



An exploration of gender differences in negotiation behavior

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Author's note

A few years ago, a new term was introduced to the world and it cannot be avoided ever since: the metrosexual, or, as we call it in The Netherlands, the 'metroman'. Wikipedia provides the following definition: "Metrosexual is a portmanteau of metropolitan and sexual, coined in 1994 describing a man (especially one living in an urban, post-industrial, capitalist culture) who is especially meticulous about his grooming and appearance, typically spending a significant amount of time and money on shopping as part of this". With David Beckham as a leading example, more and more Dutch men 'came out' for their metrosexuality. Where a certain interest in fashion and lifestyle was usually associated with homosexuality, nowadays it is widely accepted and considered to be normal. However, critics argue that the 'real man' is disappearing in The Netherlands. This discussion attracted my supervisor's attention, and when he brought up this subject I was immediately interested. Altogether, the writing of my thesis was an informative process, and it has given me interesting insight in the way different groups of Dutch men think about their masculinity.

I would like to thank several people who helped and supported me in writing my thesis. First of all, my supervisor Per van der Wijst, for his enthusiasm, his helpful feedback and his guidance throughout the whole process of writing. I would also like to thank my family, friends and my boyfriend Tom for their everlasting support. Lastly, I would like to thank all my respondents: without you this thesis would not exist.

Abstract

Over the years, many research on gender differences in negotiation behavior has been conducted. The most salient difference that has been found is that men tend to approach negotiations in a distributive manner, where the emphasis lays upon achieving the highest possible outcome without taking into consideration the other party. Women on the other hand are found to prefer an integrative negotiation approach, in which the emphasis lays upon achieving an outcome which satisfies both parties. However, this cooperativeness has generally been equated with weakness and ineffectiveness, whereas competitiveness has been associated with negotiation effectiveness. More recent studies however did not often found the same gender differences in negotiation behavior that has been found in previous studies. This study tested the question whether gender differences in negotiation behavior are reducing. It was expected that the male participants did not differ from female participants, and that this for the most part was due to the type of respondents. Recent studies that have not found differences in negotiation behavior, often made use of a highly educated respondent group, as did this study. For that reason, it was decided to add a control group consisting of males who were expected to possess many masculine traits. Participants were asked to prepare a negotiation on the basis of a conflict case, and were guided in the form of a crash course about negotiation styles. The results revealed that the standard male participants did not differ much from female participants in their negotiation behavior when they were not made aware of a certain role. The control group however, was found to differ from both the male and female participants in almost every choice they made.

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1. Introduction

Imagine a situation in which you are looking for a new car. You have found the perfect car, and although the price of the car is slightly above your budget, you are confident that you can lower the price through negotiation. When you contact the vendor, he warns you that the car is very popular and that if you would like to purchase the car you would have to come along today. Unfortunately, you are not able to visit the vendor today. You decide to ask a relative to do the bargaining in your place instead. Now, would you rather ask a male relative or a female relative? Most of you would probably feel more comfortable sending a male relative to do the bargaining. When it comes to bargaining, the prevailing image is that men outperform women. Bargaining is traditionally seen as a typical male task. This line of thought is supported by empirical research: many studies have shown that men are better bargainers than women (Kolb, 2009; Watson, 1994; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). Women were found to initiate a negotiation less often compared to men, are less likely to ask and demand, and are more likely to set lower goals (Kolb, 2009). This has led women for instance to settle with a lower salary. Furthermore, they are less confident during a negotiation and feel lower self-efficacy about their bargaining skills compared to men. Men on the other hand are known as competitive bargainers, who make many demands and few concessions (Watson, 1994). Overall, research in the field of gender differences in negotiation has resulted in the common view that distributive bargaining, where the emphasis lays upon achieving the greatest possible profit, is a stereotypically male domain. On the other hand, integrative bargaining, where the emphasis lays upon creating a 'win-win' situation, is a domain where women usually feel more comfortable. The general picture however, is that men outperform women in any kind of negotiation.

The common view that men are better negotiators than women, is mainly attributable to stereotyping. Stereotyping is the act of assigning a characteristic or trait to a member of a particular group based solely on the individual's membership in that group (Grossman & Lugovsky, 2011). Over the years, much research has been conducted in the field of gender stereotyping. Traditionally, women are perceived to be more communal than men, which includes characteristics as dependency, caretaking and selflessness. Men on the other hand are perceived to be more agentic, where characteristics as ambitiousness, self-reliance, independency and assertiveness are strongly represented (Eagly, 1987). According to Eagly's Social Role Theory (1987), there are differences in expected behavior from men and women, based on what is believed to be appropriate behavior for the role one has to fulfill. This has

resulted in traditional gender roles, where men are expected to be the breadwinner and women are expected to take care of the children and the household (Eagly, 1995). Hence, typical female-dominated careers usually contain jobs in the field of caretaking, while typical male-dominated jobs are jobs that require strength and toughness, such as construction workers or firefighters. Negotiations are seen as a part of the masculine social role, and therefore believed to be not suitable for women (Stuhlmacher, Citera, & Willis, 2007). Masculine traits, such as dominance, assertiveness and independency, are generally granted to effective negotiators, whereas the feminine traits such as being submissive and emotional are usually granted to ineffective negotiators (Raiffa, 1982; Lax & Sebenius, 1986).

It is open to doubt, however, whether these stereotypical differences between male and female negotiators are still accurate these days. Elgoboir, Munduate, Medina and Euwema (2014) conducted research among Spanish and Dutch worker representatives and found no differences in negotiation behavior between men and women. Since the Netherlands are known as a rather gender equal country, in which both men and women occupy equal positions in the public and private sphere, the question arises whether differences in negotiation behavior and outcomes are still present nowadays (Hofstede, 1996). Moreover, several theses carried out by students at Tilburg University in different experimental set-ups found no differences in negotiation behavior between men and women (Beekmans & van Lierop, 2011; Blommaert, 2011; de Munck, 2012; Stiffe, 2014). The question is whether there is still a clear distinction between masculinity and femininity in The Netherlands, or whether these differences are gradually leveling out in specific groups, such as students. Typical research respondents are often students at the university, and precisely the studies that used this type of respondents did not often find the same gender differences in negotiation behavior that has been found in previous studies. The aim of the current study is to examine whether differences in negotiation behavior between men and women still exist, and in what form this manifests itself. Based on the discussed studies which examined the role of gender differences in negotiations, this study will address the following research question:

RQ: Are the gender differences in negotiation behavior that have been found over the years still accurate nowadays?

1. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Gender differences in negotiation

Over the years, much research has been conducted to explore gender differences in negotiation situations. Many studies on gender differences in negotiation have concluded that men behave in a more competitive manner during a negotiation than women and that men tend to negotiate better outcomes than women. Women on the other hand were found to usually behave in a more cooperative manner (Walters, Stuhlmacher & Meyer, 1998; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). Besides this most salient distinction, other findings have emerged over the years. First of all, men and women conceive negotiations in different ways. Pinkley (1990) explored how individuals frame a conflict, and found that women were more likely to perceive conflicts in terms of relationship characteristics, whereas men were more likely to perceive conflicts in terms of task characteristics. Research has shown that individuals who approach a negotiation in terms of task characteristics achieve better negotiation outcomes than those who approach the negotiation in terms of relationship characteristics (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). As a result, men often outperform women in a negotiation.

Furthermore, research has shown that men and women not only conceive negotiations differently, but that they are also treated differently in negotiations. Kray (2011) investigated the effect of gender stereotypes on deceptive behavior, and found that female negotiators were deceived more frequently than male negotiators. Moreover, male negotiators lied more to female opponents than they did when they were interacting with their male opponents (Kray, 2011). This clearly shows men feel stronger when they are negotiating against a female opponent compared to when they are negotiating against a male component. This might have something to do with the stereotype around women who negotiate, which will be explained later on. On the same note, research has shown that men tend to use more ethically ambiguous tactics than women, such as emotional manipulation (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders, 2015). Emotional manipulation includes faking anger, fear or disappointment, as well as faking positive emotions such as elation or satisfaction. Not only do men use more ethically ambiguous tactics, it is what is expected of them from society. Schminke, Ambrose and Miles (2003) conducted an experiment in which a scenario was described where either a male or female actor was faced with an ethical dilemma. Participants had to rate their perceptions of the actor's ethics. The results showed that male actors were perceived to be more utilitarian in their ethics. This means that they give greater attention to outcomes which create social good and minimize social harm, rather than to rely on rules. According to this philosophy, an action is morally right

if its consequences lead to happiness, and wrong if an action ends in unhappiness. Female actors on the other hand were perceived to be more formalistic, which means that they were thought to pay more attention to rules and principles than to the actual outcomes.

Another finding that has emerged from research is the fact that men and women communicate differently in a negotiation. Watson and Kasten (1998, as cited in Lewicki et al., 2015) argued that women perceived men to communicate more assertively than men did. Moreover, aggressive and competitive tactics are viewed differently when women adopt these tactics instead of men. Bowles, Babcock and Lai (2007) showed in their study that men and women were both less likely to be hired when they negotiated aggressively, but that women were far less likely to be hired when they displayed aggressive behavior during the negotiation than men. Along the same line, Dreher, Dougherty and Whitely (1989) found that men and women do not only receive different outcomes during salary negotiations, but that the same tactics may have opposite effects on salary negotiation outcomes as well. Their study showed that women who offered their superiors an exchange, who reminded their superiors of past favors, or who offered to make personal sacrifices to obtain the desired outcome, tended to end up with lower salaries than women who did not use these tactics (Dreher et al., 1989). Meanwhile, men obtained opposite results with these tactics; they received higher salaries using the same tactics. Dreher et al. (1989) suggest these findings may be due to stereotyping: women who use bargaining tactics may violate stereotypic expectations about appropriate female behavior.

These findings are consistent with the overall prevailing ideas about female negotiators, namely that they are not as capable as men. But what causes women to negotiate worse outcomes than men? Kolb and Coolidge (1988) argued that women approach negotiations in different ways, which they have divided into four themes. The first theme is called *Relational View of Others*. According to Kolb and Coolidge, women differ from men in that they define themselves through their relationships. Women are more sensitive for relationships that are formed during a negotiation. They perceive negotiations in a larger context and are aware of how their actions can affect others. Furthermore, women place greater emphasis on interaction goals. By means of relational ordering, which means creating a climate where people get to know each other by sharing values and learning from each other's modes, women define themselves through relationships (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988).

The second theme is called the *Embedded View of Agency*. An embedded form of agency emphasizes the fluidity between the boundaries of oneself and others. Kolb and Coolidge suggest women see negotiation as a behavior that occurs within a relationship. They do not

draw strict boundaries between negotiating with someone and their relationship with that person. Consequently, they may be less likely to recognize that negotiations are occurring because they have difficulties with signaling the beginning and the end of a negotiation, unless the negotiation is specifically marked out from the background against in which the negotiation occurs. Men on the other hand are able to demarcate negotiating from other behaviors that occur in the relationship (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988).

The third theme, *Control Through Empowerment*, focuses on the role power plays in a negotiation. Whereas men use power to achieve their own goals and to force the other party to capitulate to their view, women are more likely to seek empowerment instead of power (Lewicki et al., 2015). An empowerment view is a view which allows all parties to express their interests to achieve a mutual agreement (Kolb and Coolidge, 1988).

The fourth and last theme Kolb and Coolidge discuss in their book, is called *Problem Solving through Dialogue*. Women usually solve problems through communication and interaction. Through careful listening and joint exploration of ideas, they strive towards mutual agreement (Kolb & Coolidge, 1988). Men on the other hand use dialogue to convince the other party that their standpoint is the right one.

Lewicki et al. (2015) added another two important factors that affect how women and men approach negotiations. The first factor is the *Belief about Ability and Worth*. Women have less belief in their own ability and worth compared to men, which results in worse outcomes. Barron (2003) found that women were less likely to request for a higher salary than men did. According to Barron, this is due to multiple determinants: women feel less about themselves and their value in the workplace, and do not feel like they are entitled to a higher salary. The second factor that possibly influences the way negotiation is perceived is *Perceptions and Stereotypes*. Negotiation situations activate the so called gender belief systems, which regards how men and women actually *do* act or *should* act in that particular context (Bowles & Flynn, 2010).

2.2. Gender stereotypes

Lewicki et al. (2015) suggest that stereotypes might be a factor that influence the way a negotiation is perceived. According to Raiffa (1982), effective negotiators are assertive, rational, decisive, constructive and intelligent. Ineffective negotiators are regarded to be weak, irrational, emotional and too conciliatory (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). It may not come as a surprise that many of the traits that characterize effective negotiators are perceived to be masculine in nature and are therefore more valued at the bargaining table, whereas the traits of ineffective

negotiators are perceived to be feminine in nature and therefore less valued when it comes to negotiating (Elgoboir, Munduate, Medina & Euwema, 2014; Kray, Galinsky & Thompson, 2001; Steele, 1997).

Although these characteristic traits might not be accurate anymore, stereotypes ensure that this mindset persists. Regardless of whether a negotiator endorses this point of view, just being aware of the fact that someone who is masculine in nature is seen as a more effective negotiator, and someone who is feminine in nature is rather seen as an ineffective negotiator, can influence bargaining behavior because the activation of stereotypes is impossible to avoid (Devine, 1989). Women suffer most under these stereotypes. Let's go back to the situation portrayed at the beginning of the introduction. Kray, Galinsky and Thompson (2002) also discuss in their paper the example of buying a new car, which is a typical and common negotiation scenario. According to the authors, women usually bring a man with them when they are buying a new car. Not only do they do this to be taken more seriously, but to get a better deal as well. Car dealers make skillful use of the general view that women are the weaker sex when it comes to bargaining; one audit of new car dealerships revealed that vendors charged women with significantly higher prices than they did with men who used exactly the same scripted bargaining strategies as women (Ayres & Siegelman, 1995). More importantly, Kray et al. (2002) stated that over and above any bias on the part of the dealer, women carry an additional burden with them into the dealership, which is the possibility that anything they say or do will be interpreted in light of the stereotype about women's inferior negotiating ability.

This 'burden', as Kray et al. (2002) call it, is termed stereotype threat and is described as the risk of conforming to a negative stereotype about one's group (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Ultimately, it can influence a negotiator's performance. Steele and Aronson provided the following explanation for this shift in performance: "The existence of such a stereotype means that anything one does or any of one's features that conform to it make the stereotype more plausible as a self-characterization in the eyes of others, and perhaps even in one's own eyes." Steele (1997) argued that the threat becomes reality because concern over confirming the stereotype produces anxiety, lowers expectations, and reduces performance and, thus, unwittingly confirms the stereotype. Although he did not empirically test these claims, several other studies have found that when people are being made aware of a stereotype, they adjust their behavior according to that particular stereotype (Kray et al. 2002). In other words, negatively stereotyped groups will experience a threat when they are confronted with the stereotype and thus will perform worse, whereas positively stereotyped groups will perform better when they are confronted with the positive stereotype.

For instance, Spencer, Steele and Quinn (1999) found that men outperformed women on a math test when they were told that gender differences actually exist, without even mentioning stereotypes. Kray et al. (2001) found that activating stereotypes relevant to negotiation performance had a stronger positive effect on men's negotiating performance than it had a negative effect on female performance. Hence, positively stereotyped groups, like men in negotiations, will perform better when these traditional stereotypes are activated. Kray et al. (2002) found that when women were told that feminine traits were positively related to negotiation performance, they would set higher goals for themselves and outperformed men. Men, who are traditionally seen as better negotiators, worsened their performance after the female stereotype was activated. This study has shown that even groups who are not negatively stereotyped, can in fact experience stereotype threat. The opposites hold too: disadvantaged groups, such as women in a negotiation, can benefit from the activation of a regenerated stereotype (Kray et al. 2002). However, this study has also shown that when the traits that are linked to a successful negotiator are gender-neutral, men still outperformed women.


2.3. Conflict style

From the findings that have been discussed so far can be concluded that men in general approach negotiations in a masculine, distributive manner, whereby the achievement of the best outcome is most important, whereas women prefer to approach negotiations in an integrative manner and thereby lay great emphasis on the relationship with their counterpart. Although the distributive/integrative negotiation approach is probably the most well-known negotiation style distinction, there are more factors that determine how someone behaves during a negotiation. Besides the natural tendency to approach a negotiation in a more distributive or integrative manner, people also have an individual style which more or less predicts how they will handle a conflict. One popular and frequently used model that classifies interpersonal conflict-handling modes is the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode model, which can be seen in Figure 1. This model assumes that one's motivation to choose a conflict-handling strategy is based on two underlying dimensions, namely attempting to satisfy the other person's concern, by means of cooperative behavior, and attempting to satisfy one's own concern, by means of assertive behavior (Kilmann & Thomas, 1977; Elgoboir et al. 2014; Sorenson, Morse and Savage, 1999). These two dimensions lead to five possible behaviors, namely competing behavior, avoiding behavior, collaborating behavior, accommodating behavior and compromising behavior.

High concern for oneself and low concern for others leads to forcing or competing behavior. This particular assertive behavior involves typical distributive tactics such as threats

and bluffs, persuasive arguments and positional commitments (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, and Nauta, 2001). In extreme cases, negotiators who exhibit this style can become aggressive and dominating. This behavior is competitive in nature and is therefore not surprisingly mostly used by men. Low concern for oneself and others leads to avoiding behavior, which is very passive and involves reducing the importance of issues (de Dreu et al. 2001). High concern for self and others leads to problem solving or collaborating behavior, which leaves both parties in a state where they are both satisfied with the outcomes (de Dreu et al. 2001). Negotiators who exhibit this style focus on finding creative solutions that results in mutual gains, and suggest many alternatives for consideration. Low concern for oneself and high concern for others leads to yielding or accommodating, which means adjusting to the other party's demands (de Dreu et al. 2001). Negotiators who prefer this kind of conflict-handling, usually care more about the relationship with their counterparts instead of achieving the highest profit. Women often display accommodating behavior, since they demand less and are more interested in maintaining a harmonious environment (Kilman and Thomas, 1977). However, this cooperativeness and lower level of competitiveness have generally been equated with weakness and ineffectiveness (Watson, 1994). The fifth and last behavior is compromising, which indicates intermediate concern for oneself paired with intermediate concern for others (de Dreu et al., 2001). In general, men and women differ in their preference for an individual negotiation style. The characteristics of the competitive individual negotiation style show many similarities with the characteristics of masculinity. In the same way, the characteristics of the problem solving individual negotiation style show many similarities with the characteristics of femininity. It would therefore be a logical consequence if it turns out that men who possess many masculine traits would have a preference for a competitive individual style and will adopt this more often, whereas women who possess many feminine traits would have a preference for a problem solving individual style and thus adopt this style more often.

Figure 1. Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument



2.4. Gender differences in The Netherlands

One would logically conclude from the discussed findings that women are indeed the weaker sex when it comes to negotiation, but this might not be the case. Although many studies have shown that men are better negotiators than women, whether or not because of their masculine nature or because of the stereotype threat, there are also studies that came up with opposite results. A meta-analysis on gender differences in negotiation outcomes and their moderators by Mazei, Hüffmeier, Freund, Stuhlmacher, Bilke and Hertel (2015) showed that men indeed had a bargaining advantage over women under conditions of highest predicted role incongruity for women. As stated before, masculine behavior is usually considered essential for negotiating economic outcomes, such as the previously discussed example which focused on the negotiation about the price of a car (Raiffa, 1982; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). As a result, women might be especially disadvantaged when they have to negotiate for economic outcomes because it is not congruent with their behavior that stems from their gender roles (Mazei et al., 2015). However, under conditions of lowest predicted role incongruity, for instance when they possessed negotiation experience or were negotiating on behalf of someone else, women had a bargaining advantage over men. Matzei et al. (2015) suggested that gender differences favoring men cannot only be reduced but can be reversed under conditions which are congruent with the female role. Bear and Babcock (2012) found similar results. They examined whether gender differences would be eliminated or even reversed if the negotiations focused more on the feminine social role. Although men still outperformed women when the negotiation task was considered masculine, gender differences were eliminated in the feminine version of the

negotiation task. It was predicted that women would outperform men in the feminine version, but it turned out this was not the case. Bear and Babcock suggest that this might be due to the masculine nature of negotiation itself, which neutralized women's advantage in negotiating over a feminine issue. These studies show that men are not necessarily better negotiators than women, but that it depends on the kind of task. However, on the basis of these studies, gender differences and the overcoming of these could only occur when there is a typical masculine and feminine culture. The question is whether we can still speak of a typical masculine and feminine culture in The Netherlands.

Elgoboir et al. (2014) conducted an experiment in both Spain and The Netherlands, where they explored the role of male and female worker representatives, and compared the perceived support from their constituency and how that perceived support was related to their negotiation behavior. The reason behind this investigation was the increased concern from the European Union with gender equality in representation positions in organizations. Whereas the Netherlands are seen as a society where gender equality is relatively high, Spain used to be a society where gender equality is relatively low. Spain has been an example of a society with the classical male breadwinner, female home career tradition. While men are responsible for the income, women take care of the household. According to this tradition, men are responsible for the welfare of their families, what is considered to be the most important task. Not for nothing that it is often said: "A real man takes care of his family". Taking care for the family by providing the income is therefore considered to be typically masculine. In the Netherlands, the roles are more equally divided (Hofstede, 1996; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004). The dual breadwinner, dual career is therefore applicable (Pfau-Effinger, 1998). In 2011, 83% of the women in the Netherlands participated in the work-force, which is a relatively large number compared with other EU countries (Eurostat, 2011). Yet the work field is not the only place where roles are divided relatively equal: Dutch men increasingly adopt an active role in the household.

Elgoboir et al. (2014) expected that accommodating behavior is used less by worker representatives in Spain, compared to worker representatives in The Netherlands. They found no gender differences in the use of accommodating behavior at the negotiation table between male and female worker representatives. This was both the case for worker representatives in The Netherlands, as well as for worker representatives in Spain. These results contradict the prevailing gender stereotypes, namely that men are better negotiators than women. However, they found a difference in the use of accommodating behavior between Spain and the Netherlands. Worker representatives in Spain, both male and female, were using significantly

lower accommodating behavior than worker representatives in the Netherlands. A possible explanation might be that in the Netherlands a cooperative industrial relations climate prevails. In this climate, the sharing of power between management and workers is typical for the Dutch way of organizing. Under a cooperative industrial climate, feminine stereotypes such as relationship orientation have been concluded to be highly valued in western cultures. Moreover, in such a climate, accommodating behavior can be perceived as a sign of trust in the other party, instead of weakness (Elgeboir et al., 2014). However, accommodating behavior does not lead to negotiation success. Elgeboir et al. (2014) found that worker representatives in The Netherlands relatively often adopt an accommodating negotiation style, which would imply that men and women in The Netherlands are weak negotiators.

Based on previous studies which are conducted in a masculine culture one would expect that men who possess many masculine traits or who are active in a typically male-dominated field of work will adopt a more distributive and competitive negotiation style. Multiple studies carried out by Master students at Tilburg University in the field of negotiation however did not find these salient differences between the two genders. But do these results indicate the masculine culture is decreasing in The Netherlands? Another possibility is that this phenomenon only occurs in certain groups, for instance among highly educated men such as university students. Moreover, it might be possible that in fact it are Dutch women who are slowly but surely adopting a masculine style. Since most top positions are still occupied by men, women who are in high-level positions might feel the urge to act more masculine to succeed in this – for the most part – men’s world. Based on the discussed literature and formulated research question, a hypothesis has been formed:

H: Gender differences in negotiation behavior are reducing

3. Method

In order to examine the hypotheses, an experiment was set up in which participants were asked to prepare a negotiation, whilst imagining themselves in a conflict situation.

3.1. Participants

A total of 99 respondents took part in the experiment. 43% of the participants were females (43) and 56% of the participants were males (56). The male participants consisted of two groups: one group which consisted of 24 ‘regular’ male participants (24%), mostly students at Tilburg

University, and one group which consisted of 32 (aspiring) bodybuilders (32%). The group consisting of standard male participants were not expected to behave any different than the female participants. The group consisting of bodybuilders was included in the study as a control group for the standard men and are considered to be very masculine, since they generally possess – naturally or with the help of certain means – a higher level of testosterone. These bodybuilders are therefore expected to represent the typical male stereotype. Henceforth this group will be referred to as male+. The average age of the participants was 26.55 years ($SD = 8.80$). More specifically, the analysis showed that the average age of the female participants was 24.79 years ($SD = 8.26$), the average age of the male participants was 28.29 years ($SD = 9.62$) and that the average age of the male+ participants was 28.44 years ($SD = 8.88$). The average educational level of the participants was higher professional education (HBO). Women were found to have the highest level of education ($M = 6.35$, $SD = 1.45$), followed by male participants ($M = 5.92$, $SD = 1.50$) and male+ participants ($M = 5.88$, $SD = .79$), which is all the equivalent of higher professional education. The participants proved to be a very homogenous group in both age and educational level.

3.2. Design

The experiment employed a one-way between-subjects design. The independent variable was gender type (female, male, male+). The dependent variable was the negotiation style participants employed during the preparation of the negotiation. The experiment consisted of several steps. First of all, participants were given a crash course in which some basic negotiation principles were explained. This was followed by a conflict case. Afterwards, participants had to prepare a negotiation on the basis of the conflict scenario and the acquired knowledge of the crash course.

3.3. Materials

3.3.1. Crash course

Participants were asked to prepare a negotiation on the basis of a conflict scenario. Before the participants had to prepare the negotiation, they were given a negotiation crash course about the different styles, strategies and tactics that are often featured in negotiations (See Appendix A for the Dutch version of the crash course). Both the crash course and the conflict scenario were evaluated through a pre-test to ensure that they accurately conveyed and stirred up the information and emotions intended. The information provided in the crash course was retrieved from the book *Negotiation*, written by Lewicki, Barry and Saunders (2015). The crash course

started with a presentation of the two most important negotiation approaches, namely the distributive bargaining approach and the integrative bargaining approach, followed by typical tactics that are associated with either approach. The typical distributive tactics focused on the so-called hardball tactics. These tactics are designed to pressure negotiators to do things they would normally not do (Lewicki et al., 2015). There are many different hardball tactics, but only four were selected and explained in the crash course. These specific tactics were lying, bluffing, threatening the other party, aggressive behavior and the expression of (whether played or not) intense emotions such as anger or fear. There are multiple integrative tactics as well, but again, only four were selected and explained in the crash course. The integrative tactics consisted of determination of the problem, finding out the needs and desires of the other party, coming up with alternative solutions and the selection of any of these solutions. Subsequently, the individual styles were discussed. As discussed in the theoretical framework, there are five different individual negotiation styles, namely competitive style, avoiding style, collaborating style, accommodating style and compromising style. To measure this, the negotiation style self-assessment by Holley, Jennings and Wolters (2005) was being used. Lastly, the strategic role of emotions during negotiations was discussed in the crash course. It was explained that emotions in a negotiation are not always real. For instance, by giving in with great disappointment on some minor issue, participants were told that the other party can be led to believe the issue is of great importance and might feel compelled to return the favor. Furthermore, the crash course elaborated on the consequences of expressing negative and positive emotions. Participants were told that positive emotions could, for example, improve the atmosphere which in turn leads to a better cooperation. However, expressing positive emotions can also lead to negative negotiation consequences. It was explained that the expression of positive emotions might give the other party the feeling that you do not take the negotiation seriously, or that he or she responded too much to your concerns. On the other hand, expressing negative emotions could result in positive negotiation outcomes. Participants were told that if the counterparty for instance sees that they are angry, the counterparty will be more willing to concede because people simply do not like an angry negotiation partner and are therefore naturally inclined to reduce negative emotions in others.

3.3.2. Conflict case

There were two versions of the conflict scenario: one in which 'Lisa' was playing the main role, which was shown to female participants, and one in which 'Rick' was playing the main role, which was shown to the male participants (See Appendix B and C for the Dutch versions of the female conflict case and male conflict case respectively). The scenario was written specifically

for the purpose of this study. The reason why a male and female version was created is because it is not common that a man lives together with a woman without being in a relationship, especially for students. Instead, it is more likely that two female friends or that two male friends live together. In this conflict case a situation was described where the participant and his or her imaginary roommate were constantly experiencing problems with each other. The conflict case consisted of three main problems that had to be solved. These problems concerned excessive noise, the neglect of domestic responsibilities and the division of the fine which was granted by the police for not taking care of the garbage. It was emphasized however, that although the roommates can't stand each other at the moment, there was a time where they could get along very well. By doing so, choosing for either a distributive or integrative negotiation approach would have been reasonable. It would have been understandable if participants only considered their own self-interest during the preparation of the negotiation, since their roommate appeared to do the exact same thing. However, it would also have been understandable if participants considered the wishes and needs of both parties, since the roommates used to have a good and friendly relationship with each other. The conflict case ended with the roommates deciding to negotiate about the issues to solve the problems once and for all.

3.4. Instruments

3.4.1. Method of data collection

Participants were approached via Facebook and e-mail. The control group that consisted of (aspiring) bodybuilders was approached via multiple bodybuilding platforms, such as www.bodybuilding.com and www.bodynet.nl.

3.4.2. Distributive and integrative negotiation style

The preparation of the negotiation started with participants being asked which kind of negotiation style they preferred in general. Subsequently, to help the participants with the preparation of the negotiation, four solutions were provided for each specific problem. For each issue participants had to choose one out of the four solutions. Two distributive solutions and two integrative solutions were provided for every problem. However, it was not explicitly mentioned which of the solutions were distributive and which of the solutions were integrative. By doing so, it was tried to avoid socially desirable answers. For instance, it was possible that participants choose an integrative solution three times, but it was also possible that they choose an integrative solution once and a distributive solution twice. Furthermore, participants were asked to rate on a 5-point scale how likely it was they would use any of the four discussed distributive tactics and any of the four integrative tactics, where '1' stands for 'very unlikely'

and '5' stands for 'very likely'. The scale mean of the hardball tactics scale was 2.46 ($SD = .78$) and the reliability analysis showed a Cronbach's Alpha of .68. The scale mean of the integrative tactics scale was 3.72 ($SD = .87$) and the reliability analysis showed a Cronbach's Alpha of .83. Since both scales proved to be reliable, responses to both scales were averaged together. Although it is not explicitly stated that distributive bargaining and the use of hardball tactics is associated with a masculine negotiation style and that integrative bargaining and the use of integrative tactics is associated with a more feminine negotiation style, it is expected that a framing effect will occur. Since men will probably recognize themselves more in this assertive, even aggressive role, while women will probably recognize themselves in the cooperative role, they are expected to adapt their behavior accordingly.

3.4.3. Strategic use of emotions

Participants were asked to indicate whether they were planning to strategically use their positive and negative emotions, and whether they would reinforce or tone down these emotions. This included four questions in total.

3.4.4. Individual negotiation style

To measure participants' individual negotiation style, an existing negotiation style self-assessment was used. This self-assessment by Holley, Jennings and Wolters (2005) is a well-known and frequently used assessment to measure one's negotiation style, and was included in the Qualtrics questionnaire. The assessment consisted of 25 different statements, measured on two different scales. Every scale was translated from English into Dutch. Above the first scale was the stem "How likely are you to do each of the following when negotiating?", followed by 15 statements that participants could either rate 'very unlikely', 'unlikely', 'neither likely nor unlikely', 'likely' or 'very likely'. A typical statement of this scale is the following: "I'll do things expressly to make sure that the negotiation stays friendly and comfortable". The second scale consisted of 10 statements. Above the scale was the stem "Rate your level of agreement with each of these statements", whereby participants could either 'strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with each of the statements. The second scale consisted of statements such as "When you compromise in a negotiation, you really just lose". Both scales consisted of questions that measured each individual negotiation style. As a result, each participant received a certain score on every single individual negotiation style.

3.5. Procedure

The data were collected between May 13 and July 7, 2016. The experiment was conducted online using Qualtrics Online Survey Software. As mentioned before, participants were assembled through Facebook, e-mail and several bodybuilder platforms. When participants started the experiment, they were requested to approach the situation as if they would do in real life, even though the conflict situation was simulated. Participants were told that prior to the preparation of the negotiation, they would get some guidance in the form of a crash course. During the crash course, participants learned about distributive and integrative negotiation approaches and tactics, individual negotiation styles and the role of emotions in negotiations. After the crash course, a conflict situation was presented to the participants. Depending on the gender of the participants, they were asked to imagine a situation where they had a fight with either their male roommate, Rick, or their female roommate, named Lisa. The roommate was described as someone who lacks responsibility, which results in many problems and causes a continuous tension. After the participants finished reading the scenario, they were told that they had to prepare the negotiation. Again it was emphasized that participants had to complete the preparation as if they would do when it concerned a real life situation. After participants finished the preparation they were thanked for their participation and were told they could now close the experiment.

4. Results

4.1. Preference negotiation approach

In order to test whether men and women differ in their preferences for either a distributive or integrative negotiation approach, a chi-square test was performed. The analysis showed a statistically significant association between gender and preference for negotiation approach, ($\chi^2(1) = 9.44, p = .002$). Taking a closer look, the chi-square test revealed that the group of male participants significantly differed in their preference for a negotiation approach from the group of female participants ($\chi^2(1) = 4.54, p = .04$), in that women had greater preference for an integrative negotiation approach. Moreover, the chi-square test revealed that the male+ participants' preference significantly differed from women's preference ($\chi^2(1) = 8.98, p = .004$). Again, women were found to have a greater preference for an integrative negotiation approach. Male and male+ participants however did not significantly differ in their preferences ($\chi^2(1) = .39, p = .59$) for either negotiation approach.

4.2. Preference for a distributive or integrative solution: item analysis

To test whether the groups differed in their preference for choosing a distributive or integrative solution to each of the three items, a one-way ANOVA was performed. In the ANOVA, the group (female, male, male+) was the independent variable. The choice to solve each of the three issues with either a distributive or integrative approach was the dependent variable. For both negotiation approaches, participants could get a score ranging from 0, which means they did not choose this negotiation approach once, till 3, which means they have chosen to solve all issues with that certain negotiation approach. The results revealed that the groups did not significantly differ in their intentions to solve the problems in a distributive manner ($F(2, 96) = .03, p = .97, \omega^2 = .02$). Women even choose for a distributive solution more often than males and male+ participants, although this finding was not significant. However, a main effect was found for an integrative solution: since Levene's test was significant, Welch's test revealed that the three groups differed in their preference for an integrative approach ($F(2, 49.68) = 4.77, p = .013, \omega^2 = .11$). The omega squared indicates a small effect size, meaning a small part of the variance of the preference for an integrative solution can be explained by the type of group. Male+ participants were found to have a greater preference for an integrative approach than men and women, although Table 1 shows that participants generally have a greater preference for solving the problems in a distributive manner instead of an integrative manner.

Table 1. Means and standard deviations of participants' intention to solve the issues in a distributive manner and in an integrative manner

	Men		Women		Men+	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Distributive solution	1.04	.86	1.04	.97	1.06	.84
Integrative solution	0.13	.45	0.14	.35	0.53	.67

Note. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation. Score ranges from 0 (not once) to 3 (all issues)

4.3. Intention to use hardball and integrative tactics

Furthermore, in the experiment, participants had to indicate on a 5-points scale the likeability of each discussed hardball tactic and each discussed integrative tactic. Since both scales proved to be reliable, responses to both scales were averaged together. A one-way ANOVA showed that the three groups differed in their intentions to use hardball tactics ($F(2,96) = 3.28, p = .042, \omega^2 = .04$). The omega squared indicates a very small effect size, meaning only a very small part of the variance of the intention to use hardball tactics can be explained by the type of group.

Planned contrasts revealed that this difference was only significant when male participants were compared to male+ participants ($t(96) = -2.05, p = .04$). Male participants however, did not significantly differ from female participants ($t(96) = -.01, p = .99$), nor did female participants from both male groups ($t(96) = 1.34, p = .18$). As can be seen in Table 2, the means of male participants and female participants were close to '2', which stands for 'unlikely', indicating that both groups would probably be reluctant to use any of the hardball tactics at all. Although the means of the male+ participants were closer to 'neither unlikely or likely', the mean shows that they would still rather not use any of the hardball tactics. The results of the ANOVA showed that the groups significantly differed in their intentions to use integrative tactics as well, ($F(2,96) = 7.44, p = .001, \omega^2 = .12$). Again, only a small part of the variance of participants' intention to use integrative tactics could be explained by the type of group. Planned contrasts revealed that both groups of male participants significantly differed in their intention to use integrative tactics from female participants ($t(96) = -3.06, p = .003$). Male participants however, did not significantly differ from female participants ($t(96) = -1.36, p = .18$). When male participants were compared to male+ participants, again a significant difference was found. Male participants reported a greater likeliness to use integrative tactics than male+ participants ($t(96) = 2.05, p = .04$). Unlike their intentions to use hardball tactics, participants had a greater tendency to use integrative tactics. Table 2 shows that even male+ participants preferred integrative tactics over distributive tactics, which was against the expectations.

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of participants' intention to use hardball and integrative tactics

	Men		Women		Men+	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Hardball tactics	2.32	.63	2.33	.85	2.74	.71
Integrative tactics	3.74	.65	4.02	.76	3.29	.98

Note. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation. Score ranges from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely)

4.4. Strategic use of emotions

In order to test whether men and women differ in their intentions to strategically use emotions, a chi-square test was performed. The analysis showed no statistically significant association between gender and the intention to strategically use negative emotions ($\chi^2(2) = 1.63, p = .44$), nor positive emotions ($\chi^2(2) = .30, p = .99$). Moreover, the chi-square test revealed that the groups did not significantly differ in the way (reinforce, tone down or not at all) they would

strategically use (negative) emotions ($\chi^2(4) = 2.99, p = .56$) and positive emotions ($\chi^2(4) = .45, p = .98$).

Met opmerkingen [Pv1]: Je moet tabel 1 uitbreiden met alle DV's. Dan heb je alles mooi bij elkaar.

Met opmerkingen [AH2R1]: Ik kan de eerste tabel niet uitbreiden, niet alle dv's zijn op dezelfde schaal gemeten en ook niet iedere score betekent voor elke dv hetzelfde

4.5. Individual negotiation style

Besides differences in their preference for either a distributive or integrative negotiation approach, participants were also asked to rate 25 statements in order to assess their individual negotiation style. To test whether the groups differed in their individual negotiation styles, a one-way ANOVA was performed. The results showed that the groups differed from each other for every individual negotiation style. As can be seen in Table 2, for the female and male participants the means did not differ much from each other for each individual negotiation style. Results from the ANOVA showed that for both competitive style ($F(2,96) = 9.98, p < .001, \omega^2 = .15$), avoiding style ($F(2,96) = 11.48, p < .001, \omega^2 = .17$), collaborating style ($F(2,96) = 14.58, p < .001, \omega^2 = .22$), accommodating style ($F(2,96) = 5.47, p = .006, \omega^2 = .08$) and compromising style ($F(2,96) = 9.07, p < .001, \omega^2 = .14$), the groups significantly differed from each other.

However, planned contrasts revealed that this difference was only significant when female participants were compared to the male participants, and when male+ participants were compared to male participants. Between the male participants and the female participants, no significant differences were found as for preference for an individual negotiation style. For competitive style, planned contrasts revealed that both male participants as well as male+ participants differed significantly from female participants ($t(96) = 2.14, p = .04$), and that male participants differed significantly from male+ participants ($t(96) = -3.70, p < .001$). Male participants however, did not significantly differ from female participants ($t(96) = -.25, p = .80$). For avoiding style, again female participants differed from all male participants including male+ participants ($t(96) = -3.0, p = .003$), and male+ participants differed from male participants ($t(96) = -3.90, p = .001$). Male and female participants did not differ significantly in their preferences for an avoiding negotiation style ($t(96) = -.58, p = .56$). In the same way, male participants differed significantly in their preferences for a collaborating negotiation style from female participants ($t(96) = -3.33, p = .004$), as did male participants from male+ participants ($t(96) = 3.92, p < .001$). Male and female participants did not differ from each other ($t(96) = -.58, p = .56$). Furthermore, planned contrasts revealed that female participants had a significantly greater preference for an accommodating negotiation style than all male participants ($t(96) = -2.38, p = .02$), and that male participants in turn had a greater preference for an accommodating negotiation style than male+ participants ($t(96) = 1.97, p = .04$). Again, male and female participants were found not to differ in their preference for an accommodating

negotiation style ($t(96) = -.82, p = .42$). Lastly, women were found to have a significantly greater preference for a compromising negotiation style than men who participated in the experiment ($t(96) = -2.91, p = .01$) and that male+ participants had a significantly lesser preference for a compromising style than male participants ($t(96) = 2.82, p = .01$). Female and male participants however, did not significantly differ in their preferences for a compromising negotiation style ($t(96) = -.83, p = .41$).

Table 2. Means and standard deviations of participants' individual negotiation style

	Men		Women		Men+	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Competitive style	2.82	.43	2.85	.54	3.36	.60
Avoiding style	2.87	.53	2.93	.46	2.44	.41
Collaborating style	3.68	.59	3.78	.61	3.02	.68
Accommodating style	3.13	.58	3.25	.53	2.82	.60
Compromising style	3.45	.62	3.58	.59	2.98	.66

Note. *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation. Score ranges from 1 (low) to 5 (high)

4.6. Predictors hardball and integrative tactics

Finally, a linear regression analysis was carried out on the intention to use hardball and integrative tactics, with group, preference for a distributive or integrative approach, the intention to strategically use emotions and the individual negotiation style of the participant as predictors. The linear model can be seen in Table 3. The results showed the fourth model, in which the type of group, general preference for a negotiation approach, intention to strategically use emotions and participants' individual negotiation style was included as a predictor, was able to significantly predict the intention to use both hardball tactics ($F(9,89) = 7.52, p < .001$) with an $R^2 = .432$, as well as integrative tactics ($F(9,89) = 9.34, p < .001$) with an $R^2 = .486$, and therefore the best model. Table 3 shows that for hardball tactics, competitive style turned out to be a significant predictor, whereas for integrative tactics, collaborating style turned out to be a significant predictor, which was in line with the expectations.

Table 3. Linear model of predictors of intention to use hardball tactics and integrative tactics

	<i>B</i>		<i>SE B</i>		β	
	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
Step 1						
Intercept	2.00	4.25	.23	.25		
Group	.22	-.26	.10	.11	.22*	-.22*
Step 2						
Intercept	3.17	2.65	.31	.32		
Group	.18	-.20	.09	.10	.17*	-.17*
General preference	-.70	.96	.14	.14	-.45**	.55**
Step 3						
Intercept	3.52	2.47	.43	.47		
Group	.20	-.21	.09	.10	.19*	-.18*
General preference	-.62	.93	.14	.15	-.40**	.53**
Negative emotions	-.48	.23	.16	.17	-.26*	.11
Positive emotions	.06	-.02	.14	.15	.04	-.01
Step 4						
Intercept	2.07	-.76	1.12	1.19		
Group	.08	-.05	.10	.10	.08	-.05
General preference	-.46	.60	.17	.18	-.29*	.35*
Negative emotions	-.39	.30	.16	.17	-.21*	.15
Positive emotions	-.05	.17	.14	.15	-.03	.10
Competitive style	.48	.17	.17	.18	.36*	.12
Avoiding style	.01	0.48	.15	.16	.01	.03
Collaborating style	-.07	.48	.17	.18	-.07	.39*
Accommodating style	-.26	.26	.16	.17	-.20	.18
Compromising style	.31	-.02	.16	.18	.27	-.02

Note. *H* = hardball tactics, *I* = Integrative tactics, * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$

5. Conclusion

This study examined whether the gender differences in negotiation behavior that have been found over the years are still accurate nowadays. Studies in which no gender differences were found oftentimes made use of a respondent group consisting of students. The question is however, whether gender differences in negotiation behavior are reducing in The Netherlands – which is known to be a relatively gender equal society (Hofstede, 1996) – or whether this is only the case for specific respondent groups, such as students. To answer this question, an

experiment was conducted in which participants had to prepare a negotiation on the basis of an imaginary conflict. Three groups were compared with each other: females, males and a control group for the standard male participants who are expected to possess more masculine traits than the standard male group. The results of the analyses showed that overall, male participants did not differ much from female participants in the way they prepared the negotiation. Male+ participants on the other hand, were found to differ from the other participants in almost every choice they made.

First of all, the results revealed that female participants significantly differed from male and male+ participants in their general preference for a negotiation approach. Women were found to have a greater preference for an integrative negotiation approach, compared to men. No differences were found between the two male groups. When participants were asked to resolve the conflict through the provided solutions, the analysis showed that the groups did not differ in their intentions to solve the issues in a distributive manner. However, the three groups were found to differ significantly in their intentions to solve the issues in an integrative manner. Against all odds, male+ participants significantly chose an integrative solution more often than male participants and female participants. Nevertheless, the results showed that in general all participants had a greater preference to solve the issues in a distributive manner.

Furthermore, the analysis showed that the three groups differed in their intentions to use hardball and integrative tactics. All participants were reluctant to use hardball tactics, although male+ participants reported a greater likelihood to use hardball tactics. Participants were found to have a greater tendency to use integrative tactics, which is remarkable since the previous item showed that participants were found to have a preference to solve the issues in a distributive manner. The groups did not significantly differ in their intentions to strategically use negative and positive emotions. Based on the discussed literature, it was expected that respondents with relatively much masculine traits would exhibit more unethical behavior compared to respondents with less masculine traits. The results could not conform this expectation.

Moreover, the analysis showed that the groups significantly differed in their individual negotiation style. For every single individual negotiation style, women were found to differ from male and male+ participants, although no significant differences were found between female participants and male participants. Moreover, male+ participants were found to significantly differ from the standard male participants.

Finally, a linear regression was carried out to examine participants' intention to use both hardball and integrative tactics. The type of group, participants' preference for a distributive or

integrative approach, the intention to strategically use emotions and the individual negotiation style of the participant were included as predictors. All variables were found to significantly predict participants' intention to use hardball and integrative tactics. The fourth model in which all predictors were included, was even able to predict 43,2% of participants' intention to use hardball tactics. For integrative tactics, the fourth model turned out to be even more adequate: it was able to predict 48,6% of participants' intention to use integrative tactics. Based on these findings, it can be concluded that the hypothesis can be confirmed. It turned out that the standard male participants and the female participants did not differ much in the way they prepared the negotiation. The results of the current study indicate that highly educated men prefer a cooperative, more feminine negotiation style over an assertive, more masculine negotiation style.

6. Discussion

6.1. Theoretical and practical implications

This study contributes to the existing literature on gender differences in negotiation behavior and examined whether these differences are still accurate. Many studies have shown that men generally approach negotiations in a distributive manner, focusing on achieving the best possible outcome. People who prefer a distributive negotiation approach are often competitive in nature and do not hesitate to use somewhat dubious tactics. Women on the other hand generally have a greater preference to approach negotiations in an integrative manner, where the emphasis lies on achieving an outcome which is beneficial for both parties. Women therefore often deal with conflicts by adopting a problem-solving – or sometimes even avoiding – individual negotiation style.

This study found no differences in negotiation behavior between male and female participants. It was expected that women would hold greater preferences for an integrative negotiation approach, whereas men were expected to favor the distributive negotiation approach. In this study, women indeed reported a greater preference for an integrative negotiation approach. However, when they had to choose between a distributive or integrative solution to the conflict without being explicitly told which solution was distributive and which was integrative, women were found to choose a distributive solution more often than men, although this result was not significant. It is unclear however whether this finding is only a matter of coincidence, or whether there is a little bit more to it. A possible explanation of the difference between women's intention and actual behavior, might be found in the Social Role Theory (Eagly, 1987). The crash course might have caused a framing effect to occur. Female

participants presumably identified themselves in the integrative negotiation approach, in which the focus lays on creating a win-win situation, and adopted according to the role they are expected to take on when they had to choose between both negotiation approaches. The same applies to the group consisting of bodybuilders. Against all expectations, male+ participants were found to significantly choose an integrative solution more often than female and male participants. When they consciously had to indicate their preference for a particular approach however, they had a clear preference for the distributive approach. These findings are in line with the findings of Kray, Galinsky and Thompson (2002), who stated that if people are being made aware that a certain stereotype exists, they will adjust their behavior accordingly. In this study, participants were not explicitly being made aware about the prevailing stereotypes, but, as stated before, the crash course might have activated these stereotypes.

Previous studies have shown that men tend to use more unethical behavior than women, such as emotional manipulation which includes faking emotions (Kray, 2011; Lewicki et al., 2015; Schminke et al., 2003). Since male+ participants are expected to represent the masculine stereotype, this would mean they would be more inclined to strategically use emotions. This was not the case. In all groups, the majority chose to strategically use both negative and positive emotions more often than not.

As expected, this study showed that women differed in their individual negotiation style from men. However, this was only the case when the female participants were compared to the male participants, as well as the male+ participants. When female participants were compared to just the standard male participants, no differences were found. As expected, male+ participants were found to score high on the competitive negotiation style. This style, which involves typical distributives tactics, persuasive arguments, aggressiveness and dominance, corresponds to, not surprisingly, many masculine traits. Moreover, women were found to score highest on collaborating style, which again is not surprising. The collaborating negotiation style shows many similarities with feminine characteristics (De Dreu et al., 2001; Raiffa, 1982; Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Male participants scored highest on collaborating style as well. Although this could be due to the cooperative industrial relations climate that prevails in The Netherlands, the latter is not very likely since this group consisted mainly of students. Another possible explanation may lie in the fact that students increasingly need to cooperate with other students. Since 2006, more females than males are studying at a university in The Netherlands (Abels & de Vries, 2013). As a result, it is therefore likely that male students, who are in the minority, adapt to their female peers and increasingly adopt a more integrative, problem-solving negotiation or conflict-handling style. The results indicate a pattern: studies in which

Met opmerkingen [Pv3]: Wat betekent dit?

Met opmerkingen [AH4R3]: Dat ze zich aan die rol aanpassen die ze geacht worden aan te nemen.

Met opmerkingen [Pv5]: Neem in je resultaten evt een grafiek op van de vookeuren van de drie groepen over de 5 types

Met opmerkingen [AH6R5]: De gemiddelden heb ik verwerkt in tabel 3.

respondents consisted merely of students (Beekmans & van Lierop, 2011; Blommaert, 2011; de Munck, 2012; Stiffe, 2014) did not often find the same gender differences in negotiation behavior that have been found in studies that use a more heterogeneous group (Lewicki et al., 2015; Kolb, 2009; Walters et al., 1998; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012). This does imply that studies who did not find the expected gender differences in negotiation behavior, such as those of Beekmans and van Lierop (2011) should take the type of respondents into account and perhaps make a critical comment. Gender differences may be reducing, but, as this study shows, there are still many differences in the way men and women negotiate that rely on traditional gender roles. Moreover, one's individual conflict-handling style turned out to be able to significantly predict whether someone will make use of distributive and integrative tactics. This would imply that individuals who score high on a competitive style will probably have greater intentions to use hardball tactics, whereas individuals who score high on the problem-solving style will probably have a greater intention to use integrative tactics.

6.2. Limitations and future research

There are several limitations to this study that need to be taken into account when interpreting the results. First of all, the number of respondents that participated in this study is relatively low. The experiment took longer than most online experiments and contained a lot of reading material, which resulted in an extremely high dropout rate. Since respondents participated on a voluntary basis, they were probably less inclined to finish the experiment. Perhaps if participants were given an incentive, the dropout rate would not be so high which in turn would lead to more generalizable results.

Moreover, it would have been better to include a typical feminine group in the experiment as well. Bodybuilders were included in the experiment since they are expected to represent the typical masculine stereotype – which the results partially confirmed – so it would have been logical to include a group of women who are expected to represent the typical feminine stereotype. Initially, it was intended to do so. The experiment was spread among Social Educational students at Utrecht University, who are expected to represent the feminine stereotype, but since the response was very low it was decided not to include the data into the results. During the university study Social Education, students are being taught how to prevent or handle conflict situations that are occurring among children and adolescents. For this reason, they are expected to have a great problem-solving ability and will therefore approach conflicts or negotiation in an integrative manner. Future research could include a typical feminine group

– such as Social Educational students – to see whether they differ from regular respondents and typically masculine respondents.

Furthermore, it would have been better to pretest the group who is expected to represent the typical masculine stereotype, to see whether this was actually the case. The other two groups were not selected on the basis of certain requirements, which demanded less control. Given the limited timeframe and the absence of any incentive, it did not seem achievable to pre-test the group consisting of bodybuilders on their masculinity. Future research should take this into account when selecting groups. In addition to the pre-test, it would have been better to post-test the participants after they completed the experiment to see whether the crash course indeed resulted in the activation of stereotypes, as suggested in paragraph 6.1.

Finally, future research could conduct a similar experiment, in which participants actually have to negotiate. In this study participants only had to prepare a negotiation. It might be possible that the crash course caused participants to be biased. The crash course might have given participants a certain idea about the style they would like to adopt, and recognized throughout the experiment which answers were in line with this particular style. This has been thought through before. Nevertheless, it was still decided to provide the crash course. Namely, if participants had to prepare the negotiation without being made aware of the different negotiation styles, it would have been very hard to classify their answers under any style. Nevertheless, it can be concluded on the basis of these results that when standard men and women are not aware of the role they are expected to adopt, they do not differ in their negotiation behavior.

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Appendix A

Distributieve onderhandeling

Over het algemeen wordt er onderscheid gemaakt tussen twee belangrijke en zeer verschillende manieren waarop je een onderhandeling kunt benaderen. Een hiervan is de distributieve onderhandelingsbenadering. In een distributieve onderhandelingsituatie staan de behoeftes van de ene partij meestal lijnrecht tegenover de behoeftes van de andere partij. Het is een competitieve situatie die gewoonlijk maar één winnaar kent. De winst van de ene partij gaat vaak ten koste van de winst van de andere partij. De belangrijkste focus van een onderhandelaar die de onderhandeling op een distributieve manier benadert is het maximaliseren van zijn of haar eigen winst, of het optimaliseren van het eigen resultaat. Wil je op een distributieve manier onderhandelen, dan helpt het zeker om je assertief op te stellen.

Hardball tactieken

Tijdens een distributieve onderhandelingsituatie kun je ook gebruik maken van zogenaamde 'hardball tactieken'. Dit zijn tactieken bedoeld om de tegenpartij stevig onder druk te zetten en zo je zin te krijgen. Een onderhandelaar die hardball tactieken inzet tijdens een onderhandeling moet niet bang zijn om pittige middelen in te zetten om de tegenpartij aan te pakken. Zo kun je bijvoorbeeld bluffen en de tegenpartij bedreigen ('Chicken'), om zo een overeenkomst te krijgen die gunstig is voor jezelf. Een andere mogelijke tactiek is het gebruik van agressie, om zo de tegenpartij te dwingen om akkoord te gaan. Daarnaast kan het inzetten van heftige emoties zoals (al dan niet onechte) boosheid of het intimideren en bang maken van de tegenstander als tactiek worden gebruikt om de tegenpartij tot concessies te dwingen. Tot slot kun je gewoonweg liegen om zo de tegenpartij op een dwaalspoor te zetten.

Integratieve onderhandeling

De tegenhanger van de distributieve onderhandelingsbenadering, is de integratieve onderhandelingsbenadering. Bij een integratieve onderhandeling wordt vooral gekeken naar een oplossing die voor beide partijen gunstig is. Beide partijen zouden in staat moeten zijn een groot deel van hun doelstellingen te behalen, en wanneer een partij zijn of haar doelstelling behaalt, betekent dit niet automatisch dat dit een verlies is voor de andere partij. Bij de integratieve onderhandeling is het behouden van een goede relatie met je tegenstander belangrijk. Dit kan bereikt worden door middel van open communicatie en het tonen van wederzijds respect. Het helpt om je coöperatief op te stellen als je succesvol integratief wilt onderhandelen.

Integratieve tactieken

Tijdens een integratieve onderhandelingsituatie komen er andere tactische stappen aan bod dan tijdens een distributieve onderhandelingsituatie en deze zijn ook meer gestructureerd. De eerste stap richt zich op het identificeren en definiëren van de problemen die zich tussen jou en je tegenstander voordoen. Vervolgens stel je samen een doel en bespreek je de obstakels die overwonnen moeten worden om dat doel te bereiken. Zodra je het probleem hebt vastgesteld, is het van belang om achter de interesses en behoeftes van de andere partij te komen. De volgende stap is de meest creatieve stap tijdens een integratieve onderhandeling. In deze stap ga je nadenken over alternatieve oplossingen voor het probleem waar beide partijen zich in

kunnen vinden. Het is hierbij belangrijk dat je out of the box denkt. In de laatste stap ga je deze alternatieve oplossingen evalueren, om uiteindelijk de beste oplossing te kiezen.

Daarnaast wordt er ook nog onderscheid gemaakt tussen individuele onderhandelingsstijlen. Niet iedereen heeft dezelfde voorkeur voor de manier waarop je een geschil kunt beslechten. Over het algemeen wordt er onderscheid gemaakt tussen vijf verschillende individuele onderhandelingsstijlen. Wellicht herken je jezelf in een stijl of heb je weleens gebruik gemaakt van één van onderstaande stijlen.

Concurrerende stijl: onderhandelaars die deze stijl hanteren zijn resultaatgericht, zelfverzekerd, voornamelijk gericht op het behalen van winst en hebben de neiging hun mening aan anderen op te leggen. In extreme gevallen vertoont een onderhandelaar die deze stijl aanneemt agressief en dominant gedrag. Iemand die een concurrerende stijl aanneemt is erg assertief en heeft weinig zin om samen te werken.

Ontwijkende stijl: onderhandelaars die deze stijl aannemen, onderhandelen liever niet, zijn passief en hebben de voorkeur om conflicten te vermijden. Ze dragen de verantwoordelijkheid liever over aan een ander en falen erin om zelf een goede oplossing voor het probleem te vinden. Iemand die een ontwijkende stijl aanneemt, is niet erg assertief en ook niet enthousiast over samenwerken.

Samenwerkende stijl: onderhandelaars die deze stijl aannemen maken gebruik van open en eerlijke communicatie, focussen zich op het vinden van creatieve oplossingen die beide partijen tevredenstellen, suggereren vele nieuwe oplossingen en staan ook open om deze verder te onderzoeken. Iemand die een samenwerkende stijl aanneemt, is ook assertief en gericht op samenwerken.

Toegeeflijke stijl: onderhandelaars die deze stijl aannemen vinden het belangrijk om de relatie met de andere partij te behouden en zijn het meest bezig de andere partij tevreden te stellen door mee te gaan met de wensen van de tegenspeler. Iemand die een toegeeflijke stijl aanneemt, werkt graag samen maar is niet erg assertief.

Compromitterende stijl: onderhandelaars die deze stijl aannemen proberen een middenweg te vinden, en vaak proberen ze het verschil tussen twee verschillende posities te verkleinen. Ze doen makkelijk concessies en verwachten dat ook van de tegenpartij. Ze accepteren dat beide partijen niet helemaal tevreden zijn over het eindresultaat. Iemand die deze stijl aanneemt, is geen intensieve samenwerker en is ook niet bijzonder assertief.

Emoties

Het is algemeen bekend dat de emoties hoog op kunnen lopen tijdens een onderhandeling. Er is immers sprake van een conflict. Emoties kunnen een sterke invloed hebben op het verloop van de onderhandeling. Wanneer bijvoorbeeld de ander erg teleurgesteld of juist enthousiast reageert op een bepaalde kwestie, zou je daaruit kunnen opmaken dat het een belangrijke kwestie is. Onverschilligheid zou er juist op kunnen wijzen dat de kwestie niet van belang is.

Dat hoeft natuurlijk niet altijd te kloppen want emoties kunnen ook gespeeld zijn. En dat kun je ook strategisch doen. Zo kun je bijvoorbeeld door met veel teleurstelling toe te geven op een relatief onbelangrijke kwestie, net doen alsof de kwestie erg belangrijk voor je is. De andere partij krijgt dan het gevoel dat je een grote concessie hebt gedaan, en voelt zich waarschijnlijk geroepen tot een wederdienst.

Het uiten van emoties kan ook op andere manieren de onderhandelingsuitkomst beïnvloeden. Zo kunnen positieve emoties zowel negatieve als positieve consequenties hebben voor het resultaat. Wanneer je positieve emoties uit, kan de sfeer aanzienlijk verbeteren, waardoor als gevolg de samenwerking in de onderhandeling beter verloopt. Maar het kan ook negatieve gevolgen hebben, wanneer je bijvoorbeeld zó positief bent dat de tegenpartij denkt dat hij of zij je teveel tegemoet is gekomen. Daar staat tegenover dat negatieve emoties weer kunnen leiden tot positieve uitkomsten. Wanneer de tegenpartij bijvoorbeeld ziet dat je boos bent, zullen zij eerder bereid zijn om toe te geven omdat mensen nu eenmaal niet houden van een boze gesprekspartner en daardoor van nature geneigd zijn om negatieve emoties bij de ander te verminderen.

Appendix B

Jij en Lisa zijn beiden derdejaarsstudenten aan Werkendam University. Jullie hebben elkaar leren kennen door gemeenschappelijke vrienden, en al snel ontstond er een klik. Jullie delen dezelfde interesses, en konden het al snel zo goed met elkaar vinden dat jullie ongeveer vijf maanden geleden besloten hebben om samen in appartement 4C van Campus Werkendam Zuid te gaan wonen. Campus Werkendam Zuid is een groot appartementencomplex naast Werkendam University.

Helaas bleef er van de aanvankelijke klik weinig over toen jullie gingen samenwonen. In de afgelopen maanden heb je continu problemen gehad met Lisa. Ze weigert zich aan de afspraken te houden die jullie in het begin hebben gemaakt. Lisa luistert vaak tot midden in de nacht naar harde muziek, waardoor jouw nachtrust verstoord wordt. Daarnaast is ze te lui om haar eigen vaat af te wassen, waardoor het zich blijft opstapelen en de keuken een bende is. De afspraak was dat jullie ieder om de week het vuilnis buiten zouden zetten. Iedere keer wanneer het Lisa's beurt is, vergeet ze het waardoor de hele keuken gaat stinken. Wanneer je haar erop aanspreekt, zet Lisa de vuilniszakken buiten, maar neemt hierbij niet de moeite de zakken goed af te sluiten. Het gebeurt nogal eens dat ze omvallen en dan verspreidt het vuilnis zich op straat en heeft niet alleen jij, maar de hele buurt last van een smerige stank. Hoewel het niet jouw taak is, voel jij je altijd verantwoordelijk om te checken of Lisa het vuilnis aan de straat heeft gezet en of de zakken goed zijn afgesloten. Nadat je Lisa er meerdere keren op had aangesproken, en ze hardnekkig weigerde haar gedrag aan te passen, vond je het mooi geweest. Je besluit om voortaan alleen je eigen vuilnis op straat te zetten en Lisa het zelf uit te laten zoeken.

Afgelopen week stond de reinigingspolitie aan de deur. Meerdere burens hadden geklaagd over de stank en de rommel. De reinigingspolitie geeft jullie een boete van 80 euro, en waarschuwt dat het de volgende keer een hogere boete zal zijn. Wanneer de politie eenmaal weg is, barst de bom. Lisa schreeuwt dat het deze week jouw beurt was om het vuilnis buiten te zetten, en eist dat jij de boete betaalt. Jij daarentegen roept dat je haar al vaak genoeg gewaarschuwd hebt, en dat ze de boete aan zichzelf te danken heeft. Lisa stormt naar haar kamer en sluit zich op met haar harde muziek. Je wordt gek van die herrie iedere keer. Omdat de stank in de keuken niet te harden is, besluit je maar een begin te maken aan de grote stapel vaat...

Helaas zijn de problemen niet zomaar opgelost. Daarom besluiten jullie om de volgende dag het gesprek aan te gaan. Tijdens dit gesprek gaan jullie in ieder geval onderhandelen over de verdeling van de boete, het opruimen van de keuken en de geluidsoverlast.

Appendix C

Jij en Rick zijn beiden derdejaarsstudenten aan Werkendam University. Jullie hebben elkaar leren kennen door gemeenschappelijke vrienden, en al snel ontstond er een klik. Jullie delen dezelfde interesses, en konden het al snel zo goed met elkaar vinden dat jullie ongeveer vijf maanden geleden besloten hebben om samen in appartement 4C van Campus Werkendam Zuid te gaan wonen. Campus Werkendam Zuid is een groot appartementencomplex naast Werkendam University.

Helaas bleef er van de aanvankelijke klik weinig over toen jullie gingen samenwonen. In de afgelopen maanden heb je continu problemen gehad met Rick. Hij weigert zich aan de afspraken te houden die jullie in het begin hebben gemaakt. Rick luistert vaak tot midden in de nacht naar harde muziek, waardoor jouw nachtrust verstoord wordt. Daarnaast is hij te lui om zijn eigen vaat af te wassen, waardoor het zich blijft opstapelen en de keuken een bende is. De afspraak was dat jullie ieder om de week het vuilnis buiten zouden zetten. Iedere keer wanneer het Ricks beurt is, vergeet hij het waardoor de hele keuken gaat stinken. Wanneer je hem erop aanspreekt, zet Rick de vuilniszakken buiten, maar neemt hierbij niet de moeite de zakken goed af te sluiten. Het gebeurt nogal eens dat ze omvallen en dan verspreidt het vuilnis zich op straat en heeft niet alleen jij, maar de hele buurt last van een smerige stank. Hoewel het niet jouw taak is, voel jij je altijd verantwoordelijk om te checken of Rick het vuilnis aan de straat heeft gezet en of de zakken goed zijn afgesloten. Nadat je Rick er meerdere keren op had aangesproken, en hij hardnekkig weigerde zijn gedrag aan te passen, vond je het mooi geweest. Je besluit om voortaan alleen je eigen vuilnis op straat te zetten en Rick het zelf uit te laten zoeken.

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Helaas zijn de problemen niet zomaar opgelost. Daarom besluiten jullie om de volgende dag het gesprek aan te gaan. Tijdens dit gesprek gaan jullie in ieder geval onderhandelen over de verdeling van de boete, het opruimen van de keuken en de geluidsoverlast.