

Predicting political trust

Jesse van de Mond
SNR:1274451

16-06-2019
Bachelor Thesis
dr. L.C.J.M. Halman

Abstract:

As political science research in the last decade has been moving towards a culturalist paradigm, this research aims to find out whether or not cultural and individual variable types are able to predict people's levels of political trust.

To measure the cultures of European countries, Hofstede's dimensions of culture are used. Individual variables that are used are: National pride, level of education and amount of interest in politics.

Both individual and cultural variables are proven by research to explain parts of the variance behind people's trust in their governments. Not in accordance with the recent research trends, it turned out that the individual variables were able to explain at least three times as much of the variance behind European people's trust in their governments.

Introduction:

The social importance of Political Trust:

For a democratically-ruled government to survive it is important that the people in power keep on representing the thoughts of the voting population. Furthermore it is important that the government is being trusted and backed up by the population and its members and both can be able to blow up it up depending on the constitutional laws of their countries. Political scientist David Easton defines trust in a government as the confidence of citizens in the government to do what is perceived as right and fair (OECD, 2013). Tianjian Shi, of the City University of New York, explains that political trust is one of the most important determinants of the stability of a polity. It's importance is explained as a way of making room for a political regime to solve encountered difficulty (Shi, 2001).

In their research Armingeon & Guthman (2014) have found that due to the effects of the economic crisis and the way that governments have responded to the recession, European people's political trust has eroded around the beginning of the decade. In a similar vein we see Russell J. Dalton (2005) describing an earlier erosion of trust happening in the USA. Initially, he explains this was due to crisis, unrest and political scandals happening in the 1960s and 1970s, but as time continued and unrest had decreased by the late 1990s political trust in the population did not bounce back to its original levels.

Within modern, western societies over the last century or so, the indirect democracy based around liberal enlightened norms and values, has grown to be the standard type of government more and more. With political trust's importance for both the functioning and the legitimacy of a democracy, these recent developments are very concerning for the future of many western societies.

These erosions of political trust could lead to some serious social implications like unrest in the population and the democracy no longer being considered to be a legitimate governance structure.

Already in the 18th century, social scientist Alexis de Tocqueville understood the importance of a social culture on the functioning of a democracy. He explained that for a society to stay functioning there needs to be mutual trust among the people (Audier, 2016).

Another early work on political culture and trust was done by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. In their *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* they found the balance between three types of political culture to be important for the stability of a democracy. Furthermore, they found out political culture to be a more durable concept than mere public opinion. Robert Putnam in 1993 had similar results when looking at the Italian society, and demonstrated that the historical cultures of Italy could explain their political situations (Roskin, 2016).

Recently there have been papers that have tried to explain the variables behind political trust, but these are not without their limitations. For example Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund(2015) have looked into multiple variables that could explain political trust, but they only did so in Finland, and Wang(2005), only looked at Chinese populations.

As political trust can be considered to be a major impacting factor for the survival of a modern democratic government, this paper is interested in what it is exactly that influences the levels of political trust within national populations. We will be looking to see what factors are behind people's lowering levels of political trust and try to understand via these factors why people are politically untrusting. By looking at many different variables this paper intends to explain as much of the variance regarding political trust in Europe as possible. As

this paper looks into populations from different nations and cultures this will be one of the first pieces of research on this topic that is able to compare different countries.

In the late twentieth century, political science started to adopt rational action as parts of political theories. This tried to explain that political decisions are the outcomes of strategic rational processes regarding each alternative and its consequences. It would make sense that political actors in controlling functions would go about making rational strategic decisions, as policies and other political plans are often strategically based. On the other hand rational choice theory is attacked by the assumptions from sociological and psychological theory that accept the presence of irrationality or bounded rationality, which would limit people in their capabilities of making completely rational decisions. At times people have admitted to identify with a party's identity more so than they do with specific political issues, this could influence the rationality of their voting behavior. Thus, rational choice does have its importance within political fields, but with people biologically being unable to be rational at all times, rational choice theory does not give the full picture (Lewin & Vedung, 1980). As trust does not have to be a fully rational concept and is based upon people's perception of others, it is important to see what else influences people's political decisions and what it is exactly that makes them trust politicians (Lewis & Weigert, 1985).

Another theory regarding political trust is culturalist theory, which explains that people indeed are influenced by perceptions of others and by the possible outcomes of political decisions, but that is not the complete story. People's responses to these concepts are mediated by their cultural orientation that includes their values and meanings to certain concepts.

This paper will research the effects of cultural factors on the political trust within European nations, as a way of looking for evidence of the culturalist view of political theory. In this paper political trust is defined as having trust in the national government.

In order to find out about the effects of culture on political trust we will be looking into a theoretical framework regarding culture and scores of different nations regarding how the government is being trusted.

A theoretical framework that explains the values, beliefs and attitudes to certain issues that organize a society and make up a national culture, is Hofstede's dimensional model of cultural variability.

After performing a factor-analysis on the results of employee surveys, Hofstede found out that the workplace values and preferences of IBM employees could be systemized across national cultures. With this dimensional model of cultural differences, Hofstede would go on to establish a new paradigm of intercultural research in communication studies, psychology and management studies.

Hofstede initially found out that the employee result surveys and the related national cultures could be systemized to four different cultural dimensions; Masculinity/femininity, Individualism/collectivism, Power distance and Uncertainty avoidance (Whalen, 2016). As Hofstede would go on with his research regarding what it is that separates cultures, he found out about two more dimensions namely, Long-term/short-term orientation and Indulgence.

On his personal website, Geert Hofstede (2019) briefly defines these cultural dimensions in the following way:

- **Individualism:** “Individualism is the extent to which people feel independent, as opposed to being interdependent as members of larger wholes.”
- **Power Distance:** “Power Distance is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.”
- **Masculinity:** “Masculinity is the extent to which the use of force is endorsed socially.”
- **Uncertainty Avoidance:** “Uncertainty avoidance deals with a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.”
- **Long-term Orientation:** “Long-term orientation deals with change.”
- **Indulgence:** “Indulgence is about the good things in life.”

While Hofstede’s original research was only about workplace values and in a more business-oriented area, the professor found out that each of his dimension were strongly correlated to external national factors, like national GDP, the obesity rates and subjective well-being in a country. Thus, one could conclude that the results of Hofstede’s analysis can, to an extent be generalized, and the model could be used to explain other social scientific phenomena. On the other hand Hofstede’s model has also been met with some criticisms. These criticisms can be divided into three different groups. A couple of reviewers questioned whether or not the dimensions that Hofstede came up with were merely artifacts from the time of research. Another group, despite correlations with external national factors, kept stressing the constraining impacts of Hofstede’s research population being IBM employees. A third group was mostly questioning professor Hofstede’s research methods as the sole use of attitude-surveys might not be enough to infer cultural values, they felt that a multitude of research instruments were necessary to truly study cultural differences (Sondergaard, 1994). As Hofstede’s model is both widely renowned, and questioned and criticized. This paper will intends to research the reliability of the model and try to find out whether or not each of Hofstede’s dimensions of intercultural differences are able to explain the differences in the levels of political trust in various European countries on a macro-level. While the dimensions of ‘Indulgence’ definitely have their cultural considerations they, in contrary to the other five dimensions, are not expected to have any implications regarding political trust, which is why we will disregard them for the remaining part of this paper.

National pride:

Another possibly important cultural factor in the prediction of political trust could be national pride. As national pride is about feeling proud about your country, these feelings of pride can also be coming from pride of how well they are represented by politicians. There has been research to support this, as it was found that the larger the share of the population that was not being represented in the government, the less proud citizens on average are of their own nation. Andreas Wimmer explains that political representation can be improve feelings of national identity (Wimmer, 2018).

Individual factors:

It is not only cultural factors that can help predict amount of governmental trust. As not only national factors explain why people have political trust, levels of political trust differ from person to person, so we will be looking into individual factors as well to see if they are able to help us explain levels of political trust.

Finnish professors Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund(2015) for example, have been able to find a correlation between higher levels of education and lower levels of political among the population of Finland, they argue that this is related to cognitive capacity.

Another individual factor that will be looked into is socio-political interest, Catterberg & Moreno(2006) have argued that psychologically, people tend to be more positive about things that they chose themselves and they choose to be interested in politics, and thus feel more positively about the politics in their country.

Geert Hofstede (2011) explains that people from people from large power distance contexts are more accepting of hierarchy and the use of power. Furthermore, they are less caring of the legitimacy of the used power. Real life examples of large power distance in cultures are teacher-centered ways of education and religions with hierarchies made up of priests.

As people in these large power distance contexts are more accepting of hierarchical structures within society, and are less questioning of the legitimacy of people in powerful positions, they are expected to not question the government in their country as much as people in small power distance contexts would. It is expected that people in large power distance countries are more trusting of politicians, which is how we come up to our first hypothesis:

H1: The higher the levels of power distance in a country are, the higher the scores for political trust in that country will be.

It is explained by Hofstede that in collectivist contexts harmony within a group or society is the most important thing. An example of this is the importance of the relation over a task. Individualist contexts are the other way around and people have the opportunity to speak up about things even if it against the values of the group. So it is expected that people in individualist contexts are less politically trusting and more critical of the government.

H2: The higher the levels of individualism in a country are, the lower the scores for political trust in that country will be.

Hofstede explains that masculinity in his cultural dimension for a part refers to the amounts of assertiveness and competitiveness in a society. If people are more assertive and competitive they would not have any problems with being critical of political powers, and thus less trusting of politicians as they feel like there could be better options in competition.

H3: The higher the levels of masculinity in a country are, the lower the scores for political trust will be.

Hofstede explains that uncertainty avoidance is about people trying to avoid higher levels of stress in society due to an unknown future. People who don't want any uncertainty in their future are less likely to be critical of their politicians as they would not want too many changes of the people in power. Furthermore in strong uncertainty avoidance contexts, citizens are expected to feel incompetent towards the politicians in their countries. Additionally, Kong(2012) has found that uncertainty avoidance is a mediating factor between climate and social trust, with societal cultures as outcomes of the evolutionary implications that a climate brings. This brings us to our fourth hypothesis:

H4: The higher the levels of uncertainty avoidance in a country are, the higher the levels of political trust will be.

Andreas Wimmer, of Columbia University, found out that pride regarding the identity of a nation is partially based around the amount of representation by the government. This is very much about identification with the political actors in power. Research has shown that people are more trusting of others when they are members of the same group (Tanis & Postmes, 2005). So as national pride rises with the amounts of political representation, and representation or identification leads to more trust within people, it is expected that people with more national pride are also scoring higher on political trust. This brings us to our fifth hypothesis:

H5: The higher the levels of national pride in a country are, the higher the levels of political trust will be.

An individual factor that could explain political trust could be a person's level of education. As a higher level of education usually is related to higher levels of cognitive competence, and thus a person is likely to be more capable of thinking critically. A person with a higher capability of thinking critically would be more critical of their political system and would thus need more reasoning to be trusting of the government (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2015). Because of this our seventh hypothesis is as followed:

H6: The higher the levels of education for a person, the lower their level of political trust.

Another individual factor could be political interest, as individuals choose to be interested in a particular topic, and it is argued that people tend to hold more favorable views of topics that they choose to put their attention towards. So people who are choosing to be interested in politics have a more positive opinion of politics in their country (Catterberg & Moreno, 2006).

H7: The higher the levels of political interest in a person, the higher their level of political trust.

In figure 1, below, a schematic representation of the hypothesized effects on the levels of political trust is seen.




Figure 1: Schematic presentation of hypotheses

Data & Method

The main database to be used for this paper comes from the European Values Study. The European Values Study is a cross-sectional survey that researches values and attitudes from citizens residing in countries all over Europe. The survey covers a wide range of topics including: work, environment, religion, morality, political and other societal issues (EVS, 2008). In this paper we will be using the 2008 edition of the survey. Currently the organization behind the survey is working on the 2017 edition but at the moment this still is only in the pre-release version, and thus will not be used. Fortunately cultures are relatively inert concepts and because of this the age of the survey will for the most part not be detrimental to the relevance of the paper.

The dependent variable that this paper focusses on is political trust. This will be measured with the use of one of the questions in the survey of the EVS. We chose to use Variable 222 of Question 63, which is based around confidence in the government as it is corresponding with David Easton's definition of political trust. Q63 of the EVS is as follows: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?", with item v222 being the government. Respondents have four options to answer the question. These options are 1 "A great deal", 2 "Quite a lot", 3 "Not very much", 4 "Not at all". Additionally in the database there are also the values 8 "DK" for when a person does not know their answer, and 9 "NA" when there is no answer available. For the independent variables regarding the levels of education, national pride and political interest the European Values Study will also be used. To measure a respondent's interest in politics Q54 will be used. Q54 goes as follows: "How interested would you say you are in politics?". To answer this question, respondents have four different options: 1 "Very interested", 2 "Somewhat interested", 3 "Not very interested", 4 "Not at all interested".

To measure the level of education that a respondent has, Q110 will be used. Q110 is as follows: "What is the highest level you have completed in your education?". To answer this question, the survey has twenty levels of education that the respondent can choose from. To measure the levels of national pride in the respondents, we will be using Q72. Q72 is as follows: "How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?". To answer this question, the respondent has four options: 1 "Very proud", 2 "Quite proud", 3 "Not very proud", and 4 "Not proud at all".

Additionally in the database, for our independent variables there are also the values 8 "DK" for when a person does not know their answer, and 9 "NA" when there is no answer available. In the case of education the "DK" is coded as 88, and "NA" is coded as 99. For National pride there is also the option 7 "Not applicable".

To measure how each country scores on the Hofstede dimensions, we will be using the database coming from the website of Geert Hofstede's personal website (geerthofstede.com, 2015).

A high score on Power Distance means that people from that culture are generally speaking more accepting of hierarchy. While a high score on the Individualism-Collectivism dimension means that a culture is seen as more individualist and there is a lower degree of interdependence among its people. On the Masculinity-Femininity dimension, a high score means that a culture is more masculine, in which people are more so motivated to be competitive and try to be the best. Finally, a high score on Uncertainty Avoidance means that people from that culture generally try to avoid ambiguous or unknown situations.

For the following European countries Hofstede's database did not have information for all the

dimensions: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Cyprus, Georgia, Iceland, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro & Ukraine. As these are unusable, these countries, for research purposes will be left out of our analysis.

In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of the individual-level variables from EVS database are presented, minimum and maximum scores are left out as these variables are scaled.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Level of Education	65400	3,0782	1,35126
Interest in Politics	65389	2,6393	,93761
National Pride	60246	3,3232	,75531
Political Trust	62995	2,1926	,88067
Valid N (listwise)	57042		

Results

To test which of the variables is able to explain what part of the variance of people's levels of political trust, we will be running a multivariate linear regression analysis. Furthermore, to get a good idea about the relation between our dependent and independent variables we will be testing the correlations.

Table 2 shows the results of a bivariate correlation between people trust in their governments and respectively their levels of education, political interest and national pride. The analysis presents a weak, significant, positive linear correlation between a person's level of education and their trust in the government. Interestingly, this rejects our sixth hypothesis as it was expected that this correlation would be negative.

Interest in politics is positively linearly correlated with political trust, this confirms our seventh hypothesis, which states that if a person is more interested in politics that they are also more trusting of the government.

Lastly, table 2 shows off a positive linear correlation between Political Trust and National Pride. This confirms our fifth hypothesis stating that people who are more proud of their national have got more trust in their government. It is to be noted that each of the correlations on the individual-level variables is significant at 0.01 level and thus can be considered to be a reliable measure to use in our research.

Table 2
Correlations of individual-level variables

		Level of Education	Interest in Politics	National Pride
Political Trust	Pearson Correlation	,015**	,138**	,168**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,001	,000	,000
	N	45620	45640	42079

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Similarly, a bivariate correlation analysis is performed on the macro-level variables stemming from Hofstede's dimensions of culture. Table 3 presents us with the results of this analysis.

Firstly we look at Power Distance and notice a weak negative linear correlation with political trust. This goes against our first hypothesis that stated that people from high power distance cultures would be more likely to be trusting of their government.

Secondly, political trust is weakly positively, linearly correlated with a higher score on the Individualism-Collectivism dimension. This rejects our second hypothesis, as was hypothesised that people from individualist cultures would be less trusting of the government.

Thirdly, the table shows a negative linear correlation between political trust and uncertainty

avoidance. These results reject our fourth hypothesis, stating that people from higher uncertainty avoiding cultures are more likely to be trusting of the government. Lastly, there is a negative linear correlation for political trust and scores on the Masculinity-Femininity dimension. This confirms our third hypothesis, which expected people from masculine cultures to be less trusting of the government. Furthermore it is to be noted that, like was the case with the individual-level correlations, each of the correlations on the national-level variables is significant at 0.01 level and can thus, be considered to be a reliable measure to use in our research.

Table 3.
Correlations of national-level variables

		PowerDistance	IndividualismCollectivism	Uncertainty Avoidance	Masculinity
Political Trust	Pearson Correlation	-,047**	,053**	-,105**	-,073**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000	,000	,000
	N	45959	45959	45959	45959

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

In order to gauge more information about the relationships between political trust and independent variables, we will be performing a linear regression analysis as well.

In table 4 it can be seen that together, the individual-level variables are able to explain 4,8% of the variance regarding people's levels of trust in the government. National pride can be considered to be the most important predictor of political trust as it is able to explain 2,8% of the variance. Furthermore we see that adding the level of education only explains an extra 0,2% of the variance, while adding a person's level of political interest into equation explains another 1,8%.

Table 4.
Regression analysis

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
National Pride	,168 ^a	,028	,028	,83854
National Pride, Level of Education	,173 ^b	,030	,030	,83790
National Pride, Level of Education & Political Interest	,219 ^c	,048	,048	,83014

It can be seen in the analysis of variance(ANOVA) in table 5 that when adding levels of education and amounts of political interest into the equation, the regression stays significant, furthermore it does not seem to change at all.

Table 5.
ANOVA effects of Individual-level variables on Political trust.

	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
National Pride	1	852,097 ,703	1211,835	,000 ^b
National Pride, Level of Education	2	448,445 ,702	638,734	,000 ^c
National Pride, Level of Education, Political Interest	3	478,328 ,689	694,096	,000 ^d

When looking at the results of a bivariate regression for each one of Hofstede's cultural dimensions and political trust, it can be noticed that these all have their significant effects on political trust, but they are only able to very small parts of the variance. Power distance only explains 0,6%, Individualism-Collectivism only 0,1%, Masculinity-Femininity 0,8% and finally uncertainty avoidance can be seen to explain 1,1% of the variance. When combined into one regression, together these variables are able 1,5% of the variance. Individually each of these regressions were significant, however adding Individualism-Collectivism to power distance made it lose its significance, as seen in table 11.

Table 6.
Regression power distance

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
,079 ^a	,006	,006	,87794

Table 7.
Regression Individualism-Collectivism

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
,036 ^a	,001	,001	,88011

Table 8.
Regression Masculinity-Femininity

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
,092 ^a	,008	,008	,87698

Table 9.
Regression Uncertainty avoidance

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
,103 ^a	,011	,011	,87599

When combined into one regression, together these variables are able 1,5% of the variance. Individually each of these regressions were significant, however adding Individualism-Collectivism to power distance made it lose its significance, as seen in table 11.

Table 10.

Combined regression of all National-level variables

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Power Distance	,079	,006	,006	,87794
Power Distance, Individualism- Collectivism	,079	,006	,006	,87795
Power Distance, Individualism- Collectivism, Masculinity	,101	,010	,010	,87619
Power Distance, Individualism- Collectivism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance	,123	,015	,015	,87396

Table 11.
Regression coefficients

		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2,283	,006		397,767	,000
	PowerDistance	-,002	,000	-,079	-19,844	,000
2	(Constant)	2,282	,007		349,551	,000
	PowerDistance	-,002	,000	-,079	-17,645	,000
	IndividualismCollectivism	4,137E-5	,000	,001	,307	,759
3	(Constant)	2,281	,007		350,139	,000
	PowerDistance	-,001	,000	-,039	-7,556	,000
	IndividualismCollectivism	,001	,000	,044	8,367	,000
	Masculinity	-,003	,000	-,095	-15,944	,000
4	(Constant)	2,299	,007		349,764	,000
	PowerDistance	,002	,000	,078	9,398	,000
	IndividualismCollectivism	,002	,000	,074	13,495	,000
	Masculinity	-,003	,000	-,084	-14,098	,000
	UncertaintyAvoidance	-,004	,000	-,159	-17,953	,000

a. Dependent Variable: PoliticalTrust

Conclusion & limitations

To conclude, this paper intended to find predicting variables behind and was able to do so. On both an individual and a national level variables were seen explaining variance, doing so while being significant on 0,01 level.

Our first hypothesis stated that people from high power distance contexts would be more trusting of their governments. This was rejected during our analysis. This rejection could mean that people from high power distance cultures are accepting of hierarchy but are at the same time less trusting of people higher than them in the hierarchy. Our second hypothesis stated that people from more individualist contexts would be less trusting of their government. This hypothesis was rejected as well, as it turns out that people from individualist countries actually score higher on political trust. A possible reason for this could be that people from individualist contexts have more the idea that they as individuals are able to have an impact on politics by voting for example, and thus are more trusting of the people that they have chosen to be their government, than people who are unlikely to speak up and because of that feel like they do not have a political impact.

However, our third hypothesis, which expected people from masculine cultures to be less trusting of the government was confirmed by our analysis. This can be explained by the assertiveness and competitiveness that characterises these cultures, as people are less likely to easily trust the government if there are many parties opposing the government, as they are in competition with them and speaking out against them.

Our fourth hypothesis, stating that people from higher uncertainty avoiding cultures are more likely to be trusting of the government was rejected. A possible reasoning behind this could be that people from higher uncertainty avoiding cultures do not trust people quickly in general as putting your trust in a person or government could lead to an uncertain future.

Our fifth hypothesis stating that people who are more proud of their national have got more trust in their government was confirmed by our analysis. The reasoning behind this is that people are more proud of their country if their government is doing a good job at representing its population, and people are more likely to trust their government if it performs well. This could be considered an argument for rational choice theory.

Our sixth hypothesis stated that people with a higher level of education would be less likely to trust the government, but this was rejected. Possibly people with a higher education have a better understanding of how the government functions and because of that, they could be more trusting of it.

Lastly, our seventh hypothesis, which states that if a person is more interested in politics that

they are also more trusting of the government was confirmed by our analysis. People choose to be interested in certain topics, and research has shown that if people choose things they have a higher opinion of it, this seems to be the case with the governments and its politicians as well.

As political science research has been wondering to what extent culture play a role in political trust, this research analysed both cultural and non-cultural variables to see which ones would be able to explain more of the variance behind political trust. It turned out that the non-cultural variables were able to explain at least three times as much of the variance. So it might be a good idea for future research to look more into these types of variables and less into culture.

A limitation to the research could be the age of the database, as the EVS' 2008 edition was used, not all numbers could be completely representational for 2019. Furthermore, we were limited by the Hofstede database as bunch of countries did not have any data regarding the four dimensions that we were researching.

References:

- Armington, K., & Guthmann, K. (2013). Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007-2011. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(3), 423-442. doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12046
- Audier, S. (2006) Tocqueville: Is He Relevant Today? *Études*.
- Catterberg, G. & Moreno, A. (2006). The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 18. 10.1093/ijpor/edh081.
- Dahl, R. A. (2019, February 08). *Democracy*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/democracy#ref233828>
- Dalton, R. J. (2005). The Social Transformation of Trust in Government. *International Review of Sociology*, 15(1), 133-154. doi:10.1080/03906700500038819
- EVS. (2008). *European Values study*. Retrieved from <https://europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>.
- Geert. (2010, May 3). Retrieved April 9, 2019, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20100531195834/http://www.geerthofstede.com/geert.aspx>
- Hofstede, G. (2015). *Dimension data matrix*. Retrieved from <https://geerthofstede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/>.
- Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context. *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture*, 2(1). doi:10.9707/2307-0919.1014
- Kestilä-Kekkonen, E., & Söderlund, P. (2015). Political Trust, Individual-level Characteristics and Institutional Performance: Evidence from Finland, 2004-13. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 39(2), 138-160. doi:10.1111/1467-9477.12052

- Kong, D. T. (2012). Examining a Climatorconomic Contextualization of Generalized Social Trust Mediated by Uncertainty Avoidance. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 44(4), 574-588. doi:10.1177/0022022112466700
- Lewin, L., & Vedung, E. (1980). *Politics as rational action: Essay in public choice and policy analysis*. Dordrecht a.o: Reidel. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8955-9
- Lewis, J. D., & Weigert, A. (1985). Trust as a Social Reality. *Social Forces*, 63(4), 967-985. doi:10.1093/sf/63.4.967
- OECD. (2013). Government at a Glance 2013. *Government at a Glance*. doi:10.1787/gov_glance-2013-sum-en
- Roskin, M. G. (2016, April 06). *Political science*. Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-science>
- Shen, F., & Guo, Z. S. (2012). The last refuge of media persuasion: News use, national pride and political trust in China. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 23(2), 135-151. doi:10.1080/01292986.2012.725173
- Shi, T. (2001). Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan. *Comparative Politics*, 33(4), 401. doi:10.2307/422441
- Sondergaard, M. (1994). Research Note: Hofstede's Consequences: A Study of Reviews, Citations and Replications. *Organization Studies*, 15(3), 447-456. doi:10.1177/017084069401500307
- Tanis, M., & Postmes, T. (2005). A social identity approach to trust: Interpersonal perception, group membership and trusting behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 35(3), 413-424. doi:10.1002/ejsp.256

The 6 dimensions model of national culture by Geert Hofstede. (2019). Retrieved April 9, 2019, from <https://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/>

Wang, Z. (2005). *Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes*. 10.1142/9789812569349_0004.

Whalen, J.M. (2016). *The Hofstede Model and national cultures of learning: a comparison of undergraduate survey data*.

Wimmer, A. (2018). National Identity and Political Power. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <http://www.columbia.edu/~aw2951/FA2.pdf>