

Women in Negotiation

Effects of Gender and Power on Negotiation Behaviour

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Abstract

Research on gender and negotiation has revealed interesting differences in cognitive and behavioural processes between men and women. Despite the fact that gender differences in negotiation exist, results of many studies show that women are often left worse off at the negotiation table and tend to negotiate less favourable outcomes than men. Drawing on recent research on power, this study tested the question whether power affects men's and women's negotiation behaviour differently. The author expected that power affected women's negotiation behaviour more than men's negotiation behaviour. More specifically, women were expected to make better first offers and negotiate better outcomes for themselves when they were primed with the experience of having power, whereas men's negotiation behaviour was expected not to be affected by the power prime. Using a face-to-face distributive bargaining situation, participants were primed with the experience of having power, by recalling a situation in which they had power over others, and negotiated with an opponent about the asking price of a house. The results of this study show that women who were primed with the experience of having power made better first offers and negotiated better outcomes than women who were not primed with the experience of having power. Moreover, results also show that power reduced differences in negotiation outcomes between men and women. All in all, this study shows that power influences men's and women's behaviour in negotiation differently and suggests that gender differences in negotiations are, in part, due to gender differences in social power.

Keywords: gender, power, sense of power, negotiation

Effects of Gender and Power on Negotiation Behaviour

Consider the case where two individuals, a male and a female, are negotiating separately about the price of similar cars for themselves. During the negotiation process, the male and female negotiator made completely different offers: The male negotiator started with a much lower opening offer, made smaller concessions, and ended with a much lower final offer, as compared to the female negotiator. At the end of the negotiation, the male negotiator as well as the female negotiator managed to pay less than the asking price. However, the male negotiator payed less for the car than did the female negotiator. Although we all negotiate, we differ in how we negotiate. Within the domain of individual differences in negotiation, the search for gender differences is the most researched topic by scholars. Although this research has highlighted many interesting differences in cognitive and behavioural processes between men and women in negotiation, the results of many studies show that women tend to be worse off at the negotiation table (Barron, 2003; Bowles, Babcock, & McGinn, 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), especially in distributive bargaining tasks. This is true despite the fact that, overall, women still earn less than men (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2008, 2011; Statistics Netherlands [CBS], 2011), while many women have the opportunity to negotiate a higher salary, especially since women's labour force participation has increased (BLS, 2009; CBS, 2011). But what affects men's and women's behaviour in negotiations?

Recent research supports the idea that increased power influences individuals' behaviour in negotiations. According to Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003), increased power leads to approach behaviour, that is, behaviour related to pursuing and acquiring goals and rewards in the enivornment (e.g., moving towards a desired object). In contrast, reduced power leads to repressed behaviour, that is, behaviour related to avoiding threats and (possible) punishments (e.g., inhibited speech). Recently, scholars have begun to explore the consequences of increased and reduced power on individuals' affect, cognition, and behaviour (e.g., Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007). However, little research has examined how power influences an individual's negotiation behaviour in general, and more specificly, whether power influences men's and women's negotiation behaviour differently. This raises the following question: To what extent does the experience of power influence men's and women's negotiation behaviour?

In what follows, I will first describe important recent findings of gender differences in negotiation. I then describe how power may influence individuals, discussing the recently proposed Approach / Inhibition Theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003). Drawing on this theory and findings from recent research, I then provide theoretical rationale for how the experience of power may influence men's and women's behaviour in a distributive bargaining situation, and how the experience of power may influence the difference in negotiation outcomes between men and women. Using a face-to-face bargaining situation, I then describe a study that examined the effects of power on women's negotiation behaviour.

Gender Differences in Negotiation

Research on gender differences in negotiation dates back to the 1970s and has yielded many inconsistent findings (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Some studies reported men to reap better negotiation results than women (e.g., King & Hinson, 1994; Neu, Graham, & Gilly, 1988), whereas others reported no significant differences between men and women in negotiation (e.g., Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & van Slyck, 1986; Putnam & Jones, 1982). Despite the inconsistency in research findings, two recent meta-analyses showed that, overall, women, as compared to men, behave more cooperatively in negotiations (Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998) and negotiate worse outcomes (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999), especially in distributive bargaining tasks. Nevertheless, the contradictory findings of earlier research has led scholars to examine gender and negotiation from a more cognitive and behavioural approach, and taking also into account certain circumstances in which gender differences do emerge. To start with, men and women differ in their expectations of negotiation outcomes. Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) showed that when expectations about negotiation outcomes are not given, this benefits men more than women in terms of making offers and negotiation outcomes. Bowles et al. (2005) found that men, as compared to women, expected to pay 10% less, offered 19% less, and obtained better outcomes in a negotiation about buying supplies for a manufacturer.

Furthermore, men and women also differ in how they frame a conflict situation. Conflict framing refers to how individuals interpret a conflict, which reflects their orientation towards a conflict (Pinkley, 1990). In one study, Pinkley (1990) asked disputants to describe a conflict they experienced. The results showed that women tend to frame conflicts in terms of relationship characteristics, whereas men tend to perceive conflicts in terms of task characteristics. Consequently, this might lead women, as compared to men, to negotiate worse outcomes for themselves, as Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) showed that individuals who focussed on the tasks of the negotiation reaped better personal negotiation outcomes (i.e., monetary outcomes) than individuals who focussed on the relationship of the negotiation.

In addition, men and women also differ in how they perceive their own worth and abilities when requesting a salary. Barron (2003) showed that men requested a higher salary than did women. Barron argued that men and women differ in beliefs about their own worth (i.e., in monetary terms), entitlement, and proving oneself when negotiating a higher salary. When analysing post-negotiation interviews with the male and female negotiators, Barron found that women, as compared to men, made more remarks about their uncertainty in determining their worth, made more remarks about being entitled to the same salary as others, and made fewer remarks about the need to prove themselves in negotiations. All in all, these studies highlight important differences between men and women in negotiation. However, the results of these studies favour men more than women, as women tend to do worse in negotiations than men, especially in distributive bargaining situations. To overcome that disadvantage, results from a recent study suggest that the experience of power may have a positive influence on women in distributive bargaining. Small, Gefland, Babcock, and Gettman (2007) showed that women, as compared to men, initiated fewer negotiations and felt more intimidated by the prospect of negotiating. However, when women were primed to perceive themselves as being powerful, by recalling a situation in which they had power, these feelings of intimidation towards negotiating were reduced. Thus, as power positively influences women's feelings to negotiating, power might also affect women's negotiation behaviour and outcomes positively. But what is power in negotiation? And how does power affect the individual's behaviour?

Power, Approach, and Inhibition

Power can be defined as the degree to which an actor has the ability to control the resources and outcomes of other individuals and one's own resources and outcomes, in order to satisfy one's own or others' purposes in a situation (Deutsch, 1973; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007). The ability of an actor refers to the sources of power (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2010) which are informational (e.g., expertise), personal (e.g., skills), position-based (e.g., authority), relationship-based (e.g., interdependency), and contextual (e.g., BATNAs). Actors can have control over their own and others' resources by giving these resources to or withholding them from others (Keltner et al., 2003). Resources can be material (e.g., money) or social (e.g., knowledge and affection) (Keltner et al., 2003), and purposes can be targets (Lewicki et al., 2010), goals, wants, or desires (Deutsch, 1973).

Research on power and behaviour comprises a variety of perspectives (for a review, see Keltner et al., 2003), such as how power influences stereotyping (Fiske, 1993), teasing (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998), or conformation to others (Milgram, 1974). Within the negotiation literature, many scholars have examined how BATNAs (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement), as a contextual source of power, influence an individual's negotiation behaviour. For example, Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett (1994) showed that individuals who had a BATNA reached higher personal outcomes and higher joint outcomes in a salary negotiation. Likewise, Magee et al. (2007) showed that individuals who had a BATNA.

All in all, in these and many other studies, power is often conceptualized as one's capacity to influence others. According to Fiske (1993), this type of power (i.e, power to influence others) can be referred to as social power, as it derives from an individual's relationship to others. Galinsky et al. (2003), therefore, define power as the ability to control one's own and others' resources, without social interference. According to Galinsky et al. (2003), individuals with power have access to more resources in contrast to individuals who lack power. Powerful individuals, therefore, experience less interference from others and can thus behave more unconstrained than powerless individuals (Galinsky et al., 2003). According to Keltner et al. (2003), the effects of social power on human behaviour can be integrated in a theory: The Approach / Inhibition Theory of power. This theory suggests that high power is associated with approach behaviour, whereas low power is related to inhibitory behaviour. The perspectives on approach and inhibition behaviour can be derived from a theory about the activation of two motivational systems: The behavioral approach system and behavioural inhibition system (Gray, 1987). The behavioural approach system is activated as a response to cues for rewards and opportunities, and motivates an individual to pursue and acquire these

rewards (Carver & White, 1994; Higgins, 1997). In contrast, the behavioural inhibition system is activated as a response to signals of (possible) punishments and threats and motivates an individual to avoid these threats or (possible) punishments (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1987). Keltner et al. (2003) theorize that the behavioural approach system is influenced by power, such that increased power leads individuals to pay more attention to rewards, to experience increased positive emotions, to have a more automatic cognition (e.g., increased automatic reasoning), and to have more approach tendencies (e.g., moving towards rewardful objects). In contrast, the behavioural inhibition system is influenced by reduced power, such that reduced power leads individuals to pay more attention to threats, to experience increased negative emotions, to have a more controlled cognition (e.g., evaluating the actions of others), and to act in more inhibited ways (e.g., passive and less active behaviour) (Keltner et al., 2003).

In testing the Approach / Inhibition Theory of power, scholars have showed that power affects an individual's cognition and behaviour in many different ways. For example, Anderson & Galinsky (2006) showed that participants with high-power perceived the world as less dangerous and were more likely to act in risky situations than did low-power participants. Furthermore, Magee, Galinsky, and Gruenfeld (2007) showed that participants with high-power were more likely to negotiate the price of a car than were low-power participants, and that more high-power participants than low-power participants tended to take the lead in a competitive situation. On the whole, these studies show that power affects individuals' cognition and behaviour in many meaningful ways. But how does the experience of power affect an individual's behaviour in a distributive bargaining situation? Does power affect men's and women's negotiation behaviour differently?

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The Approach / Inhibition theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) posits that increased power activates the behavioural approach system. An individual's power can be increased in many ways, for example, by having a BATNA in a negotiation (e.g., Pinkley, Neale, and Bennett, 1994) or by addressing a high position in an organisation (Lewicki et al., 2010). According to Galinsky et al. (2003), power can also be increased by recalling a situation in the past in which one had power over others. Galinsky et al. (2003) argue that when one recalls such experiences of power, this activates concepts and behavioural tendencies related to power, which influence one's affect, cognition, and behaviour. Thus, the experience of having power over others can also increase one's power as it triggers one's sense of power and becomes one's psychological property.

According to the Approach / Inhibition Theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003), increased power increases approached behaviour. Accordingly, several scholars have begun to examine how the sense of power, as it is argued to increase one's power psychologically, affects individuals' approach behaviour (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky et al., 2003; Magee et al., 2007). For example, in one experiment, Galinsky et al. (2003) showed that participants with high-power acted more against an annoying fan than did low-power participants. In line with their findings, Galinsky et al. (2003) suggest that the experience of having power increases the connection between one's goals and one's actions. That is, individuals who experience power are more inclined to act in a manner needed to satisfy their goals. In all distributive bargaining situations that comprise a seller-buyer interaction, the goal of the buyer is often to acquire a product from the seller at the lowest price possible. This behaviour of buyers is often reflected in the offers they make. For example, if a buyer wants to acquire a product from the seller at the best price possible (i.e., the lowest price possible), this may result in making a low first offer and, if needed, low subsequent offers to the seller. However, it is likely that the experience of power may lead the buyer to make even lower offers in order to acquire a product at the lowest price possible, as individuals who experience power are more likely to display behaviour that reflects their goals (i.e., paying the least amount of money possible). Therefore, it is likely that individuals who experience power are more likely to make better first offers for themselves in a distributive bargaining situation than do individuals who do not experience power.

However, it is expected that women are more affected by the experience of power than men. The results of Small et al.'s (2007) study suggest that priming the experience of power does not affect men. Furthermore, the results from Magee et al.'s (2007) study also suggest that priming the experience of power does not affect men (as men's propensity to negotiate in the high-power condition did not differ from men's propensity in the low-power condition). Therefore, I expect that women who experience power will make better first offers for themselves than women who do not experience power, whereas men who experience power make first offers that do not differ from the first offers of men who do not experience power.

Furthermore, it is likely that the experience of having power leads individuals to make smaller concessions in a bargaining situation, in contrast to individuals who do not experience power, since these individuals are more inclined to behave in ways needed to acquire a product they want at the best price possible for themselves. In the process of a distributive bargaining situation, the final offer is often the moment in which the party who received the final offer has to accept or reject the offer. The final offer, therefore, reflects the negotiated outcome. As a consequence, it is likely that individuals who experience power negotiate better outcomes for themselves than do individuals who do not experience power. As mentioned earlier, women are expected to be more affected by the experience of power than men. Therefore, I expect that women who experience power will negotiate better outcomes than women who do not experience power, whereas the negotiation outcomes between men who experience power and men who do not experience power do not differ. As mentioned earlier, women tend to negotiate worse outcomes than men (e.g., Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999). However, as women who experience power are likely to negotiate better outcomes for themselves, while men's outcomes are not affected by the experience of power, it is thus also likely that the negotiated outcomes of women who experience power differ less from men's negotiated outcomes. Therefore, I expect that the negotiated outcomes of men and women who are primed to experience power will differ less from each other, as compared to the negotiated outcomes of men and women who do not experience power.

To sum up, the hypotheses for this study are as follows:

- H1: Women who are primed with the experience of having power will make better first offers for themselves than do women who are not primed to experience power, in a distributive bargaining situation, whereas men who experience power will make first offers that do not differ from the first offers of men who do not experience power.
- H2: Women who are primed with the experience of having power will negotiate better outcomes for themselves than do women who are not primed to experience power, in a distributive bargaining situation, whereas men who experience power will negotiate outcomes that do not differ from the negotiation outcomes of men who do not experience power
- H3: The negotiated outcomes of men and women who are primed with the experience of having power will differ less from each other, as compared to the negotiated outcomes of men and women who are not primed to experience experience power, in a distributive bargaining situation

Method

To examine the hypotheses, an experiment was conducted. The experiment consisted of a negotiation dyad in which participants had to negotiate over the asking price of a house. The participants were assigned the role of buyer, whereas the author was assigned the role of seller.

Participants

One hundred one undergraduate students (50 women, 51 men) from Tilburg University participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. The average age of the participants was 21.8 years (SD = 3.62). The control condition consisted of 49 participants (24 women, 25 men) and the power priming condition consisted of 52 participants (26 women, 26 men).

Research design

The experiment consisted of a 2 (male/female) x 2 (power prime/control prime) between-subjects factorial design. The independent variables were gender and priming. The dependent variables were the height of participants' first offers, and the height of participants' negotiated outcomes. For the power prime, half of the participants were primed to experience power and the other half engaged in a control prime. The power prime was adapted from Galinsky et al. (2003), whereas the control was adapted from Small et al. (2007).

To measure the effectiveness of the power prime and control prime, participants were asked to rate themselves on seven power relevant items which were adapted from Smith, Wigboldus, and Dijksterhuis (2008). The self ratings on power relevant traits were administered at the start of the experiment and after the power manipulation. The first measurement served as a pre-measurement to determine participants' sense of power before the experimental manipulation. The second measurement served as a post-measurement to determine participants' sense of power after the experimental manipulation.

Instruments

Method of data collection. Participants were approached via the participants pool of the School of Humanities at Tilburg University. Via this pool, students can sign up to view all

studies that are currently conducted and can sign up for every study they want to participate in. Students who signed up for the study were randomly assigned to one condition. The experiment was conducted in a laboratory and was held individually.

Priming power manipulation. The power prime was adapted from Galinsky et al. (2003) and involved having participants recall a situation in which they possessed power over someone else. The instructions were as follows:

"Please recall and write down a particular incident in which you had power over another individual or individuals. By power, I mean a situation in which you had control and influence over others. Please describe this situation in which you had power what happened, how you felt, and so on"

The control prime was adapted from Small et al. (2007) and involved having participants describe how they usually spend their evenings. The instructions were as follows:

"Please describe the way you typically spend your evenings. Begin by writing down a description of your activities, and then figure out how much time you devoted to each activity. Examples of things you might describe include eating dinner, studying for a particular exam, hanging out with certain friends, watching TV, and so on"

The power prime and control prime were translated from English into Dutch and were reviewed by a second person (see Appendix A and B for the Dutch versions of the power prime and control prime respectively).

Self ratings on power-relevant traits. To measure the effectiveness of the power prime and control prime, participants were asked to rate themselves on seven power relevant items on a 9-point scale which were adapted from Smith et al. (2008): Submissive-dominant, passive-active, unassertive-assertive, timid-firm, uncertain-certain, insecure-confident, and dependent-independent. Above the scale was the stem "To what extent would you say you are...". As noted earlier, the self ratings on power relevant traits were administered at the start

of the experiment (which served as a pre-measurement) and after the power manipulation (which served as a post-measurement). Every scale was translated from English into Dutch and was reviewed by a second person (see Appendix C and D for the Dutch versions of the pre-measurement and post-measurement survey respectively).

The scale mean of the pre-measurement survey was 5.94 (SD = 1.04) and the reliability analysis showed a Cronbach's alpha of .81. The scale mean of the post-measurement was 6.16 (SD = 1.00) and the reliability analysis showed a Cronbach's alpha of .82. Therefore, responses to the seven trait pairs related to power were averaged together.

Negotiation case. The negotiation case consisted of a negotiation dyad in which participants had to negotiate the asking price of a house with the author. The participant was assigned the role of buyer and the author was assigned the role of seller of the house.

Before the negotiation took place a case briefing was given to the participants and consisted of several statements (see Appendix E for the Dutch translation). First of all, the briefing stated that participants were about to conduct a negotiation about the asking price of a house they would really like to buy. Secondly, the briefing stated that the current asking price for the house was \in 250,000.00. Although setting an asking price creates an anchoring effect (Lewicki et al., 2010), the case needed to reflect a real life situation: Every private housing in the Netherlands has an asking price, and negotiations about private housing evolve around the buyers' asking price. Thirdly, the briefing stated that participants needed to think about an offer and arguments that justify their offer. To help participants and to structure the negotiation, information to justify their offer was provided, such as information about the average price of houses in the neighbourhood. An example reason for buying the house was "you like the neighbourhood". Fourthly, the briefing stated that they were given approximately 5 minutes to prepare for the negotiation and that the negotiation would last for

approximately 10 minutes. Last, participants were asked to write down the offer they would negotiate about.

Counter-arguments were created for every argument that participants could use during the negotiation, and were used by the seller of the house (see Appendix F for the Dutch translation). An example of a counter-argument was to convince the participant that, in contrast to all other houses in the neighbourhood, all wooden window-frames were recently replaced with synthetic window-frames. The synthetic window-frames were expensive but very durable, sustainable, and require no maintenance.

The hypotheses of this study tested (1) whether women who are primed with the experience of having power will make lower first offers than women who are not primed to experience power, (2) whether women who are primed with the experience of having power will negotiate lower outcomes than women who are not primed to experience power, and (3) whether the negotiated outcomes of men and women who are primed with the experience of having power differ less from each other, as compared to the negotiated outcomes of men and women who are not primed to experience power. In hypothesis one, the height of participants' first offer was written on the case briefing by the participants themselves. Regarding hypotheses two and three, the heights of participants' negotiated outcomes were written down on a blank sheet right after the negotiation.

Procedure

The data was collected between April 12 and May 11, 2011. The experiment consisted of two parts. The first part, the manipulation phase, was conducted in a laboratory and consisted of respectively (1) a pre-measurement of participants' sense of power, by asking them to fill in a survey which consisted of questions about participants' age, gender, and the seven self ratings on power-relevant traits, (2) the experimental manipulation, in which participants were either primed with power or the control task, (3) a post-measurement of

participants' sense of power which consisted of the seven self ratings on power-relevant traits, and (4) the negotiation case briefing, on paper, about the negotiation they were going to conduct. The second part consisted of the actual negotiation in which participants, as potential buyers, had to negotiate the price of a house with the author.

When participants arrived at the laboratory, they were first welcomed. Participants were told that the goal of the experiment was to get insight in peoples' decision-making pattern. To get insight in this patern, participants were told that they would soon conduct a negotiation with someone else (participants were not told that they would negotiate with the author because this might have affected the course of the experiment). Then, participants were told that before the negotiation would take place, they first needed to complete a survey (i.e., the pre-measurement sense of power survey). After completing the pre-measurement survey, the power manipulation task was administered. Participants were given a blank sheet to write on and were given approximately seven minutes to complete the task (i.e., 2 minutes to read the task and 5 minutes to complete the task). Participants in the power prime condition were primed with power by asking them to recall and write down an incident in which they had power over an individual or individuals. Participants in the control condition were asked to write down and descibe how they usually spend their evenings. During the task the author was not present in the room in order to avoid distractions. After completing the task, participants were asked to complete the second survey (i.e., the post-measurement sense of power survey). When participants completed the survey, they were told that they were about to conduct a negotiation with someone else about the price of a house they would like to buy and they were asked to read the instructions of the negotiation, that was given to them, carefully (i.e., the negotiation case briefing). Participants were given five minutes to read the case and prepare for the negotiation. During these five minutes of preparation time, the author was not present

in the room to give participants the opportunity to prepare for the negotiation without distractions.

After the preparation time the negotiation started. The author entered the laboratory and told the participants that they would negotiate with the author, who was the seller of the house. Then, the participants were asked to make an offer. Immediately after that, the participants were told that their offer was much lower than expected, and participants were asked to state why they thought their offer was more reasonable than the current asking price of the house. After the participants had justified their offer, the author discussed the counterarguments with the participants to convince them that their current offer was too low and that the current asking price of the house was a reasonable price.

During the course of the negotiation, more counter-arguments of the participants and the author were discussed and participants were allowed to make, if needed, subsequent offers. If participants asked the author to make a concession, the author made a new offer that was $\notin 1,000.00$ lower than the previous offer. For example, if participants asked the author to make a concession because $\notin 250,000.00$ (i.e., the asking price of the house) was too high, the author made an offer of $\notin 249,000.00$.

After approximately 10 minutes of negotiation, participants were asked to make a final offer. This offer reflected the negotiation outcome. It was decided to not accept final offers that were lower than \notin 210,000.00 (i.e., 16% below the asking price) as this was the minimum asking price of the house. If participants made a final offer that was lower than the minimum asking price, they were told that their offer was rejected and that was no negotiation agreement, unless they agreed to accept the minimum asking price. If participants made a final offer that was higher than the minimum price, they were told that their final offer was accepted. After the negotiated outcome was written on a blank sheet, participants were thanked for their participation and the experiment ended.

Manipulation checks

To examine the effectiveness of the power prime and control prime task, participants completed a pre-measurement survey at the start of the experiment, and a post-measurement survey after the power prime. The purpose of the manipulation check was to examine whether priming the experience of having power increased an individual's sense of power, as it activates constructs and tendencies related to power and becomes a psychological property of an individual (Galinsky et al., 2003). Thus, individuals who experience power should perceive themselves as having more power after the power prime manipulation. In contrast, individuals who do not experience power should not perceive themselves as having more power after the control prime manipulation. To examine this, a Two-way Repeated-Measures ANOVA was performed. The independent variable was priming condition (control prime/ power prime) and the dependent variables were participants' sense of power before and after the priming manipulation. Table 1 shows the means of participants' sense of power before and after the priming manipulations. The results showed a significant interaction between participants' reported sense of power and priming condition, F (1, 99) = 35.99, p < .001, r = .27. This indicates that the difference in participants' sense of power before and after the priming manipulations differed in the control prime and power prime condition. To break down this interaction, pairwise comparisons were performed. Participants in the power prime condition perceived more power after the power prime (M = 6.09, SD = 1.04) than before the power prime (M = 5.71, SD = 1.06): F(1, 99) = 91.72, p < .001, r = .48. In contrast, participants who did the control prime perceived as much power after the control prime (M = 6.23, SD = 0.97) as before the control prime (M = 6.20, SD = 0.97): F(1, 99) = 0.88, p = .35. Thus, the power prime manipulation was effective.

Note, however, that before the priming manipulation, participants' sense of power in the power prime condition (M = 5.71, SD = 1.06) was lower than participants' sense of power

in the control prime condition (M = 6.20, SD = 0.97): F(1, 99) = 5.72, p < .05. The participants were randomly assigned to this study, the data file was checked for input errors, and there were no discrepancies in the data with regard to the date of participants' participation in this study. To examine if there were any outliers, an outlier analysis based on the *z*-scores of participants' reported sense of power before the priming manipulation was performed. According to the outlier analysis, there were seven participants (6.90%) with a *z*-score greater than 1.96, which suggests that there may be too many outliers in this study. One option was to omit these outliers from the study. However, the priming manipulation was effective (i.e., priming the experience of having power increased an individual's sense of power) and, therefore, it was decided not to delete these outliers from the study. Nevertheless, it is important to consider this difference in participants' sense of power before the experimental manipulations when interpreting the results of this study.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations for Participants' Sense of Power Before and After the Power Prime or Control Prime Task

	Control Pr	rime Task	Power Prime	Task
-	М	SD	M	SD
Before Manipulation	6.20 _b	0.97	5.71 _{ab}	1.06
After Manipulation	6.23	0.97	6.09 _a	1.04

Note. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly according to the simple effects test. $_{a}p < .001$. $_{b}p < .05$.

Results

Gender, Power, and First Offers

Table 2 shows the means of first offers by gender and priming condition. To test whether there was a difference in first offers between individuals who were primed with the experience of having power and individuals who did the control task (i.e., not primed to experience power), a two-way ANOVA was performed. In the ANOVA, gender and priming conditions were the independent variables. The height of first offers was the dependent variable.

The results show no main effect of gender: F(1, 97) = 3.27, p = .07, $\eta^2 = .03$. Women (M = 227,330.0, SD = 8,444.1) made similar first offers as men (M = 224,392.2, SD = 9,000.7). There was also no main effect of priming condition: F(1, 97) = 2.88, p = .09, $\eta^2 = .03$, indicating that the first offers of participants who did the control prime (M = 227,295.9, SD = 10,256.1) were similar to the first offers of participants who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 224,480.8, SD = 7,020.3).

However, there was an interaction between gender and priming condition: F(1, 97) = 4.05, p < .05, $\eta^2 = .04$. Simple effects tests show that men who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 224,653.9, SD = 7,376.6) made first offers that were similar to the first offers of men who did the control task (M = 224,120.0, SD = 10,580.3): F(1, 98) = .04, p = .85. However, women who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 224,307.7, SD = 6,786.9) made better first offers than women who did the control task (M = 230,604.2, SD = 6,786.9): F(1, 98) = 6.40, p < .05.

Table 2

Means and Standard Deviations for First Offers After the Power Prime or Control Prime Task, Separated by Gender

	Control Pr	ime Task	Power Pr	rime
	М	SD	M	SD
Men	224,120.0	10,580.3	224,653.9	7,376.6
Women	230,604.2 _a	6,786.9	224,307.7 _a	6,786.9

Note. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly according to the simple effects test.

 $_{a}p < .05.$

Gender, Power, and Negotiation Outcomes

Table 3 shows the means of negotiated outcomes by gender and priming condition. To test whether there was a difference in negotiation outcomes between individuals who were primed with the experience of having power and individuals who did the control task (i.e., not primed to experience power), a two-way ANOVA was performed. In the ANOVA, gender and priming conditions were the independent variables. The height of negotiated outcomes was the dependent variable.

The results show a main effect of gender: F(1, 97) = 7.86, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .07$. The negotiated outcomes of men were better (M = 232,058.8, SD = 8,216.2) than the negotiated outcomes of women (M = 236,020.0, SD = 7,399.0). There was also a main effect of condition: F(1, 97) = 8.21, p < .01, $\eta^2 = .07$. Participants who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 232,019.2, SD = 6,556.7) negotiated better outcomes than participants who did the control task (M = 236,142.9, SD = 8,935.5).

However, there was an interaction between gender and priming condition: F(1, 97) = 6.46, p < .05, $\eta^2 = .05$. Simple effects tests show that men who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 231,826.9, SD = 7,310.2) negotiated outcomes that were similar to the negotiation outcomes of men who did the control task (M = 232,300.0, SD = 9,211.6): F(1, 98) = .07, p = .80. However, women who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 232,211.5, SD = 5,846.6) negotiated better outcomes than women who did the control task (M = 240,145.8, SD = 6,731.6): F(1, 98) = 12.97, p < .001.

To examine whether the negotiated outcomes between men and women who were primed with the experience of having power differed less from each other, as compared to the negotiated outcomes of men and women who did the control task, a simple effects test was performed. Gender and priming conditions were the independent variables and the negotiation outcome was the dependent variable. The results show a difference in negotiated outcomes between men and women who did the control task: F(1, 98) = 12.64, p < .01. Women who did the control task (M = 240,145.8, SD = 6,731.6) negotiated worse outcomes than men who did the control task (M = 232,300.0, SD = 9,211.6). However, the results show no difference in negotiated outcomes between men and women who were primed with the experience of having power: F(1, 98) = .03, p = .86. Women who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 232,211.5, SD = 5,846.7) negotiated outcomes that did not differ in height from the negotiated outcomes by men who were primed with the experience of having power (M = 231,826.9, SD = 7,310.2).

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations for Negotiation Outcomes After the Power Prime or Control Prime, Separated by Gender

	Control I	Prime	Power Prime		
	М	SD	M	SD	
Men	232,300.0 _b	9,211.6	231,826.9	7,310.2	
Women	240,145.8 _{ab}	6,731.6	232,211.5 _a	5,846.6	

Note. Means sharing a common subscript differ significantly according to the simple effects test. $_{a}p < .01$. $_{b}p < .001$.

Discussion

This study examined whether the experience of having power influenced men's and women's negotiation behaviour, and whether the experience of having power affected the negotiation outcomes between men and women. To answer these questions, men's and women's first offers were examined as well as men's and women's negotiated outcomes. The results of the analyses show that women who were primed with the experience of having power made better first offers than did women who were not primed to experience power. In contrast, men were not affected by the power prime manipulation; Men who were primed to experience power made first offers that were similar to the first offers of men who were not primed to experience power, which confirms the first hypothesis.

Furthermore, women who were primed with the experience of having power also negotiated better outcomes than did women who were not primed to experience power. The negotiated outcomes of men were not affected by the power prime manipulation, as these men negotiated outcomes that were similar to the negotiated outcomes of men who were not primed to experience power. This confirms the second hypothesis.

In addition, women who were primed with the experience of having power negotiated outcomes that differed less from men's negotiated outcomes, as compared tot the difference in negotiation outcomes between men and women who were not primed to experience power, which confirms the third hypothesis.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

This study contributes to the literature on gender and negotiation and examined how men and women behave in a distributive bargaining situation when they are primed to experience power. Whereas many studies operationalized power by assigning a BATNA to participants (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994) or by using contextual or position based sources of power (for a review, see Lewicki et al., 2010), this study shows that the experience of having power can also become a psychological source of power of an individual (Galinsky et al., 2003). It was expected that women who were primed with the experience of having power would negotiate outcomes that differed less from men's negotiated outcomes. Interestingly, however, the results show that these women even negotiated outcomes that did not differ at all from men's negotiated outcomes. This highlights the dramatic effect of power on women's behaviour in negotiation, as it not only reduced the gender gap in negotiation outcomes (Bowles et al., 2005; Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999) but also diminished differences in negotiation outcomes between men and women.

The results of this study are in line with the notion that gender differences in negotiation behaviour are, in part, due to differences in social power between men and women. Small et al. (2007) argue that women might view the prospect of negotiating as a face-threatening act when negotiations are framed as 'negotiating' as opposed to 'asking'. According to Small et al. (2007), framing situations as 'negotiating' refers to situations in which individuals make demands from a powerful position, which is incongruent with women's relative low-power status in society (Eagly & Wood, 1982; Henley & LaFrance, 1984). Small et al. (2007) also argue that men are less intimidated by the prospect of negotiating when framed as 'negotiating', as this is more congruent with their high-power status in society. Small et al. (2007) showed that women, as compared to men, initiated fewer negotiations and felt more intimidated when negotiations were framed as opportunities to 'negotiate' than when negotiations were framed as opportunities to 'ask'. This intimidated feeling might, consequently, affect women's negotiation performance. The results of this study show that women who were not primed to experience power made worse first offers and negotiated worse outcomes as compared to men and women who were primed with experience power. Thus, it might be that the negotiation task in this study felt more intimidated to women who were not primed to experience power, as compared to women who were primed to experience power, which resulted in making worse offers for themselves. In contrast, when women experienced power, they negotiated more like men do. Thus, this study indirectly builds support for the notion that there are gender differences in social power by showing that power affects women's negotiation performance. Further support for the notion that differences in social power between men and women might affect how they negotiate can be derived from previous research on the effects of power and gender on negotiation behaviour and outcomes. Watson (1994) examined several studies and concluded that power, as opposed to gender, might be a better predictor of negotiation behaviour and outcomes.

Although this study contributes to the theory of gender differences in social power in relation to gender differences in negotiation behaviour and outcomes, research has yet to build support for this notion.

Second, this study contributes to the growing literature on power (e.g., Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). The author reasoned that the experience of having power, through priming power, leads an individual in a distributive bargaining situation to behave more in a manner that satisfies the individual's goals. Given that this behaviour is often reflected in the offers one makes, and that the goals in distributive bargaining situations often pertain to acquiring a product from the other party at the lowest price possible, it was reasoned that women who were primed with the experience of having power would make better first offers and to negotiate better outcomes in a distributive bargaining situation, in order to acquire a resource at the lowest price possible. However, the author expected men's negotiation behaviour not to be influenced when they primed with the experience of having power. The results of this study show that while men and women both perceived an increased sense of power after the power prime manipulation, only women's negotiation behaviour was affected by the power prime. There was, however, no difference in negotiated outcomes between men who experienced power and men who did not experience power. Thus, these results support the findings of previous studies that also reported no effect of power on men's behaviour (Magee et al., 2007; Small et al., 2007).

From a practical point of view, the results of this study suggest a focus on empowerment as an intervention to help women in negotiation. Women who are primed to experience power are more likely to negotiate better outcomes for themselves. According to Lewicki et al. (2010), it is important to be aware of power in negotiations. Thus, negotiation trainers should address issues of power to women to make women more aware of the role of power in negotiations.

Limitations and Future Research

The negotiation case consisted of a distributive bargaining situation in which participants had to negotiate with the author about the asking price of a house. This could have affected the negotiation outcomes, as most students in negotiation experiments usually negotiate with each other or with a confederate of the experiment, not with the author. Consequently, the knowledge that the participants had to negotiate with the author might have affected participants' feelings and behaviours, such as a heightend anxiety. However, the results of this study did not indicate such effects. Nevertheless, it is likely that some individuals in this experiment negotiated more differently than they would normally do. Future research should, therefore, examine if similar results are found when the negotiation dyad consists of only participating individuals (e.g., students).

Another limitation of this study concerns the dependent variables that were used to examine women's negotiation behaviour. This study only focused on the first offers and negotiated outcomes of individuals. There are, however, many more dependent variables that could be used to examine the effects of power on men's and women's negotiation behaviour, such as the height of subsequent offers, the amount and size of concessions, and also variables that pertain to the use of language, such as the the use of high or low-power language. As high-power individuals are more likely to act in ways that satisfy their goals (Galinsky et al., 2003) the experience of power may result in making smaller and also fewer concessions during negotiations. Furthermore, Brown and Levinson (1987) argue social power is related to the use of polite language: Individuals with a low-power status are more inclined to use polite speech than high-power individuals, such as making polite requests rather than demands. Consequently, the experience of power may affect the language of individuals in negotiations. For example, individuals who experience power may be more likely to use phrases such as 'Give me this' or 'I want this', whereas individuals who experience no or low power use phrases such as 'May I have this'. Therefore, future research should consider these additional variables to examine the effect of power on men's and women's behaviour in negotiations.

Furthermore, this study also only focussed on the behavioural aspect of the Approach / Inhibition Theory of power (Keltner et al., 2003) and did not examine the effects of power on men's and women's affect and cognition in negotiation. For example, the theory posits that increased power leads individuals to judge others' attitudes, interests, and positions less accurately. Consequently, priming the experience of power may lead women in negotiation to judge the other party's targets or goals less accurately, which may affect the negotiation. In addition, Keltner et al. (2003) also propose that increased power leads individuals to focus more on rewards and less on other individuals. High-power individuals are also likely to perceive others more from a self interest orientation and care less about the other. Although this study did not directly examine these consequences of power, the results of this study provide indirect support for these notions. While women who experienced power made better first offers and negotiated better outcomes, this primarily served their own interest. This suggests that women are less concerned about others when they experience power. Consequently, the effect of power on women may change the current views about women in negotiation. For example, whereas research showed that women tend to frame conflicts in terms of relationship characteristics (Pinkley, 1990), the experience of power may lead women to perceive and interpret conflicts in terms of task characteristics. Consequently, this could lead women to act less cooperatively and more competitively in negotiations. In addition, the experience of power could change the view that women tend to be more insecure than men in determining their worth when negotiating their salary (Barron, 2003). Wojciszke and Struzynska-Kujalowicz (2007) showed that participants who were primed with high power scored higher on self-esteem than participants who were primed with low power. As a consequence, the experience of power could, thus, lead women to reap better salary

negotiation outcomes. Therefore, future research should test more predictions of the Approach / Inhibition Theory of power to get more insight in the effects of power on women's negotiation behaviour.

The focus of this study was on the effects of increased power in negotiation behaviour. However, this study did not examine whether and how reduced power affects men's and women's negotiation performance. As reduced power is posited to activate the behavioural inhibition system (Keltner et al., 2003), which leads to repressed and avoidance behaviour, this may affect the height of offers and negotiation outcomes of individuals. For example, individuals who are primed to experience low power may be more inclined to make worse offers than control or high power individuals, as these individuals are more likely to avoid actions that may lead to punishments by others (Keltner et al., 2003). Therefore, future studies should also examine the effects of low power on negotiation behaviour.

Conclusion

This study broadens the literature on gender and negotiation by integrating literature on power and focusing on the effects of power on men's and women's negotiation behaviour. This study shows that the experience of having power benefits women, such that women who are primed with the experience of having power are more likely to negotiate better first offers and outcomes for themselves. Men, in contrast, are not likely to be affected by the experience of having power. While women tend to negotiate worse negotiation outcomes than men, this study shows that this gender gap can be reduced or even overcome by influencing women's perceptions of power. The differential effects of power on men's and women's negotiation behaviour suggest a gender difference in social power between men and women, and opens up a new way of studying gender and negotiation.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Power Prime Task

Beste student,

Om te zorgen dat iedere deelnemer aan dit onderzoek in dezelfde gemoedstoestand wordt gebracht zou ik je willen vragen om de volgende taak uit te voeren.

Je krijgt 5 minuten voor deze taak.

Succes!

Opdracht:

Schrijf een gebeurtenis op waarin jij macht had over iemand anders of anderen. Met macht bedoel ik een situatie waarin jij controle over en invloed had op anderen. Beschrijf wat er gebeurde in deze gebeurtenis waarin jij macht had, hoe jij je voelde enzovoorts. Probeer om hierover zoveel mogelijk op te schrijven.

Appendix B

Control Prime Task

Beste student,

Om te zorgen dat iedere deelnemer aan dit onderzoek in dezelfde gemoedstoestand wordt gebracht zou ik je willen vragen om de volgende taak uit te voeren.

Je krijgt 5 minuten voor deze taak.

Succes!

Opdracht:

Beschrijf hoe jij meestal je avonden spendeert. Begin met het beschrijven van activiteiten en denk daarna over hoeveel tijd je aan elke activiteit besteedt. Voorbeelden van activiteiten die je kunt beschrijven zijn dineren, studeren voor een bepaald examen, met vrienden omgaan, tv kijken enzovoorts. Probeer om hierover zoveel mogelijk op te schrijven.

Appendix C

Sense of Power Survey: Pre-measurement

Beste student,

Bedankt voor je deelname aan dit onderzoek.

Het doel van dit experiment is om inzicht te krijgen in beslissingspatronen van mensen. Om hier inzicht in te krijgen ga je straks een onderhandeling doen.

Voordat het experiment begint zou ik je willen vragen om de onderstaande vragenlijst in te vullen.

Nadat je de vragenlijst hebt ingevuld krijg je van mij verdere instructies over het verloop van het experiment.

Wat is je leeftijd?

Ik ben jaar

Wat is je geslacht? (kruis het antwoord aan dat van toepassing is)

Man		Vrouw	
-----	--	-------	--

Hieronder volgen 7 kenmerken. Geef aan in hoeverre deze kenmerken van toepassing zijn op jou. Ook hier geldt dat het gaat om hoe jij jezelf kenmerkt. Je kunt de vragen dus niet fout beantwoorden.

"In hoeverre vind jij jezelf ..."

1)	Onderdan	Onderdanig							Dominant
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2)	Passief								Actief
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

3)	Volgzaam								Assertief
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4)	Verlegen								Mondig
	Ο	0	0	0	0	0	Ο	0	0
5)	Besluitloos	6						В	esluitvast
	Ο	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6)	Onzeker								Zeker
	Ο	0	0	0	0	0	Ο	0	0
7)	Afhankelij	k						Onaf	fhankelijk
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Appendix D

Sense of Power Survey: Between-measurement

Hieronder volgen 7 kenmerken. Geef aan in hoeverre deze kenmerken van toepassing zijn op jou. Ook hier geldt dat het gaat om hoe jij jezelf kenmerkt. Je kunt de vragen dus niet fout beantwoorden.

"In hoeverre vind jij jezelf ..."

1.	Passief								Actief
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2.	Verlegen								Mondig
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3.	Onzeker								Zeker
	0	0	Ο	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.	Onderdani	g						I	Dominant
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5.	Volgzaam								Assertief
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6.	Besluitloos	5						В	esluitvast
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7.	Afhankelij	k						Onaf	hankelijk
	0	0	0	Ο	0	0	0	0	0

Als je de vragenlijst helemaal hebt ingevuld kun je deze bij mij inleveren.

Appendix E

Negotiation Case - Participant Briefing

Beste student,

Je gaat dadelijk onderhandelen met een tegenspeler over de prijs van een koophuis. Het huis waar je over gaat onderhandelen is het perfecte huis. Je wilt dit huis dus heel graag hebben!

De huidige vraagprijs van het huis is echter € 250.000,-. Dat vind jij echt te veel! Je zult dus moeten onderhandelen met de koper over een bedrag dat jij beter vindt en de koper moeten overtuigen waarom jij dit bedrag beter vindt.


Om je te helpen met het bepalen van een bedrag staat hieronder wat informatie. Deze informatie kun je gebruiken om de koper te overtuigen van jouw beslissing.

Je hebt ongeveer 5 minuten om je voor te bereiden voor de onderhandeling. Daarna zal de onderhandeling van start gaan. De onderhandeling zelf duurt ongeveer 10 minuten.

Succes!

INFORMATIE

- Het huis dat je gaat kopen is een twee-onder-één-kap-woning
- De afgelopen jaren (2009-2011) zijn een aantal huizen in dezelfde buurt verkocht. ٠ Onderstaand figuur geeft weer voor welke prijzen deze huizen zijn verkocht:



Verkoopprijs in euro's

- Door **deflatie** zijn huizen minder waard geworden. De **waardeafname verschilt per huis**, maar ligt tussen de **2% en 8%**.
- Het huis heeft alles wat jij wilt
- Je wilt misschien nog gaan verbouwen (bijvoorbeeld de tuin, badkamer of keuken)
- Je vindt de buurt leuk

Nu je bovenstaande informatie hebt gelezen zou ik je willen vragen om hieronder op te schrijven wat **jouw bod** zal zijn, waar je dadelijk over gaat onderhandelen.

Mijn bod is:

Appendix F

Negotiation Case –Counterarguments for the Seller of the House

Argument Participant	Er zijn een aantal huizen die voor minder dan €250.000,- zijn verkocht
Tegenargument experimentleider	Er zit een verschil in typen huizen, rijtjeshuis versus twee- onder-één-kap woningen en daarmee ook een groot verschil in oppervlakte van de huizen (zowel perceel- als woonoppervlakte)
	Én ik ken de verkopers van een paar huizen die voor minder dan €250.000,- zijn verkocht. Die moesten hals over kop weg uit hun huis en hebben het tegen een 'bodemprijs' verkocht.
Argument Participant	Door deflatie zijn huizen minder waard geworden
Tegenargument experimentleider	Daar is rekening mee gehouden met het vaststellen van de verkooopprijs. De originele verkoopprijs lag dan ook op € 263.000,- en daar is ca. 5% vanaf gehaald om te corrigeren voor de deflatie.
	Bovendien is wel zo dat we onlangs alle originele kozijnen, die van hout waren, hebben vervangen door kunststof kozijnen. Die waren ook duur, maar zijn wel duurzaam, rotten niet en der is geen onderhoud nodig. Dat maakt het huis natuurlijk wel een stuk meer waard
Argument Participant	Het huis heeft alles dat de participant zoekt in een huis
Tegenargument experimentleider	Er hoeft als ik je zo hoor niet veel aan het huis veranderd te worden. Je kunt er dus meteen intrekken. Beter kan toch niet?
Argument Participant	De participant wil misschien nog gaan verbouwen en dat brengt ook de nodige kosten met zich mee
Tegenargument experimentleider	Oh, wat zou je dan willen verbouwen? Maar ik snap dat je op z'n tijd iets wilt veranderen aan het huis om het nog meer naar je smaak te maken. Het is wel zo dat het huis nu al genoeg ruimte biedt en de onderdelen in het huis zijn in prima staat
Argument Participant	De participant vindt de buurt leuk
Tegenargument experimentleider	Het is ook een hele leuke en fijne buurt. Daar betaal je natuurlijk ook voor. Het is niet alleen het huis wat in de verkoopprijs zit verwerkt. Je krijgt 'the whole package'