FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM, THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL FIELD AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

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Football hooliganism has been a problem for a long time, and authorities have yet to solve it. In what follows, the question is posed whether an increase in participation of supporters could lead to a decrease in football violence. In order to answer this question, it will be discussed what football hooliganism exactly is, how supporter participation currently works in the four selected countries, what the causes for football hooliganism are through the lens of the semi-autonomous social field and with the help of a case study into supporter involvement at German second division club FC Sankt Pauli.

1: A background on hooliganism

Violence at big sporting events has been a well-recorded phenomenon dating even as far back as at the chariot racing in the Roman Empire (Crowther, 1996). About two thousand years later, sports events are still regularly the backdrop to violence, even though today this is mostly confined to football, due to the sport being the biggest in the world in terms of supporters. The common term to describe such violent behaviour is *football hooliganism.* The dictionary defines hooliganism as 'rowdy, violent, or destructive behavior' (Merriam-Webster, 2018). The word hooligan is said to be an alteration of Houlihan, which was the surname of an Irish family living in London that were known for getting into fights (Pearson, 1983). In the context of football examples of such behaviour include fighting, vandalism and the lighting of fireworks in the stands. Offensive or discriminatory chanting are sometimes included as well. In what follows, hooliganism will be short for football hooliganism.

What is hooliganism?

It is problematic to define hooliganism by certain actions, as this would completely ignore the social aspects and contexts relevant in football crowds. An alternative perspective from which hooliganism can be viewed then, is by focusing on the people that show hooligan behaviour: hooligans. One way of doing this, is by identifying organised hooligan groups, categorising the people involved in this as hooligans and setting them apart from 'normal' fans. This approach has been used before (Gumusgul & Acet, 2016; Redhead, 2015; Hunt, Bristol & Bashaw, 1999; Giulianotti, 2002). A less crude version, posed by Ramon Spaaij, is perhaps more representative of reality. He argues that there is an important distinction between spontaneous violence and incidents involving institutionalised groups of football supporters that regularly engage

in violent acts and whose primary objective seems to be football hooliganism (Spaaij, 2005). According to Spaaij, hooligan behaviour is more often than not triggered by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic motivation. Factors such as the match result, aggressiveness on the pitch or policing are in these cases the cause for hooliganism (Spaaij & Anderson, 2010).

A definition of football hooliganism should thus include both descriptions of individual behaviour and of group behaviour. Only certain types of actions (ie. fighting with opposing fans or the police, lighting fireworks, etc.) that happen in a certain context (ie. In or around a football stadium, representing a club, country or fan group, etc.) can be categorised as football hooliganism.

Football culture is not the same all over the world, which is in part a result of football clubs often being a symbol of a region or identity (Gómez-Bantel, 2016; Llopis Goig, 2008). Another reason is that clubs often represent a certain socio-economic class (Spaaij, 2007c). In extreme cases, this can result in neo-Nazism and racism or, on the other side of the political spectrum, extreme leftism and communism (Back, Crabbe & Solomos, 2002; Kennedy, 2013). The differences in the surrounding identity and culture affect the form in which football hooliganism materialises. The first form of hooliganism, exported from England to the rest of the world, is characterised by unorganized, spontaneous violence and heavy drinking. Due to its origins, football hooliganism used to be called 'the English disease' (Dunning, 2000).This 'classic' form is still the standard in England and parts of Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.
A newer form was brought over from Brazil to Italy, and is now the standard in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe and parts of Northern Europe: Ultras culture. While ultras are mostly associated with a highly organised type of support, they often are involved in football violence as well. Apart from organized support and violence, ultras groups often seek influence in their clubs, through disruptive or violent measures if needed. Besides, ultras appear to have common values in terms of support and football governance (Doidge, 2017). Another characterization of ultras is that they often have a political profile, which materializes in Serbia generally into nationalism (Axboe Nielsen, 2013), while there are also extreme left-wing groups found, such as the ultras of Sankt Pauli in Germany (Daniel & Kassimeris, 2013). It is important to realise that the concepts of ultras and football hooliganism are related, but separate.

A distinct culture of football violence is found in South-America, where supporter groups (*hinchas, barras bravas* or *Torcidas Organizadas*) are highly organized, similar to European Ultras. Another characteristic that they have in common is their political involvement. The influence in both local and national politics is however substantial in South-America, whereas European Ultras can be characterised as fringe groups (Duke & Crolley, 2001). This raises new challenges altogether to the combat of hooliganism that are more in the political sphere. Besides, football violence is especially in Brazil linked to 'regular' gang violence (Newson, 2017).

The culture in football stadiums is often a display of certain masculine values, but these values are not necessarily the same everywhere. It has been posed that English fan culture includes heavy drinking, because being able to 'hold one's ale' is considered a masculine value in England, whereas it does not have that connotation in Italy for example (Cashmore & Cleland, 2014), where football hooliganism is not associated with such heavy drinking.

What has been done to combat and prevent hooliganism?
Bearing in mind that football violence can at times be an international problem, due to continental club football and international tournaments, the Council of Europe has taken a role upon itself to aid in the prevention of it. The *European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in Particular at Football Matches*, originally as a response to the Heysel Stadium disaster that costed 38 lives (Taylor J., 1987), provides some general principles and calls for both domestic and international cooperation. Critics argue that the convention is not without problems, as the control and enforcement of it remain weak (Nafziger, 1992). The domestic actors identified by the Convention are the police, the national and local authorities and sport organisations, which are in the Convention encouraged to cooperate.

At the national level, the cooperation asked for in the Convention is realised in a number of countries. In the Netherlands for example, there are so-called football covenants for each professional football club. In these documents, agreements are made between municipality, police and the football club on how to handle security at football matches (Siemerink, 2014). Furthermore, there are football information points in a number of European states that provide the general public with reports on football

violence in the country and their international counterparts with detailed information on specific matches (Spaaij, 2013).

The police is another important actor in the prevention of football hooliganism and sometimes a factor in whether or not riots and violence break out. Violent behaviour is often immediately met with a violent reaction from (riot) police. A big police presence is however often regarded as escalating rather than helpful: Riotous situations are chaotic, so it is extremely difficult for police forces to punish only rioters. In other words: there is a significant chance of innocents getting punished. This can lead to an overall feeling of victimhood and a desire to retaliate (Stott, Adang, Livingstone & Schreiber, 2008). An added risk to this approach is formed by the fact that football supporters are often framed as criminal, which could play a part in the role of the police. In some countries, such as England, Sweden and Denmark, the police adopt a low profile, employing officers in plain clothing and hidden riot police (Priks, 2014). Problematic in the policing of football crowds can be the view the police has of football supporters. A study conducted by Havelund, Joern and Rasmussen in 2008-2009 in Denmark showed "a general lack of knowledge of supporter culture as well as scepticism towards engaging in dialogue with football supporters" (Havelund, Joern & Rasmussen, 2015).

Preventive measures are, it seems, the modus operandi of both international, national and local authorities and of football clubs and associations themselves. Apart from the aforementioned preventive approaches, there have also been a series of punitive measures that were designed to stop football hooligans. Especially banning orders have been a much discussed subject, due to it being so common and because it is the most extreme punishment short of prison time. A basic banning order consists of the prohibition to attend football matches, either nationally or locally. Added provisions could include (and often do) the obligation to check in at your local police station during every match of your team. In England football fans with banning orders can get travel bans whenever England or their favourite team plays abroad. Mainly the last provision has been the subject of academic discussion from a human rights and ethical perspective (Pearson, 2002; Hopkins & Hamilton-Smith, 2014). From a theoretical point of view, banning orders could work as a general deterrent and as a specific punishment. However, there is no real-life proof of the effects yet (Hopkins & Hamilton-

Smith, 2014). Other punitive measures are more indirect, and consist of handing out fines to the clubs whose fans have caused trouble. This is mostly done by international and national football associations, depending on whether the acts of hooliganism were committed during a national or international game. Fining clubs only shifts the burden of combating hooliganism to individual football teams, who do not have full control of factors such as police, infrastructure outside their stadium (and sometimes inside, as some football clubs merely rent their stadium) and societal problems that can lead to people committing football violence.

A problem of restrictive measures is that violence is not necessarily eradicated, but rather moved to outside the football stadiums, which makes violent confrontation more unpredictable. Already in 1997, such a confrontation led to a fatal casualty in the Netherlands. The changing playing field of hooliganism, has had as a consequence a higher level of violence and urged hooligan groups to become better organised (Spaaij, 2007b).

Research question and methodology
All measures described above are at best only partially successful and some have issues with human rights. The best practice mentioned here is according to the literature low-profile policing (Stott, Livingstone & Hoggett, 2008). But even then, hooliganism still exists in countries where these tactics are employed. Authorities, football associations and football fans are facing the same problem as the Romans did when 3000 people died in a riot (Taylor J., 1987): What is the best solution to hooliganism? Up until now, the most important party in football fan violence has not been involved in the making and enacting of the policies: Football fans themselves. Citizen participation is a hot topic in other parts of society, such as local politics and businesses, and the results are mostly positive. Perhaps the key to a safer environment at football matches can be found here. Especially in a dimension that is so communal like football is in a number of countries and the cultural significance it holds there, it seems natural that fans have a say.

Whether or not an increase in participation leads to a decrease in hooliganism is extremely difficult to measure, partially due to the vast number of external factors, and is therefore outside the scope of this thesis. What will be discussed, is a theoretical

background to participation and a case study into such participation. The method that will be employed to reach this end is secondary analysis. The thesis will focus on a number of countries with a long history of hooliganism, that have different approaches but have in common a political system willing and able to tackle the problem: England, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. These countries are all in the same geographical area, which is a result of the style differences in football violence that follow a North-South divide in Europe, discussed earlier in this chapter. The specific challenges of ultras and barras bravas are so different from 'regular' football hooliganism that they will fall outside the scope of the thesis. While most external factors are the same in the countries that will be looked at, the level of participation differs greatly. Participation is the highest in Germany, and has historically been so (Merkel, 2012). It is the lowest in the Netherlands and Belgium, though there is an undeniable trend towards more participation in those countries, with a national supporters collective having been formed early 2016 (Supporterscollectief Nederland, 2016). After building up a theoretical background, a case study, formed with primary and secondary analysis, will be delved into to put everything into practice.

2: A Historical overview of Supporter participation

The participation of supporters can materialise in countless ways, ranging from fans choosing the shirt their team will wear in the coming season to fans being owners of their own club[1]. Some forms require a football club to initiate a process of participation -such as the aforementioned shirt election- while others can be started by fans themselves, in the hope of realising a position of power within a football club. Cleland (2010) described participation as an inclusive club-fan relationship, "in which supporters can communicate and interact with football club hierarchies to have an influence on the decisions clubs make." (Cleland, 2010). Due to the ever-increasing economic value that football clubs represent in modern football, it is, especially in the upper echelons of football, simply an impossibility to include supporters in the decision making process in the sphere of the actual football -ie. the technical part. It has been noted by Cleland and Dixon (2015) that supporters of football teams in the top level of English football, the Premier League, have a difficult time in their endeavours to exert

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[1] The former happened at, among other clubs, NEC Nijmegen in 2016 (https://www.nec-nijmegen.nl/2016/03/stem-vanaf-volgende-week-woensdag-op-het-nieuwe-thuisshirt/), while the latter happened for the first time at Nottingham Forest in 1992 (Lomax, 2000).

influence over the decision-making of the boards of directors and other influential persons in their club. This is, according to Cleland and Dixon, mostly due to the size of these clubs making it difficult or nearly impossible to mobilize enough supporters. Further complicating the situation is the increasingly global market in football, where the biggest clubs have fans all over the world (Nash, 2000; Giulianotti & Robertson, 2004). All of the above suggests that bigger football clubs in terms of the capital they represent and amount of fans they have, including those in other countries, will give less opportunity for fans to participate in policy making. This is enforced by the fact that none of the supporter owned football clubs in England participate at the highest level of English football.

There are plenty examples of supporter participation in modern football, including fan representation at board meetings, supporter protests being taken seriously and -as mentioned above- the ownership of a football club in the hands of fans. There are however differences between countries in what forms of participation are found and in the ways these came about. In this chapter, a brief overview of the distinct histories of supporter participation in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium will be given.

History of supporter participation

England

The earliest example of football supporters coming together to gain a say in the policy of their clubs is the National Federation of Football Supporters' Clubs (NFFSC), which was founded in 1927. At that time football clubs were largely dependent on donations of individuals, who did not get anything in return with regards to decision making powers (Cleland, 2010).

In the 1980's, the Football Supporters Association (FSA) was established to protect football supporters from a variety of issues such as high ticket prices and restrictions on ticket sales. The advent of the FSA has to be seen in the light of post-Hillsborough football policy. Following the *Hillsborough Stadium Disaster Inquiry Report* (Taylor J., 1989), stadiums in the top levels of English football were required to be all-seaters. Using government funds to modernize their stadiums, clubs were encouraged to increase their facilities to attract a more affluent public. As a result, ticket prices soared,

and English football went a step further away from its working-class roots (Webber, 2017). Apart from protesting against policy on a national level -and succeeding in some instances- the FSA's impact on football club ownership and future policy was limited (Lomax, 2000).

The struggle for more power for supporters has made it into the boards of directors of many clubs and is nowadays characterised by so-called *supporters' trusts*, the first of which originated in 1992 at debt ridden Nottingham Forest. Supporters' trusts are aided by a government institution called *Supporters' Direct*. The goal of a supporters' trust is generally to either get representation in the club's board or to collectively buy the football club, so that it is owned by supporters (Lomax, 2000). In cases where this is impossible, supporters sometimes establish a new club, representing the identity and history of their old club, but with supporter empowerment as a new value. A well-known example of such a club is FC United of Manchester, which was formed after a prolonged annoyance with the new owners of the club, the Glazers (Brown, 2008).

In the wake of the revision of the original Hillsborough report, steps have been made towards so-called *safe standing* terraces, and it is not unlikely that standing sections will become allowed again in the English top flights. Meanwhile, issues regarding ticket prices and away supporters are still points of concern for supporters associations in England.

Germany
The situation for football fans in Germany is often hailed by supporters in other countries, due to relatively low ticket prices and kick-off times that are tailored towards stadium visitors, rather than people watching at home (Merkel, 2007). Fans' interests are protected by a framework entirely different from the English. The so-called 50%+1 rule has been developed after a problematic history following the comparably late introduction of professional football in Germany.

In the early 1900's, when football was still an amateur game in Germany, football was a vehicle for community building in areas that witnessed substantial migration, such as the Ruhr area in Western Germany. Later, during the Weimar Republic, working-class communities were encouraged to form their own football teams, leading to community

based football clubs all over Germany. Against this backdrop, the German national football association, the DFB, was run by the more conservative middle-class. This resulted in a distinction between 'bourgeois' and 'proletarian' football clubs, with the DFB protecting the 'bourgeois' clubs by abolishing promotion and relegation and by only allowing membership of amateur clubs.

It was not until 1963 that the DFB finally allowed professional football, as the *Bundesliga* was formed, which is still the highest level of German football today. Nearly ten years later, in 1972, the salary cap was removed, levelling the playing field between Germany and the other big European football nations at last. Due to the professionalisation, only the bigger teams survived, which signalled the end of the community based football club. From here on out, fan activism was born in Germany. First after a match fixing scandal in the 1970-71 season, after which fans decided to 'vote with their feet': attendances drastically declined, imploring the DFB to reform. Hence the removal of the salary cap. With this removal, however, the gap between working-class community and footballer became even bigger (Merkel, 2007).

Later fans voted again with their feet. This time not in the stadiums, but in front of their TV sets. When the trusted format and timeslot of the Bundesliga highlights were abandoned, TV ratings dramatically dropped from approximately five million to two million. Adversely, when a TV company that had bought the broadcasting rights went bankrupt, a lot of football clubs got into financial trouble, which led them to be more humble in their spending. Fans reacted positive, and a rise in attendance figures was observed.

Due to the historic significance of football fans in Germany, the 50%+1 rule exists to keep clubs close to their communities. In Germany, a football clubs consists of members, which are also their fans. After 1998, the DFB nevertheless allowed football clubs to be public or limited companies, instead of the obligated non-profit form that they previously had to take on. To protect fan interests, the 50%+1 rule was created, which entails that the stock ownership of the club has to be 50% of the stocks plus one, so that no football club can ever be owned by an investor or company. Two exceptions exist. In the cases of *Bayer 04 Leverkusen* and *VfL Wolfsburg*. The parent companies (*Bayer* and *Volkswagen* respectively) were seen as being connected to the

community and history of the clubs enough to be the trusted as the sole owners of the football club (Merkel, 2012).

In more recent times, the 50%+1 rule has come under some scrutiny. First in 2009 it was proposed to be abolished, but 35 of the 36 clubs of the German top two divisions voted to keep the rule. In 2018, when the rule became topic of debate again, 18 out of 34 clubs (two were not eligible for vote) (DFL, 2018) voted for a motion that restricted any debate surrounding the rule to make it more legally entrenched (Ford, 2018), with only four clubs voting against the motion. While the support for the rule seems to have shrunk a bit, the majority of clubs is still not against it. As long as the 50%+1 rule exists, it appears unlikely that the good conditions for fans with regards to ticket prices and match day restrictions will worsen dramatically.

Outside of the dimension of the 50%+1 rule, there has been another recent development that gave fans a bigger voice in their clubs. When the DFL announced stricter stadium safety regulations in 2012, fans of clubs all over Germany protested by staying silent for the first twelve minutes of the game. As the Bundesliga is a league that bases a large part of their marketing on the unique atmosphere, the DFL responded by changing their plans. Further, in the new plans, clubs were called to remain in dialogue with their fans (Ziesche, 2017). This development has given fans a statutory ground for requesting involvement.

The Netherlands & Belgium
In neither the Netherlands and Belgium is there a government led campaign to give football fans a bigger voice, neither are there such rules in the statutes of the national football associations. In fact, national supporter organisations are either non-existent (in Belgium) or very new (in the Netherlands). Whether or not the relatively unfavourable position of football supporters in both countries and the lack of a national framework that ensures or supports fan participation have a causal relationship is difficult to prove due to the enormous amount of external factors, such as political culture, football history, the differences between fans in Netherlands, Belgium, Germany & England and the willingness of both individual clubs and national football associations to cooperate with fans, to name a few.

Considering the Heysel disaster happened in Belgium, it should be mentioned that the disaster had an impact not only on English supporter policy, but also on its Belgian counterpart (De Vreese, 2000). On the level of individual football clubs, there are some initiatives found in both countries in relation to supporter participation. There is, however, not a paved way for supporters to have their voices heard. In all countries, successful initiatives for support participation start in a bottom-up rather than top-down manner. The difference is that in Germany and England, these initiatives receive support from the top, whereas initiatives in the Netherlands Belgium do not.

3: The causes for hooliganism and supporter participation

There is as of yet no general theoretical framework helping to explain and understand the effects of supporter participation on hooliganism. This is perhaps due to the aforementioned external factors influencing hooliganism. Indeed, the amount of externalities make hooliganism such a multifaceted problem, which is made more complex by a plethora of underlying and mediating causes. As such attention should first be turned to what these causes are for hooliganism. In the following, the combat of football violence will be explored through the lens of what supporter participation could add to the situation. Firstly, Sally Falk Moore's theory of semi-autonomous social fields will be applied to the context of football violence. This will be followed by an analysis of the various causes of football violence, and it will be considered whether or not more supporter involvement in the specific areas could potentially contribute to a decline in hooligan behaviour. The first of these causes, related to the policing of football matches, will receive special attention, as it has, by far, been the cause that was named the most in the literature.

The notion of the semi-autonomous social field (SASF) and the underlying legal pluralism will be a leitmotiv throughout the chapter, as the SASF is a convenient unit of analysis that can easily be applied to the situation. From this, the hypothesis will be built up that the participation of football fans, when done right, could have an influence on the occurrence of crowd violence. It should be noted that at that point, everything is purely theoretical. In order to achieve this, semi-autonomous social fields as a unit of research will be explained. This unit will then be applied to the causes for football violence as identified in the literature. The success of public participation in other

dimensions will be shown in the context of semi-autonomous social fields and the flaws of the failed cases of supporter participation will be shown too in that context.

Semi-autonomous social fields

One of the leading theories in the field of law and society is about semi-autonomous social fields (SASF). Sally Faulk Moore first coined the term in 1973. In short, the SASF "has rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its own instance." (Falk Moore, 1973, 720).

Rule-making capacities do not necessarily materialize in written law. They could also come in the form of customary law, norms and values. In addition, the means to induce or coerce compliance do not always have to come from state authorities. Despite the fact that the state is the only authority that can use legitimate force, other SASF's have their own forms of coercion. Moore notes that the most common form is exclusion from the group, but illegitimate force can also be employed. In the case of the use of illegitimate force as a coercion method, the SASF that employs it clashes with the SASF of the state.

A SASF can for instance be the state that one lives in: the state has rule-making capacities (ie. the law) and the means to coerce compliance, due to the state normally having a monopoly on legitimate force. The state as SASF can, however, be invaded by other SASF's within it, which can have their own system of rules and coercion. In the case of a university for example, rules and punishments exist that are not relevant for the larger state. If students do not hand in assignments, professors can fail them. A single person can be in an undefined number of social fields that can, but do not necessarily, overlap. The example of the university is not problematic, as the rules within the SASF of the university normally do not clash with those of the state.

The notion of semi-autonomous social fields is embedded within the paradigm of legal pluralism. According to this idea, there is a multiplicity of possible sources for rules and laws. In the theory of Moore, these rules are linked to SASF's. Considering even the relationship between two people can be a SASF, there are a lot of those fields a single

person can simultaneously belong to. A problem connected to this, is the obedience of centrally imposed legislation, which is often based on only rational grounds rather than culturally and historically embedded, which the rules of social fields closer to the individual often are. This causes people to reject the centrally imposed rules, following the rules of other social fields they are in instead. Further, people are more likely to abide rules that came about in a bottom-up fashion, rather than in a top-down manner.

In the case of football, football fans, the police and club directors are all both together in one SASF and in separate, smaller SASF's. Furthermore, different sets of football fans have their own SASF. The fans of N.E.C. Nijmegen and Vitesse Arnhem are, for instance, in separate social fields, but also together in the larger field of the state. The smaller SASF seems to take precedence in the case of football fans, who often claim they are the life and blood of their football clubs. In theory, involving supporters in the club policy could both bring the separate social fields closer together and could make supporters feel more connected to the bigger overall social field of football. As a result, supporters would be more susceptible to the imposed rules by their clubs and to the authority of the police. The interaction between the separate social fields of different football clubs contributes to football violence in the sense that the relation between supporters of different clubs can determine the risk of violence at a game between them. The relation between football clubs is unique for every combination of clubs, and it is therefore highly impractical to find a solution in this area. First though, the different causes to football violence will be looked at to allow for an analysis of the individual causes through the lens of the semi-autonomous social field.

The structural and mediating causes of football violence
Football violence is a multi-faceted problem in the sense of the variety in which it can materialize, but also in the wide array of causes. All causes can be categorized as either structural or mediating. Structural causes are linked to the economic, social, political and cultural influences to individuals, which may have the effect of creating feelings of disenfranchisement or unhappiness. Mediating causes refer to in-game events, policing, place and communication (Spaaij & Anderson, 2010). An attempt will be made to link these causes to the theory of SASF's in order to find practical measures that could help reducing football violence. Extra attention will be given to the mediating cause of policing. A lot has already been written on policing football crowds, but it is

still regarded as one of the most problematic areas. While the structural causes are arguably the biggest enablers for football violence, they largely deal with wider societal issues that fall outside the scope of hooligan prevention. A notable research, however, put boys from a problematic neighbourhood in Poland, known for spawning an enormous amount of hooligans, into educational and therapeutic programs with quite positive results (Piotrowski, 2006). The programme removed young boys from financially problematic and criminal environments and put them into an environment that is more compatible with generally socially accepted behaviour. In other words, they were brought in a SASF whose norms did not contain becoming a hooligan.

Participation and the police

As was established in chapter 1, the police has a somewhat uneasy relation with football fans. This relationship is often the cause -though not necessarily the reason for- violence at football matches. When the police misses a clear understanding of the culture of football supporters, and associated with that their expected behaviour, problematic situations can arise that could potentially devolve into violence. Therefore, it is necessary that the nature of football crowds is taken into account both when planning policing tactics in advance and by police officers 'on the ground'. Further, the correlation between a large police presence and football violence could signify that there is something wrong between the police and football fans. As Stott and Reicher (1998) argued, shifting the blame from football fans to the police is insufficient. It is in the relation between the groups that the actions of each group can be understood (Stott & Reicher, 1998). Both Stott and Reicher (1998) and Havelund, Joern and Rasmussen (2015) have mentioned the police's view of all football fans as being problematic and the corresponding treatment of fans as one of the main reasons for football violence. In a sense, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy (as Stott and Reicher put it), giving the police a reason to continue their approach for next times: *if it got out of hand last time, it makes sense to expect the same thing next time.* On the other hand, supporters' views of the police are similarly negative, which makes the chance of compliance to the police smaller. Furthermore, a significant portion of attending fans that do not partake in any violent behaviour support their hooligans or at the very least do not condemn them (Rookwood & Pearson, 2010).

Introducing semi-autonomous social fields into the case, the conclusion is that the social fields of the state in the form of the police and football fans are conflictual. The police enforces the rules made by the central governments, local authorities and their own policy. The SASF of football fans is such that, due to the way the groups regard each other, disobedience to the police is accepted and in some cases encouraged. The strength of the social field of football fans is signified by the aforementioned support or lack of condemnation of hooligans by other fans. Because the underlying problem, then, is the way in which the police and football fans regard each other, the relationship between them is not inherently problematic, but can be harmonized by changing the views they have of one another. The power relation between the two groups is such that the police generally has power over football fans. To bring the groups together to alter the views they have, including supporters in policy involving police could on paper be a solution. In the run up to most football matches in all four countries considered, there is a meeting between several parties normally including the police, the municipality and the football club prior to the game. In this meeting, security concerns are addressed and the tactics of different actors are communicated towards each other. It is in these meetings that the input of supporters could achieve benefits for all parties. Supporter participation in this area could deepen the relation between supporters and police, with the two parties getting to know each other better, giving each group less opportunity to demonize the other. When the groups have a more favourable view of each other, disobedience to the police would not be encouraged and the police would not regard every fan as a troublemaker.

In the Netherlands, it is already common policy to include supporters in one way or another in preparatory meetings to football matches. In these cases it is often representatives of supporter organisations that are involved. They often only hear the results of earlier decisions regarding the match though (Keuning, 2015). While these meetings do involve supporters in the process of football policy, it shows that the input of supporters is not deemed necessary or important by the other relevant actors. Such a structure could have negative effects, as it further alienates supporters from their club, the policy and the municipal authorities. A spokesman of the supporters' association of Ajax stated that "football can only become accessible after positive experiences, but these can only happen if there is trust from the local triangle to try it

with less restrictions. Now we as supporters cannot show that it can be different."
(Keuning, 2015).

Supporter participation in preparatory meetings before matches could affect the situation both positively and negatively. As it gives fans an insight into police tactics in general and the matchday plan specifically, it makes it easier for hooligans to circumvent the police in their search for opposing hooligans. Therefore, another approach that accounts for the problematic relation between football fans and the police is the British model of policing: a "covert and intelligence-led approach" (Stead & Rookwood, 2007), which keeps the two conflicting SASF's apart. This approach is, however, not without its problems either, as the usage of cameras to monitor football crowds has been criticized for breaching privacy (Stead & Rookwood, 2007). It is also difficult to conclusively state whether or not the covert nature of British football policing has been the main contributor to the decline in hooliganism in Britain, as football banning orders have been widely used too. Additionally, there are other externalities muddying the waters, such as recognizable police officers that are used not only to spot hooligans, but also build up a relation with the fans (Football liaison officers), which would be an example of bringing the two SASF's closer together, rather than keeping them separated.

Participation and the other mediating causes for football violence
Apart from policing, the other mediating causes for football violence are, according to Spaaij and Anderson (2010), in-game events, place and communication. In-game events refer to the match that is played; an aggressive match is said to lead to aggressive fans, and disappointing results are said to lead to disappointed fans. The place refers to the infrastructure, that plays a role in the sense of fan segregation. Communication refers to both media coverage and the communication between fans of the same club and of opposing clubs. These causes contribute in different ways to football violence, and as such have to be dealt with in various ways.

Supporters often express the feeling that they are the embodiment of their clubs, and considering the quick turnover of players, managers and directors alike in the modern game, there is a point to be made that supporters guard the identity and culture of their clubs. With this in mind, it makes sense that supporters react similarly and arguably

more extreme to what happens on the pitch compared to their players. Football fans are in the same social field as football players in that they share the football team, but players are also in the social field of the specific game they play, which includes the opposition and the referees and their authority. Not bounded by the authority of the referee, but as closely connected to what happens of the field, fans have all the space and opportunity to vent their emotions. As such, in-game events contribute to the atmosphere in the stadium, ranging from festive to aggressive and even violent.

Supporter participation has its limits with regards to what happens on the field. Even if a club does go as far to only play with supporters, there are merely eleven players of a team on the field at a time. Besides, with the financial interests of modern football, fielding just supporters does not seem like a viable way to achieve anything of importance. The other side of the spectrum of participation that is often found in practice, is clubs stressing that the atmosphere created by their fans has a positive effect on the results. By saying this, clubs want supporters to feel a responsibility for a positive atmosphere, which would lead to less fan violence. Whether or not this works is difficult to prove, and hugely depends on the nature of the fanbase of the football club. When the coercion of compliance is effective, the social field of supporters could respond to the input of the football club by making sure all members of its social field contribute to a positive atmosphere. Following the same train of thought, a club could potentially make supporters feel more responsible for what happens on the field by giving them more influence in the technical policy of the club. This could be achieved by adding a supporters' representative to the board of directors, for example. This again depends hugely on the nature of the fanbase. An added factor here is that for a supporters' representative to be actually representative, there needs to be a degree of organization among the supporters of the football club. It has been mentioned that such organization is virtually impossible for teams with big fanbases (Cleland & Dixon, 2015), so perhaps this option is only realistically available to smaller clubs.

Place refers to both the physical and psychological place of football according to Spaaij and Anderson. The physical place entails the infrastructure of the stadium and its surroundings. Relevant factors in this are fan segregation, stadium safety and additional facilities such as toilets and catering. Without sufficient fan segregation, fans have the opportunity to come together and fight. On the other hand, it creates a certain

distance between the two sets of fans, which could lead to animosity in itself. Problems with stadium safety and, to a lesser extent, additional facilities could lead to a general annoyance among the crowd, which on its own turn increases the chances of violence.

For the most part, it is neither effective nor efficient to include supporters in solving problems related to stadium infrastructure, assuming that the large part of the crowd does not consist of architects. In practice, there is one measure observable that could be linked to stadium infrastructure. In a lot of football stadiums in the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, supporters have certain freedoms to decorate the inside of the stands. At the local team supported by the author, there are big graffiti walls inside the stadium made by supporters, with paintings referring to glorious moments of the clubs' past. Additionally, there is a remembrance monument inside the stadium for deceased fans, where candles are regularly lit at half time. Other examples include Union Berlin fans helping to build their stadium themselves. Giving fans the freedom to do these things could ease annoyance towards other infrastructural problems of the stadium because the stadium feels like it belongs to the fans. Research into whether or not this is an actual effect has not been done (yet). With regards to fan segregation, supporters could play a role in identifying whether or not this is necessary, which is highly related to the aforementioned involvement of supporters in preparatory meetings with the police.

The last factor mentioned is communication, both from the media and between fans. Firstly, media communication contributes to football violence through excessive, sensationalist reporting. Media coverage is mostly negative, but there have been a number of books, documentaries and movies glorifying hooligan behaviour as well (Redhead, 2010). In 1978, Stuart Hall expressed that media coverage is "brutal, short-hand and simplifying" (Hall, 1978), with Emma Poulton stating in 2005 that little has changed since then (Poulton, 2005). Further, in 1988, Murphy, Dunning and Williams concluded that the press has played an amplifying role in football hooliganism since as early as 1950 (Murphy, Dunning & Williams, 1988). An example of the media amplifying the situation is given by Tim Crabbe, who details the events of England playing Germany in Charleroi (Crabbe, 2003). Media reporting of hooliganism has also been ascribed to exacerbating the situation in post-communist Poland (Piotrowski, 2006). In the Czech Republic a similar rise in media-reporting has been found (Smolík, 2012).

The problem with media reporting is that participation is extremely difficult to achieve, and it is uncertain whether it will help or not. There is no impetus for media organisations to give a more nuanced view of football violence, mentioning supporters' accounts, as the general public wants to read about hooliganism (Crabbe, 2003). At the very least, football clubs could refuse cooperation with organisations that have been too sensationalist. Liverpool FC has banned newspaper the Sun from their premises, following the coverage of the Hillsborough disaster (Conn, 2017). While this does not directly decrease hooligan activity, it could lead to less sensationalist media coverage, and as such their amplifying function.

Another part of communication that has been said to lead to football violence is communication between fans, both among fans of the same team and with fans of opposing sides. With technological advances, such communication has gotten easier over the years. In the 70's, you would have to meet up in person to arrange a fight, whereas nowadays you can call, text, fax, message or mail someone. With the dawn of the internet, it has become increasingly easy to identify who the fans of the opposing side are that are 'up for it'. Apart from arranged violence, pre-match provocations on the internet could lead to more annoyance among fans, increasing chances of violence. In this area, it seems unlikely that participation could contribute, as the communication between fans is a dimension that is already completely the property of fans.

Having regarded all factors mentioned that could cause football violence, it appears that an increase in supporter involvement can have varying effects. Participation may contribute to in-game causes only in specific cases where there is a relatively small football club with a high level of organisation among fans. Involving fans in the decoration of the stadium is a measure with very unsure effects towards the place-causes of violence, but it seems as though it is the only measure imaginable. With regards to communication, it is difficult to stop the media from reporting in a sensationalist, amplifying manner, as that is what the general public wants to read. Inter-fan communication is inherently an area of the fans, so an increase in fan participation is impossible. Therefore, it seems as though participation could mostly add something in the dimension of policing, as described earlier.

Public participation in other fields

Set in the current shift of government towards an emphasis on governance, public participation can be found in other areas than football, mainly politics and business. In short, this shift is one from government authority to alternative ways of regulating society (Lievens, 2015). While conditions of other areas are not necessarily transferable to football, looking at other instances of public participation could give a broad insight into whether or not it is generally effective.

Especially in local politics, a great number of examples of citizen participation can be found. One of the most radical ideas is that of participatory budgeting. It is only short of community cabinets and public referenda from being the highest concept on the ladder in terms of public participation (Van Aeken, 2015). Hailing from Porto Alegre in Brazil, the notion of participatory budgeting entails that a segment of the yearly budget is reserved for ideas of citizens. It has been noted that the effect of this is an increase in trust and understanding in and for the local authorities. Furthermore, citizens get more involved in the other aspects of local governance, traditionally a field in which citizen involvement is low, relative to other areas of politics (Hajnal & Lewis, 2003). Other examples of public participation in local politics are citizen or neighbourhood councils and referenda. These are linked with roughly the same benefits as participatory budgeting.

While participatory budgeting in local politics is difficult to translate into the area of football fandom, the same logic applies both to an increase in understanding for authorities with participatory budgeting and to supporter involvement in decision making processes: by being more involved in the decisions authorities have to make, supporters and citizens in general gain an understanding of the difficulties involved and the compromises that have to be made. They should also feel more respected by authorities (Burton, 2009). Bearing this in mind, the success of participatory budgeting in local politics can reasonably be seen as an indicator that the theoretical benefits of supporter participation are expected to translate into practice.

Participation gone wrong

The potential benefits of an increase in the involvement of football fans in decision making processes have been highlighted, but it is necessary to bear in mind the risks attached. In some cases, football fans are in such a powerful position that the combat of hooliganism is virtually non-existent, either because of a lack of legislation or because the legislation is not enforced. Generally in these situations, certain fan groups (often self-identifying as ultras or barras bravas) have this position due to their political involvement. The absence of a coordinated effort to combat hooliganism can be seen as the reward for this involvement (Spaaij, 2007a). Such is the case in Argentina and Hungary, to name two prominent examples. The lesson that should be learned from these cases is that, in order to work together with supporters, there needs to be a clear hierarchy between fans and club. Furthermore, it follows from the examples that the involvement of political figures can be dangerous for the harmonious cooperation between fans, club and police.

4: Supporter Participation in Practice

As established in chapter 2, the situation with regards to supporter participation and the combat of hooliganism per country depends on a number of factors. Especially the position of supporters with regards to participation was seen to depend largely on the presence or absence of a national framework for such participation. In England, this framework exists in the form of supporters' trusts, which are supported by the national government. The history of supporter ownership of football clubs in Germany means that a framework for involvement in Germany is largely based on tradition and history. In Belgium and the Netherlands, however, such a framework does not exist, and the position of supporters corresponds to this situation.

A number of possible measures were introduced in chapter 3, some of which have been put into practice and some which have not. Presented next is a case study into the German football club Sankt Pauli, which offers an insight into the interaction of the different semi-autonomous social fields associated with a football club and the way supporter involvement can be arranged.

Case study: Sankt Pauli

One of the most famous clubs in Germany, known not for their achievements on the field, but for their politically engaged supporters is Sankt Pauli, the second biggest team from Hamburg. Apart from being politically very left wing, which is signalled for example by flags depicting the face of Che Guevara (Schmidt-Lauber, 2004), the fanbase of Sankt Pauli is deeply involved in their community. The club itself is situated in the Sankt Pauli area of the city (hence the name), which is one of the more problematic neighbourhoods in terms of crime, poverty and social exclusion. There is therefore plenty of opportunity for a football club to bring about change.

Supporter participation at Sankt Pauli

The distinct fan culture has influenced the way the club itself is run. This makes sense from an economic perspective: For good football, the population of Hamburg has for years been better off at Hamburger SV, which played until recently at the highest national level. What is left for Sankt Pauli is to cater to the distinct fan culture, that ironically considering their socialist, anti-establishment views can even be explained as branding (Schade, Piehler & Burmann, 2014). Despite the probable economic advantages of including fans in the clubs' decision-making processes the position of fans at Sankt Pauli came about through struggle and protest (Totten, 2016), which is fitting for a German team considering the way supporter participation has developed in Germany through activism as well, as explained in chapter two.

The main vehicle for involving supporters in the club and community, is the so-called *fanladen* (fan project). Through *the fanladen*, different supporter organisations from Sankt Pauli come into contact with each other. Members are present in various boards of the club, serving as representatives of the fans. It has been noted that the *fanladen* of Sankt Pauli have a positive influence and that football is used "to develop and empower communities, bottom up" (Totten, 2016). This hints at a positive effect on the structural influences of football violence, as economic, social, political and cultural aspects of an individuals' life are linked to the communities in which they grow up. It is not without reason that troubled communities have been found to spawn a relatively high number of offenders at football matches (Piotrowski, 2006). The development and empowerment of communities should therefore in theory lead to a decrease of people susceptible to participating in football violence, especially when this happens with

attention towards the economic, social, political and cultural factors which might be lagging behind less problematic communities. The main mission stated by the fan project is "a violence-prevention approach in the work with young football fans" (FC St. Pauli, n.d.), which corroborates the theoretical analysis of the development and empowerment of communities.

Fan participation at Sankt Pauli and semi-autonomous social fields

While the fan projects within the supporter community of Sankt Pauli are organized outside the scope of the club itself, it would be advisable for the clubs' officials to get only involved by way of financial support if at all due to the anti-establishment character of the fanbase (Daniel & Kassimeris, 2013). The *fanladen* serves as a way for the Sankt Pauli fans to organize themselves. A high level of structure, including modes of coercion when necessary, indicate a very pronounced semi-autonomous social field. Considering the anti-establishment values of this field, the interaction with the social field of the official club (consisting of players, directors and other officials) is such that communication and cooperation is kept to a minimum, despite the common interest of both fields in FC Sankt Pauli. The relation between the two fields is therefore quite difficult. They share some interests, and are conflictual on others.

Conclusion

The framework provided by the *fanladen* seems to work quite well for Sankt Pauli. It needs to be borne in mind that the fan culture is distinct in its politics and anti-establishment values though. As a result, directly copying what works for Sankt Pauli might lead to different outcomes elsewhere. The case of Sankt Pauli does serve as an example that even when supporters and their club have opposing interests in some areas, fan involvement is possible and can be beneficial. The central lesson that should be taken from the case is that it is vital for any club to have a thorough understanding of the characteristics of the fanbase.

5: Conclusion and discussion

It has been established that football hooliganism cannot be identified by either the actions associated with it or the people involved in it, but by a combination of the two, set in the context of a football match. In two thousand years' time the problem of violence interfering with the enjoyment of sporting events has not been solved. An

increase in the involvement of fans was posed as a possible measure to reduce hooliganism, instead of measures such as banning orders, alcohol bans, travel arrangements, etc.

Supporter participation is not a new concept at all. Supporters in England gathered as early as 1927 in the National Federation of Football Supporters' Clubs to gain a bigger voice in their clubs. Supporters forming their own institutions (supporters' trusts) is still the way in which English fans try to get more involved. These supporters' trusts are aided by the British government.

In Germany, participation is not only historically embedded, it is also legally entrenched in the football association statutes. Especially the 50%+1 rule has been instrumental in assuring the position of German football fans.

A national and historical framework like the ones in England and Germany does not exist in Belgium and the Netherlands. There are some examples of supporters gathering to gain a bigger voice, but they mostly suffer from a lack of structure on the national level.

The causes for hooliganism can be divided into two categories: Structural and mediating. Structural causes are the causes that are of concern to society at large, rather than just football, such as economic concerns, political frustration or a culture in which authority is respected. Mediating causes are related to football. The place in which football is played, in-game events or possible forms of communication are some examples of mediating causes. Especially the policing of football matches has been noted to be an area that could be improved.

These causes can be explained through the theory of semi-autonomous social fields, which in short entails that people live in multiple inter-related social fields that have certain rule making capacities and the power to enforce those rules. They are semi-autonomous, because they often overlap without a clear hierarchy. Therefore the social fields all interact with each other and impose rules conflicting with the rules of other fields on members of the field. An example of an application of semi-autonomous social fields to one of the causes for football violence, policing, is as follows:

The police is the coercing force of the social field of the state, of which football fans are a part. Football fans themselves form a smaller social field within the state, with different rules. Disobedience to the police is a transgression in the field of the state, but something often applauded in the field of football fans.

Semi-autonomous social fields can also be applied to good practices with regards to supporter participation. The case of Sankt Pauli showed that supporters can be involved in the running of a club, even when the social fields of club and supporters regularly clash.

The research has led to a couple of points regarding supporter participation and the combat of hooliganism. First, there is a clear correlation between the position of fans on subjects like ownership, ticket prices and match times and the existence of a national framework regulating bottom-up supporter initiatives aiming at a higher degree of fan involvement. Second, from the theory of semi-autonomous social fields it follows that an increase in participation should lead to a better relation between club and fans, which should lead to less violence. When looking at the specific causes of hooliganism, the Sankt Pauli case shows how fan involvement can help with the structural causes of hooliganism. At large, it cannot be expected of football fan initiatives to solve all problems of poverty, social exclusion and political unrest in the entire world, so structural causes will always remain. The third important point from the research becomes relevant when looking at the mediating causes: Policing is one of the most problematic areas in the combat of football violence, due to the views the police have of football fans and vice-versa and the aggressive, high-profile tactics employed in a lot of countries. The last and certainly not least point is that the specific fan culture and historical, political and economic contexts of a football club should always be borne in mind by the football club itself, the police and both local and national authorities.

Discussion

Because the scope of this thesis was to theoretically research the topic, there is no empirical evidence to back up the claims that have been made. With the number of examples of supporter participation, an empirical research might be possible. Another point is the influence of politics on hooliganism, which was touched upon very briefly. There has not been a lot of research done on the influence of political leanings on the degree of hooliganism, while insights in this area could prove to be very useful in the combat of football violence. A further possible research could look more closely at the problem of hooliganism among ultra fan groups. It would be extremely relevant due to the constant spreading of ultra culture among the world.

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