Victims, Villains or Heroes?

Resentment and Populism among Ethnic Minorities in Belgium

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Abstract

This paper, engages with the emerging literature that studies the support for populism by using a direct measure of populist attitudes. The study focuses on Turkish and Moroccan respondents living in Belgium. More specifically, the paper has three objectives. First, a two factor instrument for the measure of populist attitudes will be proposed and tested across the two ethnic groups. Second, the concept of resentment will be operationalized and its mediation effect on populist attitudes will be tested. Finally, several hypothesis that take the specific context of ethnic minorities into account will be developed. The study uses data from the Belgian Ethnic Minority Election Study from 2014. A total of 779 respondents of Turkish and Moroccan descent are included in the study. Overall, the study empirically shows that support for populism, is affected by different feelings of economic and cultural vulnerabilities. However, it is not only the most vulnerable, the so called "losers" of globalization, but also those in intermediary positions in society who tend to be attracted to populist attitudes. The effects of structural characteristics are mostly explained by feeling of resentment. Furthermore, it is found that second generation migrants are more cynical towards the political elites. Ethnic minorities who do not identify with their host country are more likely to endorse favorable views on popular sovereignty. Religious involvement is found to lower support for popular sovereignty while increasing anti-elitism views.

Keywords:

Populist attitudes, vulnerability losers of globalization, ethnic minorities, resentment

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1. Introduction

The electoral success of populist parties has disrupted liberal democratic politics in many Western European societies. Numerous studies have evidenced the interplay of social structural changes and the tendency to vote for right wing populist parties out of resentment against immigrants and the political establishment (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Betz, 1990, 1993; Calhoun 1988; Kriesi, 2006). While a great deal is known about who votes for right wing populist parties (e.g. Eatwell, 2003; Lubbers, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002; Lubbers, 2001; Mudde 2007; Oesch 2008), much less research has been conducted into populist attitudes as such. Existing studies have mostly focused on specific attitudes, such as opposition to immigration (Rydgren, 2008), Euroscepticism (Krouwel & Abts, 2007), or Welfare chauvinism (de Koster, Achterberg & van der Waal, 2013), assuming that these attitudes are related to populism or that they serve as a breeding ground for (right-wing) populism. More recently, Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove (2014) who extended Hawkins, Riding & Mudde (2012) have worked to disentangle the general political attitudes of populism, distinguishing between populist attitudes and populist votes or issue preferences. Populist attitudes are regarded not so much as attitudes towards certain contents of politics, but rather as attitudes on how democratic politics should work (Pérez, 2016). Such a distinction becomes particularly relevant when focusing on the situation of ethnic minorities. While ethnic minorities are unlikely to vote for right wing populist parties, it is still possible that they subscribe to the core proposition of populism. However, the literature on populism so far has exclusively focused on natives, neglecting populist attitudes among other disadvantaged groups in society (i.e. ethnic minorities). This is unfortunate, given that the quality and stability of democratic life in Europe increasingly depends on ethnic minorities.

This paper then adds to the existing literature in three ways. First, an attempt will be made to further improve the measurement of populist attitudes and assess how this scale performs among different ethnic groups. Second, the study will further develop and conceptualize the relationship between structural characteristics, resentment and populism. Researchers often attribute the success of populism to the growing number of "losers of globalization" (e.g., Bornschier 2010; Kaltwasser 2015; Kriesi et al. 2006). However, explanatory models addressing socio structural mechanisms rarely define their components, nor do they state precisely the status of the variables in the explanations of populist attitudes. It is still unclear what individual psychological processes or collective mechanisms are implied in the different steps from structural change to individual attitudes (Flecker, 2016). This study builds on the concept of resentment and operationalizes its components to further understand the relationship between structural characteristics, resentment and populism. Finally, the study looks at the specific situation of ethnic minorities and how they translate their feelings of vulnerability and resentment into political attitudes – i.e. populist attitudes. Classical immigration theories suggests that more integrated minorities are also

more capable of effectively interacting with the host country's political system, becoming less inclined to support populist ideas. On the other side, the "Integration Paradox" suggests that it is structurally highly integrated minorities who often turn psychologically away from the political system of their host society (Dancygier & Saunders, 2006; Maxwell, 2008). They are considered to feel more relatively deprived (De Vroome, Martinovic, & Verkuyten, 2014; Verkuyten, 2016), express more, not less, ethnic hostility and are more, not less, distrustful of the political system (Tolsma, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2012). These theories will be empirically tested using data provided by the Belgian Ethnic Minority Election Study from 2014 (Swyngedouw et al. 2016). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section will provide a definition of populism and develop a measurement for populist attitudes. The next section will work out a theoretical framework which further develops and operationalizes existing theories. Finally, hypothesis which explain the relation between social structural characteristics, resentment and support for populism among ethnic minorities are proposed. Next, the data and measures will be described and the results of the empirical analysis presented. In the conclusion, the implications of the findings will be elaborated on.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Defining Populism

Populism is commonly defined as *"a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the common will of the people."* (Mudde 2007; Stanley, 2008). There are two essential components which together give the populist ideology its specific discursive logic. First, there is the people centrist component of populism. Populist demand that political decisions are made under full popular control, and that the sovereignty of the people is the absolute point of departure of all political action (Canovan, 1999; Weyland, (2001). Democracy is conceptualized first and foremost as the direct rule of the people, often embodied by a charismatic leader who can speak and act directly on behalf of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Canovan, 2002; Mudde, 2004; Mény & Surel, 2002; Papadopoulos, 2002; Taggart, 2002). The "people" are thereby considered as homogeneous entity. Membership to this entity, however, is in most cases only vaguely defined and changes continually (Canovan, 1984; Mudde, 2004). Often, populist define the people in exclusive terms based on nativism or xenophobic nationalism. In other cases, populist have developed a more inclusionary notion of the people: all those who are excluded and discriminated against (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). The exact form of populism is therefore highly dependent on its specific context, and is shaped by other "thick" ideologies to which it is attached (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; Weyland, 1996; Zaslove, 2008). The second important component refers to the anti-elitist tendency of populism. Populist

structure society into an antagonistic relationship between "the people" on the one side and "the elite" on the other (Canovan, 1999). Ordinary people are thereby regarded as inherently 'good' or 'decent', in counterpart to the dishonest and corrupt political and corporate establishment (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012). Populism therefore reflects a deep seated cynicism of existing authorities who are accused of acting only in their own interest while being alienated from the real interests and values of the common people (Hakhverdian et al 2012; Schyns, Nuus, & Dekker, 2004). By emphasising the malfunctioning of representative democracy and casting doubt on the established politicians ability to solve the people's problems, populist politicians capitalise on widespread negative political evaluations with regard to both the integrity and competence of the established elites and the responsiveness and effectiveness of the political system as a whole (Abts, 2016; Barr, 2009) This makes populist skeptical of key features and institutional structures that are intrinsic to liberal democracy, that is, compromise and mediating institutional bodies (Abts & Rummens, 2007).

2.2 Measuring Populism as an Attitude

One of the first studies that tried to tap into populist attitudes more directly was conducted by Stanley (2011). The author developed a measure of populism which tried to incorporate both the ideas and the provocative language in which populism is often expressed. This line of research was further developed by Hawkins, Riding & Mudde (2012) who disentangled populist attitudes from pluralist and elitist attitudes. All three concepts were measured with distinctive indicators and correlated to policy areas such as education, income and immigration. Similarly, Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove (2014), contrasted populist attitudes with pluralist and elitist attitudes and tested them by relating them to party preferences in the Netherlands. Their findings showed a significant and positive relationship between populist attitudes and respondents inclination to vote for populist parties in the Netherlands. Problematic however is that previous researchers have used single mean scores for the analysis of populist attitudes. As Schulz et al. (2016) have pointed out, measuring populist attitudes as a unidimensional construct does not account for the different components of the populist ideology. Individuals scoring high on one dimension of populism, have the same score as both, individuals scoring high on the other dimension, as well as individuals who score moderately on the two dimensions. Accordingly, people who hold anti-elitism attitudes but who do not see popular sovereignty as a solution to compensate for the failures of the political elite are indistinguishable from individuals who show the opposite pattern of attitudes, that is, who do not see the political elite as corrupt, but who favor popular sovereignty. In treating populist attitudes as a single dimension, researchers cannot distinguish between these two different views on politics. While this study builds on the work of Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove (2014) and Hawkins,

Riding, and Mudde (2012), it will use anti-elitist attitudes and popular sovereignty as two separate dependent variables, which together constitute the specific populist logic.

2.3 The Losers of Globalization and Populism

Demand side theories often explain populism as a response to globalization and individualization which have created a division between 'winners' and 'losers' in Western Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Betz, 1990, 1993; Calhoun 1988; Kriesi, 2006). It is argued that support for populism disproportionately originates in the lower strata of society, that is, among lower educated individuals, and those who lack sufficient material resources (Lubbers, Gijsberts & Scheepers, 2002; Oesch, 2008). Those who have been placed in a vulnerable position are considered to have difficulties with contemporary changes because of less available negotiation space and exit options in everyday life (Mileti, Plomb & Plomb, 2007). The "losers" feel increasingly disintegrated from society, and are more likely to seek for psychological compensation in the populist ideology. In order to empirically test the losers of globalization thesis, researchers have tried to show how different types of vulnerabilities are translated into a populist reaction (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016). Economically, vulnerability has largely been produced through the breakup of the Fordist regulation model, which was based on an international regime of embedded liberalism, and an interventionist welfare state (Offe, 1985; Lash & Urry, 1987; Marglin & Schor, 1990). Due to global production systems, and flexible labor practices an increasing number of lower educated individuals in Western European countries no longer possess either the right skills or the knowledge to find a satisfying job in the labor market (Burnham, 2000,). They increasingly lack the material resources to protect themselves from competition with others, feeling as a consequence more insecure and threatened in their social position (Castells, 1997; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 1999; Held & McGrew, 2000; Standing, 2016). Populist exploit these vulnerabilities by directing growing discontent to "out-groups", that is, all those who are not member of the "people". Usually, it is the ethnic "other" (Lubbers et al., 2002; Rydgren, 2003; Van der Brug, Fennema, & Tillie 2005), as well as the "corrupt elite" which are made responsible for all the wrongdoings (Norris 2005; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2007; Werts et al. 2012). Further vulnerabilities are created through the continuing processes of individualization (Bauman, 2013; Beck, 1992) and a shift towards post materialist values (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Collective identities that were once used to construct the life world, especially those based on working class and religious identities, are disappearing, resulting in individual's loss of a sense of belonging (Beck, 1992; Bauman, 2013; Touraine, 2000). In the same vein, social isolation thesis (Arendt, 1951), proposes that people who are disconnected from meaningful social relationships, are more likely to develop social distrust and intolerance, resulting in an increased search for radical ideologies which are capable of enhancing their self-esteem (Arendt, 1951; Rydgren, 2009).

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To conclude, the losers of globalization thesis postulates that support for populism largely results out of the social disintegration of an increasing part of the population. Populist attitudes are thereby considered as the expression of individual interests. Based on experiences of vulnerability, individuals form interests which in turn guide their political orientations (Citrin & Green, 1990). The individual interest perspective however, has been empirically challenged (Feldman 1981; Kinder & Kiewit 1984; Mutz 1998; Sears & Funk 1990), and the accumulating research findings indicate that the link between the personal situation and political choices is not as straightforward as suggested. Van der Brug, Fennema & Tillie (2000) for example, have shown that socio-structural characteristics alone are not sufficient to explain the variance in support for populism. Not only deprived individuals are attracted by populism, but also groups such as the core workforce and the ranks of skilled workers. Populist attract their support, more than established parties, across various social boundaries. The losers of globalization approach therefore recognizes too little that social changes are not only producing winners and losers, but also so called "vulnerable swimmers", that is, people who find it hard to keep their social status and who are worried about their future (see Abts, 2012). People's attitudes cannot be accounted for in terms of purely rational, material, and structural forces. Instead, there is a more complex human social and interpretative process at work, a process that involves both broader sociohistorical factors and individual psychological factors. Resentment is often seen as such an interpretative framework, standing between social structure, life world and populist attitudes (see Abts, 2012).

2.4 Resentment and the Populist Translation

Resentment has been described as reaction to social structural changes, focusing on a psychological malaise on the one hand and populism on the other. In the current philosophical literature, resentment has been defined as "*enduring, socially located sentiment which is influenced by relations of power, with elements of restrained or blocked emotion*" (Mann & Fenton, 2017: 32). Like the reflexive emotions of shame and embarrassment, resentment is a reaction resulting from a sense of insecurity and displacement due to a discreditation of one's rank and value (Hieronymi, 2001; MacLachlan, 2010; Mann & Fenton, 2017). However, unlike shame and embarrassment which both refer to negative self-judgments, resentment has a collective presence and force (Stockdale, 2013; Elgat, 2016). In this regard, Max Scheler's (1961) emphasized the social embeddedness of resentment. Resentment had to be understood as a long lasting and socially situated rather than a fleeting individual emotion. In particular, Scheler focuses on the discrepancies between widespread egalitarian cultural values on the one hand, and actual economic and political inequalities on the other. People's sense of resentment is shaped by perceptions of "fairness", and in turn, their sense of fairness is rooted in a comparison with a relevant other (Hoggett et al. 2013; Rhodes 2010). Resentments can be so widespread that they affect a structural

category of people within a society (Melzer & Musolf, 2002). It has been argued that subordination on the basis of class or ethnicity may become a source of resentment since individuals in these categories share conditions of existence and relationships to power as a collective (Fassin et al. 2013; Stockdale, 2013). Hoggett et al. (2013), argue that resentment carries with it a feeling of 'blocked emotion resulting from a collective sense injustice which people cannot influence or effectively oppose. Following the approach of Abts (2012), resentment can analytically be linked with the combination of three essential components: (1) chronic feelings of insecurity and displacement, (2) collective feelings of relative deprivation and injustice; (3) feelings of powerlessness and not being able to change one's frustrating situation. The notion of resentment is therefore different from anomia or relative deprivation: the theory of anomia neglects the issue of relative deprivation and social justice, while the theory of relative deprivation is neglecting the importance of powerlessness that transforms the feelings of unjust discrimination into a harsh emotion of bitterness waiting for revenge.

Insecurity is the first important element of resentment. An individual's sense of economic insecurity arises from negative expectations for the future in regard to one's own socio economic position (Hacker, Rehm & Schlesinger, 2013). While populism does not speak to individual self-interest directly, it expresses a concern for a collectivity, usually identified by phrases like the "common" people. The strong reference to the people suggests that populism can be viewed as a psychological coping mechanism. The populist ideology depersonalizes vulnerability and turns individual into collective responsibility (Mummendey et al. 1999). The empty signifier, "the people," unites various divergent grievances and provides stigmatized groups a positive social identity. Populism offers people a valuable coping strategy to deal with feelings of deprivation and frustration and to maintain their self-respect (Hogg, 2005). Culturally, an individual's sense of insecurity refers to ontological and existential dimensions (Felling, Scheepers & Peters, 1986; Billiet, Carton & Huys, 1990). "Ontological security" is at the core of Giddens' (1991) theory of human existence and refers to a person's fundamental sense of safety in the world. Ontological security requires the development of a consistent feeling of biographical continuity where the individual is able to sustain a consistent narrative about the self (Kinnvall, 2004). Individualization, however, has made it more difficult to think in terms of singular, integrated and harmonious identities, as individuals constantly have to renegotiate their relationships with an increasing number of others (Giddens, 1991; Kinnvall, 2004). Ontological insecurity has also be described as a longing for a more manageable, predictable and reliable world (Calhoun 1988). It intensifies people's search for one coherent and stable identity. Ontologically insecure people are likely to find in populism a sharp group distinction between the "ordinary people" and the establishment, between us and them, friend and enemy (Canovan 1999; Mudde 2004; Panizza, 2005). Populism defines a collective identity in

opposition to the "other". It is a form of a collective identity, based on a feeling of community shared with the members of a group which is identified as "we", accompanied by the consciousness of being different than the other group, defined as "they". To assure the self of how it is essentially different from the other, the other needs to be systematically debased. By ordering the other both structurally (e.g., politicians as "corrupt") and psychologically (by turning the elite into an enemy), the elite is seen as "evil," while the people are seen as "good." Those who do not subscribe to a common belief system thus challenge the very foundation of the group. Through the binary structuring of the social world, populist are able to offer simple solutions to complex problems.

Aside from individual feelings of insecurity, another crucial explanatory concept for resentment is relative deprivation (Stouffer et al., 1949, Pettigrew, 1967, Runciman, 1966). Relative deprivation refers to the perception that compared to a relevant referent, one or one's group is unfairly deprived of desirable goods (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984; Vanneman; Pettigrew, 1972). According to Smith et al. (2012: 204) relative deprivation consists of three aspects: (1) people make comparisons with others; (2) resulting in the perception to be at a relative disadvantage compared to others; and (3) the perceived disadvantage is interpreted as unfair invoking feelings of resentment (see also: Pettigrew et al., 2008; Pettigrew, 2016). It is perceived as a form of discrimination against 'people like us', who in this society 'never get what they deserve' (Hogg et al. 2010). Thus, relative deprivation as 'a sense of violated entitlement' (Cook et al., 1977) refers to a perceived unjustifiable discrepancy between what is and what ought to be. Runciman (1966) furthermore introduced the crucial distinction between egoistic (individual) relative deprivation, a feeling of being unfairly disadvantaged as an individual, and fraternal (group) relative deprivation, a feeling that one's in-group is deprived compared to relevant out-groups. While individual relative deprivation is likely to be related to outcomes at the interpersonal level, such as well-being (Pettigrew, 1964; Runciman, 1966; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972; Walker & Mann, 1987; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pettigrew et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2012), it is group relative deprivation which appears to be most conductive for injustice and resentment, and predominantly related to populist attitudes. Group relative deprivation relates directly to the master slave dialectic as expressed by Nietzsche. For Nietzsche (2010), the indisputable goal of the deprived is to undermine the power of the masters while gaining power for themselves. Nietzsche writes: *These weak people some day or other they too intend to be strong, there is no doubt of that, some day their 'kingdom' too shall come...* (Cited in Rollins, 2007). Populism, understood as an appeal to `the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, promises political salvation through the action of the sovereign people (Canovan, 1984; Laclau, 2005). Populism translates feelings of relative deprivation into a general hope that ordinary

people, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can overcome the failures of the established elites (Canovan, 1984).

The last important element of resentment is the notion of powerlessness. Perceived powerlessness is the sense that one's life is shaped by forces outside one's control (Mirowsky & Ross, 2001; Ross & Sastry 1999). It is a sense of separation from important outcomes in one's life. As such, it represents a major form of subjective alienation (Seeman, 1983). Feelings of powerlessness are reinforced by multiple, interlocking disadvantages. An individual's lower class position, scarce resources, lack of education and social capital, can all result in a general feeling of powerlessness. (Bourdieu, 1993; Castel, 2003; Flecker, 2009; Standing, 2016). A sense of powerlessness with regard to one's own destiny and the world in general, tends to reinforce a fear of change and leads to personal withdrawal and, as a consequence, to a fear of the 'other' and of the exterior. Powerlessness thus engenders reluctant resignation and passivity. The individual becomes cynical about the political system and believes that governments are corrupt and problematic and cannot be trusted (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997).

2.5 Acculturation and Support for Populism

If there is a relationship between social structure and resentment on the one hand, and populism on the other hand, a crucial question then is how ethnic minorities are translating their feelings of vulnerability and resentment in political attitudes – i.e. populist attitudes. It is still unclear how populism as majoritarian ideology relates to individuals who hold a minority position in society. While there is no road map insofar as explanations of populist attitudes among minorities are concerned, clues exist based on some literature which links acculturation processes with the formation of political and institutional trust among ethnic minorities.

The classical assimilation perspective holds that assimilation of ethnic minorities into the host country's cultural norms and values, leads to more favorable attitudes towards liberal democratic institutions, while disintegration is associated with more negative attitudes (Alba & Nee, 1997; Esser, 2001; Gordon, 1964). It is argued that more assimilated migrants spent more time in the host society and share accordingly more cultural practices with natives (Bracey, Meier & Rudwick, 1971; Ladner, 1973; Rumbaut, 1997). As a result, they are more capable of effectively interacting with the host country's political system, which enhances political trust and government satisfaction (Maxwell, 2008, 2010). On the other side, migrants who are less familiar with the cultural practices are more likely to be in conflict with host societies norms and have difficulties interacting with native-origin individuals, resulting in the expression of more negative attitudes about the host society and its political system (Park, 1950; Park, Burgess & McKenzie,

1925; Gordon, 1964). As such, socio cultural integration can be considered to weaken support for populism among minorities.

In contrast to the classical assimilation perspective, scholars have put forward two alternative explanations which make opposing predictions. Both argue that integration may in fact be related to less favorable evaluations of the political system, hence increased support for populism. Similar to classical assimilation theory, modern assimilation theory argues that those immigrants residing the longest in the host society will show greater similarities with the majority group in terms of political attitudes (Michelson, 2001, 2003). However, if ethnic minorities follow this pattern, then it should follow that those who are more assimilated are more likely to have anti-elitism attitudes, since general trust in government among natives has dramatically declined. Today most Western Europeans are extremely cynical about politics (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton, 2000). Logically extending this argument, it is expected that second-generation migrants, who were born in the host society are more likely to share native's social and cultural experiences and therefore their political evaluations (Abrajano & Alvarez, 2010; Blalock, 1967). They are more likely to be cynical about established power structures than those who are less assimilated. Less integrated minorities i.e. many first-generation migrants, are often more accepting of the host country's political system. Typically, they have undergone conscious sacrifices and may be prepared to accept difficult circumstances in the host society (Kao & Tienda, 1995; de la Garza, Falcon, & Chris Garcia, 1996; Escobar, 2006). The argument suggest that generational status has a direct effect on populist attitudes (a stronger effect on the anti-elitism component).

On the other hand, ethnic competition theory, also known as the separation mode of acculturation is opposed to assimilation theories which have been criticized for being overly sociocultural, paying little attention to the economy in which immigrants and their descendants work (Gans, 2007; Portes & Rumbaut, 1996; Portes & Zhou, 1993). The theory postulates that greater socioeconomic success and greater familiarity with the dominant culture allow immigrants to gain a more accurate and realistic understanding of the inequality and the practice of discrimination in the host society as they compete with members of the dominant group (Portes, 1984, 1995; Portes & Bach, 1985; Portes, Parker, & Cobas, 1980; Portes et al, 2005; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Structurally more integrated minorities are therefore expected to feel more resentment toward the host society which in turn enhances support for populism. In line with ethnic competition theory, the theory of rising expectations proposes that immigrants who are structurally more integrated tend to develop higher expectations and become therefore more susceptible to feelings of relative deprivation i.e. resentment (Buijs et al. 2006). Although their expectations have risen considerably along with their education, their opportunities have not developed at the same pace (Powers & Ellison, 1995; Landry 1987; Collins 1983, 1993). Whilst higher educated ethnic minorities have a good education, they experience more trouble finding a job than the equally educated majority group (Gijsberts

& Vervoort, 2009). They feel that they have to work twice as hard for the same reward. As a result, they become disappointed and turn away from society (Buijs et al. 2006). Ethnic competition theory therefore suggest that the effect of structural integration on populist attitudes is mediated by feelings of resentment. Furthermore, ethnic competition theory claims that individuals choose to resist assimilation, and instead maintain a separate ethnic identity (Mendoza and Martinez, 1981). In line with the theory, a stigmatized group is likely to find in the empty signifier, "the people," a way to adopt a group perspective to interpret their social position and maintain their self-respect (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996; Bobo, 1999; Bonilla-Silva, 1997). It is the distinction applied in populist discourse between us (the ethnic group) and them (established native elites) that a stigmatized group is able to overcome their frustrations and rate oneself among a certain group (Taggart 2002). The more ethnic group membership constitutes a core part of their identity, the more they will define themselves as part of the "people of ethnic descent" and the more they will find in populism an attractive ideology.

2.6 Religion and Populism

The impact of religiosity on resentment and populism seems to be more complex. For many minorities with Turkish or Moroccan background, Islam offers a sense of religious and cultural identity (Fleischmann, Phalet & Klein, 2011; Güngör, 2013). Such an identity is socially constructed based on the notion one has of oneself and the recognition of this notion by others (Franz, 2007). Individuals seeks to negotiate an agreement between this self-image and the image which is ascribed to oneself by others (Hopkins, 2011). An individual needs to feel that his or her identity is recognized and respected by others, in order to provide a sense of dignity. In Europe, Muslims are often portrait as backward, uneducated religious fanatics and generations of Muslims in Europe have had to cope with these stereotypes; as a result, feelings of resentments might be more profound among people for whom Islam is a central aspect in life (Franz, 2007; Coenders, Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005; Crul & Heering, 2008). Such resentments are likely to be transformed into support for populist ideas. On the other hand, although most religions preach tolerance toward out-groups, they permit some forms of prejudice against people who are perceived to violate the religion's value system. The case of religiosity can therefore also be understood from the perspective of symbolic threats. Symbolic threats refer to the perceived differences in cultural domains such as religions, moral values, norms, etc. (Manevska & Achterberg, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Stephan et al. 1998). More religiously involved people might perceive a sense of incompatibility of their religious way of life and with secular notions of nation and democracy. Those individuals feel potentially more alienated from their host society (De Koster et al, 2011). Similarly, social identity theory (Ellemers & Haslam, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) argues that people tend to show more negative attitudes towards other identity groups, especially in situations of group competition.

2.7 The Belgian Case

There are several reasons why Belgium is considered a suitable case to study the support for populism among ethnic minorities. Persons of Turkish and Moroccan descent generally occupy a disadvantaged socio economic position in Belgian society. In the Belgium, the notion of 'immigrants' is predominantly associated with the Turkish and Moroccan communities that have their roots in the post war labor migration. First generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants came to Belgium to work mostly in low paid jobs (i.e. coal mining and steel operations), jobs which most Belgians were unwilling to do (Reniers, 1999). The economic crisis of 1973 meant the beginning of a new period in the Belgian immigration history. Changes such as deindustrialization and a diminishing supply of upwardly mobile working class jobs have reduced the opportunities for low skilled immigrants to access social mobility. Low-skilled labor immigrants were no longer needed because of an increasing automatization of industrial work, increased unemployment among native workers, and the outsourcing of production to low wage countries (Caestecker, 2006). The realization that Muslims were not returning to their countries of origin in the 1980s gave rise to heavy backlashes among working-class Belgians competing for jobs, resulting in a crisis which was further exploited by rightist politics. This has meant that those Turkish and Moroccans eager to integrate, have faced stark opposition from the public.

3. Hypothesis

There are several sets of hypotheses which can be derived from the preceding theories. The losers of globalization approach generally focuses on the lower positions of individuals in the social structure and assumes direct effects on populist attitudes. Taking this approach as a vantage point, it is hypothesized that the (a) lower educated, (b) the lower classes, (c) respondents with low levels of income and (d) those with low social capital are more likely to endorse populist attitudes (H1a -H1d). From the theory of resentment, it is deduced that respondents with high levels of (a) ontological insecurity, (b) economic insecurity, (c) perceived group relative deprivation and (d) a sense of powerlessness are more likely to have populist attitudes (H2a - H2d). Furthermore, the theory claims that resentments mediate the relationship between social structural indicators and populist attitudes. More specifically, it is hypothesized that the lower positions in the social structure, as well as so called swimmer's (those in intermediate positions) are more resentful and consequently more likely to support populist attitudes than respondents in the higher positions (H3a - H3d). Finally, there are those hypotheses which make ethnic specific claims. The classic assimilation perspective predicts that (a) second generation immigrants, and (b) those who endorse assimilation as an acculturation strategy are more likely to score low on populist attitudes, with a stronger effect on anti-elitism. The effects are predicted not to be mediated by resentment (H4a, H4b). The modern assimilation perspective predicts the opposite. (a) Second generation

immigrants, and (b) those who endorse assimilation as an acculturation strategy are hypothesized to score high on populist attitudes, again with a stronger effect on anti-elitism (H5a, H5b). The hypotheses, rooted in ethnic competition theory, predict that (a) second generation immigrants, (b) those in a higher social structural positions, score high on populist attitudes. Ethnic competition theory assumes that the more integrated are more aware of inequalities, the effects are therefore assumed to be mediated by resentment. The mediation effect of relative deprivation is thereby considered to be the strongest among the resentment components. (H6a - H6b). Furthermore, ethnic competition theory predicts that those who endorse separation as an acculturation strategy score high on the popular sovereignty component of populism (H7). The last set of hypotheses, concerning religious involvement, predicts that the more religiously involved are more likely to feel resentments towards the host society and are consequently more likely to endorse populist attitudes (H8).

4. Methodology

4.1 Data

The hypothesis are tested using the Belgian Ethnic Minority Election Study (BEMES) from 2014. The surveys was organized after the Belgian elections of 2014 by the Institute of Social and Political Opinion research (ISPO) and the Centre d'Étude de l'Opinion (CLEO). BEMES is a large scale Belgian survey, designed to comprise a representative sample of the target population of persons of at least 18 years old with the Belgian national citizenship and of Turkish or Moroccan descent, living in Liège or Antwerp. BEMES focuses on surveying political and socio economic attitudes and political behavior. The survey contains detailed questions on party preferences, electoral behavior, political participation and on welfare state and socio-economic attitudes (Swyngedouw et. al. 2016). The age restriction to people of at least 18 years and national citizenship rights was used since an important part of the survey deals with voting behavior and political attitudes. Accordingly, it was important that the respondents had the right to vote in the Belgian federal elections. A person was assigned the Turkish or Moroccan descent if either the father or mother had a Turkish or Moroccan nationality, or if the person's first or current nationality was Turkish or Moroccan. Due to budgetary limitations and practical considerations related to the fieldwork, the sample is geographically restricted to people living in Liège or Antwerp. The total sample then, exists of four parts; residents of Turkish and Moroccan descent living in Antwerp and Liège. A simple random sample of 500 to 700 persons was drawn in each of the groups. The fieldwork work was conducted between October 2014 and December 2015 and consisted out of computer assisted face to face interviews. Both interviews and questionnaires were administered in French (Liège) or in Dutch (Antwerp). The minimum response rate for the total sample is 38.12 percent. In total, 878 respondents were interviewed.

The data were weighted by gender, age and ethnicity. Cases with incomplete information were deleted, resulting in total sample size of 779 respondents.

4.2 Indicators

Dependent Variable

In this paper, support for populism is measured using two latent constructs. The first, '*popular sovereignty*' refers to a people centric view on politics. It is refers to the demand that political decisions are made under full popular control. The second latent construct, *"Anti elitism"* refers to a general conviction of the incompetence and immorality of politicians, political institutions and the political system as a whole (Hakhverdian et al 2012; Schyns & Koop, 2007). The latter is characterized by a high degree of fatalism and political frustration, while the first appears as a politics of hope (Spruyt, 2014). Demand for popular sovereignty is measured with five items, such as *"People and not the politicians should take decisions"*, *"People would be better represented by ordinary citizens"*, or *"Better if politicians just followed the will of the people"*. All of these items articulate a notion of popular sovereignty, while also at least implicitly representing the people as a homogeneous entity. The second latent construct is measured using the four items *"Voting has no sense"*, *"Parties are only interested in my vote"*, *"Most politicians promise a lot but do nothing"*, and *"As soon as politicians are elected, they think they are better"*. Across both dimensions, various items depict the antagonistic relationship between the entity of ''the people'' and the entity of ''the politicians'' or the ''government.'', which is essential in the logic of the populist ideology.

Mediation Variables

There are four latent factors measuring the different dimensions of resentment. *Economic Insecurity* is measured through responses to two items eliciting the respondent's worries about near-term economic misfortune. *Ontological insecurity* is measured with two items that refer to fast social changes and express the feeling of not being able to deal with such change. *Group relative deprivation* is measured with three items that express the feeling of belonging to a group that is deprived in society. The three-item scale does not specify with which group, people compare themselves, but rather suggests comparisons between the respondents and generalized others. The items do not make any reference to politics or politicians. Higher scores on the scale indicate stronger feelings of deprivation. *Powerlessness* is measured using one item which captures the respondent's belief in internal lack of control, while two items tap into the respondent's perception of external lack of control. All items are measured on a five point scale. Validity, reliability and dimensionality of the items were tested and confirmed by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis.

Predictor Variables

   Respondent's education indicates the highest level of education completed and is coded into three categories: 'low' (no school attended or completed primary school only), 'intermediate' (all levels of secondary education and intermediate vocational education), and 'high' (tertiary professional education and university). The measurement of respondent's *subjective income evaluation* tries to capture the respondent's total currently disposable income. The indicator is coded into three categories: 'low' (not enough, difficult to get along), 'intermediate' (just enough to get along), and 'high' (more than enough, can easily save money and enough to get along without difficulties). The measurement of *social class* is based on a subjective indicator covered by the question: *"Could you tell me among which class you count yourself?"* Answers were coded as 'working class', 'lower middle class', and 'higher middle and upper class'. This measurement explicitly acknowledges the subjectivity of social class and the social class cultures people are embedded in (Liu et al., 2004). *Associational membership* is coded as a dummy variable. Respondents with at least one active membership in an association (sport, cultural, religious, neighborhood or antidiscrimination), were coded as one. Respondents with no active membership were coded as zero. In the operationalization of *religious involvement*, the distinction is made between Muslims (mostly Sunnis) who are regularly involved in religious practices (fasting during Ramadan, regular prayer), Muslims who do not practice on a regular base, and respondents who are atheist or practice a religion other than Islam. *Immigrant generation* is coded as into three variables. First generation immigrants are born abroad, have at least one foreign-born parent, and migrated to the Netherlands after they had reached 13 years of age. Those who migrated to the Netherlands before reaching 13 years of age and having at least one foreign-born parent are classified as the first and a half generation (Rumbaut, 2004). Those who were born in the Netherlands are coded as second generation. Finally, *Acculturation Strategy* is coded into four categories. Assimilation stands for respondent who identify exclusively as Belgian. Integration refers to those who identify equally as Belgian as well as with their origin country. Marginalization refers to those who identify with neither of these identity categories. Finally, separation refers to those who identify predominantly with their origin countries.

Control Variables

   The study controls for several possible interfering factors. *Region* is included to control for any regional differences between Liege and Antwerp. *Gender* is included to control for the generally greater support for populist politics among males than females (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). Respondent's *age* is included to control for possible cohort effects. The study further controls for *political interest,* measured on a one to five scale with the higher scores indicating higher political interest. Finally, the study controls

for respondent's ideological disposition, is measured on a scale from zero (political left) to ten (political right).

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of manifest independent variables

Variable		Percentage
Gender	*Female*	50.9
	Male	49.1
	Total	100
Ethnic group	*Moroccan*	49.1
	Turkish	50.9
	Total	100
Region	*Antwerp*	54.9
	Liege	45.1
	Total	100
Education	*Primary or lower secondary*	35.5
	Higher secondary	47.3
	Tertiary	17
	Total	100
Social Class	*Lower*	44.2
	Middle	34.9
	Upper	18
	Total	100
Subjective Income	*Low*	20.2
	Intermediate	42.7
	High	36.2
	Total	100
Social Capital	*Not a member of association*	63.8
	Member of association	36.2
	Total	100
Generation	*First*	24.6
	First and a Half	12.8
	Second	62.6
	Total	100
Acculturation Strategy	*Assimilation*	28.4
	Integration	53.5
	Separation	8.5
	Marginalization	9.1
	Total	100
Religious Involvement	*Non practicing Muslim*	40.4
	Practicing Muslim	47.2
	Non-believer, other religion than Islam	12.4
	Total	100
	Range	**Mean**	**STD**
Age	17 - 78	32.5	11.34
Rightist	0 - 10	3.95	2.38
Political Interest	1 - 5	2.59	1.21

Source: Belgian Ethnic Minority Election Study, N=779

4.3 Statistical Modeling

The statistical analysis is carried out in two major steps (Byrne 2006; Kline 2005; Hoyle 1995). First, the measurement models for the two theoretical constructs resentment and populist attitudes are tested. This is accomplished using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), designed to test the multidimensionality of both constructs. Additionally, multigroup comparison will be conducted to test for cross-group invariances of the factorial structures between Turkish and Moroccan respondents. This is necessary in order to test whether the two constructs have the same theoretical structure and psychological meaning across the two groups. The items included in the measurement model for both resentment and populist attitudes are outlined in the above measurement section. Second, the full structural model with the hypothesized relations is tested. All models are fitted in Mplus using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (MLR).

5. Results

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

CFA models were used to compare competing factorial structures for populist attitudes and feelings of resentment. Model 1 in table 2, represents a CFA model in which all populist attitude items load on one factor. Global fit indices show that the unidimensional model fits the data only very poorly. Model 2 shows a CFA with two factors (measured by four and five items respectively) that are uncorrelated. Fit indices improved substantially by specifying two dimensions instead of a single factor, but the overall fit remains unsatisfactory. In Model 3, the assumption of uncorrelated dimensions is relaxed. The model allows the two latent constructs to be correlated. Judging by all fit indices, Model 3 performs substantially better than the one without correlations (Model 2) resulting in a satisfactory model fit. This confirms that the postulated components of populist attitudes constitute two separate but interrelated components. Finally, modification indices suggest an error correlation between two anti-elitism items (v97_1 with v97_2). The inclusion of the error correlation in model 4, improves model fit significantly ($\Delta\chi2 = 19.3$, df = 1, p < .001), and is theoretically justified because both items overlap content wise. Based on these arguments, the error correlation will be included in all subsequent models. In similar vein, the factor analytic structure of the resentment items was tested. In table 3, model 1 represents again the CFA with all items loading on a single factor. The fit indices clearly indicate that a one factor structure does not fit the data. Model 2 introduces the items of the four components of resentment. The four factors are set to be uncorrelated with each other. The fit indices for this model remain unsatisfactory. Finally, model 3 allows all factors to be correlated with each other. The global fit indices improve substantially resulting in an acceptable model fit. In the last step, the possibility of overlapping components of resentment and populist attitudes was tested. In order to do so, all resentment

items and all populist attitude items were combined into a single factor solution. As can be seen in table 4: model 1, global fit indices clearly indicate that the one factor model needs to be rejected. Model 2 tests a factor solution with six uncorrelated factors resulting in a somewhat improved but still not optimal fit indices. Model 3 with correlated factors improves substantially. Finally, model 4 including the error correlation term (v97_1 with v97_2) gains a satisfactory fit. The results support the hypothesis that all latent factors used in the analysis measure empirically distinct constructs.

Table 2: Fit indices of CFA models, Resentment*

Model	Description	X^2	df	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	489.2	35	0.122	0.107	0.55	0.421
2	First order model with 4 uncorrelated factors	271.2	37	0.085	0.182	0.768	0.717
3	First order model with 4 correlated factors	52.1	29	0.03	0.034	0.977	0.964

*Economic Insecurity, Ontological Insecurity, Powerlessness, Relative Deprivation

Table 3: Fit indices of CFA models, Populist Attitudes

Model	Description	X^2	df	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	485.9	27	0.14	0.125	0.524	0.365
2	First order model with 2 uncorrelated factors	112	27	0.06	0.12	0.912	0.882
3	First order model with 2 correlated factors	73.9	26	0.046	0.044	0.95	0.931
4	First order model with modification*	54.6	25	0.037	0.04	0.969	0.956

* V97_2 with V97_1

Table 4: Fit indices of CFA models, All

Model	Description	X^2	df	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	1294.2	152	0.093	0.112	0.486	0.421
2	First order model with 6 uncorrelated factors	608.9	154	0.058	0.166	0.795	0.772
3	First order model with 6 correlated factors	234.5	137	0.028	0.041	0.956	0.945
4	First order model with modification*	217.9	136	0.026	0.041	0.963	0.954

* V97_2 with V97_1

Measurement Equivalence

In order to draw valid conclusions, the meaning and interpretation of the measurements should be equivalent for all subgroups in the population. A measurement instrument which does not operate in the same way across groups, leads necessarily to ambiguous interpretations of its meaning. The result is a lack of definitiveness in knowing whether group differences are due to true attitudinal differences or, rather to psychometric differences related to the item responses (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). This study

tests for factorial equivalence between Turkish and Moroccan respondents based on examination of the covariance structure for the resentment and populist attitude items. First, the covariance structure of populist attitudes are compared. Table 5 compares the fit indices of a series of models with different restrictions imposed. Model 1 shows the results of a configurally equivalent model, that is, equal factor structures but no cross-group restrictions on loadings or residuals[1]. The configural model has a good fit, implying that the number of factors and the pattern of factor loadings are similar among Turkish and Moroccan respondents. The result indicates that the same dimensional structure is found across both groups. However, this finding does not necessarily imply that meaningful comparisons of the latent factors can be made between the two groups, as this requires equal factor loadings. Therefore, in the next step the factor loadings were constrained. Comparison of model 2 with the previous one yielded a corrected ΔMLM $\chi2$ (6) value of 9.23, which is not statistically significant. It can therefore be concluded that the factor loadings operate equivalently across both ethnic groups. Model 3 constraints the common error correlation between item v97_1 with v97_2 (established earlier) to be equal across both groups. The overall model reveals no significant model improvement, which indicated that the error correlation works equally across both groups.

Finally, the covariance structure of resentment was compared across both groups. Model 1 in Table 6, reveals satisfactory indicators for the configural model, implying once again that number of factors and the pattern of factor loadings are similar across both ethnic groups. Model 2 with constraint factor loadings does not result in improved model fit, implying factor equivalence across the groups. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that both measurement instruments for resentment and populist attitudes, operate equivalent across the Turkish and Moroccan group. Both groups can therefore be meaningfully compared in the following structural equation model.

Table 5: Tests for Invariance of Populist Attitudes Across Turkish and Moroccan Respondents:

Model	Description	X^2	df	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	Model Comparison	ΔMLM$\chi2$*	Δdf	p
1	Configural invariance	74.6	48	0.036	0.04	0.975	0.962	-	-	-	-
2	All factor loadings Invariant	83.8	54	0.033	0.05	0.975	0.967	2 versus 1	9.2357	6	0.161
3	All factor loadings Invariant; One common residual covariance invariant	83.7	55	0.035	0.052	0.973	0.964	3 versus 2	0.3338	1	0.563

corrected values

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[1] Baseline models for both ethnic groups (with modifications) can be found in the Appendix

Table 6: Tests for Invariance of Resentment Across Turkish and Moroccan Respondents:

Model	Description	X²	df	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	Model Comparison	ΔMLMχ2*	Δdf	p
1	Configural invariance	80.2	58	0.03	0.04	0.976	0.962		-	-	-	-
2	All factor loadings Invariant	83.8	64	0.028	0.048	0.976	0.966	2 versus 1	6.4175	6	0.378

*corrected values

Full Structural Equation Model

In order to test the hypotheses, a structural equation model was developed, relating social structural indicators with the latent constructs of resentment and populism. Table 7, displays the direct and total effects of the predictors, on the latent factors. The total effects are the sum of the direct effects and the indirect effects that run through the mediating variables. Detailed insight in the explanatory model requires information on both effects. While the direct effects are especially useful to uncover differential impacts of predictors, the total effects provide insight in the general patterns in the data. First, the effects on the two component of populist attitudes will be analyzed. As hypothesized, resentful individuals in general tend to hold stronger anti-elitism views. Especially feelings of powerlessness are strongly linked to anti-elitism. An increase of one standard deviation on the powerlessness scale goes hand in hand with an increase of 0.382 standard deviations of the anti-elitism-score. Also group relative deprivation (0.313) and ontological insecurity (0.326) turn out to be positively linked to anti-elitism views. Only economic insecurity has no significant effect on anti-elitism views.

Interestingly, the effects on the popular sovereignty component of populist attitudes are differently distributed. Only relative deprivation has a significant positive effect on the popular sovereignty score. On standard deviation increase in relative deprivation is related to 0.238 standard deviation increase in popular sovereignty. The other resentment indicators do not reveal any effects on popular sovereignty, making relative deprivation the only resentment component which scores on both populist attitude factors. Economic insecurity on the other hand, is the only resentment indicator which is not related to any of the two populist attitude components. The results partially confirm the second hypothesis which stated that resentment is related to populist attitudes.

Turning to the structural variables, it can be seen that education is significantly related to anti-elitism views. Looking at the total effects, lower educated score 0.2 standard deviation higher on anti-elitism views than the higher educated (i.e. the reference category). Unlike hypothesized by the losers of globalization theory, however, the effect is even stronger for those with intermediate educational degrees. The non-significant direct effects indicate that the relationship between education and anti-elitism views is completely mediated. The fact that the lower educated report more sentiments against established

Table 7: Full Structural Equation Model Showing Direct and Total Effects

Parameter Estimate		Ontological Insecurity	Economic Insecurity	Relative Deprivation	Powerlessness	Anti Elitism		Popular Sovereignty	
		Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct	Direct	Total	Direct	Total
Ethnic group	Moroccan (ref.cat)								
	Turkish	-0.018	-0.007	-0.06	0.135*	0.012	0.043	-0.024	-0.029
Education	High (ref.cat)								
	Intermediate	0.158*	0.024	0.04	0.247***	0.093	0.252**	-0.029	0.027
	Low	0.128	0.077	0.026	0.192**	0.065	0.187*	0.073	0.115
Social Class	High (ref.cat)								
	Intermediate	0.016	0.047	-0.01	0.088	0.098	0.133	0.002	0.008
	Low	0.141	0.158*	-0.026	0.162***	-0.029	0.068	-0.011	0.019
Subjective Income	High (ref.cat)								
	Intermediate	0.161**	0.179**	0.230***	0.221***	-0.051	0.149*	0.09	0.189**
	Low	0.212**	0.381***	0.344***	0.267***	0.043	0.305***	-0.011	0.125
Social Capital	Not a member of association (ref. cat.)								
	Member of association	-0.025	-0.021	-0.02	-0.159**	0.142*	0.066	0.128**	0.105*
Generation	1 (ref.cat)								
	1.5	0.098	0.064	-0.061	-0.036	0.061	0.059	-0.015	-0.019
	2	0.026	0.035	0.019	-0.065	0.171*	0.158*	0.119	0.121
Acculturation Strategy	Assimilation (ref.cat)								
	Integration	0.171**	0.078	0.089	0.056	0.058	0.159*	0.004	0.056
	Segregation	0.042	-0.03	0.037	-0.018	0.023	0.041	0.128*	0.141*
	Marginalization	-0.002	0.016	0.148*	0.006	0.024	0.068	0.101	0.136*
Religious Involvement	Non practicing Muslim (ref.cat)								
	Practicing Muslim	0.073	0.011	0.116	0.195***	0.003	0.137*	-0.185*	-0.130*
	Non-believer, other religion than Islam	0.006	-0.015	-0.063	0.012	0.028	0.017	-0.116*	-0.129*
Gender	Female (ref.cat)								
	Male	-0.220***	-0.135**	0.128*	-0.056	0.093	0.042	0.05	0.043
Region	Antwerp (ref.cat)								
	Liege	-0.057	0.190***	0.054	-0.002	0.074	0.064	0.113	0.119
Age		0.170**	0.107	0.066	0.237**	-0.073	0.09	-0.02	0.043
Rightist		-0.053	-0.041	-0.104	-0.069	0.029	-0.044	-0.04	-0.079
Political Interest		-0.192**	0.082	-0.057	-0.171**	0.105	-0.045	0.117	0.06
Ontological Insecurity						0.324***	0.324***	0.145	0.145
Economic Insecurity						-0.034	-0.034	0.005	0.005
Relative Deprivation						0.291***	0.291***	0.238**	0.238**
Powerlessness						0.394**	0.394**	0.093	0.093
Explained Variance		0.276***	0.191***	0.201***	0.460***	0.394***		0.208***	

Chi-square: 775.495; Df: 402; RMSEA: 0.035; CFI: 0.855; TLI: 0.801

Note: The parameters displayed are semi-standardized when the independent variable is a dummy (thus representing the difference with the reference category in terms of standard deviations of the dependent variable) and fully standardized in all other cases.

N = 779; * p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001

power structures is accounted for by their higher perceived powerlessness. The same holds true for the group of intermediately high educated respondents. However, part of the indirect effect for this group, is also explained by higher ontological insecurity. While there is a clear effect of education on anti-elitism views, there is no such effect on popular sovereignty. As expected, income deprivation has a strong effect on populist attitudes. Respondents with high income deprivation are significantly more likely to hold anti-elitism views than respondents without income deprivation. The effect is less strong, albeit still significant for respondents with intermediary levels of deprivation. For both groups, the effect is explained by all four resentment variables. Additionally, there is a substantial effect for respondents with intermediate income deprivation on popular sovereignty attitudes. This group is more likely than the ones with more income to endorse the popular sovereignty component of populism. No effect on either of the two populism components can be found with regard to subjective social class affiliation. While there is an effect of lower class affiliation on perceived powerlessness and economic insecurity, the effect does not explain any variation in any of the two populist attitude components. In terms of social capital, there are significant total and direct effects on popular sovereignty. Being a member of at least one association results in a 0.128 standard deviation increase in the popular sovereignty score. Since the effect is not mediated by any of the resentment indicators, it is not entirely clear what mechanism causes the relationship. The result suggests that membership in an association is related to an increased sense of collective group efficacy which explains the attitudes on popular sovereignty. The effect of associational membership on anti-elitism views is more ambiguous. Looking at the direct effect, one can see that social capital significantly increases anti-elitism views. The total effect however is not significant. A look at the indirect effects shows that this can be explained by a negative indirect effect mostly via powerlessness. While the indirect effect is not significant, it seems to be enough to cancel out the positive total effect of social capital on anti-elitism attitudes.

The next step is to analyze the effects of the ethnic specific predictor variables on populist attitudes. The findings reject the classic assimilation hypothesis which states that later generation migrants, those who are in sociocultural terms more assimilated, have more preferable attitudes towards the political system. Looking at generational status, it can be seen that second generation migrants score significantly higher than first generation migrants on anti-elitism attitudes. In order to see whether the effect can be explained by feelings of resentment, the total and direct effects are inspected. Since both effects are significant, it can be excluded that the relationship is mediated by feelings of resentment. The finding speaks against the ethnic competition thesis which argues that more integrated migrants have less favorable attitudes towards the political system because of higher resentments. Instead, it suggests that more integrated migrants are less favorable of the political system because their political attitudes have generally become

more similar to the attitudes of natives. No such effect of generational status can be found with regard to views on popular sovereignty.

There are a few interesting things to say about the effect of acculturation strategies on populist attitudes. Respondents who mostly retain their ethnic identity, hence take a separation strategy, score 0.141 standard deviations higher on the popular sovereignty score. The effect is not mediated by any of the resentment indicators. Similarly, marginalized respondents are more likely to endorse popular sovereignty views. The effect of marginalization on popular sovereignty is partially explained by relative deprivation. The results show that ethnic minorities who do not feel Belgian, either because they exclusively endorse their ethnic minority identity or because they do not claim any of the two ethnic identities for them, are more likely to demand to bring power back to the people.

Figure 1: Path diagram of showing significant direct effects

Chi-square: 775.495; Df: 402; RMSEA: 0.035; CFI: 0.855; TLI: 0.801

Next, the relationship between religious involvement and populist attitudes will be analyzed. As can be seen, more religiously involved respondents are significantly more likely to hold unfavorable views on the establishment than less religiously involved respondents. The effect is in part explained by feelings of powerlessness. Interestingly, there is a negative unmediated effect of religious involvement on popular sovereignty. Religiously more involved respondents, as well as non-Muslims and atheist score

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significantly lower on popular sovereignty views than non-practicing Muslims. Overall, about 0.39 percent in the variability of anti-elitism attitudes and about 0.21 percent of popular sovereignty is explained by the explanatory variables. Finally, none of the control variables is in a significant way related to any of the two populist attitude components. There are only a few effects on the resentment components worth mentioning. With regard to gender: males are somewhat more inclined to feel relatively deprived than women, on the other side they report lower levels of ontological insecurity. Respondents in Liege report on average higher levels of economic insecurity than respondents in Antwerp, fitting with the generally worse of economic situation in the Walloon area. Lastly, political interest is negatively related to powerlessness and ontological insecurity.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

This paper has tested the central argument that resentment as the pivot between social structure on the one hand and a populist reaction on the other, is a central explanatory concept in the context of ethnic minority political attitudes. The results provide a nuanced view on the predictors of populist attitudes. One of the advantages of measuring populist attitudes directly is that the measure is not contaminated with other ideas, allowing for a stricter testing of the link between experienced vulnerability, resentment and the support for populism. The robustness of the proposed measure in this study could be confirmed by testing its psychometric properties across two different ethnic groups. This is one of the first studies that has tested a populism scale among non-native individuals. The fact that the scale holds a measurement invariance test indicates that the instrument can be used for further research on minority populations in other countries.

At the theoretical level, the study started with the general assumptions of the losers of globalization framework. The framework suggests that support for populism, originates in different social structural vulnerabilities. The study could indeed empirically show that support for populism, is affected by different feelings of economic and cultural vulnerability. In that sense, populism succeeds where contemporary political parties fail, namely, in uniting different grievances (Mair, 2013). While the data clearly underlines the importance of social structural characteristics, there are however, limitations to this approach. The analysis provides strong indication that it is not, as so often assumed, only the losers of globalization who are attracted to populist ideas. While social and economic disadvantages and marginalization are clearly breeding grounds for support for populism, the data shows that it is not a matter of structural disadvantages alone. Support for populism can be found across the lowest positions as well as among the positions in the middle. As such, it is not vulnerability per se that matters (i.e., income deprivation, educational attainment, social capital, and class position) but subjectively experienced vulnerability, that is, feelings of resentment (i.e., ontological insecurity, powerlessness and relative

deprivation). In other words, "objective" vulnerability matters for populism through "processed" vulnerability. Especially important here is the strong effect of relative deprivation. People do not opt for populism because they feel economically deprived; they only opt for populism from the moment they deal with their vulnerability by adopting a discourse that presents society as unjust and interprets their personal situation as the consequence of that injustice (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016). Ontological insecurity and feelings of powerlessness explain only a part of the support for populism. Both are related to a cynical outlook on the political establishment and the political system in general. However, without the activation of feelings of relative deprivation, they do not result in the full populist reaction. Overall then, populist parties and politicians draw on people's resentments and translate their daily experiences and concerns into support for populism. Although the data seem to support that interpretation, further research needs to investigate the interplay between the demand and supply side of populism.

The data confirms the hypothesized factor structure of resentment supporting the proposed operationalization of resentment as a crucial concept in the explanation of populist attitudes.

In this study, special attention was paid to the specific situation of ethnic minorities. Migrants seems to learn much of their unfavorable views with regard to established power structures over time and generations and become more similar in that regard to the native population. While second generation migrants, at least in Belgium, are more likely to be cynical about political elites, they are not so because of resentments towards the host society. This does not ignore the fact that many first generation migrants often feel disappointed and frustrated as well, mainly because of the unexpected difficulties they face living in a foreign society. However, most migrants leave their homelands out of substantial dissatisfaction. For that reason, even difficult circumstances in the host society are likely to be viewed in a more positive light. The results portray a more optimistic vision of migrant integration in Europe. The findings are at odds with the ethnic competition theory, which postulates that second-generation migrants, feel more resentments towards the host society (Gans, 1992; Waters, 1999; Crul and Heering, 2008). However, this is not to say that all minorities eventually assimilate, making ethnic identities irrelevant in the study of populism among ethnic minorities. Although it is only a small percentage (17.6) of all respondents who deny any identity affiliation with their host countries, the results still show that for those who do, populism seems to be a highly attractive ideology. Populism can serve to identify otherwise overlooked political problems and give marginalized groups a legitimate voice. It is precisely this characteristic which makes populism potentially so appealing to minority groups. The "identity" element has always been present in the theoretical work of the thesis of the losers of globalization. In empirical research, however, it has received little attention. The results in this study confirm the view of populism as a form of identity politics. The role of religion among ethnic minorities in the formation of populist attitudes also seems worthy of further research. More religious individuals are clearly more alienated

from society i.e. feel more powerless. As a consequence they are more cynical about established power structures. However, religion, and religious involvement more particularly, seems to serve as the "sacred" alternative to the more secular salvation ideology of populism. Populist see absolute power residing in the people. The Islamic doctrine, which sees absolute power only in god, might be ideologically incongruent with populist ideas and beliefs. Since religion still plays a central role in the lives of many ethnic minorities in Western Europe it seems important to consider religious believes in future research on the relation between minorities and populism.

Finally, like all research projects, this study is not free from limitations. First, the current research design does not test for any interrelationships between the resentment components as well as between the populism components. A second order model of populist attitudes resulted in an unstable factor solution, which is why a first order model was chosen. A second order factor structure for the resentment indicators did not improve the model fit while making the analysis of the indirect effects through the single components less parsimonious. Future attempts to measure populist attitude might also benefit by including a few more items that tap more explicitly into anti-elitist attitudes concerning social life in general. The second limitation of the study is related to its use of a cross sectional design. Future studies should seek to employ broader cross-sectional, longitudinal or experimental research designs, to disentangle more clearly the causal relationship between existing resentments and the susceptibility for populist messages.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: CFA results for the specific populism factors

Standardized factor loadings

		Anti-Elitism	Popular Sovereignty
V97_1	Voting has no sense	0.601	
V97_2	Parties are only interested in my vote	0.694	
V97_3	Most politicians promise a lot but do nothing	0.808	
V97_4	As soon as politicians elected, they think they are better	0.693	
V99_1	People and not the politicians should take decisions		0.681
V99_2	People would be better represented by ordinary citizens		0.721
V99_3	Power should be returned to the people		0.674
V99_4	Better if politicians just followed the will of the people		0.708
V99_6	Ordinary people know better than politicians		0.593

Correlations between factors

		Anti-Elitism	Popular Sovereignty
	Anti-Elitism	1	
	Popular Sovereignty	0.392	1

Model fit: *Chi-square: 73.995; Df: 26;*
RMSEA: 0.046; CFI: 0.950; TLI: 0.931

Appendix 2: CFA results for the specific resentment factors

		Economic Insecurity	Ontological Insecurity	Powerlessness	Relative Deprivation
Standardized factor loadings					
V90_1	financial worries will increase	0.681			
V90_2	difficulties to keep social position	0.901			
V64_1	Don't understand what's happening		0.674		
V64_2	Things are too complicated		0.912		
V64_3	You can't do anything about the things that happen to you			0.582	
V64_4	I do not have much influence on society			0.583	
V64_5	I feel like a powerless play ball of current changes			0.699	
V125_1	We have to wait longer than others				0.771
V125_2	People like me are being systematically neglected				0.835
V125_3	In times of economic crises we are the first victims				0.675
Correlations between factors					
	Economic Insecurity	1			
	Ontological Insecurity	0.328	1		
	Powerlessness	0.462	0.668	1	
	Relative Deprivation	0.316	0.299	0.466	1

*Model fit: Chi-square: 52.14; Df: 29; RMSEA: 0.046; CFI: 0.977; TLI: 0.964*

Appendices 3. Overview of Confirmed Hypotheses

	Anti-Elitism (Direct)	Popular Sovereignty (Direct)	Anti-Elitism (Indirect)	Popular Sovereignty (Indirect)
Education (Low)			H3a (+)	
Education (Intermediate)			H3a (+)	
Social Class (Low)				
Social Class Intermediate)				
Subjective Income (Low)			H3c (+)	
Subjective Income (Intermediate)			H3c (+)	H3c (+)
Social Capital (High)				
Generation (Second)	H5a (+)			
Acculturation Strategy (Assimilation)				
Acculturation Strategy (Separation)		H7 (+)		
Religious Involvement (High)			H8 (+)	
Ontological Insecurity	H2a (+)			
Economic Insecurity				
Relative Deprivation	H2c (+)	H2c (+)		
Powerlessness	H2d (+)			

Figure 2: Hypothesized multigroup baseline models of Populist Attitudes for Turkish and Moroccan Respondents

Figure 3: Hypothesized multigroup baseline model of Resentment for Turkish and Moroccan Respondents