similarity across conditions using the log transformations of the moral similarity measure. The analysis was similar to the original set of t-tests. The honor condition (M=1.04, SD=.46), was not significantly different from the non-honor condition (M=1.05, SD=.47), in ratings of moral similarity t(435.7) = .20, p=.84.

			Effect of		
		Effect of	Mediator on		
	Indirect effect	Condition on	Dependent	Total	Direct Effect
	of Mediator	Mediator (SE),	Variable (SE),	Effect (SE),	(SE), [95%
Test Statistic	(SE), [95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	CI]
	B=.007(.02),	B=06(.17),	B=12(.03),	B=.17(.09),	B=.16(.09),
Dehumanize	[04, .05]	[40, .28]	[56,39]	[01, .36]	[02, .34]
	B=02(.14),	B=07(.17),	B=.24(.04),	B=23(.14),	B=21(.14),
Tolerance	[10, .07]	[40, .27]	[.17, .32]	[50, .05]	[48, .06]
	B=002(.01),	B=07(.17),	B=.03(.03),	B=.12(.10),	B=.13(.10),
Threat	[02, .01]	[40, .27]	[02, .09]	[07, .32]	[06, .32]

S8. PROCESS macro mediation analysis with multiculturalism as covariate in Study 1

Note: The mediator is moral similarity, condition is the independent variable (X), and

dehumanization, tolerance, and threat were all entered as dependent variables in separate models

(Y). Significant effects are written in boldface.

		Effect of	Effect of Mediator on		
	Indirect effect	Condition on	Dependent	Total	Direct Effect
	of Mediator	Mediator (SE),	Variable (SE),	Effect (SE),	(SE), [95%
Test Statistic	(SE), [95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	CI]
	B=.005(.03),	B=03(.17),	B=16(.03),	B=.15(.10),	B=.14(.10),
Dehumanize	[05, .06]	[38, .31]	[21,10]	[06, .35]	[05, .34]
Tolerance	B=01(.06), [12, .10]	B=03(.17), [38, .31]	B=.32(.04), [.23, .40]	B=14(.17), [47, .19]	B=13(.16), [45, .18]
Threat	B=.001(.01), [01, .01]	B=03(.17), [38, .31]	B=004(.03), [06, .05]	B=.12(.10), [07, .32]	B=.12(.10), [07, .32]

S9. PROCESS macro mediation analysis with participant political ideology as covariate in Study 1

Note: The mediator is moral similarity, condition is the independent variable (X), and dehumanization, tolerance, and threat were all entered as dependent variables in separate models (Y). Significant effects are written in boldface.

S10. Significant differences in participant recall of Middle Eastern vs European perpetrator ethnicity (Study 2).

While most participants in the conditions with a Middle Eastern perpetrator, correctly responded to ethnic attention check (96.3%). Far fewer participants in the conditions with the European perpetrator, correctly responded to ethnic attention check (81.3%). This difference was significant, χ^2 = 10.96, *p*=.001. This means participants had an easier time remembering the ethnicity of the Middle Easterner, than the European. Further analyses revealed those in the condition with a European committing honor violence were the most likely to misidentify the ethnicity of the perpetrator. Interestingly, in this condition 10 of the 12 participants who reported the perpetrator was not European reported they were Middle Eastern. See Figure S10.1




Figure S10.1. Percentages of responses across to the ethnic check question across conditions. Each figure illustrates participant responses on the ethnic check question (i.e., asking participant what the ethnicity of the perpetrator was).

		Effect of	Effect of		
	Indirect effect	Effect of Condition on	Mediator on Dependent	Total	Direct Effect
	of Mediator	Mediator (SE),	Variable (SE),	Effect (SE),	(SE), [95%
Test Statistic	(SE), [95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	[95% CI]	CI]
	B=02(.06),	B=.07(.23),	B=24(.07),	B=09(.17),	B=08(.16),
Dehumanize	[15, .10]	[38, .52]	[39,10]	[43, .24]	[39, .24]
	B=.03(.09),	B=.07(.23),	B=.41(.10),	B=.17(.23),	B=.14(.21),
Tolerance	[15, .23]	[38, .52]	[.23, .60]	[29, .62]	[28, .55]
	B=01(.04),	B=.07(.23),	B=19(.06),	B=19(.13),	B=17(.13),
Threat	[10, .08]	[38, .52]	[30,07]	[45, .08]	[43, .08]

S11. PROCESS macro mediation analysis with participant political ideology as covariate in Study 2

Note: The mediator is perceived morality, condition is the independent variable (X), dehumanization, tolerance, and threat were al entered separately as the dependent variable (Y).

Significant effects are written in boldface.

Supplementary Material References

- Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 63, 596-612.
- McDonald, J. H. (2007). *The Handbook of Biological Statics*. Retrieved on March 18, 2020 from http://udel.edu/~mcdonald/statpermissions.html