Christian Religiosity and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

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Abstract

In this study, we investigate the relationship between Christianity and voting for populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe. We try to examine four mechanisms that has not yet been well researched: the pro-social values fostered in Christian doctrine and community engagement; the religion's function of social integration as an antidote to right-wing extremism; the differentiated effects of realistic ethnic threat and symbolic ethnic threat in religious competition; and the supply-side influence from political parties' manifesto on traditional morality. We test our hypothesis by using European Social Survey Round 7 data. First, we show that only Christian community engagement leads to less voting for populist radical right parties, and there is no significant influence from Christian conviction. Second, we find that the negative effect of Christian community is not mediated by more pro-social values, but mediated by higher level of social integration. The social integration function of Christianity resisting right-wing extremism works extraordinarily on lower-educated people. The mediations of ethnic threats are opposite to our expectation that people with more Christian community engagements perceive less threats and vote less for populist radical right parties, and we do not find different effects between two types of threats. Third, on national level, we find that in countries with more Christian population, people with higher levels of Christian community engagement or higher levels of Christian conviction are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties. In countries with more Muslim population, people with more Christian community engagements are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties. Finally, we show that the traditional morality manifestos of populist radical right parties do not work on mobilizing Christian population. In countries with more morally conservative populist radical right parties, people engaged more in Christian community are less likely to vote for these parties.

I. Introduction and Backgrounds

In recent years, European societies have witnessed the rise of public support for populist radical right (PRR) parties, among which many are gaining electoral success (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1992; Kitschlet & McGann, 1997; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005). In Poland, populist radical right party Law and Justice (PiS) won the parliament election in 2015, for the second time being in charge of the government since 2005. In Austria, far-right politician Norbert Hofer from Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) was leading the first round of the 2016 presidential election, marginally defeated by the left-wing competitor in the final round. In the Netherlands and France, populist radical right parties were also holding substantial support rates during 2017 elections, threatening the long-lasting dominance of mainstream right and mainstream left parties. The rise of populist radical right parties has drawn large research attention in sociology and political science.

European populist radical right parties, in general, manifest an ideology of the combination of nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Arzheimer, 2005; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mudde, 2010; Rooduijn, 2013). First, populist radical right parties express outright *nativism*, emphasizing the interest of native people and homogeneity of the nation, opposing cultural minorities, immigration and European integration (Mudde, 2013; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie, 2000; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Werts, Scheepers, & Lubbers, 2013). Second, in line with mainstream right parties, populist radical right parties hold *authoritarianism* with beliefs in a hierarchical and ordered society, favoring compliance to collective norms and hierarchical order rather than individual freedom in political and cultural domains (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Kitschlet & McGann, 1997; Ignazi, 1992; Mudde, 2007; 2010). Third, populist radical right parties perceive the society divided into "elites" and "the people", and argue that the established political elites are corrupt and do not concern the people, which is a view of *populism* that distinguish them from mainstream right parties (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Stanley, 2008).

Beyond basic ideologies, it is worth noticing that across Europe, many populist radical right parties also bring Christianity into their agenda. They warn that the immigration tide from non-occidental regions, and the immigration being permitted by established politics, are leading to a collapse of "Christian European civilization". They claim themselves as the defender of Christianity in Europe (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015). However, it is still not clear in existing literatures whether populist radical right parties are gaining supports from the Christian population. Billiet (1995) shows that in Flemish Belgium, Catholics are only marginally proportioned in supporting the populist radical right party. Van der Brug, et al. (2000) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) find that in Europe religious people are generally more supportive to anti-immigration parties, but the influence of religiosity is very weak. Other cross-national studies depict a contrary picture that Christians or church-goers are less likely to support populist radical right parties in Europe (Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; Werts et al., 2012). Findings are mixed in comparative studies between countries. Arzheimer and Carter

(2009) find that in Western Europe, Christians vote less for populist radical right parties in some countries (Belgium, Denmark, Italy, etc.) but there is no difference in some others (France and Switzerland). Montgomery and Winter (2015) combine Eastern and Western European countries and show that Christian religiosity lead to less voting for populist radical right party in the Netherlands, Czech Republic and Hungary, more voting for populist radical right party in Poland, and makes no substantial differences in other countries.

Beyond existing literatures, we argue that there are four issues worth further research. First, there is the argument that Christians are less likely to support radical right political views under the influence of Christian doctrine, which teaches people to have tolerance, compassion and caring for others (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015). However, there is missing empirical attempt to discover this mechanism. Second, there is evidence that populist radical right party support is overrepresented in less-educated people and under-employed people, especially blue-collar workers, and petit bourgeoisie, who are vulnerable to social disintegration in the modernized society (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). In many cases, radical right groups could offer psychological compensation and sense of inclusion to those aggrieved people (De Koster & Houtman, 2008; Mayer & Moreau, 1995). Alternatively, an affiliation to religious groups could help people overcome disintegration (De Koster, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2011; Durkheim, 1951 [1897]), serving as an "antidote" to the radical right parties. Third, beyond previous literatures that indicate the relevance of ethnic threat shaping people's support for populist radical right parties (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2000; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003), we argue that the difference between realistic ethnic threat and symbolic ethnic threat (Manevska & Achterberg, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Stephan, Ybara, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998) should be focused on. Facing religious competition brought by Muslim immigrants, Christians may perceive more symbolic ethnic threats in terms of religion, culture, etc. than realistic ethnic threats in terms of resource allocation. Hence more support for populist radical right parties may be expressed via symbolic anti-immigration attitudes among Christians. Finally, support for populist radical right parties can also be determined by the "supply-side" party systems (Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mudde, 2007). Traditionally, Christians are strongly inclined to mainstream right or Christian democratic parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015), but as those parties converge to the center in morality issues, Christian support may be lost (Jansen, De Graaf, & Need, 2012; Keman & Pennings, 2016). Conversely, when populist radical right parties tailor their manifesto to the more morally liberal side (Akkerman, 2005; Mayer, 2013; Mudde, 2002), they may probably also lose Christian supports. Hence it is of importance to examine whether country differences in Christians' voting for populist radical right parties are due to political agenda of populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties in different countries.

In this study, we will contribute to the research in the relationship between Christianity and populist radical right party supports in Europe with a comparative perspective. We will investigate whether Christian religiosity lead to more, or less support for populist radical right parties in Europe, and how the influence of Christian religiosity can be explained by Christian pro-social doctrines, religion's function of social integration and types of ethnic threats. We will also try to discover, on the supply-side, how populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties mobilize Christian voters differently between countries due to their different manifestos.

II. Christian Religiosity and populist radical right support: Theoretical Framework

Christianity and pro-social values

One possible explanation to the underrepresentation of Christians in populist radical right voters is the inherent ideological incompatibility between the Christian doctrine and right-wing extremism. On the one hand, populist radical right parties hold an extreme stance of xenophobia and ethnocentrism. They target on non-native groups in the society, including ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, blaming them as threats to social security, national identity and "European values" (Ignazi, 1992; Rouduijn 2013; Rydgren, 2007; Zaslove, 2004). They aim at retaining the ethnical and cultural homogeneity in the society and excluding those "outsiders" from enjoying equal rights to jobs, welfare, etc. Practically, populist radical right parties are not only requesting limiting the numbers of immigrants and refugees and expulsing those who do not meet their strict requirements (Mudde, 2002; Rydgren, 2007; 2008). They are also requesting restrictions to the freedom of cultural and religious expression of ethnic minorities, e.g. the proposals from Dutch populist radical right parties to ban headscarves wearing among Muslim females (Akkerman, 2005; Houtman & Achterberg, 2010), and Swiss People's Party (SVP)'s initiative to prohibit minarets building in the country (Mazzoleni & Rossini, 2016).

On the other hand, it is not likely that the Christian population would embrace the populist radical right ideology with extreme intolerance and antagonism towards out-groups. According to the saying in The Bible: "'you shall love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no other commandment greater than these." (Mark 12:31, The New King James Version), as other major religions worldwide, Christianity treasures pro-social values including tolerance, compassion and altruism, and it encourages people to treat strangers well equally to their families and themselves. There are large numbers of scientific efforts to theorize and to empirically test the pro-social features of religions. Wuthnow (1991) specifies two explanations to pro-social values and behaviors among religious people. First, the *conviction* explanation states that religious people develop pro-social values from religious doctrines. Taught by the religious doctrines of tolerance, compassion and altruism on others, religious people would endorse these concepts and internalize them into pro-social values (Wuthnow, 1991). The other explanation, the *community* approach, argues that the

adaption of pro-social values among religious people depends on the level of religious involvement (Wuthnow, 1991). Religions always advocate their doctrines. However, people do not necessarily adapt these doctrines without active involvement in religions. For example, as Durkheim (1951 [1879]) finds, although suicide is prohibited in both Protestantism and Catholicism, there are more suicides among Protestants than Catholics. The explanation to the difference lies in that Catholic communities are more cohesive than Protestant ones. Catholics are more actively practicing religions and more attached to the religious group, hence less likely to be deviant from the doctrine Durkheim (1951 [1879]). A similar logic can be applied to pro-social values in religious doctrines that people with more religious exposure are also offered more opportunities to practice pro-social religious doctrines, for example, care giving and volunteering activities, and under larger pressure from religious peers to have according to the doctrine (Wuthnow 1991). Therefore, adaption to pro-social religious doctrines can be largely facilitated by socialization in cohesive religious contexts.

Previous evidences show supports to the pro-social effect of religiosity by both explanations. In experimental studies, priming religious concepts or "God" increases participants' prosocial behaviors (Preston & Ritter, 2013; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Sosis and Ruffe (2004) shows that compared to secular collectivism, religious ideologies motivates more cooperative behaviors in Israeli Kibbutzim. As for religious involvement, Park and Smith (2000) find higher voluntarism levels among Protestants who view religion as more important and attend religious services more frequently. Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, and Dernelle (2005) find that higher levels of religious involvement increase people's empathy and willingness to help, while decrease aggression. Further, pro-social values are found to be an intermediate between religiosity and support for welfare states (Malka, Soto, Cohen, & Miller, 2011). Research suggests that both religious conviction and religious community help facilitating giving and volunteering behaviors, and there are differences between religious denominations (Regnerus & Smith 1998; Bekkers & Schuyt 2008).

The argument that Christian religious people may be less likely to support populist radical right parties because of the radical right agenda of these parties contradicts Christianity's pro-social features is already mentioned in many previous literatures (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015). However, it has not yet been empirically tested. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:

H1a: *People with higher levels of Christian community engagement are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

H1b: *The effect of Christian community engagement on voting for populist radical right parties is mediated by pro-social values. People with higher levels of Christian community engagement have more pro-social values, hence are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

H2a: *People with higher levels of Christian conviction are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

H2b: *The effect of Christian conviction on voting for populist radical right parties is mediated by pro-social values. People with higher levels of Christian conviction have more pro-social values, hence are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

Previous findings also show more evidence supporting the community approach rather than the community approach (Becker & Dhingra, 2001; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) bring national contexts into the framework and shows that church-goers are more active in volunteering, and religiosity level in the country also has a positive contribution on the general volunteering level in the country. However, context effects overwhelm individual effects that in more religious countries the effect of individual religiosity becomes marginal (Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). Therefore, we also expect the national religion context to have impact on voting for populist radical right parties, and also influence the effects of Christian religiosity. We propose that:

H3a: *In European countries where Christian communities are larger, people are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties.*

H3b: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by country-level Christian community size. In European countries where Christian communities are larger, the effect of Christian religiosity is weaker.*

H4a: *In European countries with higher Christian conviction levels, people are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties.*

H4b: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by country-level religious conviction. In European countries with higher Christian conviction levels, the effect of Christian religiosity is weaker.*

Christian religion as an antidote to radical rights

It has been widely shown in previous literatures that supports to populist radical right parties have gained disproportioned large supports in the less-educated and underemployed groups, including blue-collar workers, the lower middle class and petit bourgeoisie, (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997). Therefore a *"losers of modernization" theory* has been proposed to explain the rise of populist radical right parties (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2007). These people are vulnerable to the modernization process and feel disintegrated in the society, and they are more likely to seek for psychological compensation in populist radical right party's radical ideology.

The overwhelming secularization tide in recent decades has degraded the influence of the Christian traditional value, however at the same time also created a "moral vacuum" in European societies (Etzioni,

1995; 2001; Sztompka, 2002). When the declined Christian traditional value can no longer function in social integration, the society falls into an *anomie* (Durkheim, 1951 [1879]) that people lose guidance in value and morality domains and end up in mass distrust, intolerance and crimes (Etzioni, 1995; 2001). In line with the *mass society theory* (Arendt, 1951; Kornhauser 2013 [1960]), when people feel social isolated, they are likely to become psychologically disorganized, develop social distrust and intolerance, and they are likely to embrace radical ideologies in order to receive sense of inclusion (Arendt, 1951; Gusfiled, 1962; Rydgren, 2009). Lower level of social integration is found to be associated with populist radical right party supports across Europe. Mayer and Moreau (1995) and Eatwell (2003) show that populist radical right party supporters in France, Germany and the Netherlands are relatively more social isolated. Rydgren (2009) shows that radical right voters in Western Europe are more likely to be from those who are social isolated, less trusting and lack of civic engagement. From social-cultural perspective it explains why it is often found in existing literatures that populist radical right party supporters are lower-educated (Rydgren, 2009; Montegomery & Winter, 2015), working in lower classes or even out of work (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Vanhoute & Hooghe, 2013; Werts et al., 2013). These groups lacking economic security are particularly vulnerable to social disintegration. When economic conditions decline, these groups are more likely to develop a sense of relative deprivation and scapegoat the loss to other social groups (Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz 2013; Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, Meertens, Dick, & Zizk, 2008; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972). The populist radical right parties often make use of this relative deprivation and manipulate the target of discontent to the "out-groups", which are often ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees (Lubbers et al., 2002; Rydgren, 2003; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie 2005), as well as to the "corrupt elites" who fail to protect the benefit of native people (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Werts et al. 2012).

In a nutshell, the "losers of modernization" theory proposes that social disintegration under modernization process in European societies provides a demand-side foundation to the rise of populist radical right parties. Part of this disintegration may due to the decline of Christianity. Thus in the other way around, we could also expect that at least among part of the population, Christianity is playing a role in promoting social integration, serving as an antidote to radical right extremism. As Durkheim (2008 [1912]) stated, religion is a symbolized and ritualized form of worship to the society. Via creating sacred symbols and practicing rituals, religion develops a strong collective consciousness and consolidates social integration (Durkheim, 1915). Religions not only provide spiritual care to mental health (Gartner, Larson, & Allen, 1991; Koenig & Larson, 2001). Religions also especially comfort the grievant people as a "people's opium", by drawing people's attention to afterlife rewards, making them accept the *status quo* and conform to existing social order (Marx, 1975 [1843]); Stark, 1964; Solt, Habel, & Grant 2001). Welfare organizations founded by religions also economically help those suffered people as an alternative material

redistribution source out of the government (Gill & Lundsgaarde, 2004; Scheve & Stasavege, 2006). Therefore, we expect that although populist radical right parties appeal to suffered groups in the modernization process, they are not likely to attract the religious people, who have well achieved social integration under the religion. As Mayer and Moreau (1995) shows, religious people in France and Germany are less social isolated, and less supportive to populist radical right parties. Rydgren (2009) also shows that in Belgium and Norway, people active in church organizations are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties. To this end, we propose the following hypothesis:

H5: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is mediated by level of social integration. People with higher levels of Christian religiosity have better social integration, hence are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

The compensation from religion can work extraordinarily well towards those lower-educated or lower-class people, who are usually more socially excluded and more likely to be the foundation of populist radical right party supports. De Koster et al. (2011) find that in the highly secularized Dutch society, cultural insecurity in the post-Christian era fosters the ethnic intolerance among lower-educated people. Similarly, Stark (1964) argues that the weakening of religion in the UK give ground to radicalism among the lower-class. However, there are few efforts to directly test whether Christian religions in Europe are preventing the populist radical right rise by compensating potential populist radical right supporters in terms of social integration. There is also lacking evidence whether the influence of Christian religiosity on rejecting radical right parties is more salient on lower-educated and lower-class people. In this study, we will test it by following hypotheses:

H6a: *The negative effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties in Europe is larger on lower-educated people.*

H6b: *The negative effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties in Europe is larger on people from lower social classes.*

Cultural competition and ethnic threats

As we see in previous illustrations, ethnocentrism and xenophobia are core parts of radical right-wing ideology, and play a vital role in political rallies of populist radical right parties, thus many of literatures on populist radical right parties have focused on the conflict between native people and out-groups (Rydgren, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2000; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003). Since most recent migrants into Europe are from the Middle-East, which is Islam dominating, it becomes a common strategy for populist radical right parties to bring a cultural competition argument into their agenda. They claim that increasing cultural and religious heterogeneity will erode the traditional Christian culture in European societies. Therefore, they are strongly against ethnic minorities and immigrants, who are majorly Muslims,

to defend Christian cultures and prevent the Islamization and "Eurabianization" of Europe (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015; Mudde, 2002; 2007). This point of view corresponds to the controversial argument *"clash of civilizations"* from Huntington (1996). In his view, the post-cold-war international relations will be depicted by clashes between culturally different civilizations, and one of the greatest clashes will be between the Western civilization and the "violent" Islamic civilization (Huntington, 1996). In recent years, the tension between the West and the Muslim world has indeed been largely enhanced, from the 9/11 Attack to current European migrant crisis, and negative sentiments towards ethnic minorities and immigrants have been widely witnessed across Europe (Scheepers, Gijsbeets, & Coenders, 2002; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011).

To understand how cultural competition facilitates the rise of populist radical right parties, we introduce the *group position theory* proposed by Blumer (1958). In Blumer's view, ethnic prejudice lies in: first, the majority group in the society (e.g. the native White people and Christians in Europe) perceive themselves as superior; second, the minority out-groups (e.g. Muslim minorities and migrants) are subordinate to them due to intrinsic differences; third, the majority group therefore claim the privilege of themselves; and fourth, when the privileged position of the majority group is threatened, they develop negative sentiments towards the minority out-groups (Blumer 1958). In a word, ethnic prejudice from the majority group origins in their perceived threats from the ethnic minority groups. A similar explanation is the *social identity theory* (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) that people tend to show more negative attitudes towards other identity groups, especially when under competition. More specifically, we can distinguish ethnic threats into two types: realistic ethnic threats and symbolic ethnic threats (Manevska & Achterberg, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Stephan et al., 1998). *Realistic ethnic threats* refer to that ethnic groups are perceived as competing for scarce economic resources, including job, housing, schooling, welfare, etc. (McLaren, 2003; Stephan et al., 1998). Examples can be scapegoating ethnic minority groups to self-interest loss or the downturn in macro economy (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Kinder & Sanders, 1996;), or rejecting them to have equal rights and benefits as the majority group (De Koster, Achterberg, & Van der Waal, 2013; Scheepers et al., 2002). *Symbolic ethnic threats* refer to the perceived ethnic differences in cultural domains such as religions, moral values, norms, etc. (Manevska & Achterberg, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Stephan et al. 1998), and is often expressed as criticism to the ethnic minority group's deviance from majority groups "mainstream" cultures (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sears & Henry, 2003). The version of symbolic ethnic threats in contemporary Europe is often expressed as blaming the Muslim population as pre-modern, violent, and disintegrated (Joppke, 2014; Ribberink, Achterberg, & Houtman, 2016; Swyngedouw, 1995; Van Bohemen, Kemmers, & Houtman, 2011; Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014).

Abundance of evidence support the positive link between ethnic threats and populist radical right party supports (De Koster et al., 2012; Lubbers et al., 2002; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). To make a step further, we argue that Christian people may perceive extra symbolic ethnic threats from the presence of Muslims. During recent decades, a decline in Christian religion and a booming of Muslim population go parallel in European societies, hence the past dominance of Christianity is being largely threatened. As group position theory and social identity theory suggest, in this case the Christian group may see their cultural and religious competitor, namely the Muslims, as a larger threat, and develop negative attitudes towards Muslim minorities/immigrants, which could lead to populist radical right party supports. Previous research on the relationship between religiosity and ethnic attitudes lean to this reasoning. Billiet (1995) and Billiet, Carton, and Eisinga (1995) find that Catholics in Belgium have more native attitudes towards immigrants. Scheepers, Gijsberts and Hello (2002) find that across 11 European countries, Catholics and Protestants show more ethnic prejudice than non-religious people, regardless of the size of out-groups. Altemeyer (2003) find that American fundamentalist Christians are more likely to be prejudiced. Allport and Ross (1967) also show a positive relationship between religiosity and ethnic prejudice. Hence, we have the following hypotheses:

H7a: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is mediated by realistic ethnic threats. People with higher levels of Christian religiosity perceive more realistic ethnic threats, hence are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

H7b: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is mediated by symbolic ethnic threats. People with higher levels of Christian religiosity perceive more realistic ethnic threats, hence are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties in Europe.*

H7c: *The mediation effect of symbolic ethnic threats between Christian religiosity and voting for populist radical right parties is larger than the mediation effect of realistic ethnic threats.*

Many literatures measure ethnic threat by the context of immigration in the country. It is argued that that under contexts with larger presence of immigrants, more anti-immigration sentiment can be developed (Filindra & Pears-Merkowitz, 2013; Golder, 2003; Mau & Burkhardt, 2009; Poznyak, Abts, & Swyngedouw, 2011; Scheepers et al., 2002). Hence at the national level, we also expect that the presence of immigration will be a source of ethnic threats and influences on the support for populist radical right parties from Christians:

H8: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by level of ethnic threats in the country. In European countries with larger Muslim populations, people with higher Christian religiosity are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties.*

Supply-side: the con-/divergence of political parties in traditional morality

The previous three explanations focus on the demand-side, that is, how particular values, attitudes and preferences influence whether Christian people will vote for the populist radical right party or not. In the final section of this chapter, we will focus on the supply-side – to discover whether the Christian support for populist radical right parties will differ by countries due to the features of political party systems.

For long, the European political arena has been dominated by two major cleavages: the mainstream right and the mainstream left. Such a stable political system tends to preempt other new parties with similar ideologies from electoral success (Bale, Green-Pedersen, Krouwel, Luther, & Sitter, 2010; Kitschelt & McGann, 1995; Rydgren, 2007). For instance, traditionally Christians have strong affiliation to mainstream right (MSR) parties or Christian democratic (CD) parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Kutsen, 2004; Van der Brug & Van Spanje, 2009). Although these parties may share with the populist radical right parties in authoritarianism and nativism views in cultural domains, the populism characteristics of populist radical right parties are less likely to be appreciated by Christian people. Generally Christian people are more authoritarian and in the political domain and tend to conform to the existing social order, which contradicts populist radical right parties' anti-elite and anti-establishment populist ideologies (Montgomery & Winter, 2015). Both Arzheimer and Carter (2009) and Montgomery and Winter (2015) shows that the inclination to mainstream right/Christian democratic parties shows a *"vaccine effect"*, which prevent the Christian population from voting for the radical rights.

The traditional left-right cleavages have been representing the conflict between the working class and the upper class. In recent years with the middle class expanding in the society, parties from both sides gradually converge to the middle to ensure more electoral supports (Elff, 2009; Keman & Pennings, 2006). In the meantime, this convergence also makes parties deviant from their traditional supporters and leave political niches to more radical forces (Abedi 2002; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As Kitschelt and McGann (1995) put it: "a convergence of the main moderate left and right parties is the next precondition for the emergence of a powerful extreme Right". Similarly, under the drastic tide of secularization, the Christian democratic parties are also facing a *"confessional dilemma"* that they have to converge to the more liberal side in terms of cultural and moral issues, to win supports from middle-range voters. It is shown that increasingly, Christian democratic parties in Europe are tailoring their manifestos, replacing strict religious doctrines by abstract moral values and emphasizing less on traditional morality issues such as opposing abortion and homosexuality (Euchner & Preidel, 2016; Jansen et al., 2012; Montgomery & Carter, 2015). However, it is also shown that on the demand-side, the Christian population are not yielding to secularization, but on the contrary, they are becoming more religious and demanding stronger religious influence in the political arena (Achterberg, Houtman, Aupers, De Koster, Mascini, & Van der Waal, 2009; Bruce, 2002). The increasing mismatch to Christian voters is causing the declining support rates of Christian

democratic parties. De Graaf, Heath and Need (2001) and Jansen et al. (2012) find that in the Netherlands, the mergers of major Christian parties in 1977 and 2002 loosen their linkage to Christian supporters and result in decreased supports among Christians. Oskarson (2005) shows that in four Western European countries religious voters incline to vote for parties holding stronger traditional values. Given that mainstream right/Christian democratic parties are converging to the center, if populist radical right parties can manage to manifest a conservative stance in traditional moral values, it is very likely that they would take advantage of the political opportunity and gain electoral supports from the Christian population.

Nevertheless, not all the populist radical right parties across Europe are following this opportunity. Among the populist radical right party family, most of its members, for instance, Vlaams Belang (VB) in Flemish Belgian and the Swedish Democrats in Sweden, are conservative in morality issues, being hostile to abortion, same-sex marriage, feminism, etc. (Mudde, 2002; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2012; Swyngedouw & Ivaldi, 2001). However, there are populist radical right parties adapting themselves to a more culturally "progressive" profile. Leading examples are the former Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Netherlands and its successor Party for Freedom (PVV). Unlike other culturally conservative populist radical right parties, they manifest a liberal image of supporting LGBT rights and gender equality, which can rarely be found in populist radical right parties elsewhere, and they criticize the Muslim population as rejecting liberal principles in modernized Western society (Akkerman, 2005; Houtman & Achterberg, 2002). Pro-liberal strategies are gradually being adapted by other populist radical right parties across Europe, including the Republicans in Germany and the Ticino League in Switzerland (Mudde, 2002; Mudde, 2007). Even one of the most conservative populist radical right party, Front National (FN) in France, is adjusting its strategy under Marine Le Pen and expressing more tolerance to homosexuality (Mayer, 2013). By bringing in a progressive cultural into their political agenda, populist radical right parties could appeal to the more salient secular population. But in the meantime, they may also lose Christian voters who stays conservative in terms of morality issues. As it is not yet known from previous studies how party manifesto in traditional morality issues will affect the electoral choice of Christian voters, we will test:

H9: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by the electoral manifesto of populist radical right parties. In European countries where populist radical right parties manifest more traditional morality, people with higher Christian religiosity are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties*

H10: *The effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by the electoral manifesto of mainstream right/Christian democratic parties. In European countries where mainstream right/Christian democratic parties manifest more traditional morality, people with higher Christian religiosity are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties.*

To summarize, in this study we propose four streams of explanations to Christian people's supports to populist radical right parties. First, Christian people may be less likely to vote for populist radical right parties, since they hold more pro-social values developed from religious doctrines and community engagement. Second, Christianity serves as an antidote to populist radical right parties in solving social disintegration in modernized society, particularly for lower-educated and lower-class people. Third, perceived ethnic threats, especially symbolic ethnic threats from religious competition, are likely to mediate Christian religiosity towards more supports to populist radical right parties. Finally, Christians' supports to populist radical right parties may differ by countries' political contexts, moderated by traditional morality manifestos shown by both populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties. In the next chapter, we demonstrate the data, measurements, and statistical models we use to the test the hypotheses and address our research questions.

III. Data and Methodology

Data

To empirically test our hypotheses, we will use the *European Social Survey* (ESS) Round 7 data. The data is collected in 2014 in 21 European countries, containing a wide range of items on voting, religion, pro-social values, social relations, and immigration. The selection of our sample to analyze is as follows: First we only select traditionally Christian European countries, hence Israel is not considered. Then we find that in voting variables, there are no political parties that can be specified as populist radical right parties in Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia, and in Estonia and Portugal, support rates of populist radical right parties are very fringe (1.2% and 0.2% respectively). Therefore, these countries are also removed from analysis, and we end up in 15 countries (i.e. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden). To focus on the relationship between voting and Christian religiosity, we exclude respondents who are not able to vote (under 18 years old or not being citizens of the country), who did not vote with validity (absence voting, blank votes, or other invalid votes), and those who belong to non-Christian religious denominations. The final sample includes 14,104 respondents.

In order to capture the traditional morality manifesto of populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties across countries, we assist our analysis with *Comparative Manifesto Project* (CMP) data (Volkens, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz, Regel, & Werner, 2016). In this project, election manifesto documents from political parties are collected, analyzed, and recoded into parties' stances in a variety of political domains. The CMP data contains political parties' extents of manifesting various major political issues during elections, including their manifesto on traditional morality.

Measurements

Christian Religiosity: Following the theoretical distinction between types of religiosity effects from Wuthnow (1991), we use two different constructs to measure the independent variable: Christian religiosity. First, we measure *Christian community* by two items: "*Do you considered yourself as belonging or any particular religion or denomination?*" (1 = "Yes"; 2 = "No") and "*How often attend religious services apart from special occasions*" (from 1 "Every day" to 7 "Never"). Items are recoded as higher values indicate more Christian community engagements, standardized, and tapped into one variable by taking the average. Similarly, two items measure *Christian conviction*: "*How religious are you*" (from 0 "Not at all religious" to 10 "Very religious") and "*How often pray apart from at religious services*" (from 1 "Every day" to 7 "Never"). Items are recoded as higher values indicate more Christian conviction, standardized, and tapped into one variable by taking the average.

We also measure Christian community and Christian conviction on national level. *Country Christian community* is measure by the proportion of Christian population in the country in 2010, and we used the data published by Pew Research Center (Global Christianity, 2011). We measure *country Christian conviction* by the percentage of people who think religion important in his/her life in the country, retrieved from *Gallup Global Report* (Crabtree, 2010).

Voting Choice: The dependent variable will be recoded from "*Party voted for in last national election in 2014*". A multinomial variable is created, dividing parties into "*populist radical right*", "*mainstream right*/C*hristian democratic*", "*mainstream left*", "*left/libertarian*" and "*others*" party families. First, party families are recoded based on previous studies on political parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Ignazi, 1992; Jansen et al., 2012; Kitskelts & McGann, 1995; Montgomery & Winter, 2015; Mudde, 2007; Norris, 2005; Werts et al., 2013; etc.). For those parties not covered in previous literatures, we consult the classification in the CMP dataset (Volkens et al., 2016): we recode "*nationalist parties*" into "*populist radical right*"; "*conservative parties*" and "*Christian democratic parties*" into "*mainstream right*/C*hristian democratic*"; "*socialist parties*" and "*social democratic parties*" into "*mainstream left*"; "*ecological parties*" and "*liberal parties*" into "*left/libertarian*"; and parties with other issues into "*others*". Since we pay special attention to the competition between populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties in mobilizing Christian voters by traditional morality, we set mainstream right/Christian democratic parties as the reference category. The detailed party family classifications are listed in Table A1 in Appendix.

Pro-social Values: We measure pro-social values by the latent dimension *Benevolence* from *Human Values* developed by Scwartz (Shalom & Wolfgang, 1990; Schwartz, 1994; 2003). There are two *Benevolence* items in ESS Round 7 data: "*Important to help people and care for others well-being*" and "*Important to be loyal to friends and devote to people*" (from 1 "Very much like me" to 6 "Not like me at

all"). The indicators will be recoded hence higher values refer to more pro-social values. Then items are standardized and averaged into one scale.

Social Integration: The measurement for level of social integration will be combining three indicators depicting general social trust ("*Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful*"; "*Most people try to take advantage of you, or try to be fair*"; and "*Most of the time people helpful or mostly looking out for themselves*". Values are from 0 to 10, and higher values indicate more social trust) and three indicators measuring subjective level of social inclusion ("*How often socially meet with friends, relatives or colleagues*", from 1 "Never" to 7 "Every day"; "*How many people with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters*", from 0 "None" to 6 "10 or more"; and "*Take part in social activities compared to others of same age*", from 1 "Much less than most" to 5 "Much more than most"). Six variables will be standardized and tapped into a single variable by taking the average.

Ethnic Threats: We will measure *realistic ethnic threats* and *symbolic ethnic threats* separately according to the theoretical distinction. *Realistic Ethnic Threats* will be measured by "*Immigrants bad or good for country's economy*", "*Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs*" and "*Immigrants take out more than they put in or less*" (all from 0 to 10). Items will be recoded hence higher values indicate higher levels of perceived threats, and averaged into one variable after standardization. *Symbolic Ethnic Threats* will be measured by "*Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants*", "*Immigrants make our country worse or better place to live*" and "*Immigrants make country's crime problems worse or better*", "*Religious beliefs and practices in the country are undermined or enriched by immigrants*" (all from 0 to 10). Items will also be recoded as higher values indicate more perceived threats, standardized, and averaged into one variable.

On national level, *Country ethnic threats* will be measured by the country's proportion of Muslim population in the year of 2010. The data is published by Pew Research Center (Lugo & Cooperman, 2011).

Traditional Morality Manifesto: To test if Christian people may (not) be willing to vote for a populist radical right party due to manifestos towards traditional morality of both populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties, we will introduce both party families' manifestos on traditional morality in CMP as country-level variables. The *Traditional Morality Index* will be created subtracting "*Traditional Morality Negative*" (oppositions to traditional and/or religious moral values) from "*Traditional Morality Positive*" (favorable mentions of traditional and/or religious moral values). Due to in some countries there are plural parties in one family, we take a weighted average of parties' manifestos by their corresponding parliament seats after the election, which is the common practice in previous research (Jansen et al. 2012). The same selection and coding process will be conducted on both populist radical right parties and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties.

Control Variables: On individual level, we control for demographics including age, gender, urbanization, educational level, social class, and religious denominations. Two dummy variables will be created for males (females as reference group) and cities (villages and countryside as reference group). Educational level will be measured as a 7-level international standard *ES-ISCED* scale, from 1 "less than lower secondary education" to 7 "higher tertiary education". For social class, we deploy the *Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) Scheme* (Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero, 1979), recoded from *ISCO* code for occupation classification in the ESS data. For simplicity, we use the 3-category version with the classification of "*Non-manual workers*", "*Farm workers*" and "*Manual workers*" (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). We use non-manual workers as the reference groups and create dummy variables for other two categories. We created dummy variables for Catholics, Protestants and other Christians (Orthodoxy is very fringe in our sample, so we conflate it with other Christian denominations) and use non-religious people as the reference category.

We also control for a series of country characteristics. First, we create a dummy variable for Eastern European countries (Western Europe as reference). Second, we control for the cultural/religious heritage of the country according to Inglehart's cultural map (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), creating a dummy for Catholic countries (Protestant countries as reference). Finally, we control the economic status of the country by GDP per capita (PPP adjusted, 2011 international dollars as benchmark) in 2014, retrieved from World Bank database (World Bank, 2017).

Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. 50% of the respondents are male, and 64% live in cities. Age of respondent range from 18 to 97 years old, and the average age is 52.56. Respondents have a medium level of education on average (Mean = 4.28). 24 % respondents are manual workers and 3% are farm workers. People with religious denominations take half of the sample (26% for Catholics, 24% for Protestants, and 1% for other Christian denominations) and the other half are non-religious. 11% of the respondents have voted for populist radical right parties in 2014 elections. The sample is balanced and representative. In terms of country features, we have 7 Catholic countries and 8 Protestant countries, and 11 Western European countries and 4 Eastern European countries, and they are all high-income economies. Proportions of Christian population vary from 39.4% (Czech Republic) to 94.3% (Poland), and proportion of religion-important people change from 17% (Sweden) to 75% (Poland). Muslim populations are generally small in all countries, with proportions ranging from 0.1% in Czech Republic and Poland to 7.5% in France. Traditional morality manifestos vary a lot across countries for both radical populist right parties (Mean = 1.65, SD = 1.68) and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties (Mean = 1.56, SD = 1.04). Mainstream right/Christian democratic parties are on average more conservative than populist radical right parties in moral issues. Populist right parties are on average more morally conservative.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics				
	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Individual level variables (N = 14104)				
Christian community	-0.99	2.21	0	0.880
Christian conviction	-1.10	1.90	0	0.915
Pro-social values	-4.47	1.08	0	0.844
Social integration	-2.45	1.89	0	0.615
Realistic ethnic threats	-2.32	2.27	0	0.827
Symbolic ethnic threats	-2.36	2.23	0	0.779
Voting for populist radical right party	0	1	0.11	0.311
Age	18	97	52.56	16.560
Male	0	1	0.50	0.50
City residence	0	1	0.64	0.480
Educational level	1	7	4.28	1.806
Manual workers	0	1	0.24	0.424
Farm workers	0	1	0.03	0.183
Catholics	0	1	0.26	0.438
Protestants	0	1	0.24	0.427
Other Christians	0	1	0.01	0.116
Non-religious	0	1	0.49	0.500
Country level variables (N = 15)				
Christian population	0.394	0.943	0.741	0.151
Religion importance	0.170	0.750	0.347	0.152
Muslim population	0.001	0.075	0.036	0.026
PRR party morality manifesto	0.00	5.48	1.65	1.68
MSR/CD party morality manifesto	0.27	3.58	1.56	1.04
Catholic country	0	1	0.47	0.52
Eastern Europe	0	1	0.27	0.46
GDP per capita ($ 1,000)	24.02	63.29	40.13	11.17

We conduct reliability analyses to validate our effort of combining items into single constructs, and results are presented in Appendix (Table A2). We use Spearman-Brown coefficient as suggested by Eisinga, Te Grotenhuis and Pelzer (2013) for measurements with only two items (religious community, religious

conviction, and pro-social values) and Cronbach's Alpha for other measurements. Reliabilities are generally acceptable, especially the measurement of pro-social values in Germany (Alpha = 0.385). We will leave this violation to a robustness check that remove German samples in testing the mediation effect of pro-social values.

Model

In our analyses, we have a multinomial dependent variable, and we are also interested in comparing countries. Therefore, we use a *multilevel generalized linear model* (Hox, 2010). First, we test the main effects of religious community and religious conviction towards voting for populist radical right parties. Second, we test the mediation effects of pro-social values, social integration, and types of ethnic threats by introducing them into the model step-wise, and seeing how effects of Christian religiosity change after controlling for mediators. Third, we test the moderation of Christian religiosity on educational level and social class, and moderations of country features on Christian religiosity by adding interaction terms into the model. We use simple slope analyses to investigate possible significant interactions. Analyses will be run in SPSS Generalized Linear Mixed Models process.

IV. Findings: Christian religiosity and populist radical right voting

In this chapter, we present results of our analyses. First, we present bivariate correlations between core independent and dependent variables (See Table A3 in Appendix). Both types of Christian religiosity have weak positive correlation with pro-social values, and weak negative correlation with social integration level. There is no significant correlation between two types of Christian religiosity and two types of ethnic threat. Voting for populist radical right parties has weak positive correlations with both types of Christian religiosity, no significant correlation with pro-social values, negative correlation with social integration level, and moderate positive correlation with both types of ethnic threats.

In the following models, we test our hypotheses controlling for other variables. Results are shown from Table 4.1 to Table 4.5. Table 4.1 shows results of main effects and mediation effects. The baseline model is Model 1 with independent variable: Christian community and Christian conviction, and control variables. Christian community has a significant negative effect on voting for populist radical right parties. However, the effect of Christian conviction is not significant. There is evidence to support *H1a* but *H2a* is not supported. Among control variables, age, educational level, and manual workers have significant effect. On average, younger people, people with lower educational levels and people doing manual work are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties. Gender, urbanization, working in farm sector and religious denominations do not have significant influence on voting for the radical right parties. None of the country-

level control variables has significant effects. The significance of random variance in intercept indicates that there are differences between countries in support rates to populist radical right parties.

Table 4.1: Main Effects and Mediations (N = 14104)

populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Christian community	-0.398*** (0.091)	-0.398*** (0.091)	-0.355*** (0.091)	-0.332** (0.093)	-0.329** (0.094)	-0.295** (0.094)
Christian conviction	-0.022 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.051)	-0.015 (0.051)	-0.005 (0.052)	0.006 (0.053)	-0.002 (0.053)
Pro-social values	-	0.032 (0.038)	-	-	-	0.075 (0.039)
Social integration	-	-	-0.587*** (0.056)	-	-	-0.309*** (0.060)
Realistic ethnic threats	-	-	-	0.804*** (0.041)	-	0.374*** (0.057)
Symbolic ethnic threats	-	-	-	-	0.899*** (0.044)	0.571*** (0.060)
Catholic	-0.015 (0.148)	-0.017 (0.148)	-0.091 (0.149)	-0.155 (0.152)	-0.182 (0.153)	-0.230 (0.154)
Protestant	0.184 (0.138)	0.184 (0.138)	0.160 (0.139)	0.101 (0.141)	-0.045 (0.142)	-0.040 (0.142)
Other Christian	-0.014 (0.336)	-0.013 (0.336)	-0.109 (0.338)	-0.067 (0.345)	-0.211 (0.350)	-0.221 (0.351)
Age	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.011*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.012*** (0.002)
Male	0.099 (0.065)	0.104 (0.065)	0.102 (0.065)	0.187** (0.066)	0.136* (0.067)	0.181** (0.068)
City residence	-0.060 (0.065)	-0.061 (0.065)	-0.059 (0.066)	-0.021 (0.067)	0.007 (0.067)	0.001 (0.068)
Educational level	-0.247** (0.021)	-0.247*** (0.021)	-0.219*** (0.021)	-0.190*** (0.022)	-0.187*** (0.022)	-0.169*** (0.022)

Manual worker	0.611***	0.612***	0.557***	0.477***	0.502***	0.456***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Farm worker	-0.102	-0.099	-0.163	-0.170	-0.165	-0.191
	(0.156)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.160)	(0.161)	(0.162)
Catholic country	-0.083	-0.081	-0.202	-0.293	-0.311	-0.392
	(0.622)	(0.626)	(0.638)	(0.714)	(0.730)	(0.741)
Eastern Europe	0.760	0.773	0.570	0.861	0.804	0.783
	(0.853)	(0.853)	(0.874)	(0.979)	(1.001)	(1.012)
GDP per capita	0.015	0.015	0.018	0.023	0.011	0.018
($ 1000)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Intercept	-0.685	-0.700	-0.799	-1.438	-0.816	-1.231
	(1.725)	(1.724)	(1.777)	(1.979)	(2.023)	(2.052)
Random variance	0.725*	0.734*	0.761*	0.959*	1.003*	1.032*
	(0.319)	(0.319)	(0.335)	(0.421)	(0.440)	(0.452)

*Notes: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

In Model 2, we introduce pro-social values as the mediator into the model. Contradicting our expectation, pro-social values do not have significant effect on voting for populist radical right parties. The effect of Christian community stays significant, and the direction and magnitude of the effect does not change. Christian conviction does not have significant effect. Therefore, we reject *H1b* and *H2b*. Pro-social values are not mediating the effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties.

In Model 3, we add level of social integration and test its mediation effect. Social integration level has a strong significant negative effect on voting for populist radical right parties. The effect is significant. The effect of Christian community is still negative and significant, however, the magnitude of the effect decrease from -0.398 to -0.355, which means that part of the effect is extracted after social integration is introduced. Hence, we have evidence to support *H5*. Christian community has a negative significant effect towards voting for populist radical right parties, and part of the effect is mediated by social integration level. People with higher engagement in Christian communities gain better social integration, and are less likely to be appealed by populist radical right parties. The effect of Christian conviction is insignificant.

In Model 4 and Model 5, we examine the mediation effect of realistic ethnic threat and symbolic ethnic threat. Model 4 shows that realistic ethnic threat has a strong positive significant effect on voting for populist radical right parties. Christian community still has a significant negative effect, but the effect size decreases to -0.332. Results shows that realistic ethnic threat mediates the effect of Christian community, but the direction is opposite to our expectation. People with more Christian community engagement develop

less realistic ethnic threats, and are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties. We reject *H7a*. Model 5 shows a similar picture. Symbolic ethnic threat also has a strong positive significant effect on voting for populist radical right parties. The effect of Christian community decreases to -0.329 and stays significant. Symbolic ethnic threat mediates the effect of Christian community but in the direction contradicting our hypothesis. People with more Christian community engagement has lower levels of symbolic ethnic threats, and vote for populist radical right parties less. Also, we do not see a practically large difference between the mediation effects of two types of ethnic threats. *H7b* and *H7c* are therefore not supported.

In Model 6 we include all independent variables and mediators into the model along with control variables. After controlling for other variables, the effect of Christian community is negative and significant. A one-unit increase in Christian community engagement will make the odds ratio of voting for populist radical right party decrease by a factor of $e^{-0.295} = 0.745$, controlling for other variables. However, there is no significant effect of Christian conviction. We show supports to *H1a* but reject *H2a*. Pro-social value does not have significant effects on voting for populist radical right parties, nor does it mediate the effect of Christian community, hence *H1b* and *H2b* are rejected. Level of social integration has a negative effect towards voting for populist radical right parties, and it mediates the negative effect of Christian community. *H5* is supported. Realistic and symbolic ethnic threats have positive effects to voting for populist radical right parties, but reduce the negative effect of Christian community. *H7a* to *H7c* are rejected. Educational level and age have significant positive effects, while male and manual workers are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties, consistent to previous findings (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Vanhoute & Hooghe, 2013; Werts et al., 2013). A robustness check shows that after excluding German sample, which has very lower reliability in the measurement of pro-social values, results remain consistent that pro-social values do not have any significant effect (See Table A4 in Appendix).

In Model 7 and Model 8 (Table 4.2), we test the moderation of country-level Christian religiosity on the effect of individual-level Christian religiosity. In Model 7, we add Christian population and religion importance of the country. We also add interaction terms between Christian population and two types of individual Christian religiosity. On individual level, both religious community and religious have negative significant effects. Christian population in the country has a positive significant effect, hence populist radical right parties are more popular in countries with larger Christian populations. *H3a* is therefore rejected. We also the significance in effects of interaction terms between Christian population and both types of Christian religiosity, and interaction effects are positive as we hypothesize. In countries with larger Christian populations, the negative effect of Christian religiosity becomes weaker, reaching a support for *H3b*. Religion importance level in the country does not show significant effect, rejecting *H4a*.

In Model 8 we add interaction terms between religion importance in the country and types of Christian religiosity. *H4a* is still not supported that we do not find significant effect of religion importance level in the country. There is no significant interaction between religion importance level and individual Christian community or conviction. Therefore, *H4b* is not supported.

Table 4.2: Moderation of Country Christian Religiosity (N = 14104)
radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 7	**Model 8**
Religious community	-1.189**	-0.556**
	(0.397)	(0.180)
Religious conviction	-0.750*	-0.267*
	(0.343)	(0.135)
Christian population	4.002**	3.391*
	(1.353)	(1.367)
Religion Importance	0.652	0.790
	(1.473)	(1.504)
Christian population*Christian community	1.000*	-
	(0.502)	
Christian population*Christian conviction	0.944*	-
	(0.442)	
Religion importance*Christian community	-	0.338
		(0.432)
Religion importance*Christian conviction	-	0.689
		(0.358)
Catholic	-0.058	-0.017
	(0.151)	(0.149)
Protestant	0.224	0.293
	(0.10)	(0.144)
Other Christian	0.074	0.069
	(0.340)	(0.338)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)

Male	0.110	0.106
	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.052	-0.057
	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.247***	-0.245***
	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.602***	0.605***
	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.119	-0.053
	(0.157)	(0.157)
Catholic country	-0.090	-0.053
	(0.475)	(0.485)
Eastern Europe	0.050	0.209
	(0.622)	(0.633)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.000	0.003
	(0.026)	(0.026)
Intercept	-3.231*	-2.950*
	(1.390)	(1.431)
Random variance	0.354*	0.368*
	(0.175)	(0.182)

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

To check how cross-level interactions work, we conduct simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) on the effect of country-level Christian community by separating people into higher, medium and lower levels of Christian community engagement (Full results are shown in Table A5.1 & A5.2 in the Appendix). We also plot how the effects of Christian religiosity are affected by country-level Christian community, controlling for other variables. Figure 4.1 illustrates how the effect of Christian community on voting for populist radical right parties changes by country-level Christian community. When Christian population is relatively small in the country, there is a large gap in the probability of voting for populist radical right parties among people with different levels of Christian community engagement. The probability of people at low level of Christian community engagement voting for populist radical right parties is as much as three times of people at high level of Christian community engagement, when other variables are controlled for. However, as Christian population in the country increases, the gap shrinkages, and people at different levels of Christian community engagement converge in the probability of voting for

populist radical right parties. It is also shown in Figure 4.2 that firstly, when Christian population is low in the country, the higher level of people's Christian conviction, the less they are likely to vote for populist radical right parties. As Christian population increases, the differences between people with different levels of Christian conviction decrease. When Christian population grows over around 80%, the effect of Christian conviction reverses. The higher level of people's Christian conviction, the more they are likely to vote for populist radical right parties.

Figure 4.1: Country Christian Community and the Effect of Christian Community Engagement



Figure 4.2: Country Christian Community and the Effect of Christian Conviction



Table 4.4 shows results of testing the moderation effect of socio-economic status. In Model 9, we introduce the interaction terms between educational level and Christian religiosity. The interaction between Christian community and educational level is positive and significant, and there is no significant interaction between Christian conviction and educational level. To further investigate the interaction effect, we conduct simple slope analysis, testing the simple effect of Christian community using different levels of education as reference groups (Model 9a to Model 9c). At the lower educational level, the effect of Christian community is -0.498 and significant. At lower educational level, one-unit's increase in Christian community engagement will make the odds ratio of voting for populist radical right party decrease by a factor of $e^{-0.498} = 0.608$. At medium educational level, the effect of Christian community is still negative and significant, but the size decreases to -0.327. One-unit's increase in Christian community engagement on medium educational level will make the odds ratio of voting for populist radical right party decrease by a factor of $e^{-0.327} = 0.721$. On the higher educational level, the effect of Christian community stays negative at -0.156, but no longer significant. Therefore, the negative effect of Christian community on voting for populist radical right parties only works on lower and medium educational levels, and the effect becomes smaller when the educational level rises. We have evidence to support *H6a* that Christian religiosity has stronger effect against voting for populist radical right parties at relatively lower-educated population. Figure 4.3 shows how the effect of education on voting for populist radical right parties decreases with the

increase in Christian community engagement. As Christian community engagement becomes higher, the gap between people at different educational levels decrease. There is rarely substantial difference at the highest level of Christian community engagement. Model 10 shows that although manual workers are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties, there is no significant interactions between both types of Christian religiosity and social classes. Our results are not supporting *H6b*.

Table 4.4: Moderation of Socio-Economic Status (N = 14104)
populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 9	Model 9a Low education	Model 9b Medium education	Model 9c High education	Model 10
Christian community	-0.719***	-0.498***	-0.327***	-0.156	-0.349***
	(0.140)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.104)	(0.09)
Christian conviction	-0.047	-0.029	-0.029	-0.029	0.016
	(0.113)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.062)
Catholic	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-0.007
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Protestant	0.162	0.161	0.161	0.161	0.179
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.138)
Other Christian	-0.058	-0.057	-0.057	-0.057	0.000
	(0.335)	(0.336)	(0.336)	(0.336)	(0.335)
Age	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male	0.195	0.095	0.095	0.095	0.096
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.062	-0.063	-0.063	-0.063	-0.057
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.255***	-0.255***	-0.255***	-0.255***	-0.248***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.617***	0.618***	0.618***	0.618***	0.613***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.056	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058	-0.043
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.180)

Educational level* Christian community	0.090** (0.030)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.094*** (0.020)	0.094*** (0.020)	-
Educational level* Christian conviction	0.007 (0.028)	-	-	-	-
Manual worker* Christian community	-	-	-	-	-0.102 (0.109)
Farm worker* Christian community	-	-	-	-	-0.170 (0.262)
Manual worker* Christian conviction	-	-	-	-	-0.131 (0.106)
Farm worker*Christian conviction	-	-	-	-	0.014 (0.234)
Catholic country	-0.079 (0.628)	-0.079 (0.627)	-0.079 (0.627)	-0.079 (0.627)	-0.086 (0.625)
Eastern Europe	0.762 (0.860)	0.761 (0.860)	0.761 (0.860)	0.761 (0.860)	0.768 (0.856)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.015 (0.036)	0.015 (0.036)	0.015 (0.036)	0.015 (0.036)	0.015 (0.036)
Intercept	-0.695 (1.740)	-1.326 (1.737)	-1.787 (1.736)	-2.248 (1.737)	-0.713 (1.773)
Random variance	0.737* (0.325)	0.737* (0.324)	0.737* (0.324)	0.737* (0.324)	0.730* (0.322)

*Notes: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

Figure 4.3: Christian Community and the Effect of Educational Level



Table 4.5: Moderation of Country Ethnic Threat and Party Morality Manifesto (N = 14104) populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Christian community	-0.198	-0.272*	-0.365**
	(0.122)	(0.105)	(0.125)
Christian conviction	0.033	0.012	0.084
	(0.087)	(0.073)	(0.093)
Catholic	0.044	0.030	-0.039
	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Protestant	0.177	0.230	0.211
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Other Christian	0.035	0.026	-0.008
	(0.338)	(0.337)	(0.337)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)

Male	0.108	0.102	0.100
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.055	-0.055	-0.059
	(0.06)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.247***	-0.246***	-0.246***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.606***	0.606***	0.610***
	(0.07)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.103	-0.114	-0.110
	(0.157)	(0.17)	(0.157)
Country ethnic threat	-12.121	-	-
	(15.462)		
Country ethnic threat*Christian community	-5.680**	-	-
	(2.164)		
Country ethnic threat*Christian conviction	-1.725	-	-
	(1.934)		
PRR morality manifesto	-	-0.082	-0.072
		(0.174)	(0.177)
MSR/CD morality manifesto	-	-0.127	-0.103
		(0.349)	(0.356)
PRR morality manifesto*Christian community	-	-0.098**	-
		(0.033)	
PRR morality manifesto*Christian conviction	-	-0.01	-
		(0.304)	
MSR/CD morality manifesto*Christian community	-	-	-0.028
			(0.056)
MSR/CD morality manifesto*Christian conviction	-	-	-0.067
			(0.506)
Catholic country	0.172	-0.258	-0.210
	(0.700)	(0.732)	(0.746)
Eastern Europe	-0.167	0.890	0.841
	(1.408)	(1.196)	(1.218)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.010	0.017	0.015
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.048)

Intercept	0.010	-0.455	-0.383
	(2.030)	(2.096)	(2.135)
Random variance	0.713*	0.807*	0.838*
	(0.330)	(0.392)	(0.407)

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

In Model 11 (Table 4.5), we test whether the effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties is moderated by the extent of ethnic threat in the country. After controlling for Muslim population in the country, effects of both types of Christian religiosity lose significance. Muslim population has a large but insignificant effect. The interaction between Muslim population and Christian community is strongly negative and significant. We run simple slope analysis (Full results see Table A6 in the Appendix) and plot how the effect of Christian community is changed by ethnic threat in the country (Figure 4.4). Basically, people with higher Christian community engagement are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties, regardless of the level of ethnic threats in the country. When perceived ethnic threats, namely, the population of Muslim grows in the country, the effect of Christian community engagement enlarges. As the percentage of Muslim population grows to 6%, the probability of people with lower Christian community engagement voting for populist radical right parties is more than 1.5 times as the probability of people with high level of Christian community engagement, controlling for other variables. We find evidence contrary to *H8* and hence reject this hypothesis.

Figure 4.4: Country Ethnic Threats and the Effect of Christian Community Engagement



Figure 4.5: PRR Party Morality Manifesto and the Effect of Christian Community Engagement



Finally, we test whether parties' manifestos on traditional morality moderate the effect of Christian religiosity on voting for populist radical right parties (Table 4.5). In Model 12 we add morality manifestos of populist radical right party and mainstream right/Christian democratic Party families in the country. We also add the interaction between populist radical right party morality manifesto and types of Christian religiosity. The main effect of Christian community is negative and significant, and the main effect of Christian conviction is not significant. None of the party family morality manifestos have significant effect on voting for populist radical right parties, and there is no significant interaction between Christian conviction and party manifestos. We find a significant negative interaction between populist radical right party morality manifesto and Christian community, which indicates that in countries where populist radical right parties are more conservative in morality issues, people with higher levels of Christian community involvement are less likely to vote for populist radical right parties. *H9* is therefore rejected. Figure 4.5 shows how the effect of Christian community engagement is affected by the morality manifesto of populist radical right party in the country. The morality manifesto of populist radical right party does not influence the relatively high probability of people with lower Christian community engagement voting for populist radical right parties. However, as the populist radical right party becomes more conservative in morality issues, supports from both people with medium and higher levels of Christian community engagement decreases. The differences between people with different levels of Christian community engagement is enlarged as the populist radical right party manifests more traditional morality, and the negative effect of Christian community engagement on voting for populist radical right parties becomes larger. Full results of simple slope analysis is presented in the Appendix (Table A7). Model 13 shows that there is no significant main effects or moderation effects from the morality manifesto of mainstream right/Christian democratic parties. Hence there is no evidence supporting *H10*.

V. Conclusions and Discussions

In this study, we investigate the relationship between Christian religiosity and support for populist radical right (PRR) parties across European countries, with a comparative perspective. Using ESS Round 7 data, we test four streams of mechanisms: prosocial-value developed by Christian doctrine and socialization, the function of Christianity providing social integration to vulnerable people in modernization, ethnic threats under the competition between Christian majority and Muslim immigrants, and the political parties' mobilization strategies in terms of traditional morality.

First, we hypothesize that Christian people have higher levels of pro-social values, and therefore are likely to reject populist radical right parties' extremist ideologies (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015). We further specify the two approaches of Christian religiosity from which Christian people can derive pro-social values. The two approaches are conviction of benevolent Christian

doctrines, and socialization in Christian communities (Bekkers & Schuyt, 2008; Wuthnow, 1991). Results show that only higher Christian community involvement will lead to less support for populist radical right parties, but there is no influence from Christian convictions. Contrary to our hypothesis, pro-social values do not have a significant effect on voting to populist radical right parties, nor is it mediating the relationship between Christian religiosity and voting behavior. The result is consistent with previous findings that religious community engagement has larger impact shaping people's values and behaviors than religious beliefs (Bekker & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). It validates Durkheim's classical argument that the major function of religion is enhancing social cohesion (Durkheim 1951 [1879]; 2008 [1912]). When people are engaged more in Christian communities, they are socialized in religious environments, and internalize those religious practices into political behaviors. Therefore, they are more likely to vote for mainstream right/Christian democratic parties which Christian denominations are usually affiliated to. There is no necessarily influence from the level of religious conviction, or from pro-social values derived from Christianity. These results are also robust after excluding German sample, which has low reliability in measuring pro-social values. However, the negative effect of Christian community does not hold at country level. We show that in countries with higher Christian populations, there are more supports to populist radical right parties from Christian religious people. The result corresponds to the finding previous studies (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015; Rydgren, 2009) that Christian religiosity raises supports to populist radical right parties in countries with high Christian population like Poland (94.3%) and Switzerland (82.9%). On the contrary, in countries with relatively low Christian population the Christian supports to populist radical right parties tend to be relatively low, for example, in the Netherlands and in Belgium (Arzheimer & Carter, 2009; Montgomery & Winter, 2015; Rydgren, 2009). We from another perspective verify the convergence of Christianity in secularized societies. In countries where Christianity is waning, the remaining Christian population tend to reaffirm their religiosity (Achterberg et al., 2009; Bruce, 2002). However, the convergence to Christianity is not manifested by supporting a more conservative party, but by consolidating the affiliation to mainstream right/Christian democratic parties.

Second, we prove the social integration function of religion in fighting radical right extremism. On the one hand, we reproduce results from most previous studies that populist radical right voters are more likely to be less-educated and from lower social classes (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Vanhoute & Hooghe, 2013; Werts et al., 2013). They are more likely to feel disintegrated in modernized society, and hence more likely to embrace the extremist right ideologies for sense of inclusion and psychological compensation. Christianity, on the other hand, by offering social integration, is providing an antidote to right-wing extremism. We show that level of social integration is mediating the negative effect of Christian community to voting for populist radical right parties. Christian community engagement

fulfills people's needs to be socially integrated, and makes people less likely to be appealed by populist radical right parties. Moreover, we find that the effect of Christian community is higher on people with lower education, moderate on medium-educated people, and has no effect on higher-educated people. The social integration function of religion extraordinarily compensates those people who are more likely to be disintegrated in the society.

Third, we test whether religious/cultural competition in the presence of Muslim-majority immigration will revoke Christian people's perceived ethnic threats, especially symbolic ethnic threat, and lead to supports to populist radical right parties. As expected, both types of ethnic threats are strongly associated to voting for populist radical right parties. However, in terms of the mediation effect, we find results contradicting our hypothesis. People with more Christian community engagement are less likely to feel either realistic or symbolic ethnic threats, and less likely to vote for populist radical right parties. One explanation is that religious people are more likely to be tolerant and altruistic, and hence perceive less threats. However, it is not supported in this study as we do not show the mediation of pro-social values between Christian religiosity and voting for populist radical right parties. The other explanation may lie in that Christianity provides people with spiritual care and enhances people's mental well-being (Gartnet et al., 1991; Koenig & Larson, 2001). In this sense people feel reliefs from religious practices and are less likely to perceive threats from other people, and less likely to develop anti-immigration sentiments. On country level, we find that Christian religious people are more likely to vote for populist radical right parties in countries with less Muslim population. The results are contrary to the *group conflict theory* (Filindra & Pearson-Merkowitz, 2013; Scheepers et al, 2002) that the presence of immigrant population can foster anti-immigration sentiments. On the contrary, we show some evidence to *intergroup contact theory* (Pettigrew, 1998; McLaren, 2003; Schneider, 2008) that the high presence of immigrant population can decrease anti-immigration sentiments. We also rule out the explanation from Achterberg et al. (2009) that Christians are reaffirming to religiosity in less Christian countries because of the salience of religious competition in a more heterogeneous society. In countries with more presence of Muslims, Christian people see Muslims as more familiar. They would not see Muslims or immigrants as much as threats, and therefore they are less likely to be mobilized by populist radical right parties' anti-immigration agenda.

Fourth, we test how political parties' stances on traditional morality affects Christian people's voting choice. We expect that a conservative morality stance of the populist radical right party will help it to gain more supports from Christian people. While for mainstream right/Christian democratic parties, they would lose the traditional supports from the Christian population if they can no longer manifest a conservative stance in morality issues. The results reject both hypotheses. On the one hand, the morality manifesto of mainstream right/Christian democratic parties does not affect their supports from the Christian population. It is not observed in our study that the Christian support for the conservative party family

declines when these parties are converging to the liberal side (De Graaf et al., 2001; Jansen et al., 2012; Oskarson, 2005), which means that it is not a general trend in Europe. On the other hand, manifesting a strong stance in morality issues does not help populist radical right parties gain Christian supports. These results indicate that the linkage between Christian population and mainstream right/Christian democratic parties is still stable across Europe. The influence of mobilization from populist radical right parties remains marginal for the Christian population. This finding also demonstrates that the influence of religious community engagement plays a more salient role than religious conviction in the influence of religiosity to attitudes and behaviors (Bekker & Schuyt, 2008; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). In countries where populist radical right parties are more conservative in morality and challenge the traditional conservative parties, the Christian population are more likely to choose the party to vote for by their community engagement, that is, the affinity to mainstream right/Christian democratic parties. The parties' objective attitudes towards traditional Christian morality *per se* are not playing a major role in appealing Christian voters.

Finally, we would like to discuss about some limitations of our study. First, it is out of our expectation that Christian people in Europe are perceiving less ethnic threats. This result largely contradicts previous findings that Christian people have more ethnic prejudice and anti-immigration attitudes (Allport & Ross, 1967; Altemeyer, 2003; Billiet, 1995; Billiet et al., 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002). There is lack of comprehensive conclusion on the relationship between religiosity and ethnic attitudes. We propose two mechanisms under the phenomenon: Christian pro-social values and reliefs from Christianity. However, we do not have strong evidence to prove these speculations in our study. Future research can be focused on the research gap in how religiosity influence ethnic attitudes by introducing pro-social values or subjective well-being as potential mediators.

Second, in our model we show that traditional morality manifesto of populist radical right parties does not appeal Christian population compare to mainstream right/Christian democratic parties. However, it is possible that from a long-term perspective, populist radical right parties have already been increasing their Christian supports with the strategy. Since there is already longitudinal evidence that the Christian parties are gradually losing Christian supports as they are de-emphasizing Christian morality over time (De Graaf et al., 2001; Jansen et al., 2012). The question can be solved by modeling the effect of both party families' manifestos and corresponding support rates from Christian population with longitudinal data. However, the modelling would render that populist radical right parties in Europe are very unstable across time. They are dissolving and re-integrating often, hence recoding the party manifesto of populist radical right parties over time would be a strong hindrance

Third, in this study we only 15 countries from ESS that meet our requirements, thus our study results may be lack of generalization power across Europe. Especially, we are not able to cover many religious countries not included in the ESS Round 7 (e.g. Italy and Greece), and many religious countries

where populist radical right parties are very fringe (e.g. Spain and Portugal), and we are not able examine mechanisms we propose in this study influencing Christian population's attitudes towards populist radical right parties in those countries with existing data. Further studies can deploy other sources of quantitative data, or focus on the interplay between Christian contexts and right-wing extremism in those countries assisted with qualitative analysis.

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Appendix:

Table A1: Party Family Classifications

	Populist Radical Right	Mainstream Right/Christian Democratic	Mainstream Left	Left/Libertarian	Other
Austria	FPÖ; BZÖ; Team Stronach	ÖVP	SPÖ	Grüne	Pirate Party; Other
Belgium	VB; FN; PP	Open VLD; MR; N-VA; CD&V; CDH	SP.A; PS; PVDA+; PTB	Groen!; Ecolo	Other
Switzerland	SVP; EDU; Ticino League; Geneva Citizens' Movement	BDP; FDP; CVP; EVP; CSP	Socialist Party; Swiss Labour Party; Alternative Left	Green Party; Green Liberal Party	Other
Czech Republic	Dawn	ODS; TOP 09; KDU-CSL	CSSD; KSCM	ANO 2011	Other
Germany	AfD; NPD	CDU/CSU	SPD; Die Linke	Greens; FDP	Pirate Party; Other
Denmark	DF	Venstre; DKF; KD	SF; Social Democrats; Red-Green Alliance	Danish Social-Liberal Party	Other
Finland	True Finns; Change 2011; Independence Party	National Coalition Party; Christian Democrats	SDP; Left Alliance; Communist Party; Communist Workers' Party	Centre Party; Green League	SPP; Pirate Party; Other

France	FN; MPF	MODEM; New Centre; UMP	PS; NPA; LO; FDG	Radical Party; PRG; EELV; Independent Ecological Movement	Other
United Kingdom	UKIP; DUP	Conservative; UUP	Labour; SNP; Plaid Cymru; Sinn Féin; SDLP	Liberal Democrats; Green Party; Alliance	Independent; Other
Hungary	Jobbik	Fidesz-KDNP	MSZP; Hungarian Workers' Party	LMP	
Lithuania	TT; JL	LRLS; LiCS; TS-LKD; LLRA; KP; ST	DP; LSDP; DDVP; LZP; SLF	LVZS	DK; Republican Party; ULL
Netherlands	PVV	VVD; CDA; CU; SGP	PvdA; SP	D66; GroenLinks; PvdD	50+; Other
Norway	Progress Party	Conservative Party; KRF	Red Party; Socialist Left; Labour Party	Liberal Party; Green Party	Coastal Party; Centre Party
Poland	PiS; KNP	PJN; PO	PPP; Democratic Left Alliance	Your Movement	PSL; Other
Sweden	Swedish Democrats	Liberals; Moderate Party; Christian Democrats	Social Democratic Party; Left Party	Centre Party; Green Party; Feminist Initiative	Pirate Party; Other

Table A2: Reliability Analyses for Measurements

	Religious Community	Religious Conviction	Pro-Social Value	Social Integration	Realistic Ethnic Threats	Symbolic Ethnic Threats
	Spearman-Brown Coefficient			Cronbach's Alpha		
Country						
Austria	0.608	0.773	0.573	0.656	0.766	0.834
Belgium	0.658	0.771	0.559	0.639	0.762	0.758
Switzerland	0.699	0.786	0.588	0.580	0.610	0.749
Czech Republic	0.808	0.854	0.603	0.616	0.749	0.752
Germany	0.741	0.821	0.385	0.611	0.746	0.796
Denmark	0.526	0.742	0.560	0.596	0.747	0.813
Finland	0.604	0.778	0.590	0.606	0.663	0.763
France	0.682	0.814	0.639	0.551	0.739	0.754
United Kingdom	0.689	0.812	0.552	0.662	0.820	0.826
Hungary	0.710	0.829	0.561	0.629	0.793	0.803
Lithuania	0.571	0.808	0.631	0.677	0.751	0.807
Netherlands	0.780	0.791	0.521	0.608	0.733	0.747
Norway	0.580	0.788	0.561	0.590	0.680	0.760
Poland	0.749	0.815	0.564	0.566	0.748	0.713
Sweden	0.582	0.763	0.588	0.594	0.788	0.729
Total	0.708	0.807	0.595	0.680	0.769	0.789

Table A3: Bivariate Correlations between Variables

	Christian community	Christian conviction	Pro-social values	Social integration	Realistic ethnic threat	Symbolic ethnic threat	Voting for PRR parties
Christian community	1	0.729*	0.041**	-0.034**	-0.011	0.016	0.022*
Christian conviction	-	1	0.085*	-0.018*	-0.008	-0.001	0.020*

Pro-social values	-	-	1	0.200**	-0.064**	-0.063**	-0.010
Social integration	-	-	-	1	-0.342**	-0.329**	-0.125**
Realistic ethnic threat	-	-	-	-	1	0.724**	0.226**
Symbolic ethnic threat	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.246**
Voting for PRR parties	-	-	-	-	-	-	1

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001*

Table A4: Robustness Check: Mediation of Pro-Social Value Excluding Germany (N = 12299)

populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 1a	**Model 2a**
Christian community	-0.380***	-0.380***
	(0.095)	(0.091)
Christian conviction	-0.002	-0.006
	(0.053)	(0.053)
Pro-social values	-	0.042
		(0.039)
Catholic	0.061	-0.059
	(0.154)	(0.154)
Protestant	0.166	0.167
	(0.144)	(0.144)
Other Christian	0.116	0.116
	(0.353)	(0.353)
Age	-0.010***	-0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)

Male	0.070	0.077
	(0.067)	(0.067)
City residence	-0.089	-0.091
	(0.068)	(0.068)
Educational level	-0.254**	-0.254***
	(0.022)	(0.022)
Manual worker	0.629***	0.631***
	(0.077)	(0.077)
Farm worker	-0.133	-0.130
	(0.160)	(0.160)
Catholic country	-0.255	-0.253
	(0.634)	(0.634)
Eastern Europe	0.675	0.693
	(0.849)	(0.848)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.010	0.010
	(0.036)	(0.036)
Intercept	-0.322	-0.338
	(1.751)	(1.749)
Random variance	0.710*	0.708*
	(0.329)	(0.328)

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

Table A5.1: Simple Effect of Country Christian Community (1) (N = 14104)

radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 7a Low Christian community	**Model 7b Medium Christian community**	**Model 7c High Christian community**
Christian community	-1.189**	-1.189**	-1.189**
	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.397)
Christian conviction	-0.750*	-0.750*	-0.750*
	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.343)

Christian population	3.121*	4.002**	4.882**
	(1.393)	(1.353)	(1.453)
Religion Importance	0.652	0.652	0.652
	(1.473)	(1.473)	(1.473)
Christian population*Christian community	1.000*	1.000*	1.000*
	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.502)
Christian population*Christian conviction	0.944*	0.944*	0.944*
	(0.442)	(0.442)	(0.442)
Catholic	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Protestant	0.224	0.224	0.224
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Other Christian	0.074	0.074	0.074
	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.340)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male	0.110	0.110	0.110
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.247***	-0.247***	-0.247***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.602***	0.602***	0.602***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.119	-0.119	-0.119
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Catholic country	-0.090	-0.090	-0.090
	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.475)
Eastern Europe	0.050	0.050	0.050
	(0.622)	(0.622)	(0.622)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Intercept	-2.185	-3.231*	-4.277*
	(1.418)	(1.390)	(1.48)

Random variance	0.354*	0.354*	0.354*
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

Table A5.2: Simple Effect of Country Christian Community (2) (N = 14104)

radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 7d Low Christian conviction	**Model 7e Medium Christian conviction**	**Model 7f High Christian conviction**
Christian community	-1.189**	-1.189**	-1.189**
	(0.397)	(0.397)	(0.397)
Christian conviction	-0.750*	-0.750*	-0.750*
	(0.343)	(0.343)	(0.343)
Christian population	3.137*	4.002**	4.866**
	(1.405)	(1.353)	(1.419)
Religion Importance	0.652	0.652	0.652
	(1.473)	(1.473)	(1.473)
Christian population*Christian community	1.000*	1.000*	1.000*
	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.502)
Christian population*Christian conviction	0.944*	0.944*	0.944*
	(0.442)	(0.442)	(0.442)
Catholic	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058
	(0.151)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Protestant	0.224	0.224	0.224
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Other Christian	0.074	0.074	0.074
	(0.340)	(0.340)	(0.340)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male	0.110	0.110	0.110
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)

City residence	-0.052	-0.052	-0.052
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.247***	-0.247***	-0.247***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.602***	0.602***	0.602***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.119	-0.119	-0.119
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Catholic country	-0.090	-0.090	-0.090
	(0.475)	(0.475)	(0.475)
Eastern Europe	0.050	0.050	0.050
	(0.622)	(0.622)	(0.622)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Intercept	-2.544	-3.231*	-3.917**
	(1.422)	(1.390)	(1.428)
Random variance	0.354*	0.354*	0.354*
	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)

*Notes: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

Table A6: Simple Effect of Country Ethnic Threat (N = 14104)

populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 11a	**Model 11b**	**Model 11c**
	Low Christian community	**Low Christian community**	**Low Christian community**
Christian community	-0.198	-0.198	-0.198
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Christian conviction	0.033	0.033	0.033
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Catholic	0.044	0.044	0.044
	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)

Protestant	0.177	0.177	0.177
	(0.140)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Other Christian	0.035	0.035	0.035
	(0.338)	(0.338)	(0.338)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male	0.108	0.108	0.108
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Educational level	-0.247***	-0.247***	-0.247***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.606***	0.606***	0.606***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Farm worker	-0.103	-0.103	-0.103
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.157)
Country ethnic threat	-7.123	-12.121	-17.120
	(15.552)	(15.462)	(15.605)
Country ethnic threat*Christian community	-5.680**	-5.680**	-5.680**
	(2.164)	(2.164)	(2.164)
Country ethnic threat*Christian conviction	-1.725	-1.725	-1.725
	(1.934)	(1.934)	(1.934)
Catholic country	0.172	0.172	0.172
	(0.700)	(0.700)	(0.700)
Eastern Europe	-0.167	-0.167	-0.167
	(1.408)	(1.408)	(1.408)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Intercept	0.185	0.010	-0.164
	(2.030)	(2.030)	(2.035)
Random variance	0.713*	0.713*	0.713*
	(0.330)	(0.330)	(0.330)

*Notes: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*

Table A7: Simple Effect of PRR Party Morality Manifesto (N = 14104)

populist radical right parties vs. mainstream right/Christian democratic parties

	Model 12a Low Christian community	Model 12b Low Christian community	Model 12c Low Christian community
Christian community	-0.272*	-0.272*	-0.272*
	(0.105)	(0.105)	(0.105)
Christian conviction	0.012	0.012	0.012
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Catholic	0.030	0.030	0.030
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.149)
Protestant	0.230	0.230	0.230
	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.139)
Other Christian	0.026	0.026	0.026
	(0.337)	(0.337)	(0.337)
Age	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Male	0.102	0.102	0.102
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
City residence	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Educational level	-0.246***	-0.246***	-0.246***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Manual worker	0.606***	0.606***	0.606***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)
Farm worker	-0.114	-0.114	-0.114
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
PRR morality manifesto	0.005	-0.082	-0.168
	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.177)
MSR/CD morality manifesto	-0.127	-0.127	-0.127
	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.349)

PRR morality manifesto*Christian community	-0.098**	-0.098**	-0.098**
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
PRR morality manifesto*Christian conviction	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.304)
Catholic country	-0.258	-0.258	-0.258
	(0.732)	(0.732)	(0.732)
Eastern Europe	0.890	0.890	0.890
	(1.196)	(1.196)	(1.196)
GDP per capita ($ 1000)	0.017	0.017	0.017
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Intercept	-0.216	-0.455	-0.695
	(2.096)	(2.096)	(2.100)
Random variance	0.807*	0.807*	0.807*
	(0.392)	(0.392)	(0.392)

*Notes: *: $p < 0.05$, **: $p < 0.01$, ***: $p < 0.001$; standard errors are shown in parentheses.*